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ABSTRACT
Sir James Fergusson was appointed Governor of Bombay 
by Disraeli's Government in March 1880. In May Gladstone 
despatched Lord Ripon as Viceroy to inaugurate a liberal 
Indian policy. The Liberals favoured a pacific frontier 
policy, whereas Fergusson, a Tory expansionist and a Russo­
phobe, manoeuvred to force changes in their proposed Afghan 
settlement. Seeking the security of the Indian possessions 
and holding an anomalous jurisdiction over the British 
connections in the Red Sea area, Fergusson laboured for a 
policy of extending Britain's influence and consolidating 
her strategic position on the route to India. His assiduity 
for interference was also reflected in his supervision of 
British relations with the native states of Bombay. Again, 
he was opposed to the views of the liberal Viceroy over the 
reduction and centralisation of the Indian armies.
In internal administration Fergusson disapproved of 
Ripon's liberal policy of fostering the aspirations of the 
educated Indians. He disliked Ripon's concern for admitting 
Indians to the Indian Civil Service and resisted Ripon's 
scheme for extending local self-government. He was in favour 
of maintaining the racial character of the Indian administra­
tion. He was opposed to the introduction of the controversial
3Ilbert Bill* though he was largely responsible for the 
compromise formula which was ultimately accepted by Ripon 
and his adversaries. A paternalist in social and economic 
affairs, he was an enthusiast for factory legislation and 
he shared Ripon1s anxiety to undertake public works in a 
famine-threatened country. Again, when Ripon, consistent 
with laissez-faire principle, advocated low taxes and the 
moderation of the government demand on land, Fergusson 
called for increased taxation and the enchancement of the 
land assessment. Unconcerned about the reactions of the 
people, Fergusson represented in India the authoritarian 
Tory paternalism which sought to promote the welfare of 
the subject r a c e ^ a b o v e .
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7INTBQDPCTION
Sir James Fergusson belonged to the famous and old 
Kilkerran family of Ayrshire, Scotland, which had owned and 
lived in the same place for 400 years. The family, most 
distinguished among all bearers of the historic name of 
Fergusson, produced generations of able administrators and 
brave soldiers. Sir James was born on 14th March,1832 
at Edinburgh. He was the eldest of the four sons of Sir 
Charles Fergusson, (1800-1849) 5th Baronet of Kilkerran.
His mother, Helen, was daughter of David Boyle, the then 
Lord Justice General.
r
In August, 1845 Fergusson entered Rugby - that school 
which produced such a long list of successful administrators 
of the British empire. At Rugby Fergusson*s fellow students 
were George Joachim (afterwards lord) Goschen, Sir John 
Stuart, who served with him in the Crimea, and Sir Theodore 
Hope, a member of the Supreme Government in India in the 
early 1880*s. At school Fergusson gained some reputation in 
the debating club and in 1850 he proceeded to University 
College, Oxford, having in the previous year succeeded his 
father to the baronetcy. He had an inclination towards a 
military career and so he soon left his college without a
(l) Sir James Fergusson of Kilkerran, Bart., The Fergussons - 
their lowland and highland branches, 1956, p.23,
8degree to join the Grenadier Guards. With the 3rd battalion 
of that regiment he served in the Crimean Y/ar of 1854-55•
In the battle of Alma he was wounded at Inkeiman on 5th
November, 1854* Several of his brother officers were killed 
in that battle, including his friend and neighbour in 
Scotland, Col. J .H. Blair. At Blair's suggestion, before 
his expiry, the elector s of Ayrshire chose Fergusson to 
tame Blair* s place in the House of Commons as a Conservative 
member. He remained with the forces until May, 1855 when 
he returned to England to enter upon his Parliamentaiy duties.
On his return home he received a medal from Queen Victoria 
as a recognition of his military services and he retired
from the army on 9th August, 1859*^ This was rather an early
end to a promising military career but the beginning of a long 
and active life of a Tory Parliamentarian and administrator.
In August, 1859 he was married to Lady Edith Christian, the 
younger daughter of the First Marquis of Dalhousie and the 
first of his four wives. Fergusson had a great reverence for 
Dalhousie and he always entertained the highest opinion about 
Dalhousie's work in India. As a young Tory in Parliament he 
admired and shared muc^ of what Disraeli did or professed to do*
(l) "Sir James Fergusson", W.W. Lee-Warner, Dictionary of 
National Biography, 2nd Supplement, vol. 2. p*19„
9In 1857 Fergusson lost his seat in Ayrshire, but he
recovered it in 1859* Meanwhile he extensively toured Syria,
Palestine and Egypt. In 1861 he visited Canada and the
United States and had at close quarters a glimpse of both
the Federal and the Confederate Governments and axmies
in the opening stages of the American Civil war.^ His
interest in the British Indian empire was first aroused when
he served an apprenticeship to Indian affairs as Under -
Secretary of State to Lord Cranborne in the Derby Government
of 1866. A year later in a similar capacity he assisted
Gathmrne Hardy (afterwards Lord Cranbrook) at the Home Office#
When Disraeli succeeded Lord Derby as Prime Minister in 1868
Pergusson was made a Privy Councillor# In the following
year he was appointed Governor of South Australia. Prom 1869
to 1885 Fergussons career was identified with the overseas
empire, except during the years 1875-80. In South Australia
Pergusson's Government was efficient without being eventful.
In 1873 he served as the Governor of NewZealand and resigned
his post in 1875 when in England the Tories under Disraeli
returned to office# Back in England Pergusson*s attempt to
resume his Parliamentaiy activities proved abortive. His
efforts to capture Prome in 1876 and Greenock in 1878 were 
both unsuccessful. On 10th March» 1880 on the eve of
(1) The account of Pergusson*s life in D#N.B# did not mention 
his travels in Asia and America. The information was 
volunterred by Sir J. Pergusson of Kilkerran, Bart, 
grandson of Pergusson.
to
Beaconsfield*s fall from power, Fergusson accepted the offer 
of the post of the Governor of Bombay in succession to 
Sir Richard Temple. From April, 1880 to March, 1885 
Fergusson served as the Tory Governor of Bombay under a 
Liberal administration at home and in India.
With the fall of the Liberal cabinet of Gladstone in 
June, I8b5, the Tories under the leadership of Lord Salisbury 
returned to power. When Fergusson came back to England from 
Bombay he was elected one of the Tory representatives for 
Manchester and held his seat until January, 1906. Under 
Salisbury Fergusson served from 1886 to 1891 as Under 
Secretary at the Foreign Office. In 1891 he was appointed 
Post-Master General, retaining the office until Gladstone*s 
return to power in August, 1892. He did not take office 
again and became involved in business activities in the 
capacity of Director of the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 
the Rational Telephone Company and similar concerns.^
Fergusson, tall, handsome and extremely robust, had 
chaxm and affability of manner. Although fond of society in 
London he was very much a countryman at heart and deeply 
attached to his Scottish home and estate. Fergusson was not 
intellectually distinguished and had no creative imagination. 
He had little interest in literature or the arts and was
(1) D. H. B. p.20 .
thoroughly extrovert by nature. But his mind was quick, his 
interest in practical matters wide and his judgement of people 
and affairs generally shrewd. Though not brilliant he was 
active and conscientious. He was a devout Disraelian in 
politics and an active member of the Church of Scotland.
Two important virtues in Fergusson1s character were his 
public spirit and indefatigable energy. At work he was 
tireless and efficient without being really inspiring. Fond 
of riding Fergusson covered long distances while he was in 
Australia and in India. He abhorred the lack of stamina of 
the British civilians in the colonies. His energy, cheer­
fulness and zest for life never flagged and as one of his 
friends remarked after his death; "It took an earthquake to 
kill him".1 In January, 1907 Fergusson went to Jamaica to 
attend the conference of the British Cotton growing Association 
as the representative of the Royal Mail Steam jacket Company . 
On 14th January Kingston was overtaken by a terrible earth­
quake and Fergusson, strolling near his hotel, was killed 
by the fall of a wall.
Fergusson's tenure of office as the Governor of Bombay, 
1880-85, was the most distinctive phase of his administrative
(1) This brief character sketch is drawn in part from the
impressions that Sir J. Fergusson of Killkerran, Bart., 
has formed about his grandfather. His impressions, 
chiefly based upon what he heard from his elders, confirm 
my own impression based on research.
career. All the governmental posts he held in England were 
only secondary, allowing limited independent power and 
discretion. Colonial Governorship in Australia and New— 
Zealand was smooth and these countries were generally peaceful, 
developing and prosperous . There "the working of the 
responsible government made small demand on the Governor.11 ^
But such was not the case with the Indian territories, the 
grand base of British power in the East. The Indian empire 
was of great political and economic value and throughout 
the nineteenth century there was the symbiosis between 
Britain's investment in Asia and her power and authority in 
India. British territories in India were vast in extent and 
various in population and physical! aspects. The rainfall in 
the subcontinent was uncertain and crop failures frequent.
The defence of India often necessitated the expansion of the 
empire and the increase of imperial liabilities. In fact war 
and famine were two eventualities to be met by the British in 
India . Still,the countiy generally yielded substantial revenue 
and supported an efficient but decentralised aimy. The 
administrative structure of India evolved in^course of more 
than a century of British rule. It became complex with the 
growth of a self-conscious bureaucracy, innumlerable 
institutions and a multiplicity of departments. The Government
(1) D. N. B. p.19.
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of India was despotic yet responsible to the English 
Parliament. It was highly centralised yet afforded sufficient 
initiative and jurisdiction to the local authorities. The 
development of trade, the improvement of communications and 
the spread of education during the British rule were under­
mining traditional Indian society. With this modernisation 
were emerging western educated Indians, the natural leaders 
of future India. The problems and policies of the Indian 
administration invariably engrossed those who were in charge 
of governing the country, from the district officer to the 
local governor, from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State 
for India.
The office of a Presidency Governor in India not only 
made heavy demand on a person's ability, it was also very 
significant, only second in importance to the position of the 
Viceroy. The Governments of Bombay and Madras occupied a 
position different from and superior to that of the other 
local governments. The Presidency Governor, like the Viceroy^ 
was appointed by the Crown for a term of 5 years. He had a 
Council consisting of two members of the Indian Civil Service 
of 12 years standing. Like the Viceroy, the Presidency 
Governors possessed the privilege of communicating directly 
with the Secretary of State and enjoyed the power of overruling 
their Councils in case of emergency. The Presidency Governments
14
had their separate military establishments and the Commanders
in Chief of Madras and Bombay might be appointed, and in fact
were always appointed, extraordinary members of the Governor1s
Councils until these offices were abolished in 1893* For
legislative purposes in the Presidency the executive government
was expanded into a Legislative Council consisting of the
Governor, the members of his Council, the Advocate General and
certain additional members nominated by the Government •
According to the Indian Councils Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vie.C.27)
the additional members should not be less than 8 in number nor
more than 20, half of them should be non-officials, and all
were nominated for a teim of 2 years. The Governor was the
President of the Legislative Council and had the casting vote
when the Council was equally divided.^ Like all other
local governments the Presidency Governments in theoiy were
subservient to the authority of the Supreme Government and
subject to its strict control. But the Lieutenant-Governors
had no executive Council and were appointed by the Governor
General with the approval of the Crown from among the members 
tu
ofy^Indian Civil Service for a period of 5 years. They neither 
possessed the position nor the powers of the Presidency 
Governor. Prom this point of view Mthe control of the Government
(1) Sir C . Ilbert, The Government of India, 1907» pp.213-214.
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of India over the Governments of Madras and Bombay was less 
complete than over the other local g o v e r n m e n t s . N o t  only 
within their territorial extent but also outside these limits 
the Presidency Governors, as the high priests of British 
administration in India, could and did play important roles.
The territories under the Presidency Government of Bombay 
were large in area and diverse in population. The Presidency 
was bounded in the North West and North East by Baluchistan,the 
Punjab, the Native states of Rajputana, on the East and South 
East by Baroda, the Central Provinces, West Berar and the 
Nizam’s dominions, by Madras and Mysore on the South and on 
the West by the Arabian Sea. The total area of Bombay 
Presidency was 191*605 square miles, of which the British 
districts contained 124,182 square miles and 67,623 were 
under the native chiefs. In 1881 the total population of the 
Presidency, including the strategically situated British
2
settlement of Aden on the Red sea coast, was 23,430,523*
The Presidency was divided into four broad provinces or 
speech divisions, namely, Sind, Gujarat, Maratha country of 
Konkan and the Deccan and Karnatak. Sindhi, Gujarati, Marathi 
and'Kanarese were the predominant languages.
Pot the sake of convenience the business of the Government
of Bombay was divided into departments, of which the Political,
IT) Sir C. Ilbert, the Government of India, 1907, p.11$.
(2) Bombay Administration Report, lU8r2-83, p»l.
the Judicial, the Educational, the Revenue, the Public Works 
and the Military and Marine were especially important . Y/ith a 
view to diminishing the pressure of business the Cabinet 
portfolio system was introduced in the discharge of the executive 
and judicial functions of the government. The Governor as a 
rule disposed the business of the Military and Marine 
department and of matters connected with the Public Works 
department. The Revenue, Judicial and Political business was 
entrusted to the civil members of the Council. Questions which 
presented no special difficulty were finally disposed of by the 
member in charge of the department in which they occurred; on 
others the additional opinion of the Governor was sought and 
such as were of peculiar difficulty or importance were settled 
either according to the balance of opinion as recorded by the 
different members or after discussion at a Council meeting. All 
papers connected with the public business reached the Government 
of Bombay through the Secretariat where they were properly 
arranged and submitted to the member in charge of the department 
to which they belonged together with all available materials 
for coming to a decision with the recorded opinion of the
1
Secretary and Under-Secretary of the department in question.
The central administration was thus under the collective 
responsibility of the Governor in Council assisted by the
(1) Bombay Administration Report, 1882-83, p.20*
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Secretariat. However, the Governor always stood in. a 
different category from his colleagues .He was not only the 
motive power hwt the formal head of the government. It 
largely depended upon the individual character of the Governor 
whether his Government was efficient or feeble.
The British considered the Indian empire as a national 
asset and the general trend of opinion in England throughout 
the nineteenth century regarded the administration of India 
as beyond the arena of English party politics. This attitude 
was often confirmed in relation to the appointment of high 
officials in India. Disraeli, however, deliberately set 
aside this ndtion and the appointment of Lord Mayoun 1668 
as the Viceroy of India was in reality a party decision.
When Gladstone formed his first Liberal administration in 
December, 1868 he did not cancel the appointment of Mayo 
apparently regarding India as not a party affair. On their re­
turn to power in 1874 the Conservatives hardly reciprocated the 
gesture. Lord Northbiook - an appointee of the Gladstone 
cabinet - felt compelled to resign in April, 1876 following 
differences of opinion with the Tory cabinet on questions of 
tariff and foreign policy. The subsequent Toiy choice fell 
upon Lord Lytton, "the avowed agent of Disraeli and Salisbury. 
Thus Indian affairs were clearly brought within the range of
(1) V.Smith, The Oxford History of India, part III, revised 
by P. Spear, 1956, p.687.
s12
English party politics* The Tories and the Liberals had 
developed widely different conceptions of Indian policy and 
the higher appointments were shuffled accordingly* The Duke 
of Buckingham and Chandos, a loyal Conservative, was appointed 
by the Tories as Governor of Madras in November, 1875* Ihe 
appointment of Pergusson in Bombay was similarly a political 
act of Disraeli's cabinet before their final exit in April, 
1880. When Gladstone succeeded Disraeli as Premier and Lord 
Hartington replaced Lord Cranbrook as the Secretary of State 
the Liberal Government first sent the Marquis of Ripon as 
their representative Viceroy in June, 1880, followed by 
M. E. Grant Duff as the liberal Governor of Madras in 
November, 1881. In this making and unmaking of the party- 
dominated appointments Pergusson arrived in Bombay on 28th 
April., i860 to act subsequently as a Conservative watchman 
over a Liberal regime in India.
In Bombay Fergusson was not accepting office under the 
Liberals for the first time . During the tenure of Colonial
or
Governship in Australia he had already served a Liberal
A
cabinet at home. He personally knew Hartington and Lord 
Kimberley, who succeeded Hartington in December, 1882, and 
was familiar with their modus operandi f He, however, was a 
little uncertain about Ripon,^ whom he had had no occasion to
(1) Pergusson to Cranbrook, 1st May, 1880. C.C.
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know closely* The real concern of Pergusson, as events soon 
bore out, was not the dealings with the home authorities but 
his connection with the apostle of Liberalism in India. The 
relationship of a Tory Presidency Governor with a Liberal 
Viceroy was also likely to influence the relations between 
the Presidency and th© Supreme Governments. Besides, a 
local governor in India always inherited a strong local 
attachment to his Government and watched with distrust every 
move of the Supreme Government, for fear of a calculated 
encroachment on his rights and domain. Being appointed a 
Presidency Governor under a Liberal administration Pergusson 
had slender chance of overcoming this local antipathy 
towards the centre. To add to Pergusson*s susceptibility, 
Temple, his predecessor, wrote to him of f,the great fear" of 
encroachment by the Government of India. ^
In his own sphere in Bombay Pergusson was more fortunate. 
He inherited a docile Council, composed of civilians like 
R. Ashburner, W. Ravenscroft and their successors, J.B. Peile, 
C. Gonne and M. Helvill. All of them, and the local Commander 
in Chief, first General H. Warre, and later General A. 
Hardinge, were usually only too eager to support the Governor. 
With regard to the Council Temple*s advice to Pergusson was
(1) Temple to Pergusson, 6th May, i860. P.C
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golden. "With Council it is important not to rely on one 
colleague more than another,” he cautioned Fergusson,
"sometime agreeing with one and differing with another, getting 
support some-time from one and some-time from the other - 
preserving an even balance."’*' The task of the Governor might 
not always be so easy in relation to the Bombay Legislative 
Council, where representatives of the educated Indians could 
be assertive on occasions. On the whole, however, Fergusson 
was not likely to face much trouble in lawmaking as the 
Council contained either official members or members nominated 
by the government.
By the time Fergusson came to Bombay at the age of 48 he 
had amassed considerable experience of mankind in peace and 
war, of many countries and races and of administration - 
both legislative and executive. But Fergusson's experience 
of Indian affairs was meagre though he had always had an 
interest in India. The popular reaction to Fergusso’ns 
appointment in Bombay was one of relative unconcern. Disraeli1s 
Government in England, Lord Lytton in India and Temple in 
Bombay were thoroughly unpopular. The Tories' administration 
in India was characterised by imperialist war, repressive 
measures, dwindling finance and devastating famine. So the
(1} Temple to Fergusson, 22nd April, 1880. F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 22nd May, 1880 . C.5.
I t
Liberal victory of 1880 delighted the Indians and the
appointment of Ripon led to high expectations• In the
excitement of a lory defeat, Lytton1s resignation and the
selection of a new Viceroy, the recently appointed Governor
of Bombay was hardly noticed* The maratha newspaper
Arunoaaya was unimpressed by the selection of Fergusson and
considered his appointment "astonishing1 in view of his scant
1experience of Indian affairs. But the very fact that Fergusson
was "a safe Scotch" and "an outsider" and not an Indian
civilian like Temple pleased the Indian Spectator. But noticing
Fergusson as a Conservative of "the good old stamp", the organ
prophesied his difference of views with the Liberal regime.
"Sir James is*, not likely to agree with the Government of India
as well as t.he India Office as a matter of course hut more
2
likely to speak out when there is need ...." To the liberals 
in 1880 the initial task was to settle British affairs in 
Afghanistan and the attention of all, including Fergusson, was 
concentrated on the North West frontier of India.
-  o -
(1) Arunodaya, 9th March, 1880. Bombay Native Newspaper 
Report, 1880*
(2) Indian Spectator, 9th May, I8o0. Bombay Native Newspaper 
Report.
CHAPTER - I 
Afghanistan and the Army*
The Russian expansion in Central Asia and the security 
of the North West frontier of India guided the British 
attitude towards Afghanistan throughout the nineteenth century* 
The period 1880-85 witnessed the stabilisation of the relations 
between England and Afghanistan and the settlement of some 
of the intricate problems confronting them* Most of the 
complicated issues of Anglo-Afghan relations in 1880, however, 
developed during the preceding years.
The liberal sponsored North-West frontier policy of the 
Government of India between 1868 and 1874 sought a clear 
understanding with Russia with regard to the independence 
of Afghanistan, non-interference in Afghan affairs and the 
maintenance of British moral influence over Afghanistan. The 
policy was rudely reversed in 1874 when Disraeli felt that the 
Gladstone cabinet on the whole lowered British influence in 
Central Asia by acquiescing easily in the Russian expansion 
and that British inaction in Afghan affairs must be replaced 
by vigorous action# The policy formulated by the Disraeiians 
aimed at commanding the British position on the Afghan 
frontier and the acceptance of a British agent by the Afghan 
Amir in his territories. In return they were willing to 
assure the Amir that the British would protect him against
Z3/
future Russian invasions• When the Disraelian Viceroy Lord 
Lytton was pressing Amir Sher Ali with the British proposals, 
General Kaufmann, the governor General of Russian Turkestan 
adopted a similar attitude towards the Amir. In 1878 
Kaufmann sent his agent Stolietoff to Kabul with proposals 
for a stronger tie between Russia and Afghanistan and with 
assurances of Russian assistance against^external enemy.
When Sher Ali reluctantly received Stolietoff at Kabul in 
July, 1878 Lytton insisted on the Amir's reception of a 
British mission at Kabul in August, 1878. Sher Ali, probably 
on the advice of Stolietoff, disregarded Lytton*s insistence 
and the progress of the British mission under N. Chamberlain 
was opposed by the Afghans near Ali Mas;)id# The incident 
resulted in the outbreak of the Second Afghan War and the 
British army marched towards Kabul through ll&urram and Khyber. 
Sher Ali fled and died in Russian Turkestan in May,1879•
Before the victorious British troops could reach Kabul, 
negotiations commenced between Yakub, the eldest son of $her 
Ali,and the British and Yakub was set up as Amir. On 2bth 
May, 1879 Yakub signed The Treaty of Gandamak with the British.
By this agreement the new Amir assigned the districts of iJfurram, 
Pishin and Sibi to the British Government, agreed to conduct 
his foreign relations with the advice of the Government of India 
and consented to the stationing of a permanent British Resident 
at Kabul# In return the Government of India promised the Amir
1 4
an annual subsidy of Rs, 6 l$khs and a conditional guarantee 
of support against foreign a g g r e s s i o n T h u s  every object 
of a Tory North vYest frontier policy seemed to have been 
secured and the Treaty of Gandamak was regarded as the high 
watermark of a British forward policy.
In July, 1879 Major Cavagnarin, nominated as the British 
agent in Afghanistan, reached Kabul. On 3rd September, 1879 
the agent and his party were murdered in the course of a mutiny 
of the unpaid Herati troops at Kabul. The massacre aroused 
wide indignation in England and in India and led to the 
renewal of hostilities. The army of General Roberts marched 
towards Kabul through "Eurram and General Stewart's army 
proceeded towards Kandahar and occupied the place. Kabul fell 
to Roberts on 7th October and on 28th October, 1879 Yakub . 
was forced to abdicate under British pressure. lytton, in the 
meantime, felt that a disintegrated Afghanistan would be more 
convenient for the British to control than a united Afghanistan 
under one ruler. His Government considered the treaty of 
Gandemak as abrogated and proposed a provisional transfer of 
Herat to Persia in return for Persian support against Russia 
in Central Asia, and the establishment of an independent
kingdom at Kandahar under an hereditary ruler from one of the
r /
(l) C.U. Aitchison, ed. A Collection of Treaties, Engagements 
and Sanads., vol XI, p.344.
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old Afghan governing families. They advocated a similar
A
arrangement with regard to Kabul* The home authorities
accepted the scheme and left the implementation of the plan
to the discretion of the Government of India*
Lytton caused the British Foreign Office to open
negotiations with Persia concerning a provisional transfer
of Herat through R* Thomson, the British ambassador in
Tehran. The negotiations reached a deadlock when the Shah
of Persia refused to accept a provisional occupation of Herat
2
terminable unilaterally by the British* As regards Kabul 
the majority of Lytton's Council made Yakub's abdication 
,firrevocable" for his complicity in the massacre of Cavagnari 
and his party* The claims of Ayub, the younger brother of 
Yakub and Musa Jan, Yakub's son, were quietly disregarded 
and the throne of Kabul was offered to Abdur Rahaman, the 
nephew and defeated rival of the late Amir Sher Ali. For 
eleven years Abdur Rahaman was a fugitive in Russian Turkestan, 
depending upon a Russian pension* During the turmoil of 
the Second Afghan War he carefully watched the events and 
following Yakub's abdication he set out for Afghanistan, 
seeing his chance. Lytton was anxious to withdraw Britishtrocp
(1) S* Gopal, The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon,1955. p*8,
(2) Desp.S.of S. to Govt, of I. Seo.no.23, 21st May,1880.
Pol. 8c Sec.Letters from I.
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from North Afghanistan as soon as possible*1, and he did not 
consider the question of the Amirship of Kabul as very vital.
In the opinion of the Government of India the British interests
p
had been secured without dependence upon the Amir*s friendship.
The Viceroy took up Abdur Rahman as a candidate at hand and
started negotiations with him. As regards Kandahar Lytton
instructed Stewart, the Officer commanding the British troops
there, to start negotiations with the Afghan Governor of the
province, Wali Sher Ali, for the establishment of a separate
Kingdom. Wali Sher Ali was a cousin of the late Amir Sher
Ali and was nearly 46 years old. Luring the political
confusion following the massacre of Cavagnari he cooperated
with Stewart as a result of which South Afghanistan remained
tranquil when North Afghanistan was stormy. On 22nd December,
1879, Lytton telegraphed the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook,
hinting for the first time at separating Kandahar from Kabul.
On 3rd January, 1880 the Viceroy further informed Cranbrook
that in view of the unsettled condition at Kabul it was necessary
to give the Y/ali an assurance that if he behaved well Kandahar
3would be placed under his hereditary government. Meanwhile
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. No.3, 7th Jan. 1880.
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Secy. Por. Dept. Govt, of I. to L. Griffin, Br.Agent,Kabul, 
20th May, 1880. Encl. to Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. 
no. 139, 22nd June, 1880. Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(3) Note on the recognition of Sher Ali, O.T. Burne, 27th 
April, 1880. Pol. & Sec. Dept. Memo. no. 32.
in february, 1880 Stewart reported the outcome of his negotiations 
with the Wali. He gave a vague idea of the boundaries of the 
proposed Kingdom of Kandahar under British protection and 
indicated that the Wali agreed to conduct his affairs at 
Kandahar with the help of a British Resident and that he 
welcomed the proposal of stationing a permanent British 
garrison at Kandahar. In February, 1880 the Wali conveyed his 
willingness to accept the British arrangements at Kandahar to
"i
the Viceroy. Lytton replied on 13th March, 1880 : "I have 
great pleasure in announcing to you that Her Majesty the Queen 
Empress has been pleased to recognise your Highness as the 
independent ruler of the province of Kandahar according to 
limits to be hereafter defined."^ On 7th April, 1880 Lytton1s 
Government informed the home authorities that "the separation 
of Kandahar from Kabul is an accomplished fact and the
3independence of Sher Ali has been solemnly guaranteed." When 
negotiations with Abdur Rahaman started in North Afghanistan 
and the Wali was installed at Kandahar Stewart and his army 
proceeded towards Kabul to maintain order among the tribes and to 
facilitate British withdrawal following a settlement.
When Lytton was thus progressing with the disintegration 
of Afghanistan a significent change was effected at home.
Gladstone’s "tremendous projectiles at Midlothian" had pounded
(1) Desp. Govt, of I‘# to S. of S. Sec. no. 78, 3lst March, 1880 # 
Pol. & £>ec. Letters from I.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Desp* Govt# of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 90, 7th April, 1880# 
Pol. & ^ec. Letters from I.
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the ministerial citadel to the ground.11**" From 1878 
Disraeli*s position was waning in England and from 1879 
to March, 1880 the Liberals ceaselessly attacked the Tory 
foreign policy towards St. Petersburg, Constantinople 
and Kabul. In March, 1880 with a decisive Liberal victory 
at home Lytton*s project af partitioning Afghanistan 
received a setback. Gladstone, while denouncing the Tories, 
gave the country to understand that whenever tne Liberal 
party might be voted to power it would seek to undo all 
that the Conservatives had done. Thus the Liberal victory 
meant a thorough change in the British foreign policy as a 
whole and of the Afghan policy in particular. Lord 
Hartington, the new Secretary of State for India, announced 
the principles of a Liberal Afghan policy in his despatch 
to the Viceroy on 21st May, i860. He emphasised the 
necessity of the gradual, but the ultimate withdrawal of 
the British troops from all parts of Afghanistan, rejected 
the scheme of the disintegration of Afghanistan and desired 
that the Kingdom of Afghanistan should be reconstructed as 
a whole under one ruler. The Liberal Government, he 
declared, wanted Mto see the restoration on our North 
Western frontier of a friendly state capable of maintaining
(1) J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, 1904, vol. 2, p.594.
its independence and administering its own affairs 
without the military support of the British Government.
In June, 1880 the Marquis of Ripon was sent by the Liberal 
government to replace Lytton in India and to inaugurate 
a distinctly Liberal Afghan policy.
When the North West frontier policy of the British 
in India was thus changing hands from the Conservatives 
to the Liberals, Sir James Fergusson succeeded Sir Richard 
Temple as the Governor of Bombay Presidency on 28th April,1880# 
The Tory cabinet appointed Fergusson, a loyal Conservative 
and a devout Disraelian, in their last days before the 
election of 1880. Though he arrived in India a month 
earlier than Ripon, Fergusson hardly had any opportunity to 
assume a significant role at the very outset . He had no 
contribution whatsoever either in formulating or in implem­
enting Lytton*s policy. But in his views Fergusson was an 
obvious Lyttonite, sharing Lytton1 s concern for a ,,forwardfl 
North West frontier . As the Governor of Bombay, however,
i
he had a locus standi in Afghan affairs. From January, 1879 the 
Government of Bombay was entrusted with the charge of transport 
and supplies for the British Army through Baluchistan to 
Kandahar and South Afghanistan. At the beginning of 1880
(l) Desp. S. of S. to Govt . of I. Sec. no. 23, 21st May,1880.
Pol. & Sec . Letters to I.
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the Government of Bombay was further given the responsibility 
of furnishing reinforcement in South Afghanistan. ^
Finally, in April, 1880 with the march of Stewart1s forces 
towards Kabul, leaving Kandahar fort, the Bombay troops
under the command of General Primrose were posted at
2Kandahar. In view of this clear involvement of the 
Government of Bombay, Ripon directed the Foreign Department 
of the Government of India to convey confidentially all
3
information about Afghan matters to Fergusson. Thus 
when the new Viceroy was giving effect to a new policy, 
Fergusson - a newcomer himself - seemed to be in a 
position to put forward his own ideas.
Ripon* s task of carrying out a new Afghan policy v/as,
however, difficult in the light of some of the last deals
tke
of lytton. In^course of negotiations with regard to his 
plan for the dismemberment of Afghanistan Lytton went so 
far as to subject his successor to certain undertakings.
No government could shake off its predecessor’s diplomatic 
pledges contracted in the name of the sovereign of the country.
(1) Secy. Military Dept. Govt, of B. to Secy. Military
Dept. Govt, of I. no. 6959» 30th Nov. 1880. Mil. Proce.
Govt, of I. Dec. 1880.
(2) P. Cadell, History of Bombay Army , 1938, p. 229.
(3) Ripon io Fergusson, 2nd July, 1880. F.C.
nThe home authorities clarified that such engagements, 
effected hy the past regime concerning Afghanistan9must 
he "scrupulously r e s p e c t e d R e g a r d i n g  the transfer of 
Herat to Persia negotiations with the Shall had not progressed 
far and the Government of India were in a position to drop 
the subject. In fact the negotiations with Persia over Herat 
were not resumed. Lytton*s negotiations with Abdur 
Rahaman resulted in a vague offer of the Amirship to the 
Sirdar, but no specific understanding had been reached* On 
this point Riponfs Government was free to adopt any line 
of policy that it wished. But# such was not the case at 
Khndahar where Lytton distinctly committed the Government 
of India to uphold Wali Sher Ali. The observance of 
Lytton*s commitment to the Wali was incompatible with the 
inauguration of a Liberal Afghan policy*
The new Afghan Amir, whoever he might be, Abdur 
Rahaman or anyone else, could not by any means dispense 
•with the commercially and strategically important province 
of Kandahar. Besides, the maintenance of Lytton's engagement 
with the Wali would directly violate the Liberal policy
(1) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. ^ec. no. 23, 21st May, 
1880* Pol. & Sec. Letters to India>#
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of creating an indivisible and strong Afghanistan. The
primary object of the Liberal government, namely the
withdrawal of British troops from Afghanistan, would not be
realised if a permanent British garrison were retained at
Kandahar and military posts sustained between Quetta in
British administered Baluchistan and Kandahar. The home
authorities and the Viceroy were thus in a dilemma and the
success of their Afghan settlement depended as much on the
successful negotiations with a possible candidate at Kabul as
on disregarding Lytton1s procedure at Kandahar. Hartington
felt the gravity of the situation and wrote to Fergusson:
H... all that I have heard recently seems to indicate that
we have been very completely pledged to that policy£of
supporting a British nominee at Kandahar J  of Lord Lytton and
it will be difficult if not impossible to retire from or to
modify the engagements which have been made. At the same
time, it would appear doubtful whether Abdur Rahaman would
quietly accept the Amirship of Afghanistan without Kandahar. 1,1
Fergusson could foresee that Kandahar was the crux of a
Liberal Afghan settlement. He requested Hartington to make
a distinction between the British evacuations of Kabul and 
2of Kandahar. He explained that a sudden withdrawal from
Kandahar woulfl leave th£ friends of the British there
TT) liartington to Fergusson,25th kay,1886. F.if.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington,10th June,l880. F.C.
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unprotected against the vengeance of the tribes hostile 
towards the British. Besides, the chimerical prospect 
of trade at Kandahar under the protection of the British 
was flno unimportant consideration11 to him. At any 
rate Fergusson felt that Kandahar should remain "an 
open question1* and the place should be protected till 
Northern Afghanistan had been settled.^ The line to be 
assumed by a Lyttonite on the fate of Kandahar was thus 
quite apparent.
The character of Ripon1s Council in 1880 was 
predominantly Lyttonite. The Commander in Chief Sir F.Haines, 
tfche Militaiy member Sir E. Johnson, the Finance member Sir 
J. Strachey sponsored lytton's Afghan policy. Y/hitley Stokes 
and Rivers Thomson among other members supported Lytton*s 
views as regards a forward North West frontier. They all 
would certainly emphasize the necessity of protecting the 
Kingdom of Kandahar under the Wali and oppose the undoing 
of what they had already effected. Such was, however, not 
their attitude towards Kabul. But even there the selection 
of Abdur Rahaman as the prospective candidate for the 
Amirship by Lytton* s Council had made his case formidable.
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 20th June, 1880. F.C.
From the beginning Ripon took Abdur Rahaman to be “the
most Russian" of all and considered his selection "an
immense mistake". ^ He had sympathies for Yakub and was
convinced that he was not treated with justice when he was
accused^of having a hand in the Kabul massacre. So
personally/ Ripon was in favour of opening negotiations with
jfakub while the majority of his Council was against it.
Fergusson, like Ripon, was not satisfied that Yakub had been
justly treated for his complicity in the Kabul massacre.
However, he believed that the stamp of virtual deposition and
the memories of the Kabul rising "would be fatal to his
ppower" if Yakub was set up again as Amir. Ripon avoided
any controversy in the Council at the outset by conceding
quietly the negotiations with Abdur Rahaman - an issue least
affecting the new Afghan policy. So the lyttonites won
their point in rejecting conclusively Yakub's candidature but
the Viceroy was not defeated.
The apprehension of a difficulty in dealing with Abdur
Rahaman, without guaranteeing Kandahar's restoration to Kabul,
was soon found to be justified. It was more than once
reported that Abdur Rahaman had objections to coming to an
IT) Ripon to his wife, 17 th June, IbBO, Cited in Go pal, “ 
Ripon, p.10 .
(2) Fergusson to Hartington,10th June, i860. F.C.
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understanding if Kandahar was not given to him. 1 Even when 
negotiations were heading towards a conclusion Abdur Rahaman 
issued a circular to the tribes and gave a shrewd description 
of the British offer to him. He declared that he was 
receiving the territories of Afghanistan as determined between 
the English and the late-Amir Dost Muhammad in 1855• thus 
falsely suggesting British agreement to restoring Kandahar 
to Kabul • To Abdur Rahman such a false suggestion was 
probably necessary for hie could not hope for papular support 
by dividing Afghanistan. But Stewart and L. Griffin, the
British agent at Kabul, lost faith in Abdur Rahaman at this
2deception and wanted to discontinue negotiations. Ripon, 
however, took this leniently and directed negotiations to 
continue without giving Abdur Rahaman any promise of 
returning Kandahar or Pishin and Sibi, the districts 
assigned to the British in the Treaty of Gandamak. ^
Pergusson observed the shrewdness of Abdur Rahaman and he 
entertained no faith in the Sirdar1 s ,ffriendly designs”. He 
felt that sooner or later anarchy was bound to prevail in 
Afghanistan and the best way for the English was to leave the
(1) Teleg . L . Griffin to Poreign, ,27th June, 1880. 
Enel* to Desp. Govt, of I . to S* of 5. Sec. no. 144>
29th June, 1880. Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Gopal, Ripon, p.13.
(3) Teleg. Poreign, Simla to L. Griffin, 12th June, 1880. Encl. 
to Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Sec. no.133, 15th June, 
1880 . Pol. & Sec. letters from I.
ucountiy without passing it over to any one. HIndia and 
Europe will not hlame us for leaving the Afghans,H he 
wrote expressing the Spencerian views, Hto respect the 
process of choosing their ruler by natural selection or 
by the survival of the strongest.1* Though not sharing
Pergusson*s ideas of natural selection in Afghanistan 
Eipon agreed with his opinion about Abdur Rahaman. Ripon 
had no doubt that Abdur Rahaman was playing a double role
p
and uplaying his cards skilfully. 11 But when once
negotiations had started with him it was wrong to break 
off with him except on clear and justified grounds.
Hartington meanwhile was trying to explore the 
possibility of a reconsideration of the British agreement 
with the Wali Sher Ali of Kandahar. There was no doubt 
that Lytton* s arraj^ement at Kandahar had its weaknesses. 
The boundaries of the newly created state of Kandahar were 
still undecided and no further communication on the subject 
had been exchanged between the Wali and the Government of 
India. The amount of subsidy to be paid by Sher Ali for 
the support of the British garrison at Kandahar was not 
finalised. Moreover, Lytton's engagement with Sher Ali did
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 18th June, 1880. P.O.
(2) Ripon to.Pergusson, 9th July, 1880. P.O.
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not mention whether British support to Sher Ali would
discontinue in case of the Wali's breach of faith.^
Engagements should not be as one sided, Hartington thought,
as was the case with Lytton*s promise of support to the Wali.
Besides, Hartington had no doubt as to the disadvantage of
maintaining permanently a large and expensive British force
2at Kandahar "to keep a mere puppet on the throne. " There 
were proofs that Sher Ali himself hardly trusted his own 
abilities and once he even expressed his desire to Stewart 
to retire to Iddia on a pension from the Government of India.^ 
A Lyttonite like Fergusson disliked any attempt of a 
reconsideration of the British position at Kandahar. He 
insisted on the importance of respecting Lytton's pledge to 
the chief and the people of Kandahar that "they would no 
longer be subjected to Kabul and would be protected by 
England.1^  He sounded Hipon on this point and wrote: "If the 
pledges given by Lord Lytton of the permanent separation and 
protection of Kandahar are as definite as I am led to believe, 
its abandonment would in the opinion of all Englishmen and
(1) Desp. S.of S. to Govt, of I. Sec. no. 23, 21st May,1880. 
Pol. of Sec. Letters to I.
(2) Hartington to Fergusson, 25th/July 1880. F.C.
(3) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I • Sec . No • 23, 21st May,1880 
Pol. & Sec. Letters j
(4) Fergusson to Hartington, 18th June, 1880. F.C.
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natives be so injurious to our prestige that the effects 
would be more damaging than a military d i s a s t e r . T h e  
indication was sufficient to show exactly where Ripon might 
expect toughest resistance in settling the Afghan affairs 
from the Lyttonites in India. Ripon carefully informed 
Pergusson that he was not contemplating any hasty withdrawal 
from Kandahar "in the existing state of things." However,
he felt that Lytton gave promises to Sher Ali which the late-
2Viceroy should not have given. Then Ripon dramatically 
alluded to his wish to see "our permantly advanced 
cantonments in the Pishin valley rather than on the other side 
of the Kojuck (^Kandahar] . Ripon who shared the general 
Liberal feeling towards Afghanistan, favoured a greater 
emphasis 0n imperial security. Even before he came to India he 
confidentially informed Hartington on May 9th of 1880^his 
desire to retain the assigned districts of Pishin and Sibi.^ 
Ripon was not strictly a crusader against the forward North 
Y/est frontier of India and he was not unwilling to make a 
compromise with the Lyttonites on this point. The sudden
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 20th June, 1880. R.P.
2^) Ripon to Fergusson, 2nd July, 1880. F.C.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Ripon to Hartington,9th May, 1880 . Cited in L. Wolf,
Life of Marquis of Ripon, 1921, vol. 2, p.20.
disclosure of Ripon*s own mind to Fergusson probably
contained the hin£ of a bargain. The promise of the
permanent occupation of the Afghan territories of
Pishin and Sibi might satisfy at least the moderates
among the exponents of forward ideas.
Meanwhile at Kabul negotiations with Abdur Rahaman were
continuing. Abdur Rahaman was reported to be insisting on
the restoration of Kandahar and inciting the tribes secretly
to be prepared for an offensive against the English on this
p o i n t T h e  problan with the Government of Ripon was that
they were in a hurry to withdraw from Kabul, while Abdur
2
Rahaman could patiently wait and bargain. Ripon had to 
take a firm decision and he informed Fergusson that he had 
thought it necessary to require Abdur Rahaman to advance to 
Kabul from Badakshan without delay if he meant to come to an 
agreement. "If he does not do this," Ripon commented, "we 
shall in all probability put an end to our communications 
with him."^ Fergusson took the opportunity of warning Ripon
as to the "perplexing uncertainty" of a settlement at Kabul.
—  ^
(1) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Sec. no. 144, 29th June,
1880. End. containing Abdur Rahaman* s circular to the
tribes, 8th June, 1880. Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 2nd July, 1880. F.C.
(3) Ibid.
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“Abdur Rahaman has all along appeared to he playing an
astute game, 11 Fergusson observed, "with a full appreciation
of the dangers of his future from either arranging with us
or acting against us.” If Abdur Rahaman declined to treat
with the English unless Kandahar was given to him, Fergusson
continued, Ripon would be placed “in a position of extreme
difficulty. “■* However, as regards Ripon* s reference to the
suitability of determining a permanent British frontier
extended “some where about the Pishin valley1* Fergusson
2
had no real objection. He even conceded that militarily 
the frontier line based on the assigned districts would be 
best to defend.^ But while he seemed to agree with Ripon as 
to retaining Pishin and Sibi permanently he did not give up 
his views on Kandahar. In fact he wished not only the 
retention of Kandahar under the Yi/ali but even advocated a 
direct British annexation of the province# To Hartington 
Fergusson suggested that in supporting Sher Ali at Kandahar 
"we do not gain the same advantage as we should by 
annexing to Sind the fertile provinces adjoining our frontier.** 
Apart from the advantages of an extended frontier, he believed 
that Kandahar as a centre of trade ought to bear the military
(1 ) Fergusson to Ripon, 7th July, 1880. R.P.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 21st July, 1880. R.P.
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expenses of the English and that its tenure would s^^gfy 
those who anticipated "danger from Russian advance. " 1  
The proposal was a prelude to a Lyttonite adjustment with the 
Liberal policy. The Lyttonites could put maximum pressure on 
Ripon by talking about the annexation of Kandahar in order 
to gain "the keeping of pledges to the Wali" or at worst 
the retention of Pishin and Sibi. Any of these three 
alternatives would lead to a forward settlement of the North 
Y/est frontier of India.
In North Afghanistan RiponJsultimatum to Abdur Rahaman 
remarkably improved the situation. Abdur Rahaman, it was found, 
was not going to spoil his future for his interests for 
Kdndahar. He frankly stated that he had to preserve a
bellicose demeanour to satisfy the tribes and that this did
2
not represent his true attitude. Abdur Rahaman accepted
the British terms of enjoying independence in the internal
*
affairs of Afghanistan, of maintaining no relation with 
external powers except with the British and of not raising 
any point of settlement regarding Kandahar, Pishin and Sibi.
In return the Government of India assured the Amir of assistance 
in case of foreign aggression on Afghanistan and agreed to 
appoint a MuL/uammadan agent at Kabul in place of an European
ITT Pergusson to Hartirigion, 18th June, lbbO.P.C.
(2) Wolf, Ripon, vol 2, p.24.
(3) Gopal, Ripon, pp 11-12 .
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Resident.^" Abdur Rahaman set out for Kabul as desired by
Ripon* s Government and on 22nd July, 1880 a Durbar was held
at Kabul at which he was recognised as Amir. The British
success of a settlement at Kabul was clearly due to Ripon*s
firmness. It satisfied the Lyttonites who were eager to get
out of Kabul and Abdur Rahaman was Lytton*s choice. Fergusson
congratulated Ripon without hesitation upon the proclamation
2
of Abdur Rahaman.
When negotiations were thus settled in North Afghanistan 
new developments were rapidly taking place in South 
Afghanistan. The incidents in South Afghanistan flowed from 
the direction of Herat, another portion of Afghan territory 
held by Sirdar Ayub Khan, younger brother of late-Amir Yakub.
In May, 1880 the Liberal government abandoned Lytton*s project 
of transferring Herat to Persia.^ and the future of the district 
was left to Ayub. Ayub was young and openly hostile to the' 
English. During the exciting day3 following the Kabul 
massacre Ayub was eager to deliver the country from the hands
A
of the English. As a prince of the ruling family and for 
his hostility towards the English Ayub was very popular among
(1) Gopal, Ripon, pp 1 1 - 1 2 .
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 24th July, i860. R.B.
(31 Gopal, Ripon, p. 15.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to' S. of S. Sec. no. 185, 17th Aug.
1880. Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
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the Afghans. That Ayub at Herat was a considerable 
force was recognised by Abdur Rahaman. In course of the 
negotiations when the British agent invited Abdur Rahaman 
to establish his authority over Herat, Abdur Rahaman 
carefully avoided the offer by saying that he had no 
objection in leaving Herat to Ayub, his cousin, unless Ayub 
showed definite hostility to hi-te.*^  Abdur Rahaman and the 
British Government could not reach any decision as regards 
Herat though the probability of Ayub challenging Abdur 
Rahaman or attacking the English at Kandahar en route from 
Herat to Kabul, remained alive*
The satisfactory conclusion of negotiations with Abdur 
Rahaman seemed to have cleared the way for the withdrawal of 
the British troops from Afghanistan when an event occurred 
which threatened to postpone the movement, but in its sequel 
precipitated it. Since December, 1879 the rumour of Ayubfs 
intention to inarch to Kandahar was heard of. However, it 
was reported to the Government of India that the relations 
between Kabuli and Herati troops of Ayub were seriously
p
estranged. In March, 1880 reports arrived at Kandahar 
that Ayub had called for a jehad (sacred war on the infidel)
(1) Teleg. L. Griffin to Foreign Dept. Simla. 12th June,1880 
Encl. to Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. No. 133 
15th June, 1880..Pol. of Sec. letters from I.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. No. 185, 17th Aug.1880. 
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
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against the English*1 The Kandahar diary of the British
Resident in May, 1880 recorded Wali Sher Ali*s apprehension
of an immediate attack by Ayub on Kandahar. The Wali
started with a force to Zamindawar to collect a first
hand knowledge of Ayub*s movements* On 21st June, 1880 he sent
Col, St. John, the Resident at Kandahar, the news that Ayub was
ready to march towards Kandahar. While communicating this .
information to Simla Col. St. John recommended the advance
of a British brigade from Kandahar to oppose Ayub on the way.
On 25th June* i860 the British ambassador at Tehran,
R. Thomson, informed the Government of India that Ayub had
2
already marched from Herat. With this information the 
Government of India decided to intercept the enemy in advance 
by the despatch of a British force towards the Helmund river. 
This decision of the government was guided by military and 
political considerations. Militarily, the defence of 
Kandahar would be difficult if Ayub was allowed to cross 
the Helmund. Politically, the possibility of Ayub's march 
towards GhazaxiL and Kabul by avoiding Kandahar could disturb
the recently settled arrangements with Abdur Rahaman.^
Xl] Desp. Sovt. of I . to S. of S. Sec. no. 9, Yth April,
1881. Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 185, 17th Aug.1880.
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 9, 7th April,1881.
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
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On 11th July, 1880 general Burrows at the head of a force of
2,400 men was despatched from Kandahar towards the Helmund
and a reinforcement was ordered to be sent from Quetta to
Kandahar. In taking these measures the Government of India
anticipated no further cause of anxiety. Ripon informed
Pergusson that he was convinced that a simple British advance
“would put a stopMto Ayub1s movements.^ The Foreign
Department of the Government of India was confident that no
2
real danger was expected from Ayub. The men on the spot, 
Col. St. John and Commanding Officer General Primrose 
apprehended no threat to the defence of Kandahar from Ayub's 
army. Fergusson and the Government of Bombay, in charge of 
supply, transport and reinforcement in South Afghanistan, 
thought that “no attack on Kandahar from the troops of Ayub 
can seriously be entertained.“ The task to be performed by 
General Burrows's brigade was not wholly unknown to the 
military authorities of India. According to the British 
ambassador at Tehran Ayub's strength, consisted of 10 
regiments of infantry, 3000 cavalry and 30 guns, and
4
volunteers were to join him on the road. Both Fergusson and
p H  Kipon to fergusson, 2 nd July, 1880. F.CT 
(2; B.S. Rait, The life of Field Marshal^ Sir Frederick Paul 
Haines,” 1911, pV2$T. 1
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 9th July, 1880. F.C.
(4; Teleg. Thomson, Tehran to Simla, 25th June,1880.Encl. to 
Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 185,17th Aug. 
i860. Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
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Ripon agreed with each other that the English strength at
Kandahar was "not above the minimum."*** With the departure
of Burrows*s brigade it was reduced to 4*769 officers and 
2
men. Considering all these factors, the way in which the 
British authorities prepared to resist Ayub*s advance and to 
defend Kandahar represented an attempt to attain an 
essential object with insufficient means*
When Burrows*s brigade accompanied by Col. St. John 
arrived near the Helmund, Sher Ali*s army at the opposite 
bank of the river mutinied and the men deserted the Wali in 
order to join Ayub*s army. The mutiny of the Wali*s troops 
indicated the widespread sympathy of the Kandahajiris for Ayub.
On 17th July, 1880 Col. St. John wrote to the Foreign 
Department of the Government of India ; "For many months Ayub and 
his partisans have used every effort to inflame religious and 
patriotic feelings of the chiefs and people against us." He 
continued that the actual presence on the frontier of an 
army under a prince of the recently ruling family "has 
created a more powerful and general feeling in Ayub*s favour.**^ 
In fact the whole of the surrounding countiy was eager to 
welcome Ayub and it was generally admitted that the leading men
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 9th July, i860. F.C.
(2) The Second Afghan war, 1878-80, Official Account, 1907* 
p.4b2 .
(3) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Sec. no. 175* 3rd Aug.1880. 
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
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of Kandahar had long been in correspondence with him and 
invited him to advance from Herat, The Governor General*s 
agent at Quetta, Sir R Sandeman, also sent a note of 
warning to Simla that the movement in favour of Ayub was
2more extended and determined than was believed at Kandahar*
All along the line of his advance ^yub was screened by 
cavalry and the tribesmen, A large number of the Ghazees - or 
volunteers, mostly peasants, joined a army every day at
every stage of its journey. The British authorities at *
Simla became anxious to stop Ayub.slipping past General 
Burrows towards Ghazrxri. They accordingly instructed General 
Burrows to attack Ayub if "he considers himself strong enough 
to do so.'*^  General Burrows meanwhile received the news that 
Ayub was approaching Maiwand and he decided to resist his 
adversary there.
At dawn on 27th July, 1880, General Burrows'$ brigade 
consisting of 2400 men, 749 horses and 12 guns, marched towards 
Maiwand. The British brigade was too small a force in 
comparison with Ayub’s massive army# General Burrows in his 
official report on the battle of Maiwand estimated Abuy’s
strength as 25000 men. But in his confidential report to the
(1) Memo, of Sir. R. Sandeman on-"Kandahar, 51st Oct.1880. Encl.
Desp. G|jvt0 of I. to §• & S. Bee. no.12, 26th Jan, 1881.
Pol. & See. Letters from I.
(2) Memo, of A. Lyall on Kandahar. Nov. 1880# Encl. to Lesp.
Govt, of I. to S. of 8 . see. no. 1 2, 26th Jan. 1880, Pol.
& Sec. Letters from I.
(3) Account of Muhammad Akbar, a British Spy among Ayub*s
men. Encl. to Desp# Govt, of I. to S, of S. Sec.no. 12 ,
27th Jan. 1881. Pbl. & Sec. Letters from I#
(4) Desp# Govt, of I. to S. 0f S. Sec. no.219,12th Oct.1880# Pol. 
& Sec. Letters from I.
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Commander in Chief Haines, he confessed that the number he
mentioned in the official report was "far below the actual
strength."^ General Burros*5* brigade and .Ayub's aimy
reached Maiwand almost at the same time. Action started at
1 1 .3 0  a.m. and till afternoon it was confined to artillery
fire. Ayub so carefully directed and used his guns that
"the superior quality of the English armaments failed to
2compensate the inferior number of guns." The superiority
of the Afghan guns was soon followed by a vigorous and
decisive Afghan cavalry charge. The final blow was dealt
to the English when the Ghazees attacked ferociously. General
Burrows recorded the giving way of his infantry* "forming a
helpless crowd of panicstricken m e n . I n  utter frustration
he ordered retreat at about 3 p.m. Throughout the hurried retreat
that followed "the prospect was discouraging and discipline
completely at an end."^ General Burrows reported, "we were
fired on at every village we passed" and many of the fugitives
5
died from shots of the villagers. With great difficulty the
straggling.troops reached Kokran,where they met a relieving
(1) Confidential Report, General Burrows, 5th Sept. 1880".
Printed R.P.
(2) Col. St. John's account of Maiwand, 2nd August,1880.
Mil. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1880.
(3) Confidential Report, General Burrows, 5th Sept. 1880.
Printed R.P.
(4) Col. St. John's account of Maiwand, 2nd August. 1880 .
Mil. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1880.
(5) Confidential Report, General Burrows, 5th Sept. 1880.
Printed R.P.
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British force. Even from Kokran to Kandahar the retreating 
army had to come through skirmishes with the villagers. On 
2bth July, i860 the remnants of General Burrow s'y brigade 
entered into the citadel of Kandahar. She news of the defeat 
of Maiwand,when it reached Kandahar on the night of 27th July, 
completely unnerved General Primrose. The Cantonment at 
Kandanar,situated outside the fort, was hurriedly abandoned 
and a telegram was despatched to Pergusson at Bombay conveying 
the erroneous account of the total "annihilation” of General 
Burrows's brigade. Pergusson promptly passed this information 
to the Secretary of State who broke the news to the nation in 
Parliament. At Simla Ripon received the news of the "severe" 
defeat of General Burrows'S brigade. ^
It was a desperate time for Ripon and the Government of 
India started preparations for the next step. General Phayre, 
an officer of the Bombay army in charge of protecting the line 
of communication between Quetta and Kandahar, was ordered to 
rally trojps and to proceed towards Kandahar. Pergusson
expressed the readiness of his government to send reinforcements
2to Chaman, from which General Phayre's march was contemplated. 
But he was anxious about the difficulty of transport in a rainy
(l) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 175* 3rd Aug.1880 
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(.2) Pergusson to Hartington, 30th July, 1880 P.O.
So
season# Besides, Fergusson felt that General Phayre would 
face difficulty in his inarch and in obtaining supply in the 
north of Kojuk pass where people were unfriendly to the 
British. These factors, in Fergusson1s opinion,might prevent 
General Phayre from encountering Ayub in time at Kandahar#***
But time was unfortunately very short and a siege of Kandahar 
fort by Ayub's army was imminent. Moreover, the victorious 
Ayub was certain to dominate the country from Kandahar to 
Ghazni. In view of this alarming situation Fergusson 
suggested that a portion of the British troops at Kabul 
should march by the Ghazni en route to Kandahar simultaneously
p
with General Phayre's advance from Chaman# The Secretary
of State, Ripon and Haines were also thinking in the same 
3
direction# The Government of India invited the opinion of
Stewart on the feasibility of such a move and he agreed to
the proposal. It was decided to send a powerful force from
Kabul under the command of Eoberts. On 5th August, 1880
Stewart volunteered the suggestion that he too should leave
Kabul with the rest of the army in view of the quiet
a ,
political condition of North Afghanistan# Stewarts' return
(l) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd Aug. 1880# E.P#
C2J Fergusson to Ripon, 4th Aug. 1880. E.P.
(3) Ripon to Haines, 3rd Aug. 1880. Cited in Rait, Haines, p.309
(4 ) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. no. 186, 17th Aug, 1886 
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
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march would complete the British withdrawal from Kabul
and Ripon had no hesitation in giving his assent*
Leaving Kabul on 8th August the force under Roberts
reached GhaznJL on 15th, Khilat-i-Ghilzai on 23rd and
Kandahar on 31st August, 1880 covering 380 miles in 23 days."*"
The British garrison at Kandahar meanwhile was sevqrly
a A
pressed by a siege laid down by Ayub1 s army* However,
provisions were found to be ample in the citadel to hold out
till the arrival of the relieving forces from Kabul and from
Chaman* But th^iorale of the British garrison was very
low in consequence of the defeat at Maiwand and the
2
subsequent siege. Roberts made an attack on Ayub*s forces 
in the outskirts of Kandahar on 1st September, 1880. The 
British action was successful and it completely dispersed 
Ayubfs troops. When the defeat was certain Ayub fled towards 
Herat which he reached on 22nd September. This was 
virtually the end of the military crisis and Ripon was
3
relieved from further tension. Ripon was justified in his 
claim of the chief share of credit for sending Roberts to 
Kandahar and withdrawing Stewart from Kabul.^ The decision
was bold and Ripon had ho hesitation about it. Fergusson
U T ~  Pol. & Seo. Dept. Memo. Narrative of events ih Afghanistan 
A.W. Moore, 31st Dee. 1880. No.43.
(2) Gen. Boberis to Adjutant Gen. l8th Sept.1880. Military 
Proe. Govt, of I. Feb. 1881.
(3) Eipon to Eoberta, 5th Sept. i860. Cited in Wolf, Bipon, 
vol. 2 . p.32f
(4) Eipon to Northbrook, 5th Oct. 1880, Cited in Wolf, Bipon, 
vol. 2 , p.3 3 .
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also could rightly claim a share of the credit for foreseeing the 
delay of General Phayre in collecting the scattered regiments 
in the line of communication and in marching with inadequate 
transport and supply. He had no doubt that the march of 
Roberts "would be a great measure" from the military and 
political points of view. By this step only, he asserted, 
could Kandahar be relieved and Ayub be prevented from affecting 
"adhesion of the northern Sirdars to Abdur Rahaman.
After the return of Roberts* s troops to India by way of 
Quetta, Kandahar continued to be held by the English till the 
final withdrawal of forces in i860. Still the glory of Roberts1s 
victory could not surpass the ignominy of Burrows*s defeat.
The disastrous reverse of the British at Maiwand soon led to 
longdrawn and heated controversies in different quarters as to 
its causes. An enquiry into the fact reveals that the British 
failure in the battle of Maiwand was due to tactical blunders 
in the battle-field, military miscalculations and political 
shortsightedness. The tactical blunders were, however, the 
incidents of the defeat. Burrows decided to set out for 
Maiwand probably with the anticipation that he would reach 
the place before Ayub*s army. Unfortunately he was uncertain 
about the real movements of Ayub or about the numerical 
strength of Ayub*s army, though, it was his militaiy duty to 
obtain information before contemplating a direct clash •
(l) Fergusson to Ripon, 5th Aug. 1880. R.P.
S3
Fergusson was astonished at the little use of cavalry made
by Burrows in securing information as regards the enemy's
1 2 movements. Eipon agreed to the justice of this criticism.
Ayub's advance guards reached Maiwand earlier than the
British and so the enemy at Maiwand was nearer to Kandahar
by the Maiwand pass than Burrows was by the lower road. So
Burrows could not possibly have retreated without unavoidable
loss. But a timely retreat was preferable to marching forward
without any definite plan till pulled up at a place where
retreat and successful attack were alike impossible. Col.
St. John, who accompanied Burrows's brigade, reported that the
General was a spectator of the leisurely formation of the
enemy's lines and thus lost valuable time.^ Fergusson was
convinced that as soon as Burrows allowed the enemy to take
their position "a great step was taken towards defeat.
Sir Charles Napier's victory in Sind in 1843 was gained by his
falling on the enemies before they could form. Besides these
factors Burrows himself complained of the precipitate action
at Maiwand hastily started by an artilleiy officer, Maclaine,
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 4th Aug. 1880. R.P.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 13th Aug. 1880. F.C.
i3) Fergusson to Hartington, 6th Aug. 1880. F.C.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 4th Aug. 1880. R.P.
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who dashed oat with his guns without order. This unusual 
incident hardly allowed the British a m y  to settle down 
in the field. To these tactical blunders were added the 
failures of the officers. The cavalry officers refused 
to carry out the commands of the General and started 
retreating without covering the infantry. The infantry 
gave way before the first onslaught and could not be formed 
again. On the whole Burrows manifested less capacity for 
fighting a battle than his Afghan adversary. To Fergusson 
this total absence of glory in defeat seemed most bitter.’1’
In determining the failure of Burrows*s brigade in 
the field of action the overwhelming numerical strength of 
the enemy should also be taken into account. Fergusson thought 
that the superiority of the number of enemy cavalry had been 
"the most seiious element** at Maiwand. Col. St. John testified 
that the strength of Ayub*s artillery surpassed that of the 
English. The Commander in Chief, Haines, was of opinion that 
had Burrows been aware of the exact strength of Ayub he would 
not have considered himself strong enough to attack him.^
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 6th Aug. 1880. F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 26th July, 1880. R.P.
(3) Adjutant Gen. to Secy. Military Bept. Govt, of I.
No. 5351-A, 25th Sept. 1880. Military Proc. Govt, of I.
Oct. 1880.
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The superior strength of Ayub naturally raises the question
of British military miscalculations. Prom a military point
of view the despatch of Burrows1s brigade was foredoomed to
failure. Stewart felt that "it was unwise to send such a
small force from Kandahar."**" Similar was Fergusson1 s view:
"We had not an adequate force at the point of contact - which was
2a great military fault." It was rumoured that General 
Primrose at Kandanar favoured the withdrawal of Burrows's 
insufficient force previous to the battle of Maiwand and that 
he was "snubbed" from Simla. According to Ripon, however, 
Primrose himself urged the despatch of Burrows's brigade, 
proposing its strength and composition without conveying any 
further wish that it should be recalled.^ The Commander in 
Chief, Haines, claimed that he had been opposed to the despatch 
of a small force like Burrows's brigade and that his protest
had been overruled by the Viceroy. Ripon in his turn considered
this story as the very opposite of the truth.^ The fact 
was that all the militaiy experts were in favour of the advance 
of Burrows's brigade towards the Helmund to resist Ayub and 
no one had any doubt on Burrows's ability to disperse Ayub's men.
Fergusson rightly pointed out to Hartington that none in India
XT) Stewart to Lady Stewart, 2b th July,l'bbO. Citedin G.'R.
Elsmie, ed Field Marshall Sir Donald Stewart, 1903. p.373.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 3rd Aug. lb'80 R.t.
(3) Ripon to Fergusson, 13th.Aug. 1880. F.C.
(4; Ripon to Duke of Cambridge, 23rd Oct. 1880. Printed R.P.
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believed **in the high qualities of Ayub*s troops*1^  Even
i
the preeu&tion of reinforcing Burrowfi's brigade in case
\
of urgent need was not seriously considered. Burrows 
himself asked for reinforcements after the dispersal of
i
the Walifs mutihous troops. But Primrose sent only 50 Sabres
(cavaliy men) from Kandahar and it remained inexplicable why
2more troops were not sent out.
Pergusson accused Bipon* s Government of failure to * *
remedy the inadequacies of the defence of Kandahar. Neither
Kandahar nor the line of communications between Kandahar and
Quetta was reimorced in spite of the repeated requests from
Phayre and Sandeman* ^  Phayre suggested that the Reserve
Divisions should be stationed at Pishin to supplement the
forces at Kandahar. The Government of India, on Primrose*s
advice, considered such a measure unnecessary and turned down
the suggestion. *'1 submit that enquiries should be made,**
Pergusson demanded to Hartington, *'why forces at Kandahar were
so weak ...**. ^ Kartington had to admit in retrospect that
a serious error was made "when the garrison of Kandahar and
5its reserves were decided upon. * Apparently the British
(1) Pergusson to Hartinfiton, IJth Sept. 1880. P.O.
(2) Adjutant Gen. to militaiy Secy. Govt.'of I. no.5331-A, 
25th Sept. i860. Military Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1880
(3) Pergusson to Hartington, 21st Nov.1880. P.O.
(4) Pergusson to Hartington, 27th Oct. 1880. P.O.
(5) Hartington to Pergusson, 1st Oct. 1880 . P.O.
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indifference towards adequate defence arrangements was due 
to their complacency at the political situation at 
Kandahar. Unlike Kabul, Kandahar remained always peaceful 
and the Kandaharis seemed to have graciously accepted the 
Wali as their titular head* In the prevailing normal 
conditions at Kandahar nobody really believed that Ayub 
or any other Afghan adventurer would undertake an immediate 
invasion. Ayub1s victory in the battle of Maiwand and the 
subsequent rising of the people in his favour abundantly 
demonstrated that the British assumptions had no foundation. 
Thus the lack of political foresight on the part of the 
authorities in India was a determining factor behind the 
British reverses in South Afghanistan*
Obviously the man on the spot was primarily responsible 
for the failure in evaluating the situation at Kandahar. Col. 
St. John, British Resident at Kandahar, could hardly have 
furnished a true picture of the dispositions of the Kandahari 
people. Burrows complained about the insufficient infoimation 
supplied by the Resident and the unfriendly country in which 
the troops were moving - a fact which was not previously 
known to him.^ Sandeman wrote in his memorandum on Kandahar;
(l) Pergusson to Hartington, 2Lst Nov. 1880. P.O.
"It was wellknown that. the whole of the surrounding country,
in addition to the Wali's dispersed army took part in the
battle of Maiwand.” A.C. Lyall, Secretary, Foreign
Department, Government of India, reported after an inspection of
Kandahar in November, 1880 that the whole province took aims
against the British and "eveiy man of influence of the
Durrani tribe, who were the majority of Kandahari population,
had joined the rising in support of Ayub.” Sher Ali had
failed to establish his authority over the countly and he was
thoroughly unpopular due to his association with the English .
Lyall remarked: "Our alliance seems to have been damaging to
both the parties. The Wali suffered the odium -of adhering to
foreigners and infidels and we became responsible both for
his unpopular civil administration and for his political
2
antagonism to the late ruling family." There was constant 
correspondence between Ayub and the leading men at Kandahar 
which encouraged him to attempt to expel the English and the 
Y/ali. Thus with the approach of Ayub the Wal^s authority 
rapidly collapsed. The popular support behind Ayub was so great 
that even the siege of Kandahar garrison was largely undertaken 
by the Ghazees and armed peasantry. Kandahar in fact became
"a nation at arms" on a small scale. The precarious mature
TTJ Memo of Sir H. Sandeman on Kandahar, 31st Oct. 1880'. Uriel, 
to Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no 12, 26th Jan.1881. 
Pol . & Sec. Letters to I.
(2) Memo, of A. Lyall on Kandahar, Nov.1880. Encl. to Desp.
Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no.12, 26th Jan.l88l.Pol & Sec. 
Letters from I.
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of Sher Ali*s rule and the degree to which Ayub*s advance was 
politically dangerous were not seriously treated by the 
Government of India. Fergusson admitted that to a large 
extent the debacle at Maiwand was due to lack of intelligence 
as regards the political condition of the countiy.^ On the 
whole, the responsibility for the defeat of Maiwand must , 
be shared by all who were in charge of the Afghan affairs 
in India. Everyone so persistently believed that Ayub would 
not advance from Herat towards Kandahar that no timely measure 
was taken for reinforcing Kandahar. Ayub’s strength was under­
rated and tne political significance of his advance under 
estimated by all responsible persons from St . John to Lyall, 
from Fergusson to Ripon and froi^trimrose to Haines.
The battle of Maiwand was the central event in the Afghan 
settlement of Ripon*s Government and, directly or 
indirectly, it decided some of the complicated issues of 
the Anglo-Afghan relations. The defeat of Maiwand and.the 
difficulty of sending troops from Sind to Kandahar via 
Baluciistan forced the Government of India to determine the 
despatch of a strong force from Kabul under Roberts.
(l) Fergusson to Hartington, 22nd Oct. 1880. F.C.
GO
I
Simultaneously, Stewart pressed for the wholesale withdrawal 
of British troops from Kabul . He probably feared that any 
further delay in British withdrawal might result in their being 
involved in new complications. The Viceroy supported the 
proposal and on 6th August, 1880 the home authorities approved 
of the measure. On 11th August Stewart’s anay left Kabul 
for Peshwar. The troops reached Peshwar on 7th September with­
out firing a single shot during their return march.1 The 
peaceful withdrawal of the British troops from North 
Afghanistan - an important object of liberal Afghan policy - 
was thus safely completed.
The battle of Maiwand also ended the Kandahar deadlock 
and reopened the question of its future for a final decision* 
Ayub’s invasion at last afforded Ripon and the liberal cabinet 
at home with an opportunity to break through the embarrassing 
status/quo at Kandahar. Ripon wrote to Gladstone that Lytton had 
entered into engagements with Sher Ali which threatened at 
first to be extremely disconcerting . He continued: f,Prom 
these engagements we were relieved by Ayub Khan’s invasion of 
South Afghanistan. Sher Ali’s power collapsed at once and it 
was demonstrated to the world that he had no hold whatever 
upon the country over which Lord Lytton had set him to 
govern.
The Second Afghan War, 1878-80 official account ,1907#p*421. 
(2) Ripon to Gladstone, 22nd Oct.1881 .Printed R.P.
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The two representatives of the Government of India
completed an on the spot enquiry and came to unfavourable
conclusions about Sher Ali. Sandeman, the Governor
Generali agent at Quetta, thought that "Sher Ali was
unanimously rejected by the people as their ruler.1 He
maintained that in continuing the unpopular rule of Sher
Ali the British Government would be certain to invite greater
troubles in future. Sher Ali was no friend of Abdur Rahaman
and he was proved to be so weak and Ayub so popular that
sooner or later Kandahar would evidently fall in the hands
of Ayub. The Amir of Kabul then must face Ayub and Sher
Ali jointly and should the result of such a contest prove
fatal the English would destroy their work in Afghanistan
1through their own acts. Lyall supported Sandeman1s
observations in his report on Kandahar. He felt that if Sher
Ali were retained, the English were bound to protect him
guarding the frontiers and interfering in the domestic
administration. Such virtual British protectorate over
Kandahar would be contrary to the wishes of the Kandaharis
2and to the satisfaction of the ruling Amir at Kabul.
(1) Memo of Sir R. Sandeman on Kandahar, 31st Oct. 1880. Encl.
to Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 12, 26th Jan.1881.
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Memo, of A. Lyall on Kandahar, Nov. 1880. Encl. to Lesp.
Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 12, 26th Jan.l88l. Pol. &
Sec. Letters from I.
These reports indicated that Sher Ali*s fate as the 
ruler of Kandahar was virtually sealed. Pergusson foreshadowed 
such an outcome following the disaster at Maiwand and promptly 
shifted his stand on Kandahar. "We can not perpetually sustain 
Sher Ali or any other nomineeH, he wrote to Hartington, 
flwho only exists by our bayonets."^ He revealed views which 
were soon to be assumed by all exponents of a forward North 
West frontier. "I have certainly conceived", he announced,
"that annexation i‘ |j>f KandaharJ would be preferable to
 ^ 2 upholding a ruler only existing through our presence...
Pergusson felt that if the British Government remained at
Kandahar without showing any weakness the Kandaharis would
submit to their authority. But if the British unwisely took
up again a broken tool like Sher Ali "they would have Afghans
down upon them."^ In the denunciation of Sher Ali following
the battle of Maiwand the adherents and adversaries of the
liberal Afghan policy behaved alike. Lord Napier of Magdala
considered the retention of Sher Ali would be "the worst
arrangement."^ Sir H.C. Rawlinson believed that Sher Ali
had shown himself thoroughly incapable and thus "convicted us
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 19th Nov. 1880. P.O.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 13th Aug. 1880. P.O.
(3J Pergusson to Hartington, 19th Nov. 1880. P.O.
(4) Pol. & Sec. Dept. Memo. Note on Kandahar, Lord Napier 
of Magdala, 12th Oct. i860. No.41.
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of a gross blunder in placing him in power." Members 
of the Viceroy’s council like W. Stokes and Rivers
p
Thomson agreed that Sher Ali was "weak and incompetent."
To E. Raring, a supporter of the "back to Sind frontier"
School, Sher Ali's rule over Kandahar was equally 
distasteful. The home authorities were only too eager 
to accept this universal condemnation and the Secretary 
of State pronounced: "... it can not possibly be held... 
that our interests or those of the inhabitants can be served 
by his jj>her Ali' sjrestoration.^ Sher Ali himself hardly had 
any doubt about his own bleak future and so requested the 
Resident at Kandanar to permit him to retire to India.Lyall 
had little difficulty in persuading Sher Ali to quit Kandahar. 
On 30th October,1880 Sher Ali expressed to the Viceroy his wish 
to to to Karachi with his family and Ripon readily/ accepted 
the proposal.^
(1) Pol. & Sec. Dept. Memo. On Kandahar, Sir H.C. Rawlinson,
. 25th Sept. 1880. No.40.
(2) Minutes of the members of the Viceroy's Council. Encl. to 
Desp. Govt, of I. to S of S. Sec. no.35* 21st Feb.1881 
Pol & Sec. Letters from I.
(3) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Sec. no.45* 11th Nov.1880.
Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no.3, 12th Jan.1881.
Pol & Sec. Letters from I.
64
Ripon* s Government was thus relieved of lytton* s liability.1
In these circumstances the Kandahar question assumed a 
different significance. As long as Sher Ali maintained a 
tottering position the lyttonites like fergusson had insisted 
on honouring the solemn pledges to him. But the moment Sher 
Ali*s weaknesses were demonstrated by Ayub's invasion, the 
Lyttonite slogan for maintaining the status quo at Kandahar was 
reversed into a clamour for the annexation of Kandahar. The 
question became whether to restore Kandahar to Kabul for 
strengthening the unity of Afghanistan or to annex it to 
British India as a prize of Britain's imperial exertions. The 
Kandahar issue was excitedly discussed by the opposite groups 
in tfrhe India Council, in the Viceroy's Council and in 
Parliament but the arguments generally ran on conventional 
lines. The representatives of the Forward School attempted 
to assert their pet arguments in favour of the annexation of 
Kandahar. Politically, it was argued, the annexation of Kandahar
ii
(l) S. Gopal in his book "The Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1953, 
found a blemish on Ripon* s Afghan policy with regard to 
his treatment of the Wali and concluded that Sher Ali's 
abdication did not add to Ripon's reputation, (p.29^ ) - 
However, in view of the dilemma-between the observance of 
lytton*s commitment to the Wali and the liberal policy 
of creating a friendly Afghanistan comprising Kandahar, 
Ripon could not possibly disregard Sher Ali's weakness 
and unpopularity. In fact a reconsideration of the 
British support to Sher Ali after Ayub's invasion was 
the only course open to a liberal Viceroy*
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would mean a greater English control over the Amir which was 
essential in view of Russian movements near Afghanistan and 
future Russian aggression on India. The occupation of 
Kandahar was thus considered "an insurance against the risk
i
of a very serious nature.” Militarily, Kandahar’s strategic 
position, guarding the routes to Kabul, Herat and Ghazni was
i
believed to be most suitable for an advanced British 
frontier line-. Commercially, it was stated that Kandahar 
commanded the trade routes between India and Central Asia and 
that under an efficient British administration it would prove 
to be a financial asset. Besides, it was pointed out that 
the X>urrani people of Kandahar had always resented their 
subjection to Kabul and as Pergusson believed, a hasty with­
drawal from Kandahar would leave the friends of the English
2
at the mercy of the vengeful Afghans.
Those who favoured the restoration of Kandahar to Kabul 
were equally emphatic. Politically, they argued, the 
Kandaharis would not accept the rule of a^power alien in race 
and religion. They recalled that when the expeditions against
the late Amir Shwr Ali were undertaken, it was declared that\
the British had no quarrel with the Afghan people ** a promise 
which should not be ignored by imposing British rule on
(1) Minute by R. Thomson, 24th Peb. 1881 . Encl. to Desp. Govt, 
of I. to £». of 3. Sec. no. 40, 28th Peb. 1881. Pol.& Sec. 
Betters from I.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 13th Aug. 1880.F.C. ^
, hJcnrtti y L&rT>t<2^
ifiy- ^^-S e  lAso y-^Lo^Y .
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unwilling people*1 The strategic value of Kandahar was
2questioned, and it was pointed out that the defence of 
Kandahar depended on a further extension of the frontier line*
The home authorities dealt a severe blow to Russophobia by 
stating that they did Hnot admit that the Russian military 
positions existing some hundred miles nearer to the North 
West frontier of India constitute in itself any great danger 
from that quarter. M They refused to believe that the Russian 
advance in an unproductive and unhealthy region would give 
Russia any position of strength from which she could venture 
^the gigantic task of invading India.11^  However, the soundest 
objection to the annexation of Kandahar was its expenditure. 
According to the military authorities 6000 British troops 
and 15000 sepoys would be required to garrison Kandahar 
adequately. It would cost £1,000,000 annually, excluding the 
expenditure on barracks and other fortified posts. The 
reyenue of the Government of India in 1880-81, though it 
exceeded the ordinary expenditure of 1879-80, resulted in a 
deficit of £1,183,000 after meeting war expenditure of 
£6,125,000.^ The finance member of the Government of India, 
Baring, pointed out the uncertain state of the Indian
(1) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I'. Sec.' no.45, llthr Nov.1880.
Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
(2) Minute by Gen. D. Stewart, 31st Jan.1881. Encl.to Desp.Govt, 
of I. to S. of S. ^ec. no. 35, 21st Peb. 1881. Pol.& Sec.
Letters to I.
(3) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Sec. no.45» 11th Nov.1880.
Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
(4) Minute by E. Baring, Peb.19.1881.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to 
S. of S. Sec. no.40, 28th Peb.1881. Pol.&Sec.Letters from I.
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Exchequer in a period of war, famine and fall in the gold value 
of India1 s silver rupee. In his opinion "it would be in the 
highest degree unwise to take any steps which would have for 
their result a large increase of expenditure of a wholly 
unproductive nature."1 The surplus revenue of Kandahar was 
negligible and Coi, St. John estimated the total revenue of 
the province for 1880-81 at Rs. 2,050,000 and expenditure 
Rs. 1,450,000 leaving a surplus of only Rs. 600,000.^ After 
taking a stock of the commercial advantages of Kandahar,Baring 
prepared a table
1877-78 1878-79 1879-80
Imports from Kandahar Rs.1,829,000 Rs. 1,478,000 Rs.1,403,000 
Exports from India Rs.1,355,000 Rs. 1,351*000 Rs.2,792,000
From these figures it was not difficult to assume that 
even after enlightened British administration, the indirect 
financial advantages derived from this account could never 
counterbalance the direct disadvantages of the expenditure 
which would be the result of permanent occupation. Thus retire­
ment from Kandahar was forced upon the British Government on
3financial grounds. The Secretary of State in his despatch of
11th November 1880 conveyed to the Government of India the
firm decision of the home authorities that Kandahar would be
A
restored to the dominions of Afghanistan.
(1) Minute by E. Baring, l9th Feb,lbbl.Encl. to Desp.Govt. of I . 
to S. of S. Sec. no.40, 28th Feb.1881. Pol. & Sec.Letters 
from I.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Bes. S.ofS. to Govt, of I.Sec.no.45, 11th Nov.1880.Pol &Sec. 
Letters to I.
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The evacuation of troops from Kandahar was eventually 
announced in the Queen* s speech at the opening session of 
Parliament in 1881. The declaration roused a storm, of 
remonstrances among the Lyttonite members of the Viceroy’s 
council. They regretted that, the decision was taken by 
overruling the Viceroy’s council, ’who were strenuously 
opposed to it.”^  Strangely, Pergusson's reactions were not 
altogether remonstrative. He even admitted that the 
relinquishment of Kandahar would relieve India from ’’heavy 
expenditure.
With the conclusion of the Kandahar controversy, Eipon's 
formula of a Pishin compromise matured. It was zealously 
argued by authorities like Sandeman that Pishin and Sibi were 
not truly Afghan territories. Sandeman based his conclusion 
mainly on two grounds. Politically, he considered the 
districts independent as the Afghan Amir had had no hold 
over them for nearly a century. Besides, he argued that 
ethnologically the inhabitants of Pishin and Sibi were distinct 
fiom the Afghans.^ Both these findings of Sandeman were, 
howevejp, disputable. Lytton and his frontier officers
(1) Minute by W. Stokes, 31st Jan* 1881. Encl. to Desp.Govt, of
I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 35, 21st Peb.1881. Pol.&Sec.
Letters from I.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 10th Jan.1881. P.O.
(3) T.H. Thornton, The Life and work of Sir Robert Sandeman, 
1895, pp. 167-171.
€9
(including even Sandeman) had at different times admitted 
that Pishin and Sibi formed a part of the Afghan Kingdom."1*
The experts agreed that the Pathans of the Indian border­
land belonged to the same ethnological group as the
2
Pathans of Afghanistan. So the retention of Pishin and
Sibi could only be demanded as a matter of policy and
political expediency and not by disproving the Afghan claim
to them. Ripon was suspicious about the real disposition
of Amir Abdur Rahaman and was in favour of retaining Pishin
and Sibi as the strategic position from which the English
could control him.^ Besides, Ripon thought that a sudden
and complete return to the old Sind frontier would lead in '
future to a dangerous reaction towards an extreme forward 
4movement. The strategic consideration in fact led Ripon
to favour a compromise with the forward views contrary to
the settled liberal policy of maintaining an indivisible
Afghanistan. Surprised at Ripon1s deviation, Lord Northbrook
i
wondered if the Viceroy was overwhelmed by L^tonite
5
influence. Northbrook*s suggestion was probably baseless,
(1) L.K. Chose, England and Afghanistan, I960, p.23.
(2) W.K. Fraser-Tytler, Afghanistan, 1950, p.48.
(3) Ripon to Hartington, 11th Sept'.' 1880. Cited in Wolf, 
Ripon, vol 2, p.38.
(4) Ripon to Hartington, 25th Oct. 1880. Cited in Wolf, 
Ripon, vol. 2. p.39.
(5) Northbiook to Ripon, 22nd Sept. 1880. Printed R.P*
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but the Gladstonians were not always less concerned than the 
Disraelians with the security of^Indian empire.
The believers in a forward policy were only too glad to 
support Ripon's stand, for if they could have a frontier as 
far advanced as Pishin, their failure in retaining Kandahar 
would be handsomely compensated. In Pergusson1s opinion the 
retirement from Kandahar might somehow be defensible from 
financial and political points of view but suchvas not the 
case with Pishin and Sibi. He felt that the retirement from 
the assigned districts would be dangerous to British safety, 
injurious to British reputation and contrary to good faith. He 
carefully sounded Ripon : "My opinion may have little weight..., 
But I hope it is such as you approve and I am mistaken if it 
is not.” To Hartington he wrote : "I understand that the 
evacuation of Kandahar is determined on. You know my opinion 
but I daresay that we shall do very well with some such
p
frontier as Pishin.tT Hartington seemed to remain unwavering 
when he informed Pergusson that the retention of Pishin and 
Sibi might have powerful advocates in India but none in his 
Councxl.^ In fact important exponents of the Forward School 
like Rawlinson, General Biddulph and SirRR. Temple considered
(1) Pergusson to Ripon, 11th Jan, 1881. R.P.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 4th Dec. 1880. P.O.
(3) Hartington to Pergusson, 10th Dec. 1880. P.G.
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Pishin as strategically a poor alternative to Kandahar
* -i
and financially Mprodigously costly.1 But they could not
A
foresee that the chances of a forward frontier at this point 
depended upon the disagreement between the Viceroy and 
the home authorities. Pergusson lost no time in strengthening 
Biponih hand and spared no opportunity to convince 
Hartington.
Strategically, Pergusson pleaded with Hartington,
Pishin and Sibi afforded the best frontier line for the
British in India. The places were situated on the Amaran
range between Kandahar and Baluchistan and the inhabitants
2
were friendly and cooperative with the British. Besides,
he was of the opinion that the construction of a railway
between Quetta and Harnai, 60 miles north of Sibi along
with roadways would render frontier communications
advantageous and trade flourishing in the region. With a
position at Pishin valley Pergusson had no doubt that the
British would Hat alljtimes be ready to advance into
3South Afghanistan if unhappy occasions demand.11 A
frontier was invincible if it was guarded by a natural barrier 
like the Amran range. Thus the withdrawal from Pishin and 
Sibi would mean, according to ^ergusson, the loss of the natural
(1) Pol. & Sec. Dept. Memo. On Kandahar, Sir H.C.Rawlinson, 
25th Sept. 1680. No.40.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 10th Jan. 1881. P.O.
(3J Ibid*
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barrier and would open Baluchistan to apprehensions of 
aggression. In view of the rapid Russian strides in Central 
Asia the abandonment of Pishin might, involve in future even 
the abandonment of Quetta and Baluchistan. To Pergusson the 
significance of tne retention of Pishin valley lay not in the
occupation of a part of South Afghanistan but in ensuring
%
the safety of Baluchistan, where the British had “the gains
of pacification, influence and to a great extent actual
//1
administration*
To Pergusson the moral and political objections to the 
British withdrawal from Pishin valley were no less important 
thafr the strategic consideration. The tribes of Pishin and 
Sibi, nominally under the rule of the Afghan Amirs, enjoyed 
little protection and yielded uncertain support to the Amirs. 
“But under the faith of our protection, which can be shown to 
have been solemnly promised,” Pergusson pointed out to
Hartington, “the tribes for the most part had given important
2and open assistance to us Under this circumstance,
Pergusson felt that if the British decided to abandon them, the
Afghans would oppress the tribes to the extrme for helping
A
the British. “No greater disgrace would ever have fallen upon 
the English name than the ruin and misery of their friends.”^
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 10th Jan, 1881. P.O.
(2) Ibid,
(3) Ibid.
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Pergusson however, never questioned the validity of the 
Afghan claims to Pishin valley. He even suggested that if 
the annexation of the districts was "inconsistent with our 
full cession to the Amir of his family possessions, it would 
be easy to undertake to collect and remit to him the 
surplus revenue after the cost of administration has been 
paid."”^ Neither Ripon nor Sandeman, the staunchest advocates 
of the retention of Pishin and Sibi, could offer better argu­
ments in support of their stand than those given by Pergusson.
The home authorities in their turn considered the 
retention of Pishin and Sibi as virtual annexation and their 
possession as an involvement of the Government of India in all 
Afghan complications. The Secretary of State deprecated "any
alternative policy" other than that which Her Majesty's
p
Government declared in May i860. . The announcement stirred up 
loud protests in India. All the members of the Viceroy's
r
Council, with the exception of Baring, insisted onthe wisdom 
of the retention of Pishin and Sibi. St. John and Sandeman, 
the experts in local affairs talked loudly about the 
achievments of the British administration over the tribes for 
three years and about "the pledges ti> tfee inhabitants" of
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 10th Jan. 1881. P.O.
(2) Besp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Pol. no. 40, 3rd Bee.1880. 
Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
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Pishin and Sibi. Ripon's Government on 2nd Pebruaiy, 1881 
informed the Secretary of State that their position at Pishin, 
inilitarily and politically, differed so much from Kandahar that 
the time of the relinquishment of Pishin should not coincide 
with the time of the withdrawal from Kandahar. So they 
suggested that their present hold over the assigned districts 
should continue and that "the assignment shall be given up at
i
a later date." Meanwhile Ripon sent Sandeman as his emissary
to England to put pressure on the home government as to the
necessity of reversing their decision. The Pishin issue thus
became an interesting combat between the Government of India
and the home authorities resulting in the Viceroy having his
way. The despatch of the Secretary of State of 29th April,
1881 determined the postponement of British withdrawal from
2
Pishin and Sibi. The decision was firmly opposed in the 
India Council by Sir E. Perry, Sir P. Halliday and Sir H.
Maine . They foresaw the annexation of these two places in the 
name of so called "postponement of withdrawal." Perry 
remarked: "If we do not restore Pishin to Afghanistan now, 
we never s h a l l . T h e  prophecy was proved to be correct.
(.1) Besp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 21 2nd Peb.1881 
Pol. & Sec. Letters from I.
(2) Besp. S. of S. to the Govt, of I. Pol. No. 20,29th April
1881. Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
(3) Minute by Sir E. Perry, Sir P. Halliday & Sir H. Maine, 
29th April, 1881. Encl. to Besp. S. of S. to Govt, of I.
Pol. no. 20, 29th April, 1881. Pol. & Sec. Letters to I.
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In April, 1882 the British agent at Kabul, Sirdar Afzal Khan 
was instructed by the Government of India flnot to encourage the 
Amir of Afghanistan in any way to believe that the 
Government intends to withdraw from Pishin or Sibi."'1' In 1883 
Thai Chotiali and Harnai were added to the assigned districts, 
In 1884 the railway works for the line between Quetta and 
Harnai, suspended in i860, were resumed. Pinally, in 1887 
by a resolution of the Government of India, the places were 
incorporated within the British Territory under the name 
British Baluchistan.
Thus the high hopes of a liberal Afghan settlement
redeived a setback over the future of Pishin and Sibi and
the urge for imperial security finally trium^Aed over liberal 
conscience. The integration of Afghanistan remained incomplete 
even after Abdur Rahaman1s suecess in recovering Herat from 
Ayub in September, 1881. Ripon1 s Afghan settlement at ±4? 
stood in 1881 closely resembled what Lytton had achieved by 
the abrogated treaty of Gandamak in 1878. Essentially, both 
arrangements ran on "Porward"lines with the frontier extending 
as far as Pishin valley. As a lyttonite, Pergusson was 
obviously happy at the ultimate outcome. He was satisfied that 
the British hold over the Amran range would "greatly mitigate
(1) Instruction for British Agent at Kabul, 17th April, 1882.
Encl. to ^esp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 67, 14th
July, 1882. Pol & Sec. Letters from I.
7S
the moral and material consequences of the loss of Kandahar. M^ “ 
further, the campaigns in South Afghanistan in 1880 
affected relations between the Government of Bombay and the 
Supreme Government and brought forward a heated discussion 
over Presidential commands and the Indian Army reorganisation* 
After Stigwart's departure from Kandahar the garrison there 
was entirely commanded and manned by officers and men of the 
Bombay Army* In the line of communications between Quetta and 
Kandahar the army posts were chiefly composed of Bombay men 
and commanded by Phayre of the Bombay Army. The Government 
of Bombay was also responsible for transport, supply and 
furnishing reinforcement. The Commander in Chief of India/' 
was, however, the final authority over all these arrangements, 
though it can uardly be doubted that the army in South 
Afghanistan was in practice the divided responsibility of the 
Government of Bombay and the Government of India, Under such 
dualism of authority it was only natural that co-ordination 
in some cases would be difficult and misunderstandings frequent* 
Early in July, i860 Hipon complained to Pergusson about a 
misunderstanding between Phayre, commanding the troops in the 
line of communication, and Sandemanjholding the political
(l) jpergusson to Hartington, 11th May, 1881. P.O.
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charge of Quetta, Pishin and Sibi. 1 In his turn Pergusson 
was found to be complaining against the Hailway Department of
the Government of India delaying supply arranged by the
2
Government of Bombay for the line of communications. In 
order to remedy the unpopularity of service in Afghanistan 
among the sepoys the Government of Bombay asked for the return 
of some of their regiments from South Afghanistan.  ^ The 
military authorities of the Government of India could not 
approve this measmre, especially when South Afghanistan was 
in sucn an unsettled state. The Military Department of the 
Government of India asked the Government of Bombay in May,l880 
to reinforce;the Kandahar garrison though only a small
A
detachment actually arrived there after the deafeat of Maiwand.
There were frequent allegations on the part of the Supreme
Government that the Commander in Chief of Bombay, General Warre,
was constantly meddling in the arrangements of Bombay troops
employed in th£ South Afghanistan. Pergusson admitted that
General Warre was Ma fussy injudicious man” who always ran
5himself into trouble with the Government of India.  ^ Hipon1 s
(1) Hipon to Pergusson,8th July, 1880 P.C.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 14th May,i860. P.C.
(3) Pergusson to Hipon, 86th Oct. i860 H.P.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 219, 12th Oct.1880
Pol. & Sec. Letters to I. .
(5) Pergusson to Hartingoon, 20th Aug. 1880. P.C.
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Government instructed the officers in South Afghanistan
not to communicate directly with the Government of Bombay.
Pergusson protested against this order on the ground that
his Government might thus be uninformed of much that in the
public interest they ought to know promptly.1 Soon
indiscretion with regard to military information further
strained the relations between the two authorities.
Following the Maiwand disaster Primrose sent a telegram
from Kandahar to Bombay informing Pergusson that Burrows*s
brigade was entirely '’annihilated11. Pergusson, without
informing the Viceroy, conveyed the message to the Secretary
of State on the plea that the home authorities should not
2
hear it from private sources. Hartington after 
receiving the erroneous news, lost no time in breaking it 
to Parliament, and this shocked the whole nation. Ripon 
sharply protested to Pergusson and pointed out that in 
the context of the delicate political situation of 
Afghanistan, an alarming announcement like that might have 
produced serious evils and upset well-laid plans. 3 "We 
must be careful, " he wrote to Pergusson, "not to find 
ourselves in seeming contradictions in consequence of
(1) Pergusson to Ripon, 23rd Aug. 1880. R.P.
(2) Pergusson to Ripon, 6th Aug. 1880. R.P.
(3) Ripon to Pergusson, 1st Aug. 1880. P.C. .
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the double relations of the Bombay troops in Afghanistan.1,1
Again, General Warre, without previous sanction of the
Supreme Government injudiciously authorised the telegram of
St. John containing the first authentic news about Maiwand
2
to be communicated to a newspaper. Similar instances of 
leakage of aimy information to the Bombay Gazette were 
complained of by Ripon.^ The Government of Bombay meanwhile 
was grumbling against the Supreme Government on the question 
of financing the supplies for the aimy. Pergusson felt that 
the amount proposed and sanctioned for the small occupying 
force at Kandahar could not suffice when that force was 
joined by the relieving forces.^ Besides, Pergusson 
thought that the Government of India should not be too rigid 
with the Government of Bombay in reviewing the prices paid 
for the supplies. "Neither men nor animals... can be procured 
at peace prices at times of war."
The relations between the Government of Bombay and the
Supreme Government were rudely shaken on the issue of the
militaiy responsibility for the defeat of Maiwand. Ripon 
believed that the defeat of Burrows*s brigade was "the 
result of a singular accumulation of incompetent officers 
to whom the command of the aimy had been entrusted under the
TTT Ripon to Pergusson, 13th Aug. lbbO".
(2) Pergusson to Ripon, 6th Aug. 1880. R.P.
(3) Ripon to Pergusson, 11th Sept. 1880. P.C.
(4) Pergusson to Hartington, 21st Nov. 1880. P.C.
(5) Pergusson to Ripon,14th Aug,1880. R.P.
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Existing anomalous and mischievous system by the Bombay
Government. '‘mischievous system", Ripon referred to
was the Presidential system of the Indian army, by which
four distinct aimies existed, in Bengal, Bombay, Madras and
Punjab, theoretically under the supreme control of the
Governor General in Council but practically under four
local governments and commanded by local commanders in
chief. The cowardly behaviour of the cavalry and a part
of the infantry‘at Maiwand, the panic among officers and
the misconduct of officers while retreating pained Ripon
to the extreme. To Northbrook he wrote: **The account
which Y/hite, my Military Secretary, gives of the state in
which Roberts's force found the. garrison of Kandahar is
lamentable and I am afraid that it is clear that the
2Bombay troops are veiy poor stuff indeed." Roberts in
fact was struck by the tone of depression that pervaded
3
the British at Kandahar. The officers showed a want of 
confidence in their ability to resist attack and the 
morale of the larger portion of troops had fallen very low 
when he reached Kandahar to rescue them. He described the 
humiliating picture of a British General having abstained 
from hoisting the British flag upon the citadel of Kandahar
A
for fear that it would excite Ayub to attack. Bor overall______
TTJ Ripon to Gladstone, 22nd Oct. lSbl. Printed R.P.
(2) Ripon to Northbrook, 21st Sept.1880. Printed R.P.
(3; Roberts to Adjutant Gen. 18th Sept.1880. Military Proc.Govt.
of I. Feb.1881.
(4) Ibid.
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failures Primrose was removed from Kandahar command,
Burrows was forbidden to resume his command and General 
Nut tall, Col. Malcolmson and Major Currie were found 
guilty of cowardice and gross misconduct. Thus the Bombay 
army stood dishonoured in the light of the enquiries 
held after the battle of Maiwand. The culmination of 
these findings was a severe censure passed by the Government 
of India on the Government of Bombay. In October,1880 
Ripon's Government decided that the Kandahar command should 
no longer be exercised by a General of the Bombay army. 
General Hume of the Bengal army was soon appointed the 
commanding officer at Kandahar. The Government of India 
further proposed a reconstitution of the military staff at 
Kandahar and in the line of communication. Supply and 
transport arrangements were also taken away from the 
care of the Government of Bombay and were entrusted to 
the Military Department of the Government of India. ^
These steps were sufficient to indicate that the Supreme 
Government held Pergusson*s Government responsible to a 
considerable extent for the mismanagement of affairs in 
South Afghanistan and for the Maiwand disaster.
(l) Secy. Military Dept. Govt, of I. to Adjutant Gen.
no. 8751-K 18th Oct. 1880. Military Proc.Govt . of I.
Peb. 1881.
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Pergusson conceded that the show of the Bombay 
troops at Maiwand was disgraceful but not wholly unusual*
“The best British troops, under-officered, ill-plac$d and 
outnumbered”, according to Pergusson, "could make as 
disgraceful an exhibition as the Bombay troops did at 
Mai'wand .1,1 He further accepted the proved incompetence 
of some of the senior officers of the Bombay aimy. In
2
his opinion Primrose was "unfit" for command at Kandahar.
He sympathised with Burrows but always maintained that
3
Maiwand was, to a considerable extent, lost by bad tactics.
Pergusson, however, was opposed to the denunciation of the
rank and file of the Bombay troops. Even the Supreme
G-overnment had to admit that the Bombay sepoys proved
themselves equal in withstanding the hardship of the
4campaigns to Pathans, Baluchis, Sikhs and Gorkhas. In 
Pergusson*s opinion such excellent Bombay troops should not 
be looked down upon on account of the failure of some of 
their officers. To him Ripon1s decision to alter arrange­
ments at Kandahar constituted "an unmerited disgrace on 
account of a single failure” upon an aimy which had done
(1) Pergusson to Gen. Phayre, 17th Oct. i860. P.C.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 20th Aug. 1880. P.C.
(3) Pergusson to Goschen, 15th Oct. 1880. P.C.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military, no.40, 26th Jan. 
1881. Military Letters from I.
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j good service in the past. As was natural, Fergusson
resented the appointment of Hume at the head of the 
Kandahar garrison and f,the bad way of setting aside” the 
Government of Bombay^ 'ELo greater censure was exer passed”, 
he commented, ”upon a constitutional government and an 
army.” To Hartington he explained that there had been 
failures of command in other parts of the world but the
same army, to which the unsuccessful General belonged,
2had furnished his successor.
Fergusson1s Government strongly remonstrated against
the Government of India for marking ”an indelible stigma on the
fair name of the Bombay army.” They pointed out that the
strength and disposition of the British forces in South
I Afghanistan .was decided by the Government of India, and
A
that no other authority should be held responsible.
Concerning the quality and selection of officers,Fergusson*s 
Government attempted to evade their responsibility by 
stating that officers like Primrose were the automatic 
choice by virtue of their seniority. However, they admitted 
that "there was some difficulty in procuring supplies and 
transport animals” when Phayre* s troops were mobilised and
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 27th Oct. 1880. F.C.
(2) Ibid.
84
Roberts's troops arrived at Kandahar, but "nothing possible
was left undone."*^ The Government of India replied that in
view of the practical inconveniences resulting from the
control of ^Bombay Government over a part of the forces in
Afghanistan they merely systematised arrangements. As regards
the appointment of Hume, Ripon reminded Fergusson that the
selection of commanding officers rested solely with the
Government of India. He commented: "It does not seem to me
3that you have locus standi for a protest." To the Secretary 
of State Ripon1s Government characterised Bombay's charge of 
unde mining their army by the Government of India as 
"unreasonable and mischievous."^ It is unnecessary here 
to attempt to investigate the respective.responsibilities 
of the two governments in creating bitterness. The fact 
was that the relationship between the Government of India 
and the Government of Bombay was badly strained by October,
1880 and neither showed any inclination to improve it.
Ripon was conscious that the removal of Primrose or 
the reorganisation at Kandahar would not settle some of the
(1) Secy. Military Dept. Govt, of B. to Secy. Military Dept. 
Govt, of I. no..6248, 29th Oct. 1880. Military Proc.Govt, 
of I. Feb.1881.
(2) Secy. Military Dept. Govt, of I . to Secy .Military Dept. 
Govt, of B. no.2-c, 17th Nov.1880.Military Proc.Govt. of 
I. Feb.1881.
(3) Ripon to Fergusson, 27th Oct.1880.F.C.
(4) Desp. Govt .of I. to S. of S . Military .no. 515, 22nd Dec.
1880. Military Proc.Govt . of I. Feb .1881.
important issues raised by the late campaign in Afghanistan.
The foremost of these questions was the future of the
existing system of separate Presidential commands. To
Northbrook he declared that when he first came to India
he was favourably inclined towards the Presidential system
of the army. “But I must say that the experience of
the last two months has greatly modified my opinion.” ^
Ripon was convinced that the marked inferiority of the
Bombay troops, the slackness of their discipline, the
contempt into which they bad fallen with “good Bengal
troops" and the delay and friction which had arisen from
the double administration seemed to render a searching
examination of the faults of the Presidential system 
2
imperative. The Vicexoy was even not unwilling to 
enter into an acrimonious controversy over the performance 
of the Bombay Government and their army, though personally 
he thought it wise “to wash our dirty linen in private.”
He was not in favour of casting the whole responsibility on the 
idiosyncracies of the individuals. Ripon wrote: “Itwould
(1) Ripon to Northbrook, 3rd Oct. i860. Printed R.P.
(2) Ibid,
(3) Ripon to Sir E. Perry, 27th June, 1881. Printed R.P.
be unjust and untrue to cast the whole blame upon
either General Warj^re or members of the Bombay Government*
The difficulties were the consequences of an organisation
which produced a system of double government and double
administration fraught with most serious possibilities
of evjfcl". 1 Without exaggerating the weakness of the
Bombay aimy, Hartington felt that it would be necessary.
to consider seriously the question of the organisation of 
2the army. That the Indian army organisation needed 
certain recasting Pergusson hardly had any doubt but he 
threw hints out in a different direction. To Hartington 
he wrote that the Maiwand disaster was "another cogent 
illustration" of the failure of the British officers 
to lead their regiments and to inspire the regimental 
esp^rit de corps.^ Thus when the recent sad memory of 
the campaigns of South Afghanistan led Hipon to think 
in terms of reforming the system of army coimnands, it 
led Pergusson to enquire about the defects of officering 
the Indian army. Though different, both were questions 
of the hour.
(1) Hipon to Duke of Cambridge, 21st April, 1881. Printed R.P.
(2j Hartington to Pergusson, 1st Oct. 1880. P.C.
(3) Pergusson to Hartington, 6th Aug. 1880. P.C.
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In July, 1879 the Government of India had appointed an
Army Commission, in consequence of the financial condition of
the country rendering it necessaiy to effect extensive
reduction in army expenditure. The Commission was specially
directed to investigate the military organisation and to
consider whether the existing arrangement of separate
1
Presidential armies should be sustained. The Commission,
presided over by Sir A. Aden, submitted its report to
lytton's Government. Due to a sharp difference of opinion
in the Viceroy1s Council as to the recommendations to
the Commission, no decision was then taken and the report
was shelved for sometime . The defeat of Maiwand and the
mismanagement of the campaigns in South Afghanistan offered
Ripon an opportunity to reopen the question. In 1881
Ripon1s Government sent home a series of despatches
expressing their views on the recommendations of the
Army Commission. The Commission recommended that the
Presidential armies should be passed from the control of the
local government to the direct orders of the Commander in
Chief and the Supreme Government. In their opinion the
Presidential system of army organisation was "cumbrous and 
2costly. 11 Ripon's Government were of the opinion that this
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military, no.401. 29th Oct. 
1881. Military Letters from I.
(2) Ibid.
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proposal of the Commission ought to be adopted, as the 
evil of the Presidential command "has never been more 
prominently manifested than during the late war," when 
all the disadvantages were exhibited which might be 
looked for carrying on a campaign with allied aimies without 
any compensating benefit.^ Moreover, the Supreme Government, 
being entirely responsible for finance and largely for 
administration controlled the army in such a way that the 
Military Departments of the local governments were in truth 
"little more than transmitting offices for business."
Such a situation should more conveniently come direct to 
the Government of India. Such centralisation of authority 
would lead to a more satisfactory relationship between 
the local governments and the Central Government and the
r
c
former would be relieved of the more minute control of the lattei
The maintenance of three commanders in chief, separate military
departments and other establishments was "unnecessary" and 
3"costly". The armies of the minor presidencies were no 
longer engaged within the presidency limits only but far 
outside them under the command of the Supreme Government.
About the recent experience of a divided command Hipon*s
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military, no.401,29th Oct. 
1861. Military Letters from I.
(2) Ibid
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military, no.336,9th Sept.
1881.Military Letters from I.
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Government stated that serious complications arose Hnot 
only from orders given by the Government of Bombay during 
the war fct variance with the orders of the Government of 
India, but because, on more than one occasion, the orders 
of the local Commander in Chief conflicted with those 
given by Sir. P. Haines himself.1*3" In view of these' 
considerations the Government of India proposed that the 
four armies of Bengal, Bombay, Madras and Punjab should be 
each under a commanding Lieutenant-General who would
t
communicate with the Government of India through the Commander
in Chief. The Commander in Caief would remain the highest
authority of the four armies, but his link with the Bengal
2
army should be discontinued.
Hartington invited the opinion of Fergusson on the Army
Commission Beport of 1879* knowing well that the recommendation
for the abolition of Presidential commands would not find
much favour in Bombay.^ It was only natural that a Presidency
Governor would object to the abolition proposal and would k
oppose substantial curtailment of his power and prestige.
(1) Desp. Govt* of I. to S. of S. Military, no.200, 15th 
Oct. 1883. Military Letters from I.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I. to- S. of S. Military, no.336, 9th Sept. 
1881, Military Letters from I.
(3) Hartington to Fergusson, 9th June, 1882. F.C.
do
To this was added Pergusson1s belief as to the justification 
of the principle of national division or separation in the 
Indian army* Such a policy of segregation of the men of 
different parts of the country would lead them in times of 
excitement and disturbance to act as checks each upon the 
other. Thus, to Pergusson, the maintenance of the 
Presidential commands and not their amalgamation was in 
conformity with Britain's imperial interest. According to 
Pergusson the Presidential command was necessary to keep 
the army of a vast country like India in good order._ Without 
separate establishments in several parts of India, Pergusson 
concluded, "the army of India would be a cumbrous and unwieldy 
machine."^ The decentralisation of command was desirable 
to ensure the efficiency of the army. The problems of the 
local army would better be attended by the local government 
with their knowledge of local affairs than by the Supreme 
Government situated at a great distance. The Supreme Government 
in fact should not meddle in the affairs of the local 
armies. He accused the Government of India of refusal 
to admit the peculiarities of Bombay Presidency."They always 
insist," he wrote to Hartington, "that what is good in..* Bengal 
is good and sufficient for Bombay,although circumstances are
a) Pergusson to Hartington, 3rd July, 1882. P.C.
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widely different. As regards the reduction of army
expenditure Pergusson felt that the local governments 
should be allowed larger discretion and control over the 
military budget. "Y/ith this, ' 1 he remarked, "I anticipate
In Pergusson's opinion, if change was at all 
necessary, it should be effected not in the direction of 
Presidential command but towards the existing arrangement 
of officering the native regiments. The existing arrangement 
of officering was the Staff Corps system. In the readjustment 
of the Indian army following the upheaval of 1857 European 
troops in India became a part of Her Majesty's troops.
Staff Corps were created in 1861 in order to furnish officers 
for all native regiments, for staff departments of the army 
and for other duties outside the scope of ordinary military 
functions. In all the four army establishments Staff Corps 
lists were prepared and the British Officers serving previously 
under the Company as well as those who joined Her Majesty's 
troops were enlisted. Under Staff Corps regulations an 
officer with 12 years service would be a Captain, with 20 years 
service a Major and with 26 years service a Lieutenant Colonel.
2greater economy and efficiency."
Pergusson to Hartington, 3rd July, 1882. P.C. 
Ibid .
0)1
In 1866 the home authorities decided in order to render
Staff Corps appointmen%more lucrative that officers serving
in the grade of substantive Lieutenant Colonel for 12 years
would automatically be entitled to the Colonel's allowance
of £670 per annum.^ So far promotion to the grade of
Colonel had depended entirely on the actual vacancies and
few could expect Colonel's grade before their retirement. By
the decision of 1866, however, every officer of the Staff
Corps would be entitled to a Colonel's allowance if he could
cling to the service for 38 years. At this prospect nobody
would willingly retire. Apart from the increased expenses
of the government the situation mresuited in an unusual
increase of senior officers in the army, burdened with age and
devoid of the competence of youth. When the Staff Corps system
was originally contemplated it was hoped that it would prove
to be an effective device for tapping young British army
officers for political and civil duties in India. The
Staff Corps officers engaged in civil and political employment
always retained their right of reverting whenever they wished
2to military employment and of promotion by seniority.
(1) Army Commission Report, 1879, chapt. VIII, p.108. P.P. 
1884-85, vol 59.
(2) Ibid.
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At the age of 55 when they were considered too old for civil 
and military duties their services were placed at the disposal 
of the Commander in Chief of the Presidency and they were 
eligible for appointment to important commands. This 
practice of allowing army officers to return to militaiy 
duties after long periods of absence in civil and political 
employment was injurious to the efficiency of the service 
owing to their inevitable incompetence. The practice also 
inhibited the growth of regimental esp^rit de corps and 
loyalty. The Staff Corps system always seemed to Fergusson 
as “a hideous blunder."^* Experience of the campaigns of 
South Afghanistan convinced him that the Staff Corps resulted 
in the collection of incompetent officers. Fergusson wrote 
to Hartington: "It £the Staff CorpsJ has all but destroyed
regimental attachment and... resulted in the absurd accumulation
2
of officers of high rank.” The system, according to Fergusson, 
induced an indifference among officers to the military 
profession and a widespread desire "to get out of it as 
soon as it is worth men*s w h i l e . T h e y  preferred the civil 
and political duties while enjoying the benefits of military 
service. Fergusson felt that such officers, away from military
(1) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 4th July, 1881. C.F.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 3rd July, 1882. F.C.
(3) Ibid.
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duties, should be relieved in propriety from the military 
service. ,fIt is no use bringing back to command those 
people... who ceased to remain soldiers.”^  At a later date 
Fergusson reiterated this point to Lord Kimberley, the 
successor of Hartington: "We are wasting money on the 
officering of the army in a terrible and useless manner.
Our present system accumulates officers of high rank and pay,
of whom we have little demand and who are actually less fitted foi
2
what we require."
Similar was the reaction of the Commission of 1879 with 
regard to the Staff Corps system of officering the native 
regiments, "ihe Staff corps system has deluged the Indian 
Aimy with field officers11 and the Staff corps system of 
promotion was such that it led to "an unusual increase of 
superior ranks."^ The Commission recommended a substitute 
arrangement for the Staff Corps by which the officers of 
each army corps should be foimed into a general list* the 
number of each rank should be strictly limited and promotion 
in army rank should only take place as vacancies occurred in 
the rank above. The Commission further proposed compulsory
T H  Fergusson to HartTng^oh, 3rd 'July,1882. F.C7
(2) Fergusson toJd&bberley, 11th Aug. 1884* F.C.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military,no.230, 24th June, 
1881. Military Letters from I.
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retirement of officers electing political and civil 
appointment. 1 Pergusson wrote to Hartington: "I
heartily approve the views of the Commission with reference
2
to the Staff Corps.'* The Government of India, however, 
thought that the scheme recommended by the Commission was 
so rigid that even if one additional appointment were 
made, the difficulty would at once arise of determining 
of what rank the augmentation should be made. Similar 
difficulty would follow if a department had to be reduced, 
which would involve a special reconsideration of the 
whole military establishment of the country. The 
Government of India, on the otner hand, found the Staff 
Corps system quite flexible . It allowed the needful 
expansion and contraction of the establishment of officers 
and afforded all kinds of appointments, political and civil, 
according to the varied wants of public service in India.
If the need of a civil appointment was established an 
officer was tam.en from the native army and another officer 
was brought into the Staff Corps from the British Army. 
Similarly, if an appointment was reduced an officer 
remained supernumerary to the establishment until
(1) Army commission Report, 1879» p.113* P.P. 1884-85 
vol. 59
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 3rd July, 1882. P.C.
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he was absorbed and consequently one transfer less was 
effected from the British Army to the Staff Corps than would 
otherwise be necessaiy. Though it favoured the Staff Corps, 
the Government of India conceded that reforms should be 
introduced in the system regarding the civil and political 
appointments. In their opinion a staff corps officer in non- 
militaiy appointment should not be transferred back to 
military service after 10 years absence.^ On both the issues 
of the Presidential command and the Staff Corps the home 
authorities were in favour of maintaining the statu^iuo and 
not undertaking extensive changes. In July, 1883 they 
conveyed to the Government of India their reluctance to
give up the policy of segregation of the armies in India on
2
security grounds. As regards the mode of officering, they 
were opposed to any departure from the existing system.
The discussion on the organisation of the Indian army was chus 
put aside in 1883 but it was not entirely over.
The Russian expansion in Central Asia received a set back 
with Ripon's settlement in Afghanistan. But as if to make up 
the lost ground, Russia soon began to push forward her
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Military no. 230, 24th June, 
1881. Military letters from I*
(2) Desp. 8 . of S. to Govt, of I. Military no. 243, 2bth July, 
1883, military letters to I.
(3) Desp. 8 , of S. to Govt, of I. Military, no. 382, 13th Dec. 
1883. P.P. 1884-85, vol. 59. p.586
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outposts. In 1883 Russian local officers were found to be
in trouble with the tribes of Tekke-Turcoman territories
and in 1884 the Russians occupied Merv. With Merv Russia gained
a footing on India’s frontier and could at will disturb
Afghanistan and threaten India She could also utilise
her Caucasian base for an assault on India by extending railways
2from the Caspian towards Merv and LSarakhs. The annexation of 
Merv thus considerably increased the English anxiety with 
regard to the Russian intentions. Eergusson believed that in 
view of this Russian threat the frontier defence and the 
general military position of India must be improved* ’’What a 
rude awakening it would be for our security,” he wrote to 
Kimberley, ”if Russia take two strides more to Herat for which 
I believe everything is prepared.”'** Yet, Pergusson found 
that Ripon*s Government was not concerned aboutl'the impending 
danger. ”To my mind it is the weakest policy if policy it 
can be called at all.”^
Since 1882 Riponfs Government had noticed increased 
Russian activity towards Merv and they had advocated diplomatic
(1 ) Minute by Sir 2. Stewart, 8th Sept. 1884. Encl.to Desp.Govt, 
of India to S. of S . 22nd Sept. 1884. Pol.& Sec. Letters 
from I.
(2) Minute by Sir A Colvin, 30th Aug. 1884. Encl. to Desp. Govt, 
of I. to S. of S. Sec. no. 25* 22nd Sept.l8 8£. Pol. & Sec. 
Letters from I.
(3) Pergusson to Kimberley, 22nd May, 1884. P.C.
(4) Ibid^
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overtures regarding a settlement between England and Russia
to remedy future frontier complications* They suggested a
British agreement with Russia to the effect that if Russia
pledged herself not to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan,
England would abstain from interference in the Russian
dealings with the tribes beyond the Afghan and the Persian
boundaries#**' The suggestion was accepted by the home
authorities and diplomatic communications were exchanged with
Russia, though no formal agreement was signed* The adherents
of the Forward policy naturally distrusted the possibility of
success from this method of dealing with Russia and they
insisted on elaborate military preparations. Pergusson felt
that whatever was done in diplomacy to avert encroachments,
militarily the position of British India was too weak for
her to maintain herself if the question of strength came into 
2
play. He advocated emphatically that defence measures like
increasing the strength of the army in India and the making of
3
the railways were precautions which must be taken* The 
Secretary of State, Kimberley, was opposed to any addition 
to the military expenses of the Government of India* He
(1) Desp# Govt* of I* to of S, ^ec. Ho.6, 16th Jan,1882# Pol. 
& Sec. Letters from I#
(2) Pergusson to Kimberley, 21st June, 1884. P.C.
(3) Ibid
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reminded Pergusson that increase of the military expenditure
would "be dearly purchased by any increase of taxation which
might produce discontentment among our native population*"
But he agreed with Pergusson as to the importance of
constructing a complete system of frontier railways. 1 Pergusson
admitted the financial difficulty in the way of increasing the
strength of the Indian Army. But in his opinion the matter was
so serious that proper attention to it could not long be
delayed. He criticised Ripon for complacency at a time when
the prospect was grave." ... what would be the condition and
what would become the credit of India", he remarked, "if
real danger found her with an army so weak and with defences
2
so non-existent as they are."
The Government of India, however, promptly proposed 
measures for the completion of frontier railways. In their 
despatch to the Secretary of State of 22nd September,1884 they 
pointed out that the North West frontier was opened to ls& three 
routes , via Pishin and Bolan or Harnai pass, via Gomal pass 
leading to Dera Ismail Khan, and via Khyber and Kurram routes. 
The last of these three was well-connected with the British base 
at Peshwar while the first route was rendered defensible by the
(l) Kimberley to Pertusson, 17th July,1884* P.C. 
(2; Pergusson to Kimberley, 11th Aug.l884> P.C.
Sind-Pishin railway running through Harnai pass. Concerning
the second route, the government proposed to connect the
isolated Dera Ismail Khan by railway by bridging the
To the protagonists of the Forward school the proposed
arrangement was only a partial defence measure which should be
backed up by an increase in India* s military strength.
Pergusson pleaded with Ripon for an increased number in the
army and for intensive measures for internal defence, statesmen
may know better than the soldiers,” he pointed out to Ripon,
"but the latter regard our position vis a vis Russia as one
2Approaching to helplessness.”
Stewart, who had succeeded Haines as the Commander in Chief, 
offered specific proposals for an increase in the army. He 
observed that India*s contiguity with Russia was imposing 
upon the Government of India the necessity of strengthening 
the army, for the English in India could justify their position 
only by their ability to defend themselves. He was convinced 
that the existing state of the Indian army was unequal to this 
responsibility and suggested increasing the British establishment
to a nominal strength of 7 5 *0 0 0 men and to increase the native
3army by adding 13,000 men. In submitting hhese suggestions
T D  Desp. Govt, of IV to 0 . 0f S. Oec. no. 25, ’22nd Sept. I8 8 4 .
Pol. & Sec. letters from I.
(2) Pergusson to Ripon, 1 8th May,lS84* R*P*
(3) Minute by Sir D. Stewart, 8th Sept. 1884* Encl.to Desp. Govt 
Of I . to S. of S. Sec. no. 25, 22nd Sept. 1884* Pol. & Sec. 
letters from I.
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Stewart was strongly backed up by the majority of the Viceregal 
Council. Ripon, eager to concentrate on the internal 
development of India, had no hesitation in opposing these 
proposals. He clearly doubted a sudden and direct Russian attack 
on India. In his opinion the negotiations already in progress 
between England and Russia should continue in Europe , and until 
the negotiations reached a stalemate, new phases should not 
be thought of. Even if by accident war broke out between 
England and Russia, Ripon believed, the scene of operations 
would be in the Black Sea region rather than Afghanistan. 
Moreover, if India was attacked at all by the Russians from 
Merv - a really impossible feat - reinforcement from England 
would shortly arrive in the days of modern communications. 
Whatever might be the case, Ripon argued, it would be unwise to 
adopt on the basis of mere assumptions "measures fraught with 
serious political and financial consequences. 1 '^ he^ /cost of 
Stewart's proposals was enormous, involving a considerable annual 
increase in the army budget. The amount did not discourage 
the adherents of the Forward School and they repeated their old 
argument of insuring the.country against future dangers. In 
Fergusson1s opinion a timely precaution, though apparently
(l) Viceroy*s Minute, 22nd Sept. 1884 - Encl. to Desp.Govt, of 
of I. to S. ofS . Sec. no • 25, 22nd Sept. 1884* Pol. & Sec. 
Letters from I.
costly, would avert the great expenses of a national crisis.
He wrote to Kimberley that measures like increasing the
numerical strength of the army would "save alarms if not great
expense and danger in the future." But to Ripon the
implementation of Stewards proposals would lead either to the
imposition of new taxes or to the squandering of the financial
reserve for famine and relief works. It would also imply the
cessation of vital public works, neglect of primary education
and improvement of agriculture, which according to Ripon were
2"the first duties of a civilised and civilising government." 
Ripon remained uncompromising on the point and he unhesitatingly 
disallowed Stewart's proposals in the face of a strong 
opposition. By this decision Ripon upheld the Gladstonian 
principle that justice to India demanded the elimination of 
all taxation for military ends.
On the question of the army organisation and the defence 
of India Pergusson*s views were influenced by considerations 
of the local interest, the imperial security and the 
apprehension of external danger. The threat of Russian 
expansion in Central Asia led to the "forward” tendency of the
(1 ) Pergusson to Kimberley, 1 9th Peb. 1885* P.O.
(2) Viceroy's minute, 22nd Sept# 1884. Encl. to l>esp.Govt, of 
I. to S. of S. Sec. Ho# 25, 22nd Sept. 1884# Pol. & ^ec# 
Letters from I.
(3) R.J. Moore, Liberalism and Indian politics, 1872-1922, 
1 9 6 6. pp 26-77
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British frontier policy in India. As regards Afghanistan 
Pergusson*s opinions generally coincided with the pressures 
and bargains of the : adherents of the Porward school for 
extorting concessions from the liberals in the implementation 
of a pacific Afghan policy. The outcome of Ripon's Afghan 
settlement and the Pishin compromise, though not really forced 
by the advocates of a forward policy, had doubtlessly 
satisfied them.
Q
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CHAPTER II 
Aden and the Somali Coast
In the Victorian age British Imperial policy in the 
Mediterranean, in Africa and in the Middle East was profoundly 
influenced by consideration of the safety of the British 
empire in India. Economically, British investment and trade 
in India were a great asset to Britain. Politically, the 
military strength of the Indian empire safeguarded British 
preponderance and promoted British trade in the East. Thus 
to Victorian statesmen, Tories and Liberals alike, "India and 
the British Isles were the twin centres of their wealth and
A
strength in the world as a whole. 11 It was widely believed
that the British position in the world depended upon the
safety of the sea routes between India and the British Isles.
The Tories and the Liberals, however, differed as to the
method to be adopted to ensure the safety of the passage to
India. To the Disraelians the method was one of interference
and expansion. The Liberals denounced such "forward” policy
and Gladstone criticised the Tory interferences in Cyprus,
2EgypV, the Transvaal and Afghanistan. He carried the 
British voters with him against Disraeli's expansionist policy 
in the Midlothian election of 1880. The Gladstonian alterna­
tive was peace, morality and understanding among nations.
(1) R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, 
1 9 6 1, p.1 3 . --------------------------
(2) A. T. Basset, ed.Gladstone*s speeches. 1916, p.570
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By anti-imperialist professions he committed the Liberals to 
a policy of non-intervention abroad. The 1880's were a period 
of increased activities among the European powers to gain *** 
foothold in the East. A policy of non-intervention was diffi­
cult at this phase and the Liberal policy soon showed signs 
of inconsistency. The inconsistency was due to a clash 
between the liberal conscience and concern for the security 
of the empire, between a policy of non-intervention and a 
policy of guarding $he routes to India. The threat to the 
security of India was often believed to be so great that the 
Liberalnifel# they should sacrifice their conscience to meet 
the exigency of the situation. In consequence they found 
themselves involved in increasing Britain's Imperial respon­
sibilities. In 1881 a Liberal Viceroy in India could not 
relinquish the Afghan territories of Pishin and Sibi for 
strategic considerations. In 1882 a Liberal cabinet decided 
upon the occupation of Egypt in order to secure the safety of
A
the Suez canal. The story was repeated when the British 
followed an active policy in Southern Arabia and Somaliland 
resulting in the establishment of British protectorates in 
the Hadramaht and the Somali coast.
The British policy in Southern Arabia and Somaliland was 
largely under the supervision of the Government of India who 
exercised their control through the Government of Bombay and 
the British authorities at Aden. Since its occupation in
(1) R. Robinson and J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians,
1 9 6 1 , p . 121
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January, 1859 Aden had been left under the care of the Govern­
ment of Bombay subject to the general supervision of the Gover­
nment of India, The Government of Bombay thus enjoyed an excep 
tional share in controlling British Imperial policy in the 
Red Sea area. In the past the Government of Bombay exercised 
similar direct influence in the Persian Gulf area^, which, 
however, was transferred to the sole care of the Government of 
India in 1872. Thus Pergusson after being appointed the Gover­
nor of Bombay, found the settlement of Aden as "the last rag 
of Bombay’s foreign relations." In the days of early steam 
navigation, when engines required large amounts of fuel Aden 
was important as a coaling station in the vicinity of the Red 
Sea. But the chief value of Aden was its unique strategic 
position. Aden was the halfway house overlooking the Suez 
canal between Britain's Eastern market and the British Isles. 
The political importance of the settlement lay in the influence 
that if exercised on the Arabian and African coasts of the 
Red Sea guaranteeing the security of the course to British 
Indian possessions.
In 1880 the administrative and defensive arrangements for 
a British settlement of such importance were quite astonish­
ingly inadequate. The settlement covered an area of 21 square
o
miles and had a population of 19,289* The settlement proper 
or the fortified town was so overcrowded that the place became 
"a fruitful cause of disease and crime".^ The executive head
(1 } Pergusson to Ripon, 3rd Dec.1881, R.P.
(2) Bombay Admn.Report, 1880-81, p.2
(3) Bombay Admn.Report,1881-82, p.XIV.
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of Aden settlement was a Political Resident appointed by the 
Government of Bombay. He was the judge of the Court of Resi­
dent, under which was the subordinate court of his assistants* 
He had under him an engineer and engineering staff, a Commi­
ssary and arsenal, a Treasury, several departments including 
police and revenue and a force of troops constituting a bri­
gade of approximately 1,750 men. The defence of Aden unfor­
tunately was not properly cared for. There was no battleship 
to guard Aden and only occasionally did poorly-armed vessels 
of the Government of India visit the place. The arsenal of 
Aden was not properly equipped and the fortress of Aden was 
incapable of withstanding a long siege. The harbour of Aden 
was too shallow to admit big ships and the port facilities at 
Aden were far from satisfactory. The poor condition of the 
harbour was surprising, especially as Aden authorities 
received a considerable amount from imports? The Bombay 
Administration Report of 1881-82 showed that the number of
vessels that touched Aden during the year was 1,272 or 259
2
more than in the preceding year. In view of all these 
deficiencies, Captain G.R.Goodfellow, the Acting Political- 
Resident of Aden, remarked in 1880 that Aden was treated as 
if ,fit was nobody's child.
The real anomaly of the administration of Aden lay in the
(1 ) Memo.Capt.G.R.Goodfellow,Acting Pol.Resident,Aden,51st 
May, 1880, P.C.
(2) Bombay.Admn.Report,1881-82,p .XIV.
(5) Memo.Capt.G.R.Goodfellow,Acting Pol.Resident,Aden,51st 
May,1880. F.C.
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curious position of the Politicalj-Resident. He was not only 
the chief civil officer but also a Brigadier commanding Aden 
troops. As a civil officer he was under the joint survei­
llance of the local government and the supreme government and 
to make matters worse as a military officer he was under yet 
another authority - the Commander-in-Chief of Bombay Presi­
dency. To add to his difficulties,the Political-|-Resident had 
to address independently the Secretary of State for India 
and receive his separate instructions. It was simply impo­
ssible for one individual to perform such various duties 
under so many authorities. On this question of the. plurality 
of authority over Aden, Pergusson was quite unwilling to give 
up his share of supervision. As a Presidency Governor, over­
sensitive about the rights, jurisdiction and functions of 
the local government, Pergusson sincerely believed that the 
Government of Bombay could attend to the affairs at Aden 
better than the Foreign Department of the Government of India, 
which was lfbusy in multifarious activities." He wrote to
General Loch, Resident of Aden : nI shall not willingly give
a
up any more of our functions. 11 This intensely local feeling 
was characteristic of Fergusson and Ripon once ridiculed this 
by saying that Fergusson was "as local as if he had been born 
in a Bombay office." Apprehending any measure that might 
exclude Aden from the jurisdiction of the Government of
(1) Fergusson to Gen.Loch, 16th Dec.1880. F.C.
(2) Ripon to Northbrook,1stlpnly,1881, Printed R.P.
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Bombay,Pergusson anxiously wrote to Kimberley : "I venture 
to think that from Bombay we can exercise a beneficial control 
over local affairs at Aden and that the facility of an occa­
sional visit by the Governor is an advantage which would be 
lost, were it transferred to the Government of India or the
A
Colonial office." Whatever were his views, there was no doubt 
that the transfer of the responsibility for Aden from the 
Government of Bombay to the Government of India would have 
simplified much of the administrative procedures. The commu­
nication among authorities at Aden, in Bombay and in Calcutta 
often caused delay and inconvenience. However, Ripon's Govern­
ment showed no inclination to raise any controversy by chang­
ing the existing arrangements.
Pergusson was conscious of the difficulties of joining in 
one person the duties of a Brigadier with those of a Chief 
Political officer. So far the practice had been to select a 
senior officer of the army for the post of Resident of Aden.
It was burdensome for an army officer to cope with all the 
responsibilities of a place which was fast assuming political 
significance. The political importance of Aden vastly increa­
sed in view of the movements of the European powers in Red Sea 
areas. Pergusson thought that the civil and political func-
A#/*
tions should^be held by ai. Brigadier "who happened to be eli­
gible by mere seniority of command." To Ripon he pointed out: 
"Aden has in many ways become a place of political importance
(1) Pergusson to Elmbepley', 5tb. Uoi'l.188ft,. F .C.
no
and in view of the dealings with the Turks, the Egyptians, 
the French, the Italians and the Arabs of the soil, I think 
that the Resident must be chosen especially for his adminis­
trative fitness and experience.” Thus Fergusson contended 
for a senior civil officer at the head of the administration 
of Aden with a military subordinate commanding the troops. 
Ripon was in favour of maintaining the existing arrangement.
He felt that in so small a place as Aden the presence of two 
high officials, civil and military ”might be productive of 
friction and inconvenience which we avoided by the present
system of uniting the political and military authority in the
2same hands.” Thus when Fergusson wanted to maintain the 
anomalous controlling powers of a local government over an 
aspect of British India*s foreign relations, Ripon decided 
to continue the incongruous functions of the Resident of Aden.
During his stay in Bombay Fergusson was interested in the 
development of the settlement of Aden. Aden*s surplus popu­
lation urgently needed relief and the Government of Bombay 
proposed to purchase the two adjacent villages of Sheikh 
Othman and Imad. In 1881 these two places were bought from 
their owner, the Abdali Sultan of Lahej for Rs.55,000.^ A 
new township was soon laid out and the people were induced to 
go there by the exemption from all rates and taxes. When
(1 ) Fergusson to Ripon,3rd Dec.1881. R.P.
(2j Ripon to Fergusson,23rd Dec.1881. F.C.
(3) Bombay Admn.Report,1881-82,p.XIV.
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Pergusson visited Aden in April,1884 he found these villages
'I
constituting !lan orderly and healthy town of 5000 people.M 
In spite of insufficient port facilities the trade of Aden 
was increasing rapidly. In 1882-85 the total value of trade 
at Aden showed an increase of Rs.35*4- lakhs over the trade of 
the preceding year and in 1883-84- it showed a further increase
p
of Rs.31 lakhs. Fergusson felt that trade at Aden would
further increase if improvements were effected in the port of
Aden. With this view he proposed to constitute a Port Trust
*
for Aden with initial financial help from the government. 
Unfortunately neither the Government of India nor the Secre­
tary of State took any notice of the proposal. For expediti­
ous adjustment of the cases of wreckage and salvage near Aden 
the appointment of British Consul in the Red Sea area had long 
been pressed. In 1880 in view of the growing activity of the 
European powers on the Somali coast such an appointment became
a political necessity to maintain British influence over the
il
Somali tribes. Fergusson1s Government strongly recommended 
that the Assistant Political Resident of Aden, Captain F. M. 
Hunter should be invested with consular authority in addition 
to his duties in the settlement^ and this was readily conceded 
by the home authorities.
Fergusson*s chief interest concerning the settlement of
(1) Fergusson to Kimberley, 18th April, 1884-. F.C.
(2) Bombay Admn.Report,1882-83>P*XXV and Bombay Admn.Report, 
1883-84-, p. 14-1
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley, 14-th April,1884-.F.C.
(4-) Resident Gen.Loch to S.of S.No.1-121,27th Jan,1881. Letters 
from Aden.
(5) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.200,3 1st Aug.1880.Pol &
Sec.Letters from I.
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Aden was, however, in its relations with the neighbouring Arab 
tribes. Since the occupation of Aden the British policy was 
to develop the settlement not merely as a coaling station and 
a defensive post but as a profitable trade centre. Aden had 
the prospect of becoming the main outlet for trade in Yemen.
For the safety of this trade route and for supplies to the 
settlement, the British had to cultivate stable relations with 
the independent Arab tribes of Aden hinterland. At the beginn­
ing these tribes were hostile to the British occupation of Aden 
and their hostility sprang mainly from financial considerations 
The former ruler of Aden, the Sultan of Lahej, used to pay 
each tribe of the neighbouring area a portion of the customs 
dues of Aden, partly to encourage their use of the port and
A
partly to secure the roads from their attacks. When the 
British took possession of Aden the tribes suspected that they 
might be deprived of their share of the dues. The British, 
however, had no such intention. They knew that a refusal of 
the payment was certain to lead to tribal aggression on the 
Kafila (convoy of travellers or traders) routes or trade links 
of this southern part of Arabia and on the settlement of Aden 
itself. Britain felt that the best policy was to improve the • 
defences of Aden, to make friendly agreements with the tribes 
of the area, to agree to pay them subsidies and to undertake 
occasional punitive expeditions against them in case of
(1) T. E. Marston, Britain's Imperial role in Red Sea area,
1 9 6 1, p . 78 ----------------------------
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hostilities. This policy of friendly understanding, stipend 
and firmness proved to be effective and helped the British 
dealings with the tribes. The total subjugation of the Arab 
tribes was difficult and the maintenance of a British adminis­
tration over them was expensive. If the hinterland of Aden 
had been economically lucrative, the occupation of Aden might 
have led to the British occupation of entire South West Arabia 
But the sandy, rough, barren lands of the Arabian coast 
offered no good prospect to the British. So the British autho­
rities were satisfied with the preservation of Aden primarily 
as a coaling station and a defensive post guarding the passage 
to India, and secondarily as a trade centre, treating the 
tribes as their allies without interfering with their inde­
pendence. The Government of Bombay repeatedly instructed the 
Residents of Aden not to get involved in the affairs of the 
interior.^
Thus the British policy at Aden can be summed up. First,
the British authorities decided to grant stipends to the
tribes and sub-tribes, originally through the chief of a
major tribe like the Abdali Sultan of Lahej, but later on
pto each tribe independently. Secondly, the British authori­
ties contracted friendly agreements with most of the tribes, 
insisting on their good behaviour. These agreements were 
neither subsidiary alliances nor treaties guaranteeing the 
tribes their independence. These were merely forms of
(1 j T. E. Marston, Britain1 s Imperial Role ■>1: C1»p.497.
(2) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Relations of the British Govt.with 
the tribes of Aden hinterland,R. Ritchie,19th March,1936. 
No.B.155
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agreements by which in consideration of the stipends, the 
chiefs bound themselves to keep open the roads and maintain an
/i
attitude of friendship towards the British Government; Thirdly 
the British authorities decided to maintain an attitude of 
strict non-interference with regard to the independence of the 
tribes and in respect of inter-tribal conflicts which were 
frequent in the neighbourhood of Aden. To the British impe­
rial interest the defence of Aden was most important and it 
was presumed that to interfere with the tribes was to weaken 
the defence of Aden itself by exciting opposition in the inte-
p
rior. Lastly, the British authorities at Aden, though reluc­
tant to interfere with the tribes in Aden hinterland, were 
absolutely unwilling to allow in this area a free hand to any 
other European nation. The Resident of Aden was constantly 
urged to enforce strictly the policy of exclusion of European 
powers in the hinterland.
The year 1869 saw the introduction of new elements in the 
situation in Red Sea areas. On November 17, 1869 the Suez 
canal was opened and in one day the Red Sea, economically a 
backwater, became one of the main sea routes of the world.
The result of the opening of the canal was quickly felt at 
Aden. In January 1870 Resident General Russell reported that 
Prussian, Dutch, Spanish, French, Italian and Austrian ships
IL
were constantly moving along the Arab coast. Of these
(1 ) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Relations with the tribes in the vici­
nity of Aden,. F.M.Hunter, 28th Sept.1885« No.B.30.
(2) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Relations of the British Govt.with the 
tribes of Aden hinterland,R.Ritchie,19th March,1936.No.B.
, N 155-(3) T.E.Marston, Britain's Imperial Role,P.4-97
(4) Resident Russdl'l to Gbvt.of B.T2th Jdn.18/0.Cited in 
Marston,Britain's Imperial Role,p.388
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European powers interested in the Red Sea, France and Italy 
were to be seriously reckoned with. The French men of comm­
erce vigorously commenced their activities in the Red Sea areas 
supported by their government. Some French traders in 1868 
were said to have purchased a small harbour, Sheikh Sayid, on 
the Arab shore of the Red sea from the local chief. But the 
Porte, the suzerain authority in the area, refused to sanction 
this purchase. There were further reports of the French at 
Aden attempting unsuccessfully to negotiate with the Somali
chiefs for the possession of a place on the African coast,
2
opposite to Aden. The Italians, realizing the potentialities 
of the Suez canal, thought that the opening ofthe canal would 
put Italy among the Western European countries closest to the 
East and would revive her trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
As early as 1870 the widespread rumour was that the Italians 
were trying hard to find a suitable post in the Red Sea area, 
preferably in Assab, a place on the African littoral where 
the requisites of a good harbour existed.
That Turkey had an eye on the whole of the Arab coast of 
the Red Sea was clear when she refused the French any posse­
ssion at Sheikh Sayid in 1868. The Turkish rule in Yemen in 
the past was claimed to have covered even the vicinity of Aden, 
The Turks who evacuated Aden as early as 1633, reoccupied the 
province of Yemen in 1873 and came face to face with Aden
(1 ) Resident Goodfellow to Govt.of B.12 16th Nov.1869. Cited s 
in Marston, Britain's Imperial Role, p.381
(2) Resident Russell to Govt.of B.24th April,1869. Cited in 
Marston, Britain's Imperial Role p.380
116
hinterland. Meanwhile the British Government had already 
established direct relations with most ofthe important 
tribes of the hinterland, such asj the Abdali, the Fadhli, 
the Akrabi, the Subaihi, which were nearest to Aden, and the 
Haushabi, the Alwi, the Amiri, the Taffai and the Aulaki
A
bordering Yemen. From Yemen the Turkish Government began
contending that their Sultan's Sovereignty extended over all
these tribes by virtue of their former occupation of the area.
The British Government on the other hand strongly maintained
that the tribes were independent. In addition to the Turkish
claim to sovereignty, there had been ever since 1873 constant
disputes in regard to the frontier between the tribes and the
territory under the direct administration of the Turks in
Yemen. Both the subjects were discussed from time to time by
the British Government and the Porte. In 1873, the British
ambassador at Constantinople informed the Porte that the
British Government would not tolerate the interference of the
Ottoman authorities in the territories of the tribes. In the
succeeding years this declaration had been repeated on several 
2occasions.
Thus in 1880, when Fergusson assumed powers in Bombay, 
the British officials at Aden were apprehensive of the move­
ment of the European powers in the Red sea and of the motives
(1) Both the Yaffai and the Aulaki tribes were sub-divided 
into upper and lower sections.
(2) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Memorandum respecting Aden frontier 
delimitation, British Foreign Office, Dec.11,1905«No.B.156
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of Turkey in Yemen, the immediate neighbourhood of Aden hinter­
land, Under these circumstances Fergusson*s Government showed
far
a tendency^) f bo coming- active and^int o rf-e r ing in their rela­
tions with the Arab tribes, Ripon1s Government on the other 
hand always preferred to restrain the enthusiasm of the local 
government, not allowing them to go too far. This was only 
natural, for ideologically Fergusson, an orthodox Tory, was 
committed to the Forward ideas of Indian politics and Ripon, 
on the whole a liberal, preferred to put more emphasis on the 
tasks of internal reorganisation of India,
Fergusson*s eagerness for interference in the affairs of 
the Arab tribes in Aden hinterland was clearly revealed in a 
conflict between the Lower Aulaki and the Fddhli, In 1883) 
the lower Aulaki tribe, in pursuance of a long standing feud 
with the Fadhli, decided to attack the Fadhli with the assis­
tance of the Abdali, When the news reached General Blair, 
the Resident, he promptly decided to help the Fadhli chief
'i
with ammunition. In April, 1883, in view of the impending 
aggression on the Fadhli, the Resident proposed to interfere 
in the conflict and sought Fergusson*s orders to employ a 
British force to assist the Fadhli, He further suggested 
that in case of necessity, the whole of the Aden troops must
p
be despatched to occupy Hawar, the capital of Lower Aulaki. 
Fergusson*s government promptly answered that in case of emer-
(1 ) Resident Gen.Blair to Govt.of B.26th Feb.1883.Enel .to Desp, 
Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.104,29th June,1883*Pol& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) Govt.of B.to Govt.of I.17th April,1883.Encl.to Desp.Govt, 
of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.104.29th June,1883.Pol.& Sec.Letters 
from I.
mgency the proposals of interference might be carried out, 
though simultaneously they pointed out the traditional British 
policy in such eases that "interference in the quarrels of the 
tribes is to be resorted to as rarely as possible.11 The 
settlement of Aden was hardly involved in the conflict except 
for the fact that the Fadhli was a stipendiary of the British 
Government and the Lower Aulaki, though not a stipendiary, 
entered into an agreement of friendship with the British autho­
rities. Fergusson1s Government in their urge to maintain 
peace in the country surrounding the settlement and to disci­
pline the unruly tribes finally resolved to flout the declared 
policy of non-interference and hurriedly telegraphed the
Resident that if the attack was imminent he might send the 
2
forces. As a result of this message, a British force under 
the command of Major Hume was sent from Aden to aid the Fadhli 
chief and to put pressure on the Lower Aulaki. On the arrival 
of the troops at Shugra, the Fadhli capital* it was found that 
no invasion by the Lower Aulakis had so far taken place. Thus 
after a stay of several days, the detachment was withdrawn. 
Soon after the army left the Lower Aulaki suddenly advanced 
to within 3 miles of Shugra. Fortunately, however, in the 
fight that followed the Fadhli defeated and drove back the
Aulakis. Ripon1s Government could not approve the proceedings
(1J Govt.of B.to Resident Gen.Blair, 1st May,18 8 3 .Encl.to besp. 
Govt.of I to S.of S.Sec.Ho.104. 29th June,1883.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) TeleS-Govemor, Bombay to Resident,Aden, 17th April, 1883. 
Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.104. 29th June, 
1883«Fol•& Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Resident Gen.Blair to Govt.of B.7th May,1883.Encl.to Desp. 
Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.104,29th June,1883.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
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and pointed out to the Government of Bombay that interference 
in the affairs of the Arab tribes should be very cautiously 
exercised,
Pergusson1s forward leanings with regard to inter—tribal
conflicts found a further opportunity to interfere when a
quarrel started between the Kotaibi tribe and the Amir of
Zhali. The Kotaibi tribe, which in the past was tributary to
the Amir of Zhali, a British stipendiary, was found in 1880
to be endeavouring to free itself from Zhali authority* The
principal sheikhs of the Kotaibi built up forts on the Kaflla
routes and illegally, started collecting taxes on Kafilas and
disturbing the trade between the Zhali district and Aden* The
trade route between Irinih'i and A1 Suffra, for the safety of
which the Amir of Zhali had hitherto been held responsible by
2the British, was thus usurped by the tribe* General Blair , 
the Resident of Aden, was in favour of interfering in the 
dispute on the plea of re-establishing order on the trade 
routes and recommended the demolition of the forts built on 
the highways by the employment of British force from Aden.
He also proposed that a treaty should be effected between the 
Amir of Zhali and the Kotaibi Sheikhs through British media­
tion, binding the Kotaibi Sheikhs to be obedient to the Amir*3
The district of Zhali, where the dispute broke out, was conti-
(1) Govt.of I.to Govt.of B.7th June,1883.Encl.to Desp*Govt.of 
I.to S.of S.Sec.No.104,29th June,1883*Pol.& Sec.Letters 
from I.
(2) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.25,6th Feb.1 8 8 3.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(3) Resident Blair to Govt.of B,11th Oct.1883. Encl.to Desp. 
Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.25,6th Feb.1883*Pol•& Sec.Lettei 
from I.
izo
guous with Turkish-occupied Yemen and the Turks could easily 
exploit the dispute in favour of the authority of the Porte. 
Bearing this consideration in mind, Pergusson1s Government 
promptly decided to sanction the proposed measures of British 
interference."1 Riponfs Government, however, quickly inter­
posed, directing that an attempt should be made to effect an
amicable settlement by means of direct negotiations with the
2
Kotaibi, instead of an armed intervention. Resident General
cu
Blair was opposed to such^measure and pointed out that some 
other trade routes of the fceglon were commanded by the tribes 
like A1 Abdulla and A1 Bukri under the authority of the Amir 
of Zhali. If the Kotafbll claims had been recognised by the 
British Government by opening negotiations with them, these 
tribes would levy taxes on the Kafilas and press their claims 
on the Amir of - Zhhli# So a separate British understanding 
would only set up a bad precedent for dealing with the tribes. 
On the other hand a prompt solution of the disturbance was 
essential in view ofthe fact that the Amir of Zhali was in 
friction with the Turks in Yemen. The Turks, it was believed 
at Aden, were "looking for an opportunity to create diffi­
culties and to advance further." Thus to General Blair the 
only course that seemed open was a show of force on the part
(1 ) Resolution,Pol.Dept.Govt.of B.7th Nov.1882.Encl.to Desp. 
Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.25,6th Feb.1883.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.to Secy.Pol.Dept.Govt.of B.1 st Feb 
1 8 8 3. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.25,6th Feb.
1883. Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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of the British and strengthening the hands of the Amir. The 
situation continued unchanged for sometime, after which 
General Blair informed the Government of Bombay that a section 
of the Kotaibi had reconciled itself to the Amir,of Zhali1s 
authority but that the other sections had manifested no dis­
position to come to terms and were levying taxes by violating 
the authority of the Amir. Pergusson's Government under this 
circumstance strongly pleaded with the Government of India to 
permit the Resident of Aden to put pressure on the disturbing 
Kotaibi elements. They wrote *V!...it is necessary for the 
peace and good order of the neighbourhood of Aden that the 
authority of the superior chiefs should be supported and that 
petty chiefs should not be permitted to defy their superiors 
under the cover of the disapproval of the British Government
np
of war and hinder trade by irregular exactions. The Govern­
ment of India under such pressure sanctioned financial aid 
and help in armaments and ammunition to the Amir of Zhali to 
suppress the rebels. The Amir of Zhali was accordingly given 
gun powder and shot but he was hesitant to attack the Kotaibi. 
Thus the dispute continued to drag on without any settlement#
(1) Resident Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.5th March,1883. 
Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.90, 8th June, 
1883* Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Secy.Pol.Dept.Govt.of B. to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I#4th 
March,1884. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.90,
8th June,1883- Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I. to Ch.Secy. Govt, of B. 17th 
March,1883. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I. to S.of S. Sec.No.90, 
8th June,1883• Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
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In June, 1884 the merchants of Saana in Turkish Yemen 
protested to the Aden authorities against the illegal exac­
tions of the Kotaibi. The Aden authorities at this point 
were suspicious that the Turks in Yemen might fish in the 
troubled waters of inter-tribal quarrels. Major Hunter, 
officiating Resident of Aden, suggested that the only way of 
settling the question and freeing trade from the "rapacity 
of the troublesome Bedoins" was to support the Amir by the 
presence of Aden troops and by the forcible demolition of the 
forts on the roads of the Kafilas. He proposed to despatch 
a company of Aden troops and anticipated no real resistance
A
from the Kotaibis. The Government of Pergusson on 12th
June, 1884 sanctioned the proposal of armed intervention. On
17th July, 1884 the Aden troops demolished the Kotaibi forts
and forced the tribe to acknowledge the Amir of Zhali1s 
2
authority. Thus once againJbr the reason of maintaining 
peace in the neighbourhood of Aden armed interference was 
resorted to. Ripon as usual was in favour of restraint and 
his government thought that the case "was not one of sudden 
emergency or imminent danger" and that Pergusson*s Government 
had unnecessarily departed from the general policy towards 
the tribes.
As regards British relations with the Arab tribes Pergu-
sson suspected the intentions of the Turks in Yemen. He was
(1) Maj.Hunter to Secy.Pol.Dept.Govt.of B. No. 216-1407* 27 til 
June,1884.Por Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Ext.Nov.1884.
(2) Report of Capt.J.S.King,Officer commanding troops,20th 
July,1884.Por Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Ext.Nov.1884.
(3) Secy.Por Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.2599E, 
10th Sept.1884.Por Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Ext.Nov.1884.
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afraid that Turkey was threatening the neighbourhood of Aden
in the same manner as Russia did on the North West Frontier
of India. The suspicion of Fergusson was largely facilitated
7
by the fact that after 1880 in the politics of^ Eastern Ques­
tion there was marked estrangement between the liberal cabi­
net of Gladstone and the Porte. A firm believer of non­
conformist conscience Gladstone felt that foreign policy 
should be conducted on moral principles. Since 1876 the 
denunciation of the Turks for the Bulgarian massacre and for 
oppression of the subject nationalities became "a strong
A
obsession" with Gladstone. Thus during his second ministry, 
Gladstone, guided by his passionate hatred of Turkish oppre­
ssion, decided to drop by 1881 the Conservative scheme for 
defending the Turkish empire. The Gladstonians felt morally 
bound to dispense with"the unspeakable Turks" as an ally. But 
what is more interesting is to note Fergusson's concern for 
the movement of the Turks in Yemen in contrast with the then 
Tory slogan supporting the cause of Turkey in Europe. Essen­
tially, however, a Tory like Fergusson was concerned only for 
the security of India. The Disraelian expediency to maintain 
the "sicl^nan" of Europe was largely inspired by the same 
consideration, namely, to disallow Russia a footing in the 
Mediterranean and thus to obtain the naval security of the
(1) J. Morley, Life of Gladstone, 1903, Vol.II, P.565
124
Indian possessions. Besides, if the Russians had Constanti­
nople, Disraeli believed, they could at any time march their 
army towards India through Syria. Thus to Disraeli Constanti-
A
nople was "the key to India". Apart from this question of 
a Russian aggression, the Indian authorities in the 1880's 
gravely suspected the Turkish movements in the Red Sea region. 
The British interest in the Persian Gulf and in the settle­
ment of Aden was of paramount importance to the safety of 
India and it was believed that the Porte had a long-cherished 
plan for the extension of Turkish authority along the Arabian 
coast towards the Persian Gulf. The Government of India con­
sidered any extension of the Turkish influence on the Arabian 
coast "as detrimental as closing the whole Arabian coast 
round Aden and subjecting it to the direct influence of Turke$
In the Zhali affairs the Government of Pergusson and 
their agents at Aden were clearly influenced by this appre­
hension of a Turkish advance. In 1873 with the occupation 
of Yemen the wave of Turkish aggression began to approach 
the Amiri district, contiguous to Yemen and 90 miles from 
Aden. The chief of the district was directed by the Ottoman 
authorities in Yemen to submit to the power of the Porte.
At the outset he was compelled by the force of the circumstan­
ces to give in to the Porte, but he expressed to the Resident
(1) G. E. Buckle, Life of Disraeli. 1910, Vol.VI,p.84.
(2) Desp.of Govt.of 1. to 3. of S.Sec.No.146. 30th Oct.1881. 
Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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of Aden his desire to retain British friendship. As a matter 
of fact no clear treaty then existed between the British 
Government and Ali Mokbil, the Amir of Zhali, but Ali Mokbil*s 
predecessors were always friendly towards the British. At 
the time when the Porte pushed its conquests in 1873* the 
boundary of the Amir stretched upto Yaffai district. In con­
sequence of a visit to Aden Ali Mokbil was imprisoned by the 
Turkish authorities in Yemen, but was released after a strong 
diplomatic remonstrance by the British Government in January, 
1874. On his return to Zhali, Ali Mokbil found his capital 
in the hands of a Turkish nominee who resisted him for some 
time. In March,1878, Ali Mokbil with the help of the Abdali 
was successful against the usurper. Though he regained his 
territory Ali Mokbil had to dispense with 16 villages which 
remained nominally under the Turkish authority. Some of 
these under pressure paid allegiance to the Porte and in case
A
of the others the people voluntarily preferred Turkish rule.
Meanwhile in 1880 a formal agreement of friendship was signed
between the Aden authorities and the Amir of Zhali in which
a stipend was granted to him for keeping the safety of the
2
trade routes through his domain. But Ali Mokbil always 
remained aggrieved for the loss of his territory to the Turks 
and the Turks in Yemen in their turn never failed to exert 
pressure on him.. A series of boundary frictions broke out
(1) Resident Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.395 * 17th
2$lg
Nov.1884. Letters from Aden.
(2) Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.23,31st July,1883.
Pol. & Sec.Letters from B.
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and this undesirable state of affairs was often brought to
the notice of the Resident of Aden who wrote strong letters
of protest to the Governor of Yemen against Turkish encroach-
ment on Zhali territory* In June, 1880 by the order of
Fergusson1s Government Aden troops were despatched to Zhali
2
to resist Turkish intrigues*
To Fergussonfs Government and to the Government of India 
the cause of Zhali against Turkey was very important and it 
was believed that as the settlement of Aden was largely depen­
dent for supplies on the neighbouring country11 it was important 
to restrain the spread of Turkish influence over the indepen- 
dent tribes of South West Arabia1. Fergusson always empha­
sized the importance of a high level diplomatic negotiation
between England and Turkey in Europe to solve the Zhali ques-
4tion permanently. Riponfs Government also took the same
attitude and implored the government at home 11 to cause the
matter to be placed before the Turkish Government in a manner
that will prevent any interference on their part in the Zhali
country.11^  At this point the Resident of Aden, General Loch
informed the Government of Bombay that the Turkish officials
in Yemen were endeavouring to bring under Ottoman rule all 
C D  Act.Resident Goodfellow to flh.Secy*Govt.of B.N0 .I6I ,24th
??T21
Jan.1880. Letters from Aden.
(2) Lesp.Govt.of I.to S. of S.Sec.No.177?10th Aug.1880.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Ibid.
(4; Fergusson to Hartington, 4th June, 1880. F.C.
(5) Lesp.Govt.of I. to S.of S.Sec.No.177?10th Aug.1880.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
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the Sheikhs who remained the subjects of the Amir of Zhali* 
This they did, he thought, ,fno doubt in the hope that in time 
the whole of the Amiri district may become subject to the 
Porte. 11 ^ It was further reported in October, 1882 that the 
Turks in collaboration with the personal enemies of the Amir 
were inducing people to waver in their allegiance to their 
ruler and that the Porte considered the Amiri district - far 
away from Aden - as beyond the zone of direct British influ­
ence. General Loch requested the Government of Bombay to 
sanction the despatch of Aden troops to Zhali.
Meanwhile the Turks in Yemen were complaining against the 
activities of Ali Mokbil damaging their interests. In Septem­
ber, 1884 Izzat Pasha, the Governor of Yemen,accused Ali Mok­
bil of disturbing the tranquillity of the frontier region by 
acts of aggression and violence on Turkish subjects. He even 
accused the Aden authorities of inciting the Amir in these 
hostile and unfriendly acts. The Turkish allegations agai­
nst the Amir were not probably without any foundation and 
Ali Mokbil was possibly attempting to use the British support 
not only against the Turks in an unjust manner, but also 
against his personal enemies and relatives by painting them 
as pro-Turkish. General Blair, the Resident, confessed that
the chief was "the veritable old man of the sea,f who hungontbe
(1 ) fies.Gen.Loch to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.25th April,^S8T.Enel.to 
Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.154,26th Dec.1881.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Res.Gen.Loch.to Gh.Secy.Govt.of B.17th Oct.1881.Encl.to 
Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.154,26th Dec.1881.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Res.Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.393,17th Nov.1884. 
Letters from Aden. 2518
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British authorities and led them to paths ”far from pleasant”
It was thus potentially harmful for the British Government to
support such an ally consistently against the Turks. This
consideration prompted the Government of India to instruct
Fergusson's Government to restrain the Amir from giving "legi-
2
timate cause of offence to the Turkish authorities.” Still
Fergusson's Government and the Resident of Aden apprehended
Turkish movements as such a real menace that they continued
their advocacy of strengthening the hands of the Amir by a
considerable addition to his stipend to enable him to keep
his turbulent vassals in order. Though the British had merely
a friendly agreement with the Amir, the Resident of Aden
refused”to abandon him n o w . G e n e r a l  Blair's views were in
conformity with the policy of the Government of Bombay. In
connection with the Turkish allegation against the British
support of the Amir's anti-Turkish activities, he remarked so
long as Her Majesty's Government consider it desirable- as it
undoubtedly is, that Aden should be surrounded by a zone of
independent stipendiaries, so long will Turkish jealousy
ascribe to the Aden Residency interference with Ottoman 
n4possessions.”
The only remedy to the whole problem was a proper delimi­
tation of the Zhali-Yemen frontier. The home authorities felt 
(T) Resident Gen.falair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.395, 1?th Nov.
2yfe
1884. Letters from Aden.
(2) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.39,10th March,1885. Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Resident,Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.5 9 5 ,1 7 Nov.1884 
Letters from Aden. r 2^io ’
(4) Res.Gen.Blair to S.of S.No.^r,5th Dec.1884.Letters from 
Aden.
ri9
that the Governor of Yemen should receive immediate instruc­
tion from Constantinople to come to terms with Aden. With 
this object in view British negotiations began at Constanti­
nople in 1885. In March 1884, Resident General Blair received 
an invitation from the Governor of Yemen to depute an officer 
to hold a friendly talk with him on Zhali affairs. However, 
at this point, affairs on the Somali coast attracted the
whole attention of Aden Residency and this prevented the
1
despatch of^proposed deputation from Aden. By this time 
reports of fresh Turkish attacks on some Zhali villages 
arrived and the Resident informed the home authorities and 
the Government of Bombay that the Turkish officers in the 
neighbourhood of Zhali had compelled the shaikh^ under the 
Amir’s authority to sign a complaint against the Amir for 
blocking the roads and committing acts of aggression on Turk­
ish frontier villages. Such fabrication, it was alleged, was
Pto be used by the Porte while holding talks with the British. 
On the other hand the Porte formally lodged a complaint that 
the Amir ofZhali illegally occupied a place called Chonar in 
Shaari country. This place, it was claimed, belonged to 
Turkish Yemen.^ The Governor of Yemen, Izzat Pasha, further 
complained about the proceedings of the Amir of Zhali in
(1) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.Ho.39,10th March,1885.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Resident Gen.Blair to S.of S.No.7 ,17 Feb.1885.Letters froi 
Aden. 3^7
(3) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.39,10th March,1885. Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
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threatening people of the frontier villages of Yemen. In 
the midst of such charges and counter-charges, Fergusson’s 
tenure of office in Bombay came to an end. The Zhali-Yemen 
frontier delimitation question was finally taken up in 1886 
and in 1887 delimitation was effected.
Fergusson’s governorship in Bombay witnessed renewal of 
activities on the part of the European powers to gain^foot- 
hold on the coastal areas of the Red Sea. The Italians were 
the first to obtain a position in Assab where the Dankali 
chief of the African littoral sold the place to Italian
2
Rebattino Company for establishing a coaling station there.
By August, 1880 the settlement of Assab was extended by 
further purchase of territories. In January, 1881 the Agent 
of the Rebattino Company returned and the Italian Government
tL
appointed a political officer to act as the governor of Assab; 
In September, 1880 a French Company called Comte de Revoire 
with the authority of the French Government proceeded towards 
Obokh on the African littoral.-' In December, 1881 the news 
reached Aden that Obokh had been sold to the French by the
f:
local chief. The French also renewed their attempt to seize
(1) Resident Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.8 12th Jan.1885 
Letters from Aden. 55,
(2) Act.Res.Goodfellow to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.229,20th July,
1880. Letters from Aden. T(562
(3) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.183,17th Aug.1880.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(4) Resident Gen.Loch to S.of S.No.1-121,27th Jan.1881,Letters 
from Aden.
(5) Act.Resident,Goodfellow to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.317,23rd 
Sept.1880.Letters from Aden. ’PF55
(6) Res.Gen.Loch to Br.Consul-Gen.Cairo,No.1929,13th Dec.1881 
Letters from Aden.
Sheik Sayid on the Arabian coast with the sanction of the 
Porte.1 In the context of these proceedings of the Italians 
and the French and the British friction with the Turks in 
Yemen, it was but natural that Fergusson would be determined 
to safeguard the British influence in the Red Sea. For.-'this 
purpose he was inclined to employ diplomatic pressure on the 
tribes, threat of violence and the actual use of force to 
exploit inter-tribal conflict in the neighbourhood of Aden.
All these methods were illustrated in the single incident 
of the quarrel between Shehr and Makalla.
Makalla and Shehr wa£e two principal ports on the south 
coast of Arabia, 250 and 270 miles away respectively from 
Aden. The chiefs belonged to Kasadi and Kaiety branches of 
the Yaffai tribe. Since 1873 the two chiefs had been engaged 
in a feud, which was actively prosecuted upto 1877* The 
quarrel had its origin in a temporary alliance of the two 
chiefs against their common enemy, the Kathiri tribe. To 
prosecute the feud against the Kathiri tribe, it was agreed 
by the two chiefs of Makalla and Shehr that the cost of the 
operations should be borne by the two allies equally. It 
was actually defrayed in the first instance by the financially 
solvent chief or Jemadar of Shehr, to whom the ruler or Nakeeb 
of Makalla finally owed 160,000 Austrian dollars. This was ~
(1) Resident Gen.Loch to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.33, 17th Feb.
1882. Letters from Aden.
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never paid and in 1873 was wiped off by an agreement between 
the two chiefs, under which one half of Makalla and one half 
of its allied small port, Bunder Broom, were sold to Shehr 
for 240,000 dollars. The balance of 80,000 dollars was 
promptly paid by the Jemadar to the Nakeeb in cash. The 
Nakeeb, meanwhile refused to abide by the bond on the ground
A
that it was extorted by treachery. Whatever might have taken 
place, it was certain that the Nakeeb had kept the money and 
the Jemadar had never obtained the possession of the stipula­
ted territory.
The British Government had treaty relations with both the
parties dating from 1863, when the two chiefs entered into
engagements to prohibit the-slave trade. Besides this link,
the Government of India was interested in the conflict because
both the chiefs had relatives serving the Nizam of Hydrabad
and in^course of/bhe conflict these relatives supplied arms,
men and money to continue the struggle. Strong British
pressure, however, was put on the Nizam to prohibit assistance
going from his territory to strengthen the conflict in South 
pArabia. But the primary interest of the British authorities 
in this struggle was to prevent hostilities by sea between the 
contestants. Without hostilities at sea the conflict was
bound to remain inconclusive as Makalla was only vulnerable
(1) Res.6en.Loch to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.1^0-902,3rd June,1879. 
Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.16.2nd Feb.1881. 
Pol.8b Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Shehr and Makalla,A.W.Moore,7th March,
1 8 8 1. No.B.23.
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by sea. The Government of India stated clearly that they 
were interested in the dispute in order to prevent hostili­
ties by sea, for such hostilities would lead to piracies and 
hinder trade in general on the coast. All these considera­
tions led the British authorities to attempt mediation through 
the Resident at Aden. The Resident General Loch in 1876 was 
successful in concluding a truce between the parties for some­
time. General Loch’s attempted negotiations, however, failed 
to produce any settlement of the dispute though the truce was 
allowed to continue by the two parties*
During:this period of lull Fergusson appeared as the 
Governor of Bombay and immediately took lively interest in 
the affair. In November, 1880 General Loch pointed out the 
dangers of continued British inaction which might lead to 
Makalla coming into the possession of either the Turks or
the French or the Italians. Makalla was the "gateway" through
tHe
which all trade of^South Arabian coast or Hadramaut usually 
passed. Thus any strong power holding Makalla would soon 
possess the whole of the Hadramaut and if the Turks managed 
to occupy Makalla they would soon extend their sway towards 
Oman and^Persian Gulf. It was apprehended strongly that the 
Nakeeb of Makalla, finding the British not helpful might
throw^his lot with the Turks or with a European power.
(1) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.16,2nd Feb.1881.Pol.fc “ 
Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Resident Gen.Loch to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.29th Nov.1880.
Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.16,2nd Feb.1881 
Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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To avert such a possibility General Loch proposed a British 
protectorate over Makalla by suggesting that Makalla should 
remain with the Nakeeb under the protection of the British 
Government paying one-sixth of the revenue of the place for 
such protection and making suitable arrangement to pay off
A
the debt to Shehr. Fergusson promptly supported this plan 
and wrote to Ripon that Shehr and Makalla both in course of 
time would fall into the hands ofthe Turks "if we do not take
p
hold of them^T This proposal of a moderate extension of
British influence was to allure Ripon and the Liberal Cabinet
at home who on principle were opposed to shouldering any
expenditure and responsibility of fresh direct annexation.
The Government of FergusBon officially advocat&d the scheme
of a protectorate on the ground that under a little pressure
the Nakeeb of Makalla would be likely to accept the proposal
and that tTif the British Government abstained for the present
in the affairs ofthe Hadramaut, they might be hereafter
*
involved in more difficult complications.”
While the proposal was in consideration hostilities broke 
out and Broom was seized by the troops of Shehr. Fergusson*s 
Government caused the British ship "Philomelt! to move towards
Makalla in order to prevent war at sea. An officer of the
(1) Govt.of B.to Govt.of I.No.6197,21st Dec.1880.Encl.to Desp.’ 
Govt.of I. to S. of S.Sec.Ho.16,2nd Feb.1881.Pol.& Sec.
Letters from I.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon,16th Feb.1881. R.P.
(5) Govt.of B.to Govt.of I.No.6197»21st Dec.1880. Encl.to 
Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S. Sec. No_.16,2nd Feb.1881 .Pol.&
Sec.Letters from I.
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Residency was empowered to attempt to effect a further truce 
for sometime. The Nakeeb, however, was unwilling to make a 
truce, having invited to his aid his former foe, the Kathiri# 
Soon it was found that the Nakeeb regretted his decision of 
inviting the Kathiris and was afraid that the Kathiris, while 
protecting him against Shehr, might themselves occupy Makalla# 
This led him tpawrite.Cto the Resident of Aden offering to make 
over his country to the British in consideration of a monthly 
stipend of 500 dollars for himself and his successors. He 
hinted plainly that the offer if refused by the British should
A
be made elsewhere.
Resident General Loch was strongly in favour of accepting 
the offer without hesitation. "I can not but fear,” he wrote 
to Fergusson, ,fthat unless we accept the Nakeeb of Makalla*s 
offer, Makalla will be sure to fall into the hands of the
p
Turks." The Government of Fergusson thus proposed in January
1881 that "the Government without incurring any permanent
obligation might offer to administer the territory in question
for a term of 5 to 7 years in the name of the Nakeeb with
power to extend the period on payment of 500 dollars per
month to the Nakeeb and setting a portion of the revenue to
meet the debt of Shehr"^ This was in fact a very mild approach
(1) Resident Gen.Loch to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.l6th Be0.1880.^017* 
to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.16,2nd Feb.1881.Pol.& 
Sec.Letters from I.
(2} Loch to Fergusson, 27th Dec.1880.F.C.
(3) Govt.of B.to Govt.of I.3rd Jan.1881.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of 
I.to S.of S.Sec.No.16,2nd Feb.1881.Pol.& Sec.Letters from 
I.
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to suit the susceptibilities of Ripon. Ripon1s Government, 
though disturbed by the constant reference to the Turks, were 
in favour of merely continuing to prevent war by sea. However 
in view of the importance of excluding the Turkish influence 
from the Hadramaut coast they caused the Nakeeb to be warned 
against "attempting to dispose of his country without the 
assent of the British Government.*1
In February, 1881 the whole affair took a dramatic turn. 
The Jemadar of Shehr told the Resident of Aden that he wanted 
to purchase Makalla and Broom outright from the Kasadi family 
on payment of 3 lakhs of dollars and thus to settle the dis­
pute. He also agreed to place himself under the suzerainty 
of the British provided that the sale was sanctioned and 
carried out. General Loch considered the proposal as satis­
factory and recommended it on the ground that the Nakeeb, who
was very much pressed by the Kathiris for money, would agree
2
to the scheme. To Fergusson this was another opportunity of 
establishing a British protectorate in the Hadram&mt and he 
advocated the scheme to Ripon by emphasizing that the Jemadar, 
if allowed to purchase Makalla, would promise !,to give us a 
comparatively strong, friendly and tributary neighbour.*1^
(1) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S. Sec.No.16,2nd Feb.1881.Pol.&
Sec.Letters from I. <
(2) Loch to Fergusson, 28th Feb.1881. F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 25th April,1881, R.P.
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To Hartington he wrote "the tribe of Shehr is a rising and 
dominant force in this little region and ifcwill secure in 
future both the independence and peace of the coast under
A
British influence,11 The Resident of Aden immediately induced 
the two chiefs to sign an agreement proposing the sale of 
Makalla to Shehr, Ripon1s Government by this time succumed 
to the notion that "no foreign intervention should be permi­
tted in the dispute between Shehr and Makalla11:!and sanctioned 
the deed of purchase. The Jemadar promptly paid the first 
instalment of the purchase money to the Residents treasury 
at Aden. But it soon became evident that the Nakeeb of 
Makalla, weak and vacillating, was not disposed to agree to 
any arrangement which did not entirely meet his views. He
accordingly declined to carry out the agreement in spite of
Pall that the Resident of Aden could do.
Believing that the chief of Makalla would be held to the 
sale of his possessions, the Jemadar of Shehr withdrew his 
garrison from the port of Broom which he had previously 
occupied. On the refusal of the Nakeeb to comply with the 
agreement, Fergusson thought that the British Government 
"ought to go through with the settlement" for they were 
committed to the Jemadar who had withdrawn from a position of
advantage at Broom.^ This justified the British use of force
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 55th May, 1881. B.C.
(2) Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.146, 30th Oct.1881.
Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 25th April,1881. R.P.
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in aid of the Jemadar, if necessary, to hold the Nakeeb to 
his agreement. It was at once decided to allow the Jemadar 
of Shehr to attack and occupy Makalla by sea which had so long 
been forbidden. This, however, was to be done by blockading 
the ports of Broom and Makalla by a ship of the Royal Navy 
which would cover the landing of the troops of Shehr and sub­
due any fire from the fort of Makalla by the use of the ship's 
guns. Accordingly,Her Majesty's ship "Dragon11 under commander 
Hulton was despatched and a blockade was laid around Makalla. 
But due to some miscalculation of the Resident it was found 
that the Jemadar was not prepared to take possession of Makallc 
Under the misapprehension that all necessary operations would
be undertaken by the British, he had allowed his troops to 
a
dwindle away. The misunderstanding resulted in the setback 
of the grand project. Fergusson in utter disgust wrote to 
General Loch : "You do not appear to understand how annoying 
it was after we had procured assent {from the Government of 
India]] to the use of force to find that you had not seen that
p
thej Jemadar was ready." Fergusson was afraid that the mis­
carriage of the plan might lead Ripon to think that the Govern­
ment of Bombay had "got into a mess." In desperation he 
proposed another plan by which the Jemadar of Shehr would be
(1) Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.146,30th Oct.1881.Pol.
& Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Fergusson to Loch, 1§th Sept.1881. F.C.
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placed in possession of Broom and that Makalla should become
a protectorate of the British* A British agent would collect
the revenue of Makalla, paying one-half to the Nakeeb and the
other half to repay the debt of Shehr, Ripon in reply
commented : "...the whole affair is now in an unpleasant
state and I am afraid that it will be difficult to bring it to
p
a really satisfactory conclusion,rt It was heard at this 
point that the Nakeeb of Makalla had appealed for help to the 
Sultans of Zanzibar and Muscat and that having failed to 
obtain help from them he declared himself a Turkish subject 
and desired to place himself in the hands of the Turkish Gover 
nment. The information considerably strengthened Fergusson*s 
hands and he wrote to Ripon : MI do not think we can be indi­
fferent to the troubles that would ensue were we now to with­
draw from intervention,
By this time the Jemadar had prepared to seize Broom and 
Commander Hulton helped him by towing the boats containing his
troops to the neighbourhood of Broom, When all was ready, the
Jemadar proceeded on 1st November 1881 to land at Broom under 
the cover of the guns of the British ship and the place was 
speedily captured. When the Jemadar's troops were approaching 
Makalla from Broom, Commander Hulton with his ships helped the
Jemadar in obtaining from the Nakeeb the cession of Makalla,^ .
(1^ Fergusson to Ripon, 3rd June,1881, R.P.
(2) Rmpon to Fergusson, 13th July, 1881. F,C.
(3; Fergusson to Ripon, 6th July, 1881. R.P.
(4) Dent>. Govt.of I. to S. of S.Sec.No.66, 14th July,1883.
Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
140
Fergusson promptly informed Hartington about the settle­
ment of the dispute through British coercion and expressed 
satisfaction that the Jemadar of Shehr was placed in posse-
A
ssion of Makalla and Broom, Curiously Ripon1s Government
also seemed to be satisfied with this arrogant and dangerous
intervention. They wrote : "...seeing that the result has
been the speedy and complete settlement of a very troublesome
p
dispute, it is unnecessary to take any further note of it.11 
On 29th May, 1882 a treaty was signed by the Jemadar of Shehr 
and the Resident of Aden by which the Kaiety tribe became a 
stipendiary of the British and resolved not to dispose of 
Shehr, Makalla and Broom to any power other than the British 
Government. It was further decided that the purchase money 
of Makalla and Broom should be passed over by the Resident 
of Aden to the Nakeeb from the Jemader. Thus Fergusson1s 
plan for intervention was satisfied and a British protecto­
rate was firmly established on the Hadramaut. The case of 
Shehr and Makalla was a clear indication that the former 
British policy of non-interference in tribal affairs in Aden 
neighbourhood had definitely been abandoned.
In January, 1882 General Loch, Resident of Aden proposed 
the establishment of a British protectorate over the territo­
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 1 5th Dec.1881. F.C.
(2) Govt^of I. to Govt.of B. 11th July, 1882. Encl.to Desp.
Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.66, 14-th July, 1885. Pol. &
Sec.Letters from I.
(5) Agreement between Jemadar and Resident of Aden, 29th May,
1882. Encl. to Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S. Sec.No.66,14-th 
July, 1885* Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
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ries of the Lower Alonku and Wahidi tribes on the Hadramaut in 
view of increasing activities of the French and the Italians 
in the Red Sea* The wealthy Kaiety family, the new stipendiary 
of the British, had for long an eye on Dhofar - an important 
position on the Hadramaut under the possession of the Imam of 
Muscat. General Loch reported that the Kaiety in fact were 
trying to pursuade the Imam to sell Dhofar to them. Thus, in 
the opinion of the Resident, if a British protectorate over the 
Wahidi and the Lower Alonku could be established and if the 
Jemadar of Shehr succeeded in purchasing Dhofar, the whole of 
the coast from Aden to^Persian Gulf would come under the British 
control. “No power would then be able“, General Loch remarked 
to Fergusson, “to obtain a footing on any part of it“. The 
scheme of General Loch was strongly supported by his successor, 
General Blair. Fergusson promptly took up the scheme,which 
seemed to him "perfectly just", and forwarded it to the Viceroy
p
for serious consideration. Ripon, however, did not like the 
proposal and wrote to Fergusson:"I am always inclined to hesi­
tate about proposals for extending our obligations in Arabia 
and of course if we induce the tribes to bind themselves not 
to hand over their territories to any foreign nation, we shall 
be obliged in return to undertake not merely to pay them some 
small subsidies - which is a minor matter, but to defend them 
against attacks - which is an engagement not to be entered into
Loch to Fergusson, 8th Jan.1882. F.C.
(2; Fergusson to Blair, 12th April,1882. F.C.
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without careful consideration.11 Though fundamentally the 
Liberals were as eager for the security of British Indian 
possessions as the Conservatives, the difference of attitude 
between Ripon and Fergusson was clearly one of outlook and not 
of mere emphasis. The scheme was then hurriedly dropped.
Fergusson's Government played an important role in the 
affairs of the Somali coast mainly through their jurisdiction 
over the settlement of Aden. In fact Aden's contact with the 
ports of the Somali coast and the security of British interests 
in the Aden Gulf always determined the British policy towards 
the African coast. With its poverty of local resources, the 
settlement of Aden was largely dependent on the food supplies 
from the Somali coast, especially on the supply of livestock. 
The Aden authorities and the Government of Bombay were thus 
directly concerned that orderly conditions should prevail on 
the Somali coast and that the feeder caravan routes from the 
interior should be clear and free. A definite British occupa­
tion of the Somali coast was never seriously contemplated by 
the British authorities and the government was not willing to 
take any expansionist measure unless the supply from the Somali 
coast was seriously threatened by any new development.
The Ottoman authorities always claimed the sovereignty of 
the Porte over the whole of the Somali coast on the grounds of
(1) Ripon to Fergusson, 17th March,1882.F.C.
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the past conquests of the Ottoman power. The Ottoman Sultan,
Salim I, the conqueror of Egypt, in 1517 occupied the area.
With the withdrawal of the Turkish garrison in 1633» most of
the Somali coast came into the hands of the independent tribes,
with the exception of Zeyla. Zeyla passed under the sheriff
of Mocha, a dependent of the Porte. Prom 1827 the Government
of India contracted a number of treaties with the tribes at
Berbera, Tajourah and Zeyla securing the safety of commerce
and the protection of the British interest. At Zeyla, however,
the British negotiated two treaties of commerce, and peace in
1840 - one with the Sheriff of Mocha and the other with the
chiefs of the Arab tribes. An understanding with the Sheriff
of Mocha showed that the British considered Zeyla under Turkish
influence though in case of other places, the tribes were
a
treated as independent. Besides the British, two other '
European powers, Italy and Prance, had their eyes fixed on the
Somali coast. As early as 18591 the French were negotiating
with the Dankali chief for the cession of Obokh. Since 1869
2
the Italians were active in obtaining a position at Assab.
With the opening of the Suez canal in 1869 the movements of 
Italy smd Prance increased to a great extent. Primarily as 
a reaction to these moves of the European powers, Egypt 
revived Turkey?s ancient claims on the African littoral of the 
Reddsea. In 1866 the Turkish Sultan granted a Firman to the
(1) Pol.& Sec.Dept.Memo.Somali Protectorate, W. Lee-Warner,
25th Nov.1896. No.B.74.
(2) I.M.Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland, 1965* p.41
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Khedive of Egypt by which Egypt claimed the Somali coast as 
her dependency. In July, 1875 Zeyla was farmed to Egypt by 
the Porte for a fixed annual subsidy and Tajourah as a tribu­
tary of Zeyla also passed into the hands of the Egyptians.
In 1870 one Jamal Bay was sent by the Egyptian authorities to 
the Somali coast to raise the Egyptian flag at Berbera and 
Bulhar. In 1875 an Egyptian corvette "Surka" treated the 
British ship "Dalhousie" near Somali coast as if the country 
belonged to Egypt. In January, 1874- the report of the Resident 
of Aden indicated that the Egyptian occupation of the Somali 
coast was almost complete.
The .Egyptian occupation provoked immediate British protests 
While not herself seeking to occupy Somali territory, in the 
interests of the safety of the supplies to Aden, Britain did 
not wish to see any other power established on the opposite 
side of the Gulf of Aden. To achieve this end emissaries were
often sent from Aden to intrigue among the Somalis against 
p
Egypt. Due to constant pressure from Aden authorities and 
the Government of Bombay, the India Office caused the Foreign 
Office to resist Egyptian claims^to the coast east of Zeyla 
through diplomatic channels from 1870 to 1874*. In 1874* the 
newly-formed cabinet of Disraeli favoured a change of British 
foreign policy as regards the Somali coast. Faced with other
less predictable rivals like Italy and France they came to ^
(1; Pol .& Sec.Dept.Memo.Egyptian claim to Sovereignty over 
Somali coast, A.W.Moore,11th Oct.1879* No.B.3*
(2) I. M. Lev/is, Modem History of Somaliland, 1965> p.4-1
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regard the Egyptian occupation as more in keeping with British 
interests than hostile^to her* This change in attitude was 
inspired by General Stranton, British Agent and Consul General 
in Cairo, In October, 1874 he emphatically argued in his des­
patch to the foreign Office that a regular system of govern­
ment under the Egyptians on the Somali coast offered more seri­
ous guarantee of friendly relations with Aden than were afford­
ed by the existing commercial treaties with the Sheikhs of Ber- 
bera, Zeyla and Tajourah. In his opinion the fears expressed 
by the Indian authorities that Egyptian occupation of Berbera 
would endanger provisioning of Aden appeared to be ,fchimerical 
Following this the Government of Bombay and the Government of 
India shifted their stand and declared that if Aden's interests 
were not affected adversely they had no objection in recognis­
ing Egyptian sovereignty over the Somali coast. Both General 
Stranton and the authorities in India agreed that if Egyptian 
authority was allowed to prevail on the Somali coast it would
be detrimental to other European powers seeking to obtain.foot-
AA
hold. Accordingly the matter vvjas settled by a Convention betw­
een Britain and Egypt,signed at Alexandria on 7th September, 
1877* By this agreement the British Government recognised the 
Khedive's jurisdiction under the suzerainty of the Porte over, 
the Somali coast as far as Has Hafun. The agreement was to
(1) Pol.fc Sec,Dept,Memo, Egyptian claim to Sovereignty over 
Somali coast, A. W, Moore,11th Oct.1879* No.B.3.
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come into operation under the terms of Article V by which the 
Turkish Sultan should give a formal assurance to the British 
Government that no portion of the territory of the Somali coast 
would be ceded to any foreign power. Another important provi­
sion of the agreement was that Berbera and Bulhar should be 
free ports and that the duties at Zeyla and Tajourah should 
not exceed 5 per cent on imports and 1 per cent on exports.
The assurance from the Porte to ratify the Convention,however, 
was never given and from that point of view the Anglo-Egyptian 
convention of 1877 was not strictly binding. But the settle­
ment composed differences for'the moment and an Anglo-Egyptian 
understanding over the Somali coast was definitely reached.
Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, described the Conven­
tion as "our only security against other European powers obtai-
2
m n g  a footing opposite Aden.rt
After this the Egyptians had little difficulty in esta­
blishing their authority over the ports of Berbera, Bulhar, 
Zeyla and Tajourah and they even succeeded in expanding behind 
Zeyla and established a garrison in the ancient commercial 
city of Harrar in the Galla country. But their influence over 
the nomads of the interior was limited and it was customary on 
the part of the Aden authorities to characterise the Egyptian 
rule as oppressive and unjust. The British authorities in
India, as expected, were vigilant in safeguarding their supply
(1) Pol• & Sec.Dept.Memo.Somali Protectorate, W. Lee-Warner, 
25th Nov.1896, N0 .B.7 4 .
(2) I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland, 1965iP.4-2
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from Somali ports. In 1875-76 about 65»000 sheep and 1100
A
cattle were imported to Aden and the number gradually swelled.
When Fergusson assumed charge at Bombay the situation on the
Somali coast from the British point of view was apparently
satisfactory. Officers at Aden found greatly improved port
facilities at Berbera and Zeyla. Some lighthouses were erected
and the lawless population had been coerced into subjection.
But some concern always existed as to the position of trade.
Captain Hunter, an offleet" ato Aden reported in April,1880
that at Berbera and Bulhar taxes on merchandise were levidd
by the Egyptian authorities. "This proceeding”, he wrote, ”is
in direct violation of the Convention with Khedive of 1877
which stipulated that they {Berbera and BulharJ should be free 
2ports.” One Captain Heron of the Royal Navy was of the 
opinion that the Egyptian occupation of the Somali coast was 
doing "infinite harm” and that British imports and exports had 
considerably decreased.^ However, it was quite reasonable 
for the Egyptians to think that the ports should be self- 
supporting by the levy of moderate dues. The British policy 
was not to insist on Berbera and Bulhar being absolutely free 
ports but to limit the British demand to the removal of every
tax, duty and cess on import by land and export by sea of
X"1) Memo.on Somali coast, Gen.M.Schneider, Ex-Resident,Aden,.
22nd Jan. 1884-. For Dept .Pro .Govt, of I.Exfc.April,1884-#
(2) Report of Capt.F.M. Hunter, 20 th April,1880.Encl.to Acting 
Resident Goodfellow to Govt.of B.No. 181,17th May, 1880. E'. -I. 
Letters from Aden.
(5) Repo^t .efCapt.He'r6nT5^h' June ,1880.Encl.to Actg.Resident 
Goodfellow to Govt.of B.No.177-662,7th June,1880.Letters 
from Aden.
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livestock and provisions, Fergusson*s Government were disposed 
to think that as long as the exactions of the Egyptians were not 
oppressive, it was hardly necessary to insist upon the two ports
A
being absolutely free. The British vigilance against the levy
of dues by the Egyptians was so effective that Egypt, while
incurring a heavy expenditure for the administration of Somali
ports "was compelled to content herself with declaring her
2
supremacy in Somaliland without any adequate return.” In July,
1882 when Arabi Pasha's movement against the Khedive?s power
shook Egypt, a rumour became current that the Governor of
Berbera, Ferhat Pasha was a sympathiser of Arabi and anti-
Khedive in attitude. It was feared that this might lead to a
closure of Berbera*s supply to Aden as a reaction to British
assistance to the Khedive in putting down the revolt of Arabi.
This naturally made Fergusson and his Government exceedingly
anxious. Later on it was found that Ferhat Bay had written a
friendly letter to Aden assuring uninterrupted supply.^
In 1884 Arabi*s revolt in Egypt was quickly followed by the
/Ce
Mahdi's revolt in*Sudan against the authority of the Khedive.
tuThe enormity of the outbreak in^Sudan necessitated a concentra­
tion of Egyptian resources and a drastic curtailment of Egypt's 
responsibilities in such outlying areas as Eritrea, Harrar and
the Somali coast. This abruptly resulted in the termination of
(1) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.200,31st Aug.1880.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) Memo.on Egyptian withdrawal from Somali coast by the Resi­
dent of Aden.Hag.F.Hunter,Offg.Resident to S.of S.No.C/I,
5th June,1884.Letters from Aden.
(3) Resident Gen.Blair to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.219 18th .Tulv 
1882.Letters from Aden. 1086’ ’
the Egyptian regime on the Somali coast. The occupation of 
the Somali coast involved the stationing of Egyptian garrisons 
to discipline the Somalis, which could no longer be allowed 
in the contingency of a revolt in the Sudan.. Moreover, finan­
cially, the Somali coast area was an impracticable liability 
for Egypt.1 It was decided in May,1884- that the Egyptians 
would shortly evacuate.Somali coast. The proposal of Egyptian
A
evacuation immediately raised again the question of adminis­
tering the Somali coast to the advantage of Aden. Meanwhile 
Erance and Italy had become remarkably active. Recent French 
acquisitions in Madagascar and Indo-China and the collapse 
of the Anglo-French condomonium in Egypt by 1884 gave France 
an impetus to strengthen her base of Obokh on the Red Sea 
route. In 1884 the' French also emphatically laid claim to 
TagoUrah and the Aden authorities believed that in consequence 
of the evacuation of the Egyptians, if Zeyla fell under the 
Turks, Tajonrah under the French and Italian influence exten­
ded from Assab, the whole Somali coast and Southern Abyssinia
would be dominated subsequently by foreign powers. Thus to the
Cl) Estimate of Egyptian income and expenses 5
Place Revenue Expenditure in 1885
Farrar - 755^0 dollars- 229 dollars - Surplus of
15281 dollars
Zeyla - 5600 ,f - 9105 ” - Deficit of
5505 dollars
Berbera- 6074 ” - 9037 " - Deficit of
2963 dollars.
Mr#Egerton,Act.Br.Agent,Cairo to Earl of Granville,For S.
of S.Eo.740,26th July,1884. For Dept.Pro.Govt.of I.Ext.
Nov.1884.
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British interest in obtaining easy supplies from Somali coast
was added the apprehension of the penetration of France, Italy 
a
and Turkey,
Fergussonfs Government could not remain indifferent to this
question as the Somali coast was the chief source of Aden
supplies and as the area was under the consular jurisdiction
2
of Major Hunter, an officer of Aden, To Fergusson the Egyp­
tian withdrawal meant a golden opportunity for the British to 
extend their authority on the Somali coast. This he felt 
necessary on strategic grounds# He had no doubt that the 
French and the Italians, already active in the Red Sea, would 
take advantage of the Egyptian evacuation unless prevented by 
the British. To Cranbrook, &hleadipglTo:£yf in the House of 
Lords, Fergusson wrote, 1 it seems that we must recognise our
responsibilities and interests and that naval strength in these
*
seas is important."^ He denounced "the wavering attitude in 
English politics" as regards the strategic objectives. To 
Kimberley he wrote:"I know how many considerations must deter­
mine action in such instances as that of the Somali coast. In 
the narrow range of view which a local government have, it seens 
a pity to lose the attachment of the tribes-whose relations 
with us are friendly and through which we may preserve the
prestige which has hitherto belonged to us in those parts."
Memo.on Egyptian evacuation of Somali coast, Resident,Aden.' 
Maj.Hunter, Off.Resident to S.of S.No.C/I,5th June,1884. 
Letters from Aden.
(2} Fergusson to Ripon,27th April, 1884.R.P.
(3) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 14th April,1884. C.C.
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He was frankly in favour of the military occupation of the 
whole area,^ The British policy on the Somali coast at this 
phase was conducted by the concerted action of the India Office 
and the Foreign Office in London. The India Office worked 
through the Resident of Aden and the British Consul on the 
Somali coast, Major Hunter, while the Foreign Office moved 
through the British Agent and Consul General in Egypt, E.Baring. 
As the immediate authority over the settlement of Aden Fergu­
sson largely expressed the opinion of the men on the spot and 
much of the working of British policy depended oh the discre­
tion of these men. Major Hunter confirmed the opinion of 
Fergusson that British indifference to the Egyptian evacuation 
would result in the occupation of the area by the French or the 
Italians. General Blair, Resident of.Jtdei},also pleaded 
strongly in favour of the friendly tribal feeling towards the 
British and the preference of the tribes for a British protec- 
torate. Fergusson advocated to Kimberley the necessity of the 
interference of the Aden troops before the Egyptian evacuation 
on the plea of tribal anarchy. He contended on the basis of 
Major Hunter's report that the Somalis would become undisci­
plined and might even attack the withdrawing Egyptians,throwing 
the country into utter confusion. To Maintain order the Aden
troops must be despatched to different parts of Somaliland.
(A ) Fergusson to Kimberley,2tfBfccJu5ei*1884.F.C.
(2) Maj.Hunter, Off.Resident to S.of S.No.C/I,5th June,1884. 
Letters from Aden.
(3) Memo.on Egyptian withdrawal from Somali coast by the Resi­
dent of Aden.Maj.F.Hunter,Off.Resident to S.of S.No.C/I,5th 
June,1884. Letters from Aden.
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In his opinion, on the behaviour of the tribes depended "the 
peaceable withdrawal of the Egyptians and the subsequent good 
order of the country." It was in fact expressed emphatically 
by Major Hunter to the Secretary of State in July, 1884 that 
the relations between the Egyptian Governor of Harrar and the 
Eesa Somal tribes became so strained that the latter refused 
all obedience to the Egyptian officers. Under the circums­
tances he recommended the despatch of Aden troops to maintain 
2
order. In August, 1884 Major Hunter reiterated his stand 
by stating that a temporary British military occupation of 
Zeyla would prevent the Eesa Somals from obstructing the 
march of the outgoing Egyptians and would pacify the country.
Fergusson was aware of the reluctance of the Liberal Gov­
ernment at home and of the Government of India to establish a 
permanent military occupation of the region. So he proposed 
a temporary military occupation backed up by a plan of British 
protectorate over the Somali tribes, guaranteeing their auto­
nomy. In Fergussonfs opinion the Somalis were "ready to 
accept as much British protection as they can get." He wrote 
to Kimberley : "I am well aware that the last thing you want 
is any responsibility and I believe that Major Hunter would 
incur none beyond mutual friendship and some slight reward
(1} Fergusson to Kimberley, 50th June, 1884. F.C.
(2) Maj. Hunter to S. of S. No.C ,5th July,1884. Letters from 
Aden. W “
(5) Maj.Hunter to S.of S.No.5» 4th Aug.1884. Letters from Aden
Z
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A
for engagements not to treat with foreigners•wi To Ripon,
Fergusson repeated his stand and implored him to send Major
Hunter from Aden to the Somali coast to treat with the tribes
and facilitate the Egyptian evacuation without disturbance.
He explained that the tribes wished for^British protectorate
and that "Major Hunter's business will be to get the effects
2of this without the obligations."
In consistence with the Liberal policy,Ripon from the
beginning was averse to any military occupation of the Somali
coast. He however agreed that Major Hunter should be sent
to the Somali coast "to look after our interests at Berbera
4 .
and etc. when the Egyptians withdraw." To this the home 
authorities were agreeable. In view of the activities of the 
Italians and the French it was necessary for the British to 
safeguard their interests on the Somali coast. In the opinion 
of Kimberley : "With the French at Obokh and the Italians at 
Assab it is quite necessary that we should secure such a foot­
ing as will enable us to get our supplies for Aden without 
interruption."^ But there was considerable difference of 
opinion as to the limit of the coastal area over which the 
British should exert their influence. The Egyptians occupied
the whole Somali coast from the straits of Bab el Mandeb to
"(1) Fergusson to Kimberley, 30th June, 1884. F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 25th June,1884. R.P.
(3) Tel^Viceroy to S.of S.10th May,1884. For Dept.Pro.Govt, 
of I.Ext.June,1884.
(4^ Ripon to Fergu^sson, 19th June, 1884. F.C.
(5) Kimberley to Fergusson, 14th Nov.1884. F.C.
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Has Hafun, including Tajourah, Zeyla and Berbera. The supplies 
for Aden were mainly drawn from the coast eastward from Zeyla 
to Ras Hafun which included Berbera. The other portion of the 
coast, from Zeyla westward to Bab el Mandeb, stood on a diff­
erent footing. There the Porte was said to possess rights 
which had never been practically disputed by the British Gover­
nment. Under these circumstances it was decided by the home 
authorities to acquiesce in any steps the Porte might take 
to maintain its authority from Zeyla to Bab el Mandeb while 
the British should enter into direct relations with the tribes 
to the east of Zeyla. To this decision the Aden officials 
protested by pointing out that the Turkish sovereignty over
Zeyla, based on a conquest made in the medieval period should
2not be acknowledged by Britain. Fergusson contended that "it 
would be very inconsistent besides being hardly humane to hand 
over the poor people ofZ'these areas to the Turks whose rule is 
even worse than the E g y p t i a n s . T h i s  was a repetition of the 
common British imperial argument generously used for the reten­
tion of Kandahar, Pi&hiri and Sibi in North Western frontier. 
Fergusson imagined that the quasi-recognition of the Turkish 
authority over Zeyla and Tajouirah was "to hinder the extension
of foreign European advance," but considered it a wrong step.^
(1) Under Secy.of State for India to Under Secy.of State for 
Foreign Affairs,8th May,1884.For Dept .Pro. Govt .of I.Ext. 
June,1884.
(2) Memo.on Egyptian evacuation by Resident of Aden.Maj.F. 
Hunter,Offg.Resident to S.of S.No.C/I,5th June,1884.Letters 
from Aden.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley,21st June,1884.F.C.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 25th June,1884. R.P.
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Personally Ripon did not like the idea and informed Fergusson 
that this recognition of Turkish authority over Zeyla and 
Tajonrah "might be inconsistent and inconvenient some day."
The home government in the meantime asked the Porte to take 
occupation of Zeyla and Tajourah, failing which the British 
would temporarily occupy Zeyla to maintain order on the eve
p
of Egyptian evacuation. The Turks, however, hardly took any 
notice of this request.
Finally, it v/as decided that Major Hunter should go "to 
facilitate arrangements for the withdrawal ofthe Egyptians 
and to anticipate the contingency of local disturbance or any 
attempt at foreign occupation by entering into direct agree­
ments with the Sheikhs of the local tribes." The agreements 
would be contracted on the basis that the tribes would not 
dispose of:any part of their territory to any power without the 
consent of the British Government and would maintain peace and 
order in their areas.^ Major Hunter at once proceeded to 
the Somali coast with a small escort party. With the Egyptian 
evacuation from Berbera, he promptly negotiated with the local 
tribes and effected a sort of British supervision of the port 
M Y  Ripon to Fergusson, 19th June,1884.F.C.
(2) Under Secretary of State for India to Under Secy.of State 
for Foreign Affairs,8th May,1884. For Dept.Proc.Govt.of 1^ 
Ext.June,1884.
(3) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.1547E,18th 
June,1884. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Sec.No.103,
8th Aug.1884.Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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under a British agent and police. At Zeyla Major Hunter
insisted on a temporary military occupation, as proposed, of
the place on the eve of the withdrawal of the Egyptians. It
was his belief that unless Zeyla be occupied by a British
force, the tribes were certain to create difficulty in the
2
withdrawal of the Egyptian garrison at Harrar. The home
authorities, receiving no reply from the Porte concerning the
fate of Zeyla and Tajouirah, sanctioned the despatch of the
Aden troops to Zeyla.^ On 21st August,1884 troops from Aden
were sent to Zeyla, presumably for a temporary occupation
which in reality turned out to be a permanent one. Thus as
the events stood, Fergusson1s plan of the military occupation
of^Somali coast was largely realised and the Liberal policy
defeated. The logic of imperialism in India led Britain,
despite the Gladstonian reluctance, to assume imperial burdens
in Africa. The military occupation of Zeyla, however, v/as
c-
precipitated by an unforseen incident - the Turkish indiffe-
A
rence to resume control over distant and unremunerative places 
like Zeyla and Tajo&rah. Tajcctrah, the only place on which 
the British Government laid no hand, was promptly acquired by
the French through direct negotiation with the local Dankali
/
chief
(1) Maj.Hunter to S.of S.No.C4. 5th July,1884.Letters from 
Aden.
(2) Maj.Hunter to Govt.of B.No.2-H,30th July,1884.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.Ext.Oct.1884.
(5) Tele^S.of S.to Viceroy,2nd Aug.1884.For Dept.Pro.Govt.of 
I.Ext.Oct.1884.
(4) Tel^Resident,Aden to Governor,Bombay,24th Nov.1884.Letter 
from Aden.
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In November, 1884- the Egyptians evacuated the whole of the 
Somali coast and by the end of the year Major Hunter concluded 
formal treaties, replacing the earlier Anglo-Somali trade agree­
ments, with the Eesa, Habr Awal, Godabursi, Habr Garhajis and 
Habr Sol Jalo clans. Though the new treaties practically esta­
blished a clear British influence over the Somalis, they had 
not effected any British protectorate in the area in a formal 
sense. Certainly little was ostensibly conceded to Britain.
By the treaties the Somalis only entered into an agreement with 
the British Government for "the maintenance of our independency 
the preservation of order and other good and sufficient reasons1 
Nor did the Somalis expressly cede their land to Britain. They 
merely pledged themselves "never to cede, sell, mortgage or 
otherwise give for occupation save to the British Government 
any portion of the territory under their control." The Somalis 
only granted to the British Government the right to appoint
A
British agents to reside on the Somali coast. Still this was 
most of what Fergusson and his officials at Aden aimed at. In 
December, 1884- Fergusson sounded Kimberley for clarification by 
stating that in his opinion the British position at Berbera and 
Zeyla was not quite secure. "Would it not be well to assume a
p
protectorate at once ?" _ Kimberley frankly admitted that the 
^1) Copy of the treaty "with Eesa Somals,31st Dec. 1884-.Maj.Huntel 
to E. Baring,Br.Agent and Consul-Gen.in Cairo,No.I,5th Jan.
1885•Letters from Aden.The British treaty with Eesa Somals 
was representative of all the treaties effected with the 
Somali tribes.
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, 17th Dec.1884-. F.C.
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British had already established a virtual protectorate over 
the Somali coast. It became "indispensable”, in view of the- 
European activities there, he pointed out, that the British 
should "hold a position of authority as protectors.” However, 
Kimberley informed Fergusson that the British had no intention 
"to deprive the Somals of the control over their internal 
affairs." Sometime later, in 1886, the position was made 
clear by a further supplementary treaty with the Somalis which 
announced that the British Government undertook to extend to 
the tribes "the gracious favour and protection of Her Majesty
p
the Queen Empress."
Though authorities in Simla and Bombay were connected to 
a large extent with the British policy towards the Somali 
coast, the future affairs of the area should in propriety have 
been conducted by the British Foreign Office or Colonial Office 
The Somali coast was not only far awayy from the Indian terri­
tories but was intimately connected with the developments in 
Africa and Europe. This Lord Ripon realised and decided that 
all matters connected with Africa should be left to the Foreign 
Office. "The Government at home", he wrote to Fergusson,"will 
never be content to leave any Indian Government free to deal 
with them and I am afraid that there will be a constant source
of difficulty and f r i c t i o n . it was difficult for Fergusson,
(1) Kimberley to Fergusson, 8th Jan.1885« F.C.
(2) Supplementary British Treaty with the Somali tribes.Cited 
in I.M.Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland, 1965%p.4-7
(3) Ripon to Fergusson, 8th Dec.1884. F.C.
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who by virtue of his jurisdiction over Aden gained an influence 
in Somali affairs, to accept such a view. He was firmly of the 
opinion that the management of the Somali affairs should be 
continued for the sake of convenience under the Residency at 
Aden.^ Lord HuffTetfii}, the successor of Ripon, held similar 
views.2 Thus in 1885 Fergusson hardly faced any difficulty in 
obtaining sanction from the Secretary of State to the existing 
arrangement. So the curious anomaly of entrusting the Govern­
ment of Bombay with the intricate task of managing the British 
affairs in the Red Sea from Aden continued unabated. In the 
past the difficulty of communication was responsible for such 
shifting of the charge of a comparatively unimportant area to 
a local government of British India. But in the days of steam­
ship and telegraph in 1885 such an arrangement was simply 
anachronistic, especially in view of the growing importance of 
the Red Sea after the opening of the Suez canal.
Whatever might be the disadvantage of the jurisdiction of 
a local government in the Red Sea area it afforded Fergusson 
an opportunity to display his ideas of Tory imperialism. With 
great tact and timely pressures he influenced a Liberal Viceroy 
and the home government to pursue an active policy, despite 
their anti-imperialist professions, in the African and Arabian 
littoral of the Red Sea. The consequence of such^active policy
(1) Fergusson to Kimberley, 17th Dec.1884-. F.C.
(2) Teles Viceroy to S.of S.22nd Jan.1885. Encl.to Desp.S.of S. 
to Govt.of I.Pol.Ho.7,20th Feb.1885. Pol.& Sec.Letters to 
India.
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was an increase of Britainfs imperial responsibilities. Thus 
Fergusson committed the British Government to a policy of 
interference with the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden, 
established one British protectorate in the Hadramaut and 
worked for another in the Somali coast.
CHAPTER III 
Relations with the Native States
a
Dealings with the native states was always a delicate respon­
sibility of British Indian statesmen. It was complicated by 
varied administrative jurisdiction of the native princes, allega­
tions of misgovernment against them by their subjects, the- 
unscrupulousness of factions contending for power and the extent 
of interference that had to be exercised. To such problems were
usually added, as Fergusson found,”rival-heir plots, subdivision
2
of holdings, semi-pauper aristocracy and intrigues for offices” ■ 
Fergusson was so much aware of this state of affairs that he 
supervised with the utmost personal care the Political Depart- ' 
ment of his government which conducted the relations with the 
native states.
The territories under the native princes formed almost one- 
third of the total area of Bombay Presidency, an aggregate of i
73,753 square miles, and a population of seven million inhabi- j
x  ;
tants.^ The relations of these Indian states with the Bombay \
Government were regulated by a series of treaties and engagements
many of which dated from the last quarter of the 18th century, j
On the whole, however, the treaties rested upon the general
settlement effected for Western India at the close of the Third
Haratha War. The native states under the jurisdiction of the
Government of Bombay were varied in their extent and population.
i
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(1) The word "native”, though^acquired a derogatory connotation 
is neutral in meaning. It was freely used in official 
documents and in the private letters of Ripon and Fergusson'
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, 9th Feb.1883, F.C.
(3) W.W.Hunter, Bombay 1883-90, 1892, p.80.
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The great Kathiawar group of states had, according to the
census of 1881, an area exceeding 20,358 square miles and a
population of 2-J million. The little state, Savanur had
hardly an area of 70 square miles, while Narukot had only
a
6,837 inhabitants. The characteristic feature of the Bombay 
native states was the great number of petty principalities.
p
The peninsula of Kathiawar alone contained 193 separate states. 
The jurisdiction and powers of the rulers of the states of 
Bombay varied from absolute civil and criminal authority to the 
mere right to collect revenue in a village and the enjoyment 
of immunity from taxation. The control of the Bombay govern­
ment over these states was exercised through the political 
agents. According to their importance the native states were 
divided into three categories. In the first category were 
those big and populous states in each of which the government 
of Bombay was represented by a political agent. The second 
category was formed by the groups of smaller states,for each 
of which a political agent residing at a central station,was 
responsible. The last category comprised the isolated small 
states in close proximity to the British districts, the collec­
tors of which were ex-officio agents of the government? The 
position and duties of the political agent varied considerably 
in different states, being governed by the terms of the 
original treaties or by recent sanads or letters patent. In 
such states as Cutch, Kolhapur and Junagad the functions of
the agent were limited to general advice. But in certain other
C1) Bombay Admn.Report, 1880-81, p.81.
(2) Imperial Gazetteer of India,1908,Vol.VIII,P.3^1•
(3) Ibid. p.343.
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states, the political agent was invested with an effective 
share in the administration. The states, whose rulers were 
minors,were often directly managed by. the political agents or 
by mixed agencies appointed by the government.
Fergusson1s dealings with the native states of Bombay Presi­
dency were essentially a part of the policy of the Government 
of India towards the native states during the Viceroyalty of 
Ripon. From 1858 the most dominant tendency in the British 
attitude towards the native states was the growth of the con­
ception of Paramountcy of the British Crown over the Indian 
princes. The paramountcy of the Crown was a de facto status 
and not a de jure one. The chiefs and princes of India had 
not agreed by any of their treaties to vest in the Crown any 
power other than those which they expressly surrendered. In 
practice the paramountcy of the Crown turned out to be an 
unlimited growth of the central authority over the native 
states and the claim of the Government of India to extra­
treaty rights of encroachment on the affairs of the native 
princes. This outcome was partly due to the fact that the 
treaties were concluded between unequals and partly due to 
the changed conditions of the country. By coming into treaty 
arrangements with the Indian princes the British Government, 
an infinitely superior power, had all the practical advantages 
of going beyond the treaty stipulations. To these advantages
were added the development of communications, the building of 
railways, the construction of telegraph lines and the growth 
Of^public press resulting in an ever-increasing closeness
(1) W. W.Hunter, Bombay, 1885-90* 1892, p.82
between the British Government and the native states*
Another notable tendency of the British Government in the 
post—mutiny period was the deliberate undermining of the former 
distinction between those states which had treaty relations with 
the government as allies, and those, which were expressly depen­
dents of the government* Thus after the proclaimed annulment 
in 1858 of the British policy of annexation, the native states, 
though relieved from threat to their existence, were subjected 
to the constant interference of the Paramount Power. The great 
exponent of the policy of annexation, Lord Dalhousie, had earlier 
objected to such a policy* Dalhousie was always in favour of 
classifying the native rulers in three categories,namely,sove­
reign or quasi-sovereign rulers,subordinate and dependent chiefs 
and the sovereignties created or revived by the sanad of the
A
British Government. As regards the states belonging to the 
first group, Dalhousie denounced constant British interference 
in their affairs. In his memorable despatch to the Resident of 
Hyderabad he objected to "a system of unwarranted and officious 
meddling” in the jurisdiction of these states and was opposed 
to the British right ”of deciding authoritatively on the exis­
tence of native independent sovereignties and the arbitrarily 
setting them aside when their administration may not accord
p
with its own views. " The period that followed the Govemor- 
Generalship of Dalhousie witnessed the gradual evolution 
of the principle of interference of the Paramount
(1) W. Lee-Warner, Life of Lord Dalhousie, 1904, Vol.2, p.155.
(2) K. M. Panikkar, Indian states and the Government of India,
1952, p.37* -- -----------------------
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power and the consequent repudiation of the distinction 
between the allied states and the dependent states. The evolu­
tion of the policy was almost complete when at the installa­
tion of the Nawab of Bhawalpur in 1905 Lord Curzon declared 
that the Indian states represent ”a series of relationships 
that have grown up between the Crown and the Indian princes 
under widely differing historical conditions,but which in pro­
cess of time have conformed to a single type.” Curzon defined
the position of the Paramount power by concluding that ”the
a
sovereignty of the Crown is everywhere unchallenged...#”
Twenty-three years later Lord Reading reaffirmed this by
announcing that when imperial interests were concerned or the
general welfare of the state was affected ”it is with the
Paramount power that the ultimate necessity for taking reme-
2
dial action, if necessary, must lie.”
Broadly, Ripon1s tenure of office in India was a phase in 
this transition of the British attitude towards the native 
states from Dalhousie to Curzon. Ripon was eager to follow 
the post-mutiny British liberal policy towards the native 
states, that of rejecting the plea of annexation and courting 
good relationswith the Indian princes. He firmly believed 
what Lord Canning expressed in his despatch of 30th April,
1860 (No.43.A): ”the safety of our rule is increased and not 
diminished by the maintenance of the native chiefs well-
affected to us....One of our best mainstays will be found
(1) Lord Curzon in India — being a selection from his speeches 
^906,p.22?. Published by Macmillan and Co.Ltd.
(2) Lord Reading's letter to the Nizam, March 22,1926.
Cited in K.M.Panikkar,Indian States and the Government of 
of India.1952. p.38----------------------------------------
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in these native states." Ripon never considered the British 
treaties with the native states as obsolete. In his opinion 
the Parliamentary recognition of the binding nature of these 
agreements by the Act of 1858 imposed an obligation on the 
Government of India to observe them. But Ripon could not 
disregard a general consideration which ought to override on 
occasions the literal engagements of the treaties, namely, 
the responsibility of the Crown to the subjects of the native 
states. He believed that British interference in the juris­
diction of the native states was justified on the ground of 
the responsibility of the Government of India for "seeing 
that the inhabitants of the native states did not suffer from 
oppression and misgovemment.11 He further thought that in the 
past a native prince, guilty of grave misgovernment, would 
run a risk of being overthrown by insurrection or supplanted 
by some more popular rival. One of the effects of strict 
maintenance of law and order in India was the difficulty, if 
not the impossibility, the people of the native states felt 
in overthrowing the oppressive chief. "We incur in conse­
quence", Ripon remarked, "a responsibility for their protec­
tion against evils against which we prevent them from protec-
p
ting themselves." Thus Ripon in accordance with the Gladsto- 
nian liberal professions was in favour of abstention from 
imperial involvement in the affairs of the native states 
unless misgovernment in these places compelled him to inter-
fere. In case of practical application such a policy_________
(1) "The Native States of India", a paper by Lord Ripon read
before Leeds Philosophical and Literary Society on 20th 
October, 1885
(2) "The Native States of India," a paper by Lord Ripon
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involved a conflict between the necessity of curbing the 
powers of the native rulers and the desire to maintain 
princely authority. About this conflict Ripon was personally 
conscious and knew very well **how difficult and delicate a 
task it is to reconcile that freedom from all harassing and 
needless interference which we desire to secure to the native 
princes and chiefs with that protection from injustice and 
wrong which we are bound to afford to the people who dwell
A
within their territories.1
Fergusson on the whole accepted the general policy of the 
Government of India towards the native states. Theoretically 
he acknowledged the necessity of balancing British responsibi­
lities towards the inhabitants of the native states against 
the British observance of the jurisdiction of the princes and 
chiefs. But in practice Fergusson was in favour of judging 
every case on its merits and he wanted to remain unfettered 
where he considered interference necessary. His belief in the 
civilising mission of the British rule in India inspired him 
to think in terms of the assertion of imperial power over the 
native states. To Ripon he wrote, lfif a government like this 
^BombayJ cannot control wicked and cruel practices and mal­
administration in states over which we exercise that elastic 
influence called political, it will be so weakened and 
discredited that it will have little power for good.**^ Thus 
in his dealings with the native states Fergusson showed a 
tendency to push Ripon*s policy of judicious interference
Cl) "The Native States of India," a paper by Lord Ripon.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 22nd Oct.1880. R.P.
U 8
a little too far. This, however, was in conformity with his 
annexationist leanings in the North West Frontier of India and 
his assiduity for interference in the Aden hinterland and on 
the Somali coast.
Fergusson often claimed that his personal relationship with 
the native rulers of Bombay Presidency was satisfactory. To 
Ripon he wrote, ,fI do not believe that any of my predecessors 
has done more than I to be courteous and considerate to the 
native chiefs of all degrees and I feel sure that I have gain-
A
ed the 'confidence of a good many.” But during Fergussonfs
stay in Bombay several significant instances of assertion of
the Paramount power occurred which speak of the application
of the principles of interference and acknowledgement of the
authority of the chiefs. One such case was associated with
*
the name of Chota Udaipur, a petty state in Rewakantha Agency 
in Gujacmt. The chief or the Maharawal of the state had Juris­
diction over only the criminal offences of his own subjects.
In July,1880 information reached A. Grant, Acting Political 
Agent in Rewakantha that Maharawal Jitsinghji*s favourite son, 
Chandrasinghji, had murdered his young wife. It was rumoured 
that Chandrasinghji had learned that his wife committed adul­
tery with another person in the palace. Torture of "incredi­
ble barbarity” was inflicted on her, resulting in her death.^ 
The body was burnt and a medical man was induced to report 
that the lady died from snake bite. A police officer was at 
once despatched to Chota Udaipur. His report showed that
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 18th Jan.1883. R.P.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 5th Oct.1880,R.P.
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there was a prima facie case against Chandrasinghji. The
Maharawal, being too affectionate for his son* had taken no
notice of the incident so far. However, he informed the
Agent of his anxiety to have a full enquiry into the case
1and of his willingness to assist him. Grant, having ascer­
tained who would be required as witnesses, called upon the 
Maharawal to produce them in order that they might be taken 
to Godhra, a British territory and the headquarters of the 
Political Agency, for formal examination. The witnesses 
mostly dependents of the palace were then brought to Godhra 
and detained there. The government, on receipt of these 
proceedings, directed the Acting Political Agent to try
Chandrasinghji on the charge of murder, to submit the report
2
to the government but not to pass any sentence. To this
the Maharawal of Chota Udaipur strongly protested^ stating
that he had agreed only to the confidential enquiry into the
case at Chota Udaipur but "not to the trial in supersession
*
of his jurisdiction."-' Fergusson and his Government,however,
refused to recognise any distinction between trial and
enquiry in such a case, but having regard to the chieffs
jurisdiction they decided to accept his nominee who would be
associated with the Acting Political Agent in the trial. The
Raja concurred in this arrangement by making the nomination
of his Dewan.^ Soon Chandrasinghji begged the Government
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B. to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I, 30th Oct. 
1880. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.12,19th 
Jan.1881. Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(2} Ibid.
(3) Maharawal Jitsinghji to the Governor,Bombay,30th Aug.
1880.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.12,19tlr Jan
1881. Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 5th Oct.1880. R.P.
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that the trial might not he conducted by the Acting Politi- I  
cal Agent, who had been involved in the enquiry, but by any I  
one from the judicial service# As this request seemed I
quite reasonable the government appointed H.M.Birdwood, the I 
Judge of Surat, to preside over the trial. When required to I 
appear before the court Chandrasinghji came down to Godhra I 
with a large armed retinue and his father followed him with I 
an armed mob. The armed procession created such a threat to I 
peace that some troops were sent to intercept the violent I 
mob outside Godhra and Chandrasinghji was put under arrest.^ I 
His trial commenced at Godhra on 1st October 1880.
All these steps were taken by the Government of Bombay 
before the matter was reported to the Government of India, 
who meanwhile received a remonstrance of the Maharwal 
addressed to the Viceroy in August, 1880. Soon the incident 
got into newspapers,which complained of the illegality of the 
trial and pointed out that the government should not have 
directly interfered in the jurisdiction of the native chief? 
Ripon also felt very strongly about the incident. rtI am 
afraid,1 he wrote to Lord Northbrook in England, "that the 
Bombay Government are very likely to get us into a mess by 
the action they have taken without our knowledge.11 The 
whole proceeding, in Ripon1s opinion, was without any warrant 
of law whatsoever. He apprehended that such an act of setting
(1) Chandrasinghji1s appeal to the Governor,Bombay,15th Sept.
1880.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.12,19th Jan.
1881. Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Ripon to Northbrook,1§t&.0<£^,1880.
(3) Reports of Native Newspapers on the case.Encl.to Desp.
Govt.of I.to S. of S.Pol.No.12,19th Jan.1881.Pol.& Sec.
Letters from I.
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aside of the chieffs recognised jurisdiction would be looked 
upon with uneasiness and alarm by other native princes with 
similar judicial rights and powers. The o^overnment of 
India accordingly demanded explanation from Fergusson*s 
government as to the consideration that led them to inter­
fere in the criminal jurisdiction of the chief. Fergusson 
justified his government's case on the grounds of customs 
and precedents. He agreed that all small native states like 
Chota Udaipur were legally foreign territories. Nevertheless 
it had been found necessary for the Paramount authority in 
the past to interfere in the jurisdictional independence in 
most of the small native states. As instances of such inter­
ference, the Government of Bombay cited the cases of the 
Rana of Poi'ebandar and the Nawab of Janjira. In 1869 both
the chiefs were severely censured by the Government of Bomber
2
for the practice of judicial barbarity. Thus in the 
opinion of Fergusson the Paramount authority had considered 
itself entitled by virtue of its controlling authority to 
interfere in the jurisdiction of the native states whenever 
necessity arose. The same power of the Paramount authority 
existed in regard to any particular case which, from excep­
tional circumstances, the native chief might not be disposed 
to deal with. He believed that the circumstai ces of the 
case of Chota Udaipur and the tendency of the chief to hush 
it up had "justified the Paramount power assuming
(1) Ripon to Northbrook,16^; X?<£t*1880, Printed R.P.
(2) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B. to Secy.for. Dept.Govt.of India.
30th Oct.1880. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.
No.12,19th Jan.1881. Pol. & Sec.Letters from India.
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jurisdictionl" Fergusson further pointed out that in cases
of unjust and cruel treatment, the interference of the govern
nment had been justified by the British authorities in the
past. The case of Chota Udaipur, he argued, was one of such
character and it was not consistent with the duties of the
British Government to acquiesce in such a case and to allow
it to pass without proper judicial enquiry. Pointing to the
barbarous oppression committed on the deceased, Fergusson
commented : "Were such acts passed unnoticed how could we
2hang poor people for the like?"
Contrary to the above arguments, Ripon thought that the 
chief of Chota Udaipur, though petty, enjoyed substantial 
powers of sovereignty, namely, the criminal jurisdiction over 
his people. In this respect his position was hardly diffe­
rent from that of the ruler of a big state, such as Holkar 
or the Nizam. He argued that the chief of Chota Udaipur 
might perhaps by a voluntary cession have invested an officer 
of the British Government (the Political Agent) with juris­
diction within the limits of his dominions. But the commen­
cement of the trial at Godhra - a British territory, the 
arrest of Chandrasinghji and the detention of the witnesses 
were acts for which there was no legal warrant. In fact the 
present interference on the part of Fergusson was a pure and 
simple act of the state in which the necessity of the inter­
vention must be clearly established. Ripon felt that an
act ocfTtfche state of this kind might have to be resorted to
IT1 Fergusson to Sipon, Oct.1880,R.P.
(2) Ibid.
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in serious cases as was done in the deposition of the
A
Gaekwar. But so grave an act of the state should not have 
heen taken by the Government of Bombay without the sanction 
of the Viceroy. So he informed Fergusson that f,the unani­
mous feeling of the Council was that the case was a curious
one and that your Government appeared to have overlooked
2some of its most serious aspects.11 Ripon also pointed out
x
that in acts of the state, such as in the Tonk^ and Gaekwar 
cases, the proceedings were held in the native territory. 
rlIhe real question upon this point is” Ripon wrote to 
Fergusson, ,fwhether precedent can be found for the exercise 
of such an act of the state ousting and casting aside the
lL
recognised jurisdiction of a native prince.11 In the cases 
of Janjira and Porebandar in 1869 the Government of Bombay 
merely censured the chiefs without flouting their criminal 
jurisdiction.
Fergusson, however, thought that when the Raja agreed to 
send his nominee to participate in the trial at Godhra he 
seemed to have recognised the validity of the proceedings. 
So ”the question of jurisdiction was never brought dis­
tinctly to an issue.11 Regarding his own motive in the act
Fergusson declared ” it seemed to me that such acts as
are alleged against Chandrasingh were such as could not be 
tolerated and that as this petty state is under the control
(1) Halhar Rao Gaekwar, the ruler of Baroda, was deposed 
in 1875 on charges of maladministration.
(2^ Ripon to Fergusson, 18th Oct.1880. F.C.
(3) In 1867 the Nawab of Tohk was deposed and his son set 
up in his stead for complicity in an affray in which 
15 relatives of a dependent chief were shot down.
(4-) Ripon to Fergusson, 18th Oct.1880. F.C.
mof this Government, it was our duty to investigate it.tf
While this argument continued, Birdwood completed the 
trial of the case. The verdict of the judge was that the 
death of the lady could not he clearly connected with the 
assault and tortures which were undoubtedly committed on^herf 
Thus Chandrasinghji was freed from the police custody and 
Ripon was relieved from an embarrassing position. He caused 
the Foreign Department of the Government of India to write 
an epilogue on the case stating the general principle of 
interference in the jurisdiction of a native state. Ordina­
rily, it was essential to respect the jurisdiction of a 
native chief, however small might be his authority. There 
might arise exceptional cases where the British Government 
might be compelled to exercise its own supreme and ultimate 
authority. But an interference of this nature ^ being an 
act of the state, is a measure reserved for grave and rare 
exigencies and .... except for reasons of unquestionable 
urgency such measure should not be adopted."^ In the case 
of Chota Udaipur the Government of India were not convinced 
that the wish of the chief to screen a criminal was suffi­
cient for any interference.
Fergusson readily recognised the broad principle laid 
down by Riponfs Government. But he differedjfrom Ripon as
('O Fergusson to Ripon, 18th Oct.1880. R.P.
(2) Findings of H.Birdwood, 6th Nov.1880. Encl.to Desp.Govt. 
°f I*to S.of S.Pol.No.12,19th Jan.1881.Pol.& Sec. Letters 
from I.
(5) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.17th Dec.
1880.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.12,19th Jan.
1881. Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
17S
to the gravity of the cruelties practised in the native 
states* "Such acts as have been committed by Chandra," he 
wrote to Ripon, "if permitted, would be damaging to our 
credit more than any jealousy of the native princes would
A
be to our powers#" This Ripon refused to believe and he 
was inclined to think that "the maintenance of the acknow­
ledged rights of native rulers of more importance than
p
the punishment of an individual crime*" Such an absolute 
opinion was not wholly justified in the circumstances of 
the native states. Often it was necessary to judge a case 
from the point of view of its merits and not from the pers­
pective of a preconceived notion* Ripon had to admit this 
at a later date when he stated ft i*t here are no doubt some 
forms of misgovernment of which the British Government can­
not be patient spectator and foremost among them, I should 
say, is the practice of cruelty."^ The Chota Udaipur case 
exposes clearly the conflict between policies of upholding 
princely authority and just government in the native states* 
The interference of the Paramount authority in a native 
state to check persistent maladministration was always a 
justifiable proceeding on the part of the British Government 
Such interferences were in conformity with the responsibi­
lity of the British Government to look after the interests 
of the subjects of the native states. In cases of this 
sort, Ripon, though in favour of moderation, had no real 
hesitation. Pergusson was so convinced of the need of such
assertions ofthe Paramount authority that he hardly spared
(']) Pergusson to Ripon, 22nd Oct.l8b0* K.P.
Ripon to Northbrook,16th Oct.1880.Printed R.P.
(3; "The Native States of India", a paper by Lord Ripon.
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any opportunity to intervene in cases of maladministration. 
The most striking example of this kind of interference was 
the case of Porebandar state. In September, 1882 Pergusson 
complained to the Viceroy against the misrule of the Rana of 
Porebandar, "whose misgovernment was oppressive to his 
subjects and hurtful to the trade of his neighbours which 
his port should accommodate*" He pleaded for authority from 
the Viceroy to interfere in the management of the state, 
without which he was afraid that the government would not 
get the Rana to be reasonable. Porebandar was one of the 
most important states of the Kathiawar group and had a good 
port under its jurisdiction. The Rana, a formidable prince 
among the Kathiawar chiefs was first censured by the Govern­
ment of Bombay in 1869 in consequence of judicial barbarity. 
The Government of Bombay again had to deal with the Rana in 
view of two sets of problems, namely, the mismanagement of 
the port of Porebandar and the abuses of internal adminis­
tration. Attention of the Government was first drawn to 
the mismanagement of the port by the complaints of the 
British India Steam Navigation Company and by the personal
p
observations of Pergusson when he visited Kathiawar. The 
government in October, 1882 forced the Rana to draw up 
approved rules for port management and to appoint an approve< 
officer of the Government as Port Superintendent. Por a
(1) Pergusson to Ripon, 17th Sept.1882. R.P.
(2) Ch.Secy." Govt, of B. to Secy, for. Dept. Govt.of I. 
No *5133* 19th Oct.1882. Por. Dept.Proc. Govt.of I. Jan. 
1883*
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time these steps resulted in a marked improvement of the 
port. Soon, however, Col.Burton, the Political Agent of 
Kathiawar, reported numerous complaints to the government. 
These showed that in Porebandar, the traders were subjected 
to miscellaneous oppressive exactions in addition to fixed 
customs duties. The Port Superintendent, appointed at the 
instance of the gpvernment, was alleged to be often harassed, 
interfered with and threatened by the Rana. Regarding the 
abuses of the internal administration the Agent complained 
that the state was in reality being governed by a clique 
of unworthy intriguers headed by the Karbhari or the Dewan. 
The Agent reported instances of gross judicial lapses indi­
cating how the favourites of the Rana received favours from 
the law-courts. There were also innumerable examples of the 
execution of unjust decrees. The Police Department of the 
State was so badly managed that the situation as regards 
law and order became grave. The inhabitants ofthe state, 
it was reported, constantly complained against the levy of 
irregular taxes. There was widespread popular discontent 
in Porebandar and the turbulent Mers, a tribe who once 
constituted the feudal militia of the state, were agitated. 
It was said that the Rana was encroaching on their lands by 
violating their privilege as tenants by service (Bhayats)
and by considering them only as tenants at will.(Prasaits) 2
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.No.5133, 
19th 0ct.1882.Por. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Jan.1883.
(2) Col.Burton, Pol.Agent,Kathiawar to Govt.of B.Pol.Dept. 
■No.64, 28th Feb.1882. Por. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Jan.1883
178
Considering these complaints*the Government called on the 
Rana in strong terms to reform the abuses of the administra­
tion and to get rid of the corrupt officials including the
A
garbhariJ But the Rana showed no sign of undertaking a
single necessary reform and exhibited "a stolid indifference
2to all remonstrances." Fergusson was determined to put an 
end to this intolerable state of affairs and to make the 
Rana understand that unless he followed the advice given to 
him the administration of his state would be assumed by the 
government. The Government of Bombay thus decided that a 
memorandum should be drawn up detailing the abuses of the 
state on behalf of the government and this should be placed 
before the Rana. "He should then be informed that unless
he carries out the desired reforms he will be deprived
of all his authority.Regarding the mismanagement of the 
port of Porebandar, the government of Fergusson thought that 
no further discussion with the Rana was desirable, for the 
proper management of the port was a matter of interest to 
the whole province of Kathiawar and not of Porebandar only. 
By treaty between the British Government and the Porebandar 
state in 1809* "one half of the port of Porebandar with a 
full participation in all its rights" was ceded to the 
British Government. So the government was fully entitled by 
the treaty to assume the management of the port in the 
interests of the Porebandar state, the whole of Kathiawar
(1) Res.Govt.of B. Pol.Dept.No.1415, 21st March,1882,Pol. 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of B. March,1882.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 26th Aug.1885* R.P.
(3) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B. to Secy.for. Dept.Govt.of I.No.5133* 
19th Oct.1882.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Jan.1883.
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and trade generally*
Ripon's Government agreed to the proposal of placing a 
memorandum on the abuses of the administration before the 
Rana with a view to giving him a final warning "in fulfil­
ment of the special responsibilities which devolve upon the
» » o
Paramount power/' But the Government of India was reluct­
ant to sanction any interference in the affairs of the port 
management and consequently held Pergusson back on this
p
issue* The proposed memorandum was placed before the 
Rana in June, 1883 and the Government urged him to take 
immediate steps. In response the Rana wrote an evasive 
letter praying for further time? Pergusson in utter dejec­
tion wrote to Ripon : 111 think, you will agree that we must 
put absolute pressure on the Rana, for the example of a 
chief who sets government at a defiance is evil." Fergussor 
decided to send an ultimatum to the Rana declaring that if 
he refused to appoint a suitable Karbhari, the government 
would appoint one who was not to be removed without their 
sanction. The Government of Bombay further suggested that 
a settlement should immediately be effected between the 
Mers and the Porebandar state by applying to the Agency 
court in Kathiawar. To both these proposals the Supreme
5
government agreed. The Rana finally gave way and even­
tually carried out both the measures.
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For. Dept.Govt.of I.No.5135? 
19th Oct.1882. For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Jan.1883
(2) Secy.For.Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.227*1? 
2 9th Jan.1883.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Jan.1883
(3) Rana,Porebandar to Sir J.Fergusson,14th Oct.1883*For. 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.May.1884.
(4) Fergusson to Ripoft^ttifefeb,1884. R.P.
(5; Secy.For. Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No. 13911? 
18th April,1884, For.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.May,1884.
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The interference of Fergusson's Government in the adminis­
tration of Rajpipla state was similar to that in the case of 
Porebandar. In 1882 the attention of the Government of Bom­
bay was drawn to the repeated expressions of dissatisfaction 
at the misgovernment of the state of Rajpipla by the subjects 
of Raja Gambhir Singhji. Enquiry into the complaints of the 
subjects satisfied the Political Agent that many of them 
were well-founded. The principal grievances of the people 
were "sale of offices, corrupt administration of justice, 
imposition of new and arbitrary taxes, the ejection of old 
resident cultivators, the farming of the revenues to rapaci­
ous middlemen and the capricious enhancement of transit 
a
duties." Fergusson's Government thought that the popular 
discontent caused by continued misgovernment of a native 
ruler had always been considered "to justify the interposi­
tion of the Paramount power." Besides, when in 1821 the 
state of Rajpipla came into treaty relations with the British 
Government? the then Raja and his successors found themselves 
acting in conformity with the advice of the British Govern­
ment. So Fergusson was of opinion that the time had come to 
hold Raja Gambhirsinghji to this engagement and that a
genuine reform must be effected in every branch of the admini-
2
stration of the state.
In spite of distinct warnings of the Government, the 
Rajpipla Durbar failed to take any effective measure for 
disciplining theadministration. As a consequence, in
(1) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.1223?11th March,1882. Enel.to 
Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.20,1884.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) Ibid.
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June, 1885 the inhabitants of the state submitted further 
petitions to Fergusson complaining against the misrule of 
the Durbar. The Government of Bombay considered this 
situation sufficiently grave to call for immediate inter-
A
vention. So in November, 1885 Fergusson appointed Major 
Hancock to enquire into the alleged abuses and misgovern­
ment of the Durbar of Rajpipla. He informed Ripon that the
p
Rajpipla state would require "more severe remedy."
Major Hancock enquired into an immense body of complaints 
against the general administration of the state. He 
observed that oppressive taxes were current in the state 
and that land revenue was excessive. He found that the 
records of the law courts were ill-kept and judicial 
officers inadequately qualified;. The sale of offices like 
"Patelship" or village " Havildarship11 and the corrupt con­
duct of the officials were amply proved. The enquiry also 
confirmed the serious charge of the ejection of old resi­
dent cultivators. "It is very necessary", Major Hancock 
concluded, "for the chiefs to understand that the Govern­
ment will sometime intervene and deprive them for a time 
at least of the powers they abuse. ” -7 Fergusson was con-
vinced that the charges of maladministration a w s  suffi-A.
ciently proved by Major Hancock's enquiry and that it was 
opportune for the Paramount authority to intervene. His
(1) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.5912,29th Nov.-1885.Encl.to 
Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S*Pol.No.20,1884.Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon,41fbFebh,1884.R.P.
(5) Report of Maj.Hancock,1st Feb.1884.For, Dept.Proc.Govt, 
of I.June,1884.
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government were sensible that the policy of interference 
should be used as little as possible with the native states. 
However, they felt that"in the long run surest effect will 
be given to this policy by measures of effectual interfe­
rence in cases of mal-administration so notorious as that
A
of Rajpipla." Fergusson informed Ripon "many of our native 
states are so well that it is intolerable to have some so 
flagrantly bad.
Fergusson*s Government recommended the appointment of 
a British officer as the joint administrator of the state 
of Rajpipla for five years to look after all the branches 
of administration. The Government of Bombay thought that 
after five years when the time for restoring the state to 
the sole management of the Raja arrived, a scheme of adminis­
tration should be drawn up on the pattern of the famous 
Instrument of Transfer for the Rendition of Mysore by which 
the Raja should be bound to abide.^ Ripon's Government 
accepted this recommendation of the Government of Bombay and 
agreed that interference in the unsatisfactory administra­
tion of Rajpipla was justified. Yet, in their opinion, the 
Raja was young and the abuses of the state "although 
serious were not without any hope of amendment." So they 
decided that the appointment of the joint administrator
should be made not for five years but only for two years.**'
("1} Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.No.1881,
7th April,1884.For.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1884.
(2} Fergusson to Ripon, 26th Feb.1884.R.P.
(3) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For. Dept.Govt.of I.No.1881,
7th April,1884.For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1884.
(4) Secy.for. Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.2219 I* 
14th June,1884.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1884.
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This was clearly a case of Fergusson being restrained by Ripon. 
Fergusson reluctantly accepted this verdict of the higher autho* 
rity but expressed his dissatisfaction to Ripon:, ”1 don't think 
it possible that a state so utterly without any system or orga­
nisation can be got into order in that time (two years) and I 
think it very expedient that the Raja should be led to believe 
that the period of his tutelage is dependent on his docility
A
and cooperation.” The case further reveals a contrast between 
Riponfs policy of judicious interference and Fergusson's ideas 
of effectual interference.
Fergusson's enthusiasm for interference on the grounds of 
mal-administration was again revealed when he drew up a plan 
of joint administration in the small isolated state of Khairpur 
in Sind. The chief of Khairpur, Ali Murad Khan, was an old
1
man with antiquated ideas of government. According to the j
British officials in Sind the chief had "half ruined” his pros-
2
perous state. The agriculture was thoroughly neglected, the 
taxation was oppressive and the civil and judicial administra­
tion was unsystematic. The state, according to H. N.B.Erskine, 
the Commissioner of Sind, was simply ”a refuge of thieves and 
bad characters.”-^ Fergusson drew the attention of the Viceroy 
to the mismanagement at Khairpui; which was ”as unimproving as 
can be imagined.” However, he felt that ”in the old man's time
h.
no great improvement can be expected...”
An opportunity for interference suddenly appeared in April,
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 13th Feb.1884. R.P.
(2; Erskine to Fergusson, 14th April, 1882. R.P.
(3) Erskine to Fergusson, 24th April, 1882. R.P.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 18th Sept.1881. R.P.
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188? when a murderous attack resulting from personal feud 
was made upon the chief by one of his subjects. The chief 
suffered seriously from a bullet wound and there was deep
A
concern for his life. In consequence of this incident the
future of Khairpur state became very uncertain. The heir-
apparent and the eldest son of the chief was confronted with
the enmity of his brothers and each of the wives of the ruler
2
started plotting for her own offspring. The Commissioner
of Sind at this point proposed the joint administration of
the state for sometime. Fergusson readily accepted the idea
and informed Ripon of his intention of setting up, in case of
the death of the chief, a joint administration of a British
officer and the successor of the chief. This, he thought,
was ”the only way of procuring universal reforms” in the
state.^ Fergusson even directed the Commissioner of Sind
to negotiate with the heir-apparent, who in return for the
British support against his brothers, might agree to a joint
administration and the occupation of his capital by a British 
zl
detachment. Before this plan could mature the chief 
recovered from his bullet wound and Fergusson hurriedly 
abandoned his scheme.
During Fergusson1s tenure of office there arose several 
intricate questions of succession where government inter­
ference was both indispensable and embarrassing. Of these 
the succession questions relating to Navanagar and Kolhapur
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 14th April, 1882. R.P.
(2) Sinclair, Collector of Shikarpur, to Fergusson, 6th April 
1882. R.P.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 14th April, 1882. R.P.
(4) Fergusson to Erskine, 29th April, 1882. F.C.
were most significant. Navanagar in Kathiawar was ruled by a 
Jare.ja Rajput, bearing the title "Jam11. Fergusson found the 
Jam of Navanagar an old-fashioned fellow who had his faults 
but who was kind to his own people. He felt that "the Jam
A
realises the idea of 'Old King Cole1 in his own ways." The 
Jam's only son, Kalubha, was born of his marriage with a 
Muhammadan wife. In 1872 the British Government had recognisec 
Kalubha as heir to the chiefship after a good deal of discu­
ssion as totUesvalidity of the Jam's marriage to a Muhammadan 
lady. Soon Kalubha turned out to be a man of loose morals and 
he incurred the displeasure of the Jam. In 1877 the Jam 
formally disinherited and banished him. Having no other issue, 
the Jam in 1878 adopted an infant of the Jareja stock. The 
infant having died within a year the Jam adopted in January, 
1879 another boy of the same house, Ranjit Singhji by name. 
This selection was formally approved by the British Government 
In this case of adoption there was a stipulation in the deed 
by which the natural father made over his child for adoption, 
that in the event of the Jam getting a son by any of the Ranis 
such son would be heir to the chiefship. The adopted son in
that case would receive a money allowance according to the
2
usage of the state. In August, 1882 a son was b o m  to 
Janbai, another Muhammadan wife of the Jam. This led the Jam 
to apply formally for the recognition of this son, named 
Jaswant Singh, as his heir and successor, to the exclusion of
f1} Fergusson to Kimberley, 17th Nov.1884. F.C.
(2) The Jam's petition to the Govt.of B.21st April,1884. 
Desp.Govt.of I. to S. of S.Pol.No.50, 1884. Pol.& Sec. 
Letters from I.
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1
the boy adopted in 1879*
Fergusson1s Government was opposed to this application of 
the Jam* They suspected an intrigue in the whole proceeding 
and argued that the selection of 1879* confirmed by the Para­
mount authority, was a solemn act of the state not lightly to 
be cancelled* They further stated that the rights of the 
adopted son belonging to the Jareja Rajput family were superior 
to those of the low-born son of Janbai,a Muhammadan lady* As 
to the reservations in the 1879 deed of adoption on the rights 
of a son by a Rani of the Jam, they,in the opinion of the 
Government of Bombay,were understood to apply to a son by a
p
Rajput wife* Ripon's Government,however,decided that the 
newly-born son of the Jam by his Muhammadan wife should be 
recognised as the heir and successor to the state* They 
believed that the legitimacy of theeJamfs marriage with a 
Muhammadan lady was recognised in 1872 by the British Govern­
ment* As regards the adoption of 1879» the Government of India 
pointed out that the birth of a legitimate son was ,fa suffi­
cient and proper cause for withdrawing a recognition which 
from the nature of the case was conditional*,f^  On principles 
of Hindu law Ripon1s Government was justified in their deci­
sion, for the son b o m  to a wife should always take precedence 
of the previously adopted son* But politically, Fergusson 
claimed, the decision of the Government of India was
unpopular and particularly distasteful to the Rajputs.n'
{lyThe Jam1 s petition to the Govt.of B72lst April:i8'84.Desp* "
S.Pol.No.50,1884.Pol.& Sec * Letters ftom I« 
{d) on.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For.Dept.Govt.of I.No.3910,26th ' 
July,1884.:£ncl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.50,1884. 
Pol. & Sec.Letters from I.
ilS?*J25;13)l!gtn*G2vt^of XZto Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.35571,20th Sept.1884.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.46,^884. 
Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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It should be recalled in this context that in 1857 the young
Raja of Alwar wanted to marry a Muslim lady. This so shocked
1the Rajput nobles of the state that they rose in rebellion.
The Navanagar Succession question was another case of Ripon 
upholding the prince!s rights and Fergusson looking to the 
sentiments of the people.
The question of Kolhapur Succession was significant for 
the complicated nature of the problem itself, as well as for 
the public attention it attracted. A prominent Maratha princi­
pality of a million people, Kolhapur held a notable position 
among the native states of Bombay. For fifteen years it had 
the misfortune of passing through uncertainty of succession.
In 1866 Maharaja Shivaji III of Kolhapur died without a natural 
heir. His adopted successor named Patankar died in 1870 in 
Florence while returning to India from an -European tour* In 
September, 1871, a minor boy called Shivaji was adopted by the 
widow of the late Raja. From 1866, during the minorities of 
the two adopted Rajas, Kolhapur was directly Tinder the manage­
ment of the Government of Bombay. The chances of the restora­
tion of a native regime brightened up when the young Raja 
Shivaji became 18 years of age and was ready to assume the 
reins of administration. At this point Fergusson informed the 
Viceroy that the Raja, who had been for sometime in a weak
p
condition of health had become an occasional lunatic. The
Raja was first suspected to be developing insanity in September
1:870, one year after his marriage. In September, 1881 the
Raja's case was found to be unfavourable to the highest degree? 
T1) Cambridge History of India, 1956, Vol.Vi,p.498.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 12th July,1880. R.P.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon,8tbtQ3t, 1880. R.P.
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The committee of doctors who examined him reported that his 
recovery was uncertain and that he would hardly be capable of
'I
taking care of himself or managing his state affairs. Soon
popular anxiety over the Raja's condition led to suspicion
and rumours. It was supposed that the insanity of the Raja
was fabricated by interested parties and so constant libellous
attacks were made upon the Dev/an of the state by Marathi news-
.2
papers like Maratha and Kesari. The mother of the Raja and
her agents pretended to believe that the Raja was not really
insane and thus helped the progress of rumours. A big public
meeting at Poona in November, 1881 resolved to demand the end
of the Raja's seclusion and giving him over to the care of his 
x
mother.^
To the government the main concern was the future rulership 
of the state. If the Raja would never be fit to be entrusted 
with administration of Kolhapur state then steps should imme­
diately be taken with a view to adopting a successor. Pergu­
sson referred to Ripon the necessity of an early settlement 
in view of the popular outcry and the intricacy of the case. 
The young Raja was hardly in a condition to adopt and his wife
could not do so in his life time according to a previous
4Supreme Court decision. To get out of this difficulty 
Pergusson's government had three future courses before them, 
namely, the appointment of a Regent, the appointment of joint
administrators, British and native and the appointment of a
(1J Report of the Committee of Doctors,21st Jan.4881 .For. Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1882.
(2) Bomb.Admn.Report,1880-81,p.PV and XVIII.
(3) Tel^gRaibahadur G.R.Desmukh to Viceroy,25th Nov.1881.For.
N Dept.Proc.Govt,of I.June*1 9 8 2
(4) Pergusson to Ripon, 8th Oct.1881.R.P.
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single native minister or Council of ministers. The govern­
ment was opposed to any joint administration as "the position 
of a British officer at the head of a native administration in
'I
its normal independence is anomalous*11 Fergusson disliked
the idea of appointing a single native agent or a Council of
native ministers who would become arrogant to the government
after being promoted. Besides, he felt that the disloyal and
restless educated Indians of the Deccan would hot like some of
2their members placed in prominent positions* Under the cir­
cumstances, Fergusson's government was in favour of a native 
regency and they suggested the name of the Chief of Kagal, a 
tributary to Kolhapur, and one who was a relation to the 
Kolhapur royal family, as the R e g e n t R i p o n  approved this 
step but pointed out that if the insane prince recovered he w 
would be restored to his position. The chief of Kagal must 
hold the Regency subject to that condition and also to any 
adoption after the Raja's death, made by a person legally 
entitled to adopt. In the event of the Raja's death his 
wife or the surviving widow would have the right of adoption.^ 
So in July, 1882 with the approval of the home authorities the 
chief of Kagal was declared the Regent of Kolhapur. The ten­
sion, however, persisted and. Fergusson reported to Ripon, a 
conspiracy to bring the Raja into the society of his wife with
a view to facilitating the birth of a putative sont Such a
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For Dept.Govt.of I.1st Nov.1881.
For. Dept.Proc•Govt.of I.June,1882.
(2^ Fergusson to Ripon, 13th Feb.1882. R.P.
(3) Chief Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For. Dept.Govt.of 1.1st Nov.
1881.For,Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1882.
(4) Ripon to Fergusson,18th Feb.1882.F.C*
Fergusson to Ripon, 13th Feb.1882.R.P.
(6) Fergusson to Ripon, 3rd March,.1882. R.P.
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circumstance would certainly have complicated matters aid this 
consideration led Fergusson to arrange for the?continued seclu­
sion of the Raja. The Kolhapur question finally came to a 
definite conclusion when in,December 1883* the insane Raja 
died and the two Ranis unanimously adopted one of the sons of 
the chief of Kagal as the successor.
In the Kolhapur case the succession question was interwoven 
with the issue of the restoration of native rule in the state 
and the reversion to the normal condition after 15 years of 
direct British management. f,The management of the British 
Government , however good and wise,” said Fergusson, f,was not 
an arrangement which would be considered permanently satis­
factory in a native state and would hardly be consistent with 
the firm determination of the Queen Empress to maintain the 
native states in their integrity &nc^.ndependence. Fergusson 
achieved both succession and the restoration of native rule 
in Kolhapur with great tact and a thorough grasp of the situa­
tion.
Another important case of the restoration of native rule 
during Fergussonfs tenureo£xoffice took place in Sawantwadi 
state. The British Government had been directly managing 
Sawantwadi through ^ Resident for nearly 45 years. In 1838 
in consequence of rebellion and disorder in the state, the
British Government set aside the Chief, Khem Sawant, and
(1) Secy.forDept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.552-1,14th 
Feb.1884.For.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Oct.1884.
(2) Fergusson*s speech at Kolhapur, March,1883, Bomb.Admn. 
Report, 1882-83, P.II.
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assumed the entire administration* Anna Saheb, the chiefs 
eldest son, was rebellious against the British* He was par­
doned in 1849 but in consequence of his treason his rights of 
succession were forfeited. The chief was merely allowed to 
stay as a titular head and it was decree^d that after his 
death the state was to be annexed to the British territory. 
However, after the outbreak of 1857 the British policy of 
annexation was dropped. Anna Saheb, who behaved well during 
the mutiny, was recognised by the British Government as heir 
to his father's chiefship in 1863* "purely as a matter of 
grace and favour1.1 The chief died in 1867 and it was disco­
vered that Anna Saheb by this time had become so degenerate 
through indulgence in all forms of sensuality that he was 
unfit for undertaking the responsibilities of chiefship. It 
was, therefore, thought necessary by the British Government to 
impose certain conditions on Anna Sahebfs assumption of power. 
But before this could be done Anna Saheb died in 1869* leaving 
a minor son, Sirdesai. The British Government,who ruled over 
the state in place of the deposed chief, Khem Sawant, had to 
continue their management on behalf ofSirdesai upto 1883. The 
state of Sawantwadi during this long British rule was vastly 
improved and the general administration was brought upto the
A
standard of a non-regulation British district.
Sirdesai, who was so long a ward of the British Government, 
attained his majority in 1883 and thus was ready to be entrus­
ted with the charge of administration. With the question of 
Sirdesai's assumptionofTauthority were connected the interests
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For Dept.Govt.of I.No.5005,10th 
Oct.1883. For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.April,1884.
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of the subjects of the state. Th&jpeople of Sawantwadi had 
enjoyed two generations of security and advantages of British 
rule and they would expect the same from the new chief.Sirdesai 
who attended the Rajkumar College at Rajkot, was apparently 
fit for the management of the state. Still, the Government of 
Bombay were not absolutely certain about his character and 
integrity and remarked, ”....his habits and dispositions as 
yet have offered no guarantee for the good government of the
A
people.” Pergusson felt that the character of Sirdesai and
the anarchic past of the kingdom rendered it expedient that
2
his assumption of power "should be not without'! checks*1 
Thus the Government of Bombay proposed to enter into specific 
stipulations with Sirdesai when he was installed in power "for 
ensuring continuance of good government to which the people 
are accustomed.” Such stipulations, they thought, would assign 
the limits within which the chief should exercise his authority 
and avoid all occasions of British interference. In the 
meantime the Political AgentcflffSawantwadi informed the govern­
ment that the prince had contracted settled habits of drinking 
and mixing with disreputable persons, that he had not con­
trolled himself in spite of repeated warnings and that he was 
indifferent to administrative responsibility.^ Under these 
circumstances, Fergusson had to change his mind regarding the
(1) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.No.5005,10th 
Oct.1885. For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.April.1884. *
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 4th Feb.1884. R.P.
(5) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for.Dept.Govt.of I.No.5005,10th 
OctC>1883.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.April. 1884.
(4) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for. Dept.Govt.of I.No. 1168,29th 
Feb.1884. FoijDept.Proc.Govt.of I.April,1884.
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immediate installation of Sirdesai and decided that rtit would 
be contrary to good policy to entrust Sirdesai with the admin­
istration of his state when heis giving no proof of his capa­
city, but falling into evil courses.** He suggested an indefi­
nite postponement of the chief’s investiture to offer him
opportunities **to give better proofs of his steadiness and
,f1disposition to qualify himself. The Government of Bombay, 
however, decided to continue to draft the proposed agreement 
embodying permanent bindings upon the future rulers of Sawant­
wadi.
In August, 1884, the Government of India sanctioned the 
Instrument of Transfer of Sawantwadi, drafted by the Government 
of Bombay. The document defined the conditions shbject to 
which Sirdesai and his successors should exercise the govern­
ment of the state. The succession ofthestate was to devolve 
upon the lineal descendants of Sirdesai, whether by blood or 
by adoption. Each case of adoption must be sanctioned by 
the Paramount power. Import and manufacture of arms, unless 
authorised by the British Government were,prohibited. The 
state of Sawantwadi was forbidden to interfere in the affairs 
of other native states or to maintain any relations with 
foreign powers. The Instrument insisted on the extradition 
of persons accused of committing offences in British India and 
on the grant o£-land, free of charge, to the British Government 
for telegraph lines and railways. The salt and opium arrange­
ments ofthe British Government with the state should strictly
(1) Minute by Sir J. Fergusson,16th Feb.1884.For. Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.April,1884.
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be respected. All laws and rules in force in the state during 
its management by the British Government were directed to be 
maintained and without the prior permission of the British 
Government the Durbar should not modify them. The Instrument 
held the chief responsible to publish, for the information of 
the Government, an annual budget estimate of income and expen­
diture. Finally, the Instrument laid down that the Chief 
"shall follow any advice that the Government may think proper
A
on any matters of administration."
By nature this Instrument of Transfer was a regrant of 
rulership and as such it ran on lines similar to those in 
the document for the Rendition of Mysore (1881) which was 
drafted under the watchful eyes of Ripon himself. The cir­
cumstances ofa re-grant in the case of Sawantwadi as in that 
of Mysore were exceptional. As a result^ the conditions which 
were imposed in cases ofthis sort could afford no precedent 
for attaching similar terms and conditions to the recognition 
by the Paramount power of successions which did not involve 
re-grant. However, the terms of the Instrument of Transfer 
of Sawantwadi contained a comprehensive statement of the obli­
gations of the future rulers in respect of various matters of 
political importance, for the settlement of which re-grant of 
chiefship afforded a good opportunity. In other words, the 
Sawantwadi case represents the extent of British interference 
in the domains of a native state. It represents a model of 
British interference as understood by Ripon and Fergusson*
(1) Instrument of Transfer of Sawantwadi. Encl.to Ch.Secy.
Govt.of B.to Secy.for,Dept.Govt.of I.No.4170,9th Aug.1884. 
For.Dept,Proc.Govt.of I.March,1885*
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Fergussonfs perseverence in asserting the Paramountcy of 
British authority led him to a complaint against Baroda, a 
state over which he had no direct political jurisdiction. 
British relations with the powerful Baroda state had, in the 
past, been conducted by the Government of Bombay. Following 
the trial eaod deposition of Malhar Rao Gaekwar in 1875 Lord 
Northbrook transferred the political control of Baroda from
A
the Government of Bombay to the supreme Government. In spite 
of this shifting of the responsibility the connection between 
Baroda and the Government of Bombay was not absolutely sevenscL 
The Baroda territory overlapped and intercepted the British 
districts in Gujrat and Baroda had a number of tributary 
states in Kathiawar peninsula under the supervision of the 
Government of Bombay. This link between them .was emphasised 
when Ripon deputed Fergusson as his representative to instal 
Sayaji Rao Gaekwar as the new ruler of Baroda on 1st January,
p
1882. However, during Fergusson1s stay in Bombay the 
relations between his government and the Baroda Durbar were 
far from cordial. In February, 1881 Fergusson complained to 
Ripon against Baroda*s attitude of non-cooperation and 
"selfish isolation".^ The tributaries of Baroda in Kathia­
war, comprising one-seventh of the whole peninsula, were 
subjected to the Political Agency of Kathiawar. All the 
Kathiawar states used to contribute for the general improve­
ment of theprovince to a common fund annually, from which
(1) W.W.Hunter.Bombay. 1885-90.1892.0.80.
(2 J Ripon to Fergusson, 8th Aug.1882.F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 13th Feb.1882. R.P.
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expenses incident; to education, trunk roads and other public 
works of generaLinterest were paid. But Baroda, Fergusson1 s 
government pointed out, had always held itself and its tribu—
A
taries aloof from this system of co-operation. The..'Baroda 
Durbar in their turn stated that their political relations were 
in the hands of the supreme government and as such the position 
of their dependencies was distinct from that of other states 
of Kathiawar* Ripon's Government concurred in\£ifrfi>views 
expressed by the Durbar of Baroda.
Fergusson always felt the need to check Baroda1s influence 
over its tributary states in Kathiawar. ,fNo time should be 
lost,” he wrote to Ripon, "in repulsing a disposition to revive 
a past supremacy which could not but be prejudicial to the 
proper influence of the Paramount p o w e r . T o  the Viceroy 
he complained against some "unwarranted pretensions” of the 
Gaekwar of Baroda. At the end of the year 1882, the Gaekwar. 
arrived at Ahmedabad, a British city, at a date of his own 
choosing. He held a Durbar at Ahmedabad accompanied by large 
troops and followers without the prior sanction of the Govern­
ment of Bombay. Next, in January, 1883, the Gaekwar expressed 
his pleasure to come to Sadra, a British station in one of the 
tributary states of Baroda, and claimed that the British Poli­
tical Agent of Mabhkantha should ceremoniously receive him and
assist him at a Durbar of the tributary chiefs of Baroda.
(i; Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For Dept.Govt.of I• No'. 18$, 15th 
Jan.1881. For. Dept.Proc.Govt,of I.Oct.1881.
(2) Gov.Genfs Agent,Baroda to Secy.For.Dept.Govt.ofl.No*1361 
17th Feb.1881.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.0ct.1881.
(3) Under-Secy.For-Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.414.I 
9th May,1881.For. Dept•Proc.Govt.of I.Oct.1881.
(4) Fergusson to Rippn, 18th Jan.1883. R.P.
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Fergusson believed that the states subjected directly to the
Government of Bombay would not dream of such impertinence.
"Why should Baroda do what Kolhapur, Bhavanagar or Cutch
would not?” For a long time the Government of Bombay had
administered the tributaries of Baroda and had established
a regular system of government. "It is to such influence ,
he asserted, "rather than the nominal suzerainty of Baroda
that these tributary states should be encouraged to look for
guidance".1 This consideration led Fergusson to claim the
resumption of authority of the Bombay Government over Baroda.
The outlying provinces of Baroda, Fergusson argued, were so
mixed up with the states under the direct control of Baroda
that Baroda itself should conveniently come under the control
of the Government of Bombay. To Kimberley he w r o t e •.we
could have kept a more effective control £over BarodaJ and
not have allowed...the assertions of independence which have
2
now crept in." But the authorities in India and at home
thought otherwise and decided to continue the supervision of
ofi the Government of India over Baroda.^
On the question of the disbandment of the Gaekwar*s contin­
gent, Fergusson became particularly sensitive. According to 
a treaty between the Company and Baroda of November, 1817, 
the Durbar were to maintain a contingent of 3000 cavalry at 
the disposal of the British authorities for service in Kathia­
war and Gujrat.^ In course of time the force was found to be
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 18th Jan.1883. H.P.
C2) Fergusson to Kimberley^th: Ncfv„ 1883. F.C.
(3) Kimberley to Fergusson^th, Nc?V„ 1883. F.C.
(4) Desp.Govt.of I. to S.of S.Pol.No.128,16th Oct.1881.Pol.
& Sec. Letters from I.
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irregular and badly managed. In view of this unsatisfactory 
condition of the contingent, the principle of a money 
■feaitdLom w/as recognised by both the British Government and the 
state of Baroda and eventually an agreement was executed by 
the parties in September, 1881. By this agreement, the Baroda 
state agreed to pay annually 3i lakhs of rupees to the British 
Government in lieu of the services of the contingent and the
1sum was to be expended on the maintenance of a police force. 
This new police force would remain at the command of the Gover­
nment/of Bombay "for the general purposes of the Paramount
2power in the native states of Gujrat and Kathiawar."
The Baroda state, by this arrangement, gained considerably 
as the sum envisaged was only one-third of the annual cost of 
the contingent.^ But the arrangement was damaging to the 
pride of the state. Baroda was always reluctant to see the 
abandonment of a system which added to their power and pres­
tige. In view of the unpopularity of this plan in Baroda, 
the British Government postponed the implementation of the 
measure until the accession of Sayaji Rao Gaekwar. The 
Gaekwar, whenheeacceded to power, proposed that the agreement 
might be frozen for 5 years. Later on he submitted through 
the Governor-General1s Agent in Baroda a scheme for thoroughly 
reforming the contingent instead of disbanding it outright.
It was contended that the force "symbolised the superiority
(lj dopy of the Agreement signed at Baroda,8th Sept.1881.For, 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Nov.1881.
(2) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For Dept.Govt.of I.5th June,
1882.For. Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Sept.1882.
(3) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.128,16th Oct.1881.For. 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Nov.1881.
(4) Secy.for.Dept.Govt.of I.to Agent.Gov.Gen.Baroda No.6231P, 
10th Aug.1881.For.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Nov.1881.
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of Baroda” over the tributary states and that the reformed 
contingent would be as advantageoustfe© the Government of Bombay
A
as the creation of a new police force* The Government of
Bombay, however, expressed their "decided opposition to any
2
departure from the agreement agreed to*11 Pergusson was of 
opinion that the tributary states should look towards the 
British Government rather than Baroda and that the visible 
signs of power, such as the maintenance of an army, should be 
entirely connected with the Paramount power."I can imagine 
nothinggraore impolitic,” he wrote to Ripon, "than to perpe­
tuate the appearance of the military supremacy of the Gaekwar 
over petty states.. .'Jr But, though in favour of controlling 
the military forces of the native Durbars, Ripon wanted to 
bear in mind the personal susceptibilities of the princes,who 
considered the maintenance of a certain amount of military 
pomp as essential to their dignity* "To wound their feelings 
without an absolute necessity upon a point upon which they 
are very sensitive would be impolitic in the highest degree."^ 
So the Government of India consented to postpone the agreement 
for a further period of three years during which the scheme 
forjbhe reorganisation of the force was to pe carried out.^
With regard to Baroda Pergusson urged the assertion of imperial
power while Ripon advocated moderation in order to safeguard
('t) Agent,(jov.&en• Baroda to Secy.For.Dept.Ciovt.of 1.18th June,
1883.Por, Dept•Proc*Gov*of I* July,1883*
(2) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For.Dept.Govt.of I.No.4-583,19th 
Sept.1883.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.23,1884. 
Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(3) Pergusson to Ripon, 5th Sept.1883.R.P.
(4; "The Native States of India", a paper by Lord Ripon
(5) Secy.JFor.Dept.Govt.of I. to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.1498 I, 
28th April,1884. Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I to S.of S.Pol.No. 
23,1884.Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
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princely dignity*
Bergusson*s persistence in interference with the native
chiefs was reversed when the Bhils rose in rebellion in the
native states in Gujaj&t. He acted in the case of the Bhils
essentially from considerations of political stability. The
Bhils, a wild and predatory tribe of western and central India
lived in great numbers in the jungle tracts of Khandesh in
Bombay, in the native states of Gujaaut, under the native chiefs
in Central India and in some of the states of Rajputana. The
a
Bhils belonged to the non-Aryan Mundari group of tribes. They
were divided into an endless number of highly organised clans
2
who believed in nature worship. The pacification and settle­
ment of the Bhils in agricultural life remained incomplete even 
in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Only in the 
British district of Khandesh in Bombay Presidency, where the 
Bhil tract was directly administered by the Government,was the 
settlement of the Bhils complete. The grant of rent-free land
or land at a low rental inspired the Bhils there to accept the
x
agricultural life.
In 1881 a wave of Bhil risings suddenly affected the Bhil- 
inhabited native states and attracted the attention of the 
British authorities. The trouble started in ffeywar in Rajpu- 
tana where Udaipur Durbar officials were said to have maltrea­
ted the Bhils. The Bhils retaliated by indiscriminate looting
and killing and forced the Durbar to yield to the redress of
(1) G. Ai, Grierson, Linguistic Survey pf India, 19^7»Vol»J»
Part I, P . 1791and e7m• lin't'ho'ven, Tribes and Castes of Bombay 
1920, Vol.I, p.152. —
(2) E. M. Enthoven, Tribes and Castes pf Bombay,1920,Vol.I,
p.152. ---------------------------
(5) SeCp.for Dept.Govt.of I. to Agent-Govt.Gen.Rajputana,No.63 
637IP,13th Aug.1881.Por Dept.Pro.Govt.of I.Aug.1881
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A
their grievances. Meywar in Rajputana and the native states
of Gujarat under the Mahikantha agency were adjacent territories,
Soon it was rumoured that the Bhils in the native states of
Mahikantha had shown a feeling of uneasiness. Ripon was
anxious and advised Fergusson to keep an armed detachment ready
under a competent officer who would tackle the Bhils not by
severity but by tact. ftIn the suppression of a rising among
such tribes*" he wrote to Fergusson, "force goes a much less
way than the moral qualities which gain influence over savage 
2
nature•"
But before anything could really be done* in June, 1881 the 
Bhils in the petty native state of Pol* under Mahikantha Agency 
started burning and looting the villages. In this rising the 
Bhils of Pol were probably encouraged by the success of their. 
Meywar brethren. They compelled the chief of Pol to sign an 
agreement by which the chief was bound to reduce his claims for 
land rent, to punish criminals sympathetically and to release 
prisoners.^ The Political Agent of Mahikantha, Col.Goodfellow* 
rushed to the scene, but was forced by a violent BObl of Bhils 
to put his signature to the agreement. The Bhils considered 
this endorsement as a guarantee of the observance of the terms 
of the agreement* Fergusson severely condemned the officer 
for signing the document at Pol^ and instructed him to intimate 
to the Bhils that his signature on the document did not mean
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 27th April,1881. R.P.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 22nd April,1881. F.C*
(3) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.For,Dept.Govt.of I.No.9P,17th 
June,1881. For, Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(A) Fergusson to Ripon, 15th July,1881, R.P.
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the acceptance of the agreement by the government. The satis­
faction of the claims of the Bhils, the Government of Bombay
thought, "even if just, can not be obtained through turbulence
a
and insubordination.”
Meanwhile the Bhil disturbance was spreading very fast. On 
50th June, 1881 several thousand Bhils came upon Gallora, Mahi­
kantha, looting the nearby villages and then clashing with the
p
state police at Edur. This was followed by a series of Bhil 
raids in the minor Rajput states bordering Gujooat. To check 
the Bhil risings in Mahikantha it was necessary that the gene­
ral Bhil question in India should be settled. This led Ripon1s 
(government to propose to convene at Mount Abu a conference of 
officers experienced in the ways and thoughts of the Bhils, 
Simultaneously it set up an enquiry into the causes of the 
Bhil disturbance. A commission was appointed, composed of
Major 0. Probyn of Bombay and Col. C. R* Blair of Rajputana
*
Political Agency.-'
The Bhil riots in the native states, though apparently spora­
dic, were in fact organised with care and shrewdness. The
A/
leaders used to send^symbolic arrow and bodice to the Bhil
villages inducing them to join the uprising by accepting the
'Tkt
arrow, a symbol of manhood and militancy or to take^bodice like
Zl
women if they were afraid to join. The Enquiry Commission
had to admit in their report that the volume of Bhil disturbance
(1) Cli,Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.No.9P, 17th 
June,1881• For Dept♦Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(2) Asst.Pol.Agent,Edur to Col.Goodfellow, No.l4l,4th July, 
1881. For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(3) Tel<g.Foreign,Simla to Govt.of B.14th July,1881.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(4) Officiating Pol.Agent,Meywar to First Asst.Agent,GovtGfen. 
Rajputana,No.29J,1st Aug.1881.For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.
June,1882.
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was unusual and that such scenes were unprecedented. Leaders
like Chitu, Maria Damur and Bhowani Turi could not be arrested
by British or native forces# In 1883 they submitted to the
police only of their own accord after leading a massive Bhil
1raid in the native state of Ali Rajpur in Central India.
The very fact that Bhil risings were taking place not in the 
British administered districts but in.Bhil-inhabited native
A
states of Gujarat and Rajputana points to some sort of responsi­
bility on the part of the pative chiefs. The high land assess­
ment in the native states and the rapacious and harsh conduct 
of the Durbar officials were certainly the strongest factors 
behind the Bhil risings. The Meywar Bhil trouble started due 
to the maltreatment of the Bhil Sirdars by the local Thanadar
of Udaipur Durbar, who had long been hated by the Bhils because
2
of his oppressive character. The Bhil raid on Gallora in 
Bombay Presidency was largely incited by the police officer of 
the native chief, "who had made himself obnoxious to the Bhils 
Regarding the disturbance in Pol state in Bombay, Col.Goodfellow 
wrote in his report : "The Pol Rao, I find now, has undoubtedly 
been acting and still acts harshly and is in the habit of 
screwing money out of his Bhil rayats. They rose against him 
seeing their opportunity and undoubtedly I believe, could prove
their case for complaint if records were examined."^ That the
(1) Agent,Govt.Gen.C.India to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.NoY9 p-67 ~ 
17th March,1883.Encl.to Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Pol.No.73,
18 8 3 .Pol.& Sec.Letters from I.
(2) Report of the recent disturbances among the Bhils, A.Wingate 
Udaipur, 26th April,1881.For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(3) Col.Goodfellow to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.18th June,1881.For Dent. 
Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
(4-) Ibid.
lo4
Bhils were supported by other sections of the aggrieved 
people ofjpol state can easily be proved with a reference to 
the agreement imposed oh the chief by the rebel Bhils. The 
clauses of the agreement showed that the interests of the 
Banias or money-lenders, carpenters, potters etc. were accu­
rately voiced in these and that the chief was accused of
A
gross judicial abuse.
Major Wodehouse, replacing Col.Goodfellow as the Political: 
Resident of Mahikantha felt that the chiefs of the area,inclu­
ding the Rao of Pol, should “be reminded that their jurisdic-
p
tion carried with it "higher duties than amassing money.” 
Fergusson1s Government acknowledged that "a rooted antipathy 
exists between the Bhils and the chiefs of the states in 
which they d w e l l . T h e  Government of India was also aware 
of the various exactions of the native chiefs, the high asse­
ssment of Bhil lands and the administrative mismanagement by
Zl
the Durbar officials.
Fergusson who was usually concerned for the welfare of the
subjects of the native states, reversed his attitude in the
case of the Bhils. The reference to the Banias in the Bhil
agreement in Pol led Fergusson to believe that the Bhils were
acting as tools of others. To Ripon he wrote, "...we have
reasons to believe that the whole movement was instigated by
the Banias who had the cultivators under their hands as their 
"(1) Copy of the Bhil agreement with the dhief of Pol* June,
1881.For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881
(2) Major Wodehouse to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.20th June,1881.Pol. 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of B.Sept.1881*
(3) Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.No.11P,23rd 
June,1881. For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I. Aug.1881.
(4-) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.to Agent,Gov.Gen.Rajputana No. 
6371P>13'kh Aug. 1881 .For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1881.
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debtors and they intended, by greatly reducing the claims.of 
the state, to improve their own position. This predisposition 
was strengthened by Fergusson^ dislike for disorder. He was 
reluctant to treat the indisciplined Bhils with sympathy and 
thought that any "extravagant concession would create further
tt>i
trouble. Such an attitude might have been motivated by 
considerations of political stability. In effect, however, 
it relieved the native chiefs of any charge of misgovernment 
towards the Bhils. The findings of the Bhil Enquiry Commi­
ssion of 1882 ran almost on similar lines. In their opinion 
the Bhil disturbance in Rajputana and Gujarat* was not the out­
come of a general rising, but each raid "had its origin in 
some supposed grievance "(enhanced salt and opium rates and 
the census proceedings etc.) which probably would not have 
been thought of but for the example of success of cother raids? 
TheriC6mmission categorically rejected the idea that the native 
chiefs were "in any way responsible for the grievances of the 
B h i l s . M u c h  was then said about the rehabilitation of the 
Bhils, their impulsive nature and their readiness to avenge 
fancied wrongs. But not a stricture, not to think of any 
administrative intervention, was passed against any of the
large or small Bhil-dwelling states of Bombay and Rajputana.
In face of the Commission^ report the Government of India
hurriedly abandoned the proposed Bhil conference at Mount Abu.
(1} Fergusson to Ripon, 12th June,1881. R.P.
(2) Col.Blair and Major Probyn to First Asst.Agent, Gov.Gen. 
Rajputana,18th April,1882. For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,
1882.
(3) Ibid.
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In the massacre of the Maiyas by the police of Junagad 
Durbar in January, 1883, Fergusson’s Government not only stood 
behind the cruel act of a native prince but even acted in 
collaboration with him. On the contrary,Ripon in this case 
gave up his usual position of liberal abstention in the affain 
of the native states and acted from considerations ofjjustiee, 
The Maiya tribe in Junagad had in the past served the Dunbar 
in maintaining law and order in the state. In the early days 
of British paramountcy over Kathiawar peninsula when the 
country was still politically unsettled, the Maiyas establish­
ed themselves as a turbulent lawless people. The British 
authorities strongly felt the necessity to control them and 
after several attempts they succeeded in disarming them in 
1872. Thereafter, the tribe ceased to be a formidable threat 
and became a peaceful section of the cultivators. At the 
beginning of December, 1882, an exodus of the Maiyas from 
their villages towards the nearby Kanera hill took place in 
protest against the oppression of the Junagad Durbar. On 
29th January, 1883 a horrible slaughter of men was committed 
on Kanera hill as a result of the Durbar’s determination to 
subjugate the Maiyas.
An examination ofthe Maiya grievances reveals that the 
Maiyas always claimed their lands in Junagad by hereditary 
right. But the Durbar contended that the Maiyas were holding
land only in return for their police service and that these
X4) By descent the Maiyas or Mahias were Jadhav Rajputs and 
they migrated to Kathiawar from Chittor. R. E. Enthoven, 
Tribes and castes of Bombay» 1920, Vol.2, p.418
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lands were therefore resumable by the state if it chose to 
dispense with the police service of the Maiyas.'In 1871 the 
Government of Bombay held that the lands occupied ,Tby the 
Maiyas were hereditary and were not resumable, though a condi­
tion of service was attached to them. In 1876 the Secretary of 
State, Lord Salisbury, however, suggested that in lieu of ser­
vice,which the Maiyas were expected to render, it might be 
expedient to substitute "a moderate money payment by the Maiyas
A
to the Durbar." Following this the Government of Bombay con­
cluded that the Maiyas should pay a fixed ”Jama” or lumpsum 
for each village and the proportion of this Jama was fixed as 
two-thirds of the t>Verott(sum leviable on each "Shanti" or a 
plot of 20 acres) at the rate current in Junagad state. The 
Durbar insisted that their usual collection of Vero was at the 
rate of Rs*30 per Santi and this rate of Vero was accepted by 
the British Political Agent in Kathiawar as the basis of cal- 
culation. Thus it was finalised that the Maiyas should pay 
annually Rs.20/- per Santi to the Durbar. But the statement of 
the Durbar regarding the usual rate of Vero in Junagad was 
tfrong,for the average Vero levied by the Durbar was only Rs.17/- 
per Santi. (Thus the Durbar maliciously obtained the sanction 
of the Government of Bombay for the imposition of "an unreason- 
able tax,!^  This high rate of Vero was imposed without any 
reference to the quality of the lands and the lands of the
(1) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.2003,26th April,1883. For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I. June, 1883.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Enquiry Report, Mag.G.E.Hancock,20th Feb.1883.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June, 1883.
IdB
Maiyas were generally poor. It was natural that the Maiyas 
would refuse to pay such a high tax for the simple reason 
that they could not. "To impose a Vero of Rs*5100/“ per annum 
on Amro Kalofs (the Maiya Headman) estate of 255 Santis of
A
jungle lands yielding Rs.3883/- was simply to ruin him.1
Thus Amro Kalo, the Maiya leader had to remark to the British
Political Agent : "You may blow us away at the point of a gun
2
if you like, but we will not pay." The Junagad Durbar 
decided in 1881 to coerce the Maiyas. They sent armed forces 
to the Maiya villages, attached the entire crop of the Maiyas 
for three consecutive years for non-payment of Vero and thus 
simply drove the Maiyas to despair.
In December, 1882 the aggrieved Maiyas left their villages 
*in protest and departed to Kanera hill, leaving their property 
and familiess. They carried with them some rusty swords and 
old matchlocks for the security of their persons. The Junagad 
Durbar, terrified by these "unlawful arms? urged the Maiyas 
to disperse from the hill, which they refused to do. Some 
attempts at negotiation between the Durbar and the Maiyas 
were made by one British Political Officer, Captain Scott, in 
vain. The Durbar then thought it necessary to dislodge the 
Maiyas from their "fortifications" and resolved to besiege the
hill to capture the Maiyas. The Political Agent of Kathiawar,
(1) Enquiry Report, Maj.G.E.Hancock,20th Peb.1883.Por Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883•
(2) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.2003,26th April,1883.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883*
(3) Enquiry Report, J.W.Watson,2nd March,1883.For Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.June,1883#
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1Col. Burton, gave his sanction to this "innocent measure".J 
On the morning of 28th January, 1883 the Junagad Police surr­
ounded the Kanera hill and attacked the Maiyas. The Maiyas 
could offer no resistance and were easily routed by the police, 
A number of fugitives were tied up and butchered. An old 
Maiya woman reported that she was compelled to carry down 
the severed heads of her clansmen. Cart loads of heads were 
taken towards Junagad and on the outskirts of the town the 
Nawab in royal procession welcomed the victorious police force,
Later on, the jubilant Durbar delivered a congratulatory lette:
2to the commandant of the police force. According to the 
version of the Junagad Durbar 74- Maiyas were killed and 26 
injured while loss to the Junagad police was negligible.
Prom the very outset Fergusson defended the Junagad Durbar. 
In his opinion the Maiyas obstinately refused to pay any vero 
in opposition to the unquestionable decision of the British 
Government. If the levy fixed by the Durbar was too high and 
its collection oppressive, the Maiyas should have approached
Zl
the government. Fergusson was convinced that "the Durbar 
showed great forbearance and were clearly in the r i g h t . T o  
emphasize this, he pointed out that it was absolutely nece­
ssary "to disperse without delay the gathering of the Maiya 
tribe who were defying all terms, subsisting by plunder and
(1) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.2003,26th April,1883.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883.
(2) Enquiry Report,J.W.Watson,2nd March,1883.For Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.June,1883.
(3) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.2003,26th April,1883.For Dept. 
Pro.Govt.of I,June,1883*
(4-) Fergusson to Ripon, 18th March,1883.R.P.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley,9th Feb.1883. F.C.
H o
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endeavouring to get the other tribes to join them.1* Fergu­
sson believed that the indiscriminate massacre was due to the 
precipitate action of the Maiyas in firing on the police party 
first and thus inviting trouble. His conclusion was that the
Maiyas required a lesson and he was sorry that rfit has been so 
o
severe”. However, as a matter of routine Fergusson appoin­
ted a Commission,consisting of Col.Watson and Major Hancock, 
to enquire into the whole case. The Commission, at the con­
clusion of their enquiry, accused the Junagad Durbar of 
imposing an excessive Vero. They were of the opinion that the 
Durbar "appeared to have made up their mind from the very 
first to coerce the Maiyas." The Commission suspected that 
the Durbar gave an oral order to the police to destroy the 
Maiyas and they rejected the plea that the Maiyas shot first 
at the police party. E. Ravenscroft, a member of the 
Governor's Council at Bombay,supported the findings of the 
Commission. The imposition of a high Vero, he believed, was 
due to the British Political Agent and Durbar officials, "who 
mismanaged matters between them." Regarding the massacre, he 
declared that the Nawab of Junagad and his officers exhibited 
unparalleled brutality "calling for exemplary reprobation and 
punishment.
But the majority of Fergusson1s Government found no fault 
with the Durbar. They were convinced that the Maiyas who
opposed the decision of paying a Vero were "open rebels,
(1) Fergusson to Ripon,ijth Feb."1883. R.P* ‘
(2j Ibid.
(3) Enquiry Report, J.W.Watson,2nd March,18 8 3.For Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.June,1883.
(4) Minute by E. Ravenscroft,26th April,18 8 3 .For Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.June,1883*
x n
assembled in arms in defiance of lawful authority," For the 
common security of Kathiawar, they asserted, the Junagad 
Durbar was duty bound to dislodge the Maiyas from Kanera hill. 
Such stout defence of the Durbar could only come from a govern­
ment acting in collaboration with the Durbar. Previously, the 
Government of Bombay had not only sanctioned a high Vero fixed 
by the Durbar but also permitted it to attach the crops of 
the Maiyas on the plea of the nonpayment of the tax. When 
the Maiyas approached the Government of Bombay in May,1882
p
for redress, they refused to interfere in the proceeding. 
Finally, when the Maiyas took refuge on Kanera hill, Col.Burtoi 
the Political Agent of Kathiawar, sought military aid from the 
government to assist the Junagad operations against the Maiyas 
He requested the grovemment to supply a detachment of British 
force and a mountain-battery tfto make a successful attack! on 
the position ofthe M a i y a s F e r g u s s o n 1s Government welcomed 
the suggestion and instructed the Military Department to be
4
ready to despatch such a contingent by sea from Bombay.
Ripon1s Government, however, were not prepared to support 
the Durbar in the face of a derogatory Commission Report. They 
more or less supported the Commission^ findings and held the 
Durbar responsible for "the deplorable occurrence.nP The
Government of Bombay were naturally loud- in their protest
TT5 Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.2003,26th April,1883.For Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883. -
(2) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.3984,16th Aug.1882.Por Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883.
(3) Col.Burton to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.14th Jan.1883.Por Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883.
(4) Res.Govt.of B.Pol.Dept.No.243,18th Jan.1883.Por Dept.Proc 
Govt.of I.June,1883.
(5) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I. to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.15321, 
7th June,1883.Por Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883.
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against this verdict of the Government of India, They said 
that they were not in favour of showing any sympathy to the 
Maiyas !,that is calculated in any way to sanction the imita-
r1tion of their lawless proceedings by other disorderly classes 
Fergusson pointed.out that the Maiyas defied both the Junagad 
Durbar and the Paramount power, for "the tribe was revolting 
against exactions, avowedly founded on the decision of the
p
British Government," He urged Ripon to modify the opinion
of his Government, which, in his opinion, would "give sanction
*
to an act of rebellion,
This defence by Fergusson and the Government of Bombay 
was weak in foundation. They could neither substantiate 
their allegation of the first shot having been fired by the 
Maiyas nor justify the rejoicings of the Durbar at the 
massacre. The Durbar could not be acquitted of their res­
ponsibility in fixing an excessive Vero, Further, Fergusson1s 
charge against the Maiyas that they were open rebels committ­
ing violence, could not be firmly established. The Enquiry 
Commission s t a t e d : ......it must be reported that the Maiyas
had shed no blood and were not even proclaimed outlaws and 
criminals." Fergusson*s assertion that to denounce the 
Durbar for the suppression of the Maiyas was to lower autho­
rity and encourage the rebels was logically unsound. The
^l) Ch.Secy.Govt.of’ B.to Secy.For Dept.G^vt.of I.-No.3144,4th 
July,1883.For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Aug.1883.
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley,3rd May,1883.F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 21st June,1883. R.P.
W  Enquiry Report, J.W.Watson,2nd March,1883. For Dept.Proc. 
Govt.of I.June,1883*
mbehaviour of the Durbar should be deplored*for effecting harsh 
measures, for oppressing people in the name of tax collection 
and for massacring harmless people. Thus to accuse Junagad 
Durbar was to strengthen legitimate authority and not to weaken 
it. The fact was that Fergusson himself was not unaware of 
this. To Ripon he confessed, "In the case of Junagad, there 
were certainly faults on the side of the state, but the Maiyas
A
were impracticable." To Fergusson*s extreme concern for law 
and order was added his eagerness to promote the alignment 
between the British Government and the native chiefs. His 
Government's despatch to the Secretary of State clearly stated 
that in refusing to hold the Durbar responsible for the 
massacre of the Maiyas they were "actuated by a sense of what 
was due to the responsibility of first class chiefs, which it 
has hitherto been the policy of the British Government to
p
enforce for the suppression of rebellion within their limits."
The strong defence of Fergusson saved the Nawab of Junagad 
from outright denunciation, punishment and supersession. Only 
the Dewan of the state and his assistant were forced to resign 
and the Jamadar of Police was dismissed. The Nawab was mildly 
informed of the disapproval of the British Government of his 
proceeding in the Maiya affair. A new Commission was set up 
to fix a moderate Vero on the Maiyas.^ Judging from these
results it can be concluded that the Nawab of Junagad came out
(/I Y Fergusson to Ripon, 26th Aug.18&3. R.P.
(2) Desp.Govt.of B.to S. of S.Pol.No.28, 28th Aug.1883. Por 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Oct.1883.
(3) Secy.for Dept.Govt.of I.to Ch.Secy.Govt.of B.No.15321,
7th June, 1883. For Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.June,1883.
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without much harm being done to him from a situation in which
his complicity in the massacre was undoubted. The Junagad 
case further illustrates the contradiction of British policy 
towards the native states; namely, the policy of supporting 
the rulers, which was in conflict with the principle of 
ensuring just rule.
On the whole, Fergusson's policy towards the native states 
lacked consistency. He diligently interfered in the jurisdic­
tion of the native rulers where issues were small and inter­
ferences safe. But on larger issues, like the Bhils and the 
Maiyas, where interference was essential, he preferred not to 
interfere but to support princely authority in the name of 
law and order. In consequence, Fergusson did not raise him­
self to the delicate task of mingling occasional and justified 
interference with the general British policy of non-interfe­
rence in the native states. Ripon was more consistent in his 
views with regard to the native chiefs and displayed a greater 
sense of justice. Generally, he was anxious to uphold princely 
authority and to favour moderation in ordinary cases of inter­
ference. But on issues like the massacre of the Maiyas Ripon 
displayed a just inclination to intervene.
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CHAPTER IV 
Local Self-Government
In 1880 local self-government in Bombay Presidency, 
though efficient and organised in comparison with other parts 
of India, was languishing under official control and the 
indifference of the people. The educated community, the only 
section of the public who could take^interest in the local 
bodies, found governmental supervision obstructive and oppre­
ssive. Such a state of affairs throughout India inspired 
Ripoii and his (government to strive for a real and substantial 
change. The change was to be brought about through legisla­
tion and in Bombay Pergusson had to undertake new enactments 
for local self-government. The issue brought Ripon's liberal­
ism and Pergusson's conservatism into a clash and Pergusson's 
position in relation to the move for reform became significant 
not so much for his urge for reform but for his opposition to 
it. The result was a bitter conflict of ideas followed by 
a serious misunderstanding between the Supreme Government and 
the Presidency Government.
Local self-government in India is not altogether an
imported element. The panchayats or the village councils,
which carried on the internal government of the villages,
have survived in a recognisable form in every part of India.^
But the modern institutions and ideas of local self-government
(1) John Matthai, Village Government in British India,1915* 
p.15
l i b
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in India were introduced during the British rule. In Bombay 
Presidency self-government developed in three directions - in 
the city of Bombay, in the mofussil (country) towns and in 
the rural areas. In 1793 by an Act of Parliament (33*Geo.III. 
C.52) the municipal administration of the town of Bombay was 
entrusted to a corporate body of the Justices of the Peace 
under strict government control. By this Act the Justices 
were to be appointed by the government from among the European 
inhabitants of the Presidency for judicial and civic functions. 
In course of time the Bench of the Justices of the Peace inclu­
ded Indian residents of the town and developed into a body of 
variable number. In 1845 a Board of Conservancy was created 
in Bombay town from among the Justices and the government 
officials to undertake the executive function of the local 
administration. This body, strangely, was not responsible to 
the Justices but only to the government for all its actions. 
Thus municipal administration in these days in Bombay town 
was shared by the Justices and the government and this dualism 
was productive of constant friction. Bombay Municipal Act IX 
of 1865 later on turned the Justices into a body with inde­
pendent powers and entrusted them with the undivided control 
of the municipal fund. The Justices, though they considerably 
represented the opinion of the residents, were in reality only 
nominees of the government. Following a phase of extreme 
financial extravagance in the civic administration of Bombay
217
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a cry for reform was soon raised. Under the leadership of 
Pheroze Shah Mehta a demand for the substitution of an elected 
body to control the municipal affairs in place of the Justices
A
of the Peace was gaining ground. The outcome was Bombay 
Municipal Act III of 1872 which replaced the Bench of the 
Justices by a Corporation of 64 members of whom 32 were to be 
elected by the ratepayers, 16 by the Justices and 16 nominated 
by the government. A town council was also created, composed 
of 12 members, 8 elected by the Corporation and 4 including 
the official Chairman nominated by the government. The 
general supervision of the works of the municipality was 
entrusted to a civilian commissioner with special executive 
powers.2
Bombay Municipal Act XXVI of 1850 first inaugurated 
local self-government in the mofussil towns of Bombay Presi­
dency. The Act provided for the constitution of Town Commi­
ttees, the levy by them of certain indirect taxation and the
A/
establishment of^municipal agency in any town on the applica­
tion of its residents. The agency was declared to be the 
Collector assisted by a committee of members, official and 
non-official, appointed by the government. In 1870 lord 
Mayo*s (government called upon the local governments to give 
their attention to the development of local self-government.
(1) R. P. Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government in Bombay
1 9 2 9, p . 216 -----------------------------------------:-----
(2) R. P. Masani, Evolution of Local Self-Government in Bombas
1929, p.82 - --------------------------------------------
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The Government of Bombay responded by passing Bombay Municipal 
Act VI of 1873 which declared the municipalities to be bodies 
corporate capable of holding and conveying property and of 
suing and being sued in their corporate capacity. The Act 
made distinction between the Town Municipalities and City 
Municipalities, the town municipality comprising not less than 
2000 inhabitants, the city municipality not less than 10,000 
inhabitants. According to the Act, the town municipalities 
were comprised of non-official members nominated by the govern­
ment not exceeding 12 and certain ex-officio government 
officials. The collectors of the districts were Presidents 
of such committees and the executive power was placed in the 
hands of the Presidents. The city municipalities on the other 
hand were composed of two-thirds non-official members nominated 
by the government and the executive power was placed in the 
hands of the committee as a body. The Act of 1873 further 
conceded permissive authority by which the government, if 
satisfied with the public spirit of a city municipality,could 
direct a portion of the committee to be appointed by election.
Provision for local taxation always existed in Bombay 
Presidency as in other parts of India and the local taxes were 
collected to be spent on local requirements. However, this 
provision was not much utilised in Bombay Presidency before 
1864. In 1864 the Government of Bombay under Sir B&rtle Prere 
sanctioned the establishment of a district local fund in each
(1) R. G. Shah, The Growth of local self-government in the 
province of Bombay. 1955* p*26
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of the districts of the Presidency* This Fund was to consist 
of local cess on land, local toll and ferry collection and 
the surplus cattle pound fund* The Local Punds Acts VIII of 
1865 and III of 1869 of the Government of Bombay constituted 
District Local Pund Committees for the management of the funds* 
The government also framed rules under these Acts by which 
sub-divisional local fund committees or Taluk committees were 
formed* The Taluk committees were mere consultative bodies 
without powers of appropriation and distribution of local 
funds* Both the District Local Fund Committees and the Taluk 
Committees were composed of officials and non-official land­
holders appointed by the government. As a rule the collector 
was the President of the District Local Pund Committee and
A
the entire executive power vested in him* On the whole, 
organisationally, the development of local self-government in 
Bombay Presidency was considerable. Pergusson proudly con­
tended that his Presidency was "absolutely pretty advanced in
4
local self-government" in comparison with other parts of India, 
Ripon1s Government seemed to have taken the same view that 
in Bombay Presidency mofussil municipal organisation was 
complete and the municipal law best in India.^
The municipal organisations during the tenure of office of
ij/T)l?.G.Sfaah» A?he growth of local self-government in the 
province of Bombay, 1955* P.6UT
(2^ Pergusson to R i p o n 1882. R.P.
(3J Secy.Home Dept.Govt.of I.to Secy.Govt.of B.Home,No.3516, 
Oct.10.1881. R.P.1883,Vol.51,P*58.
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Pergusson seem to have worked quite efficiently under official 
supervision. But the system lacked very much popular enthu­
siasm, the very essence of local self-government. The number 
of the municipalities in the Presidency was 163 in 1880, of 
which 10 were city municipalities.^ In 1883 "the number 
increased to 165 and- 14- more town municipalities were upgraded 
to city status.® The total funds at the disposal of the 
municipalities increased from Rs.76,87*879 in 1880-81 to 
Rs.94*56,141 in 1882-83* Usually Octroi duties or town taxes 
formed a very considerable part of the total income of the 
municipalities. Income derived from Octroi and direct muni­
cipal tax or house tax^were 49# and 46# respectively in 
1880-81.5
The unrestricted imposition of Octroi by the municipa­
lities on goods coming into or going out of the towns tended 
to become a transit duty seriously interfering with the 
freedom of trade. This led Ripon*s Government to express 
their dissatisfaction with the prevalence of Octroi duties 
in Bombay municipalities. Pergusson*s Government in their 
turn issued instructions to their district officials to
h.
restrain the collection of Octroi. But in spite of this 
effort the Octroi continued to be imposed unreservedly by 
the municipalities of the Presidency.^
(1) Municipal Report, Bomb.Pres.1880-81,Hun.Proc.Govt.of B. 
April,1882.
(2) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pre>s.1882-83.Mun.Proc.Govt.of I*
June,1884.
(3) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres.1880-81.Mun.Proc.Govt.of B. 
April,1882.
(4) Res.Govt.of B.General Dept.No*2047,28th June,1881.Mun. 
Proc.Govt.of I.Sept.1881.
(5) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres.1882-83*Mun.Proc.Govt.of I* 
June,1884.
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The municipalities of Bombay Presidency, like those in 
other parts of India, suffered from the burden of the police 
charges. Customarily the townspeople were required to pay 
through the municipality for the police establishment in the 
town for the maintenance of law and order* The municipalities 
provided funds for meeting the cost of the town police force 
but exercised no real control over the police* The Government 
of India remarked in October, 1881 that the municipalities in 
Bombay were f,saddled with more than 5 lakhs of rupees of police 
charges while their expenditure on education and sanitary 
establishments does not exceed 2-J lakhs of rupees*11 When the 
Government of India expressed their opinion against the obno­
xious police charge Fergusson^ Government decided to relieve
p
the mofussil municipalities of their police expenses* In 
1882 the mofussil municipalities in general were freed from 
the police charge and the costs of police in the district towns 
were to be met from the provincial budget* However, the 
police charge was not discontinued in case of Bombay City 
Municipality.
Fergusson*s regime in Bombay witnessed an unfortunate 
decrease in the number of non-official members in the munici­
palities in comparison with the number of the official members*
In 1883 the total number of the official members was 909
ClJ Under Secy.Dept.of"Finance- & Commerce,Govt*of l.to Secy* 
Finance Dept.Govt.of B.No*3516,10th 0ct*1881*P.P.1883i 
Vol.51,p.58.
(2) Res.Govt.of B.No.3583,Sept.19,1882.P.P.1883,Vol.51,P*39.
(3) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres*1882-83. Mun.Proc.Govt.of I* 
June, 1884.
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showing an increase over the number of the previous year,
901. On the other hand, the number of the non-official 
members showed a marked reduction,being 1593 in 1883 while 
the number was 1695 in 1882.  ^ Fergusson's Government,though
they appreciated on occasions the examples of public spirit 
of the Indian members of the municipalities, placed the utmost 
emphasis on the performance of the official members and the 
district officers. In the opinion of the government "the 
energies of the district officers can hardly be more usefully 
employed than in endeavouring tb reform the abuses which
p
affect the welfare of the community at large.” The Government 
of Bombay complained of a lack of attendance on the part of 
the non-official members in municipal meetings. They felt 
that municipal commissionerships were not popular.^ The 
government officials were of the opinion that in many cases 
’’desirable improvements can not be carried out, if the opinion 
of the non-officialswaere acted upon. ” Fergusson noticed 
that the non-official members in some cases considered 
essential municipal activities like conservancy and road 
repairs as unnecessary. Even in the highly advanced town of 
Poona the municipality declined to proceed with a drainage
scheme and stood upon their vested right to drain in the
(4; Municipal Report,Boi^.Sres.l’tJ6^-837Hun,5Proc.ciovt.of I# 
June,1884.
(2) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres.1880-81,Mun.Proc.Govt.of B. 
April,1882.
(3) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres.1881-82,Mun.Proc.Govt.of B.
May,1883.
(4) Municipal Report,Bomb.Pres.1880-81,Mun.Proc.Govt.of B. 
April,1882.
nearby river which had already been turned into a source of
A
cholera epidemic, These facts convinced Fergusson that there
had been little or no disposition on the part of the non-
Tk'Z
officials to take^ initiative or to co-operate with the offi­
cials,^
The official preponderance was overwhelming in the adminis­
tration of the local funds in the rural areas of the Presidency, 
Generally the District Committees were instructed by the gover­
nment to adopt a long term budget of 5 or 7 years to work out 
extensive plans for water works and road construction with 
the aid of the Public Works Department of the government. The 
work was usually carried out efficiently and the development 
of communications in the districts was remarkable. But local 
funds thus spent upon the roadways of the district left nothing 
for the local W&rk&conceming the immediate interests of the 
villagers.^ In consequence scant consideration was paid to 
village development in Bombay Presidency in spite of the 
existence of the Taluk Committees and the administration of 
local funds became exclusively a government concern. Pergusson 
was conscious of the defect of the system and observed that 
there were complaints against Mthe application of the local 
fund on plans so extended as arterial roads that minor works 
in every petty locality are often alleged to be neglected.
(1} Fergusson to K i m b e r l e y 11S83 * F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st May, 1882. R.P.
(3 ) Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.Legis.Dept.Govt.of I.No.Legis.I,
9th May,1883. Legis.Dept.Proc.Govt.of B.May,1883*
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st May, 1882. R.P.
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It was true that the general public with the exception 
of the educated class were very indifferent towards the admin­
istration of their own local affairs. The government in 
their turn practically made no effort to foster enthusiasm 
and relied on the efficiency of their district officials.
The picture was*same everywhere in India and excluding the
A
Presidency cities of Bombay* Madras and Calcutta there was 
no local self-government in the true sense of the term. 
Although a framework of local administration and local taxa­
tion existed, control was firmly in the hands of the officials 
The public indifference to local self-government was due to 
well-known general factors. Ordinarily people considered 
municipalities as means of imposing fresh taxation. To the 
commercial class the Octroi was a veritable nuisance and 
municipal business unjustly interfering. Prominent residents 
were reluctant to come forward in municipal acti^rities for 
fear of misusing time and energy. The rule of conducting the 
municipal proceedings in the English language also proved 
to be an obstacle to many. Only some men of the legal pro­
fession and young educated Indians took some interest.
However, the intelligentsia as a whole constituted a Micros­
copic minority” of the people. Besides these, the people 
were unconcerned about health and hygiene and were accustomed 
to relying on a highly centralised government. But what was 
important was not the inertia of the people but the fact that 
the British regime never wanted to break this general lethargy
Z 2 5
rather the government took advantage of this* Despite the 
isolated liberalism of Lawrence and Mayo to develop local 
self-government in the period preceding Ripon's Mceroyalty 
no real effort was made by those in immediate control of 
affairs to infuse life into the organs of local government. 
Local government virtually degenerated into a mere depart­
ment of the government* The non-official members were 
usually those "who nod their heads to everything that is 
proposed by the President.11 Thus the municipalities and 
local fund committees lacked life and vigour. It was to the 
credit of Ripon that he realised that the primary requisite 
was the infusion of fresh life. This was tame of India as 
a whole and of Bombay Presidency in particular. The fresh 
life could only be instilled by inspiring popular interest 
and by introducing the popular element into the moribund 
committees. The new spirit that Ripon was conceiving when
he came to India was ,fa more general introduction of the
2elective system in the municipalities.11
The picture was quite different in the local administra­
tion of Bombay city. The Act of 1872 supplied Bombay City 
Municipality with its life-inspiring spirit - the principle 
of popular representation. The performance of Bombay City 
Municipality was so good that the body was favourably compa­
red with the municipalities of the leading cities of Europe.
(1) Kalpataru. Marathi Newspaper. 4th July.1886, homh-Na-hTvg 
Newspaper Reports,1880.
(2) Ripon to Hartington, 26th June,1880. Cited in Gopal, 
Ripon. 1956, p.90.
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The Government of Fergusson admitted that the works executed 
by the Bombay Gity Municipality were "generally conceived on
A
a liberal scale and were carried out with efficiency”• H.
Cook, the Chairman of the Town Council, thought that the
Indian members of the Corporation and the Town Council fairly
2represented intelligence, education and social influence*
The enlightened Indians of Bombay city, however, showed an
inclination to monopolise all powers of the local body in
their hands. The Corporation,which used to elect two-thirds
of the members of the Town Council,showed a tendency engineered
by the Indian members to keep these places for men of their
own community. In the year 1881 the government was alarmed
to find that the Corporation elected only one European out
x
of their eight members in the Council.^ The leading Indian 
members of the Bombay municipality like Pheroze Shah Mehta, 
Viswanath Mandalik, Kashinath Telang, Badruddin Tayebji 
belonged to the articulate minority of the educated section 
and were full of western ideas of constitutional liberty. To 
Fergussonfs Government the activities and expressions of these 
men exhibited ”a certain jealousy of Government, an impatience 
of control and an inclination to claim concessions as a right."
As a reaction Fergusson resolved to maintain strictly the
(1) Secy.General,Dept.(iovt.of B.to Secy.Heme Dept.Govt.of I. : 
No.3510,20th 0ct.1881.P.P.1883,Vol.51,p.145.
(2) H.Cook,Chairman,Town Council to Secy.Rev.Dept.Govt.of B.
No.254,1 8 8 1. P.P.1883,Vol.51»p.145.
(3) Secy.General Dept.Govt.of B.to Secy.Home Dept.Govt.of I.
No.3510,20th Oct.1881.P.P.1883iVol.51fP*145
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existing limitations on the elective principle, namely, the 
nominated members of the government in the Corporation and 
in the Council and the appointment of the municipal commissio—
a
ner by the government* The authoritarian attitude of Pergu- 
sson and the aspirations of the Indian members of the munici­
pality were thus irreconcilable and a clash was close at hand*
The clash between the Government of Bombay and the Bombay 
City Municipality started on the question of the re-introduc- 
tion of the Contagious Diseases Act of 1868 in the city of 
Bombay. The Contagious Diseases Act or the popularly known 
C.D.Act was first introduced in 1869 in the city of Calcutta 
to fight venereal disease, which was spreading fast, especially 
among the troops. In 1870 the Government of Bombay decided to 
introduce the Act in Bombay city where a certain population 
was always floating and sailors and travellers from all parts 
of the world gathered. The expenses of the working of the 
Act in Calcutta were defrayed partly from the municipal fund. 
Similarly the Bench of the Justices in charge of Bombay city 
municipality decided to help the introduction of the Act in 
Bombay by contributing Hs.40,000 for the year 1870. It should 
be noted here that the cost of the establishments to examine 
public women, to treat them with adequate medical facilities 
and to provide for additional police charge to induce the 
women to undergo examination was considerable. The Act in
(1) Secy.General Dept.Govt.of B.to Secy.Home Dept.Govt.of I.
No.3510, 20th Oct.1881. P.P.1883,Vol.51,p.145.
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Bombay city continued with moderate success for two years. 
after which it was suspended due to the refusal of Bombay 
municipality to make any further grant to meet the expendi­
ture of the Act. The subject was revived again in 1876 by 
the Report of the Sanitary Commissioner of Bombay showing 
an alarming prevalence of venereal diseases. The Government 
of Bombay approached Bombay City Municipality regarding the 
re-introduction of the Act and the financial arrangement for 
its working. The municipality had no objection to the re- 
introduction of the Act, but they expressed their inability 
to shoulder responsibility for any portion of the requisite 
funds. Sir R. Temple, the predecessor of Fergusson, had no 
doubt that the Act should prove beneficial in Bombay city.
He made preparations for the introduction of the Act and 
invited Bombay municipality in January, 1880 to share the
"I
expenses of the Act, but without any success. Thus, Fer- 
gusson, when he arrived, inherited the task of finally intro­
ducing the Act as well as settling the account with the 
unwilling Bombay municipality. Hartington, the Secretary of
State, warned Fergusson to proceed carefully with the "tick-
2
lish question" of the C. D. Act.
The question was "ticklish" due to two factors, namely, 
the unpopularity of the C.D.Act and the determined disagree­
ableness of Bombay municipality. The unpopularity of the_____
C"1) Desp • Govt . of B. to S . of S. General, No • 16, 7th June, 1881 •
P.P.1883,Vol.50, p.535.
(2) Hartington to Fergusson,9th^Ju|$, 1880. F.C.
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Act was chiefly owing to the fact that it encouraged corrup­
tion by regularising prostitution and that it gave opportu­
nities for police malpractices on the plea of the supervision 
of public women* The wealthy people objected to the Act for 
fear that their mistresses would be subjected to medical check­
up thereby, their privacy being interfered. There was also 
the apprehension that "the police would extort money from
A
these mistresses as a condition of exemption*11 The moral
issue involved was whether the goad people should pay for
2
"the sins of others knowingly done" The distinguished citi­
zens of Bombay protested in a memorial against the Act. They 
pointed out that the Act, if re-introduced, would be harmful 
by giving "a quasi-government sanction to v i c e s . F e r g u s s o n  
disregarded these objections and introduced the Act in Septem­
ber, 1880. The opposition to the Act after its introduction 
continued with renewed vigour and the native press was loud 
in its disapproval.
From the beginning Fergusson had no doubt that the intro­
duction of the Act, though unpopular, was justified from the 
point of view of "practical circumstances."4 That it was so 
was proved by the report of the hospitals of Bombay city.
Taking all hospitals and dispensaries of Bombay city together
Fergusson to hartington,9'fc‘lr^Ju^,1880. F.C.
(2) Native Opinion, Anglo-Marathi Newspaper, Bomb.Native 
Newspaper Report,1882•
(3) Desp.Govt.of B.to S.of S.General, No.16, 7th June,1881. 
p.p.1883i Vol.50, p.555*
(4) Fergusson to Hartington,9WiJui*£, 1880. F.C.
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the number of venereal cases treated during the 15 months 
from June, 1879 to August, 1880 prior to the introduction 
of the Act was 8964, while for subsequent 15 months from 
September, 1880 to November, 1881 during which the Act was 
enforced was 7235 - showing a decrease of 1729 cases or of
A
19 per cent. This fact convinced the home authorities of 
the beneficial character of the Act. Meanwhile in England 
the opinion was strongly in favour of "the administratioh 
of vices” and a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 
August, 1882 recommended that the English C. D. Acts should 
be extended to a wider area. Under these circumstances the 
Secretary of State decided upon the continuance of the Act
p
in Bombay city.
A conflict soon started between the Government and 
Bombay City Municipality over the allocation of the police 
expenses for the C.D.Act. By Bombay Municipal Act of 1865 
it was decided that the annual expenses of police establish­
ment in the city of Bombay should be paid out of the munici­
pal fund. But the growing expenditure of police establish­
ment increased *'• so rapidly that the municipal fund of 
Bombay could not cope with it. The municipality brought the 
matter to the notice of the government and pressed for a
subsidy towards meeting the police charges. The Government
(1J Re s. Govt, of B. General Dept .rJo.43 59,29t1hUec. 1881. p.p.
1885, Vol.50, p.601.
(2) Desp.S. of S. to Govt.of I. Statistics and Commerce,No. 
180, 26th Oct.1882. P.P.1885, Vol.50, p.609*
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of Bombay sanctioned a grant which after somejfcime was abruptly 
discontinued. The municipality pursued their cause by memo­
rialising the home authorities. After a prolonged exchange 
of communications between 1874 and 1877 it was finally decided 
that the Government of Bombay would contribute annually 
Rs.90,000 (one-fourth of the total cost of police establish-
A
ment in Bombay city) to Bombay city municipality. When 
Fergusson re-introduced the C.D. Act in Bombay and pressed 
the municipality to bear a portion of its working cost the 
municipality refused to incur any such responsibility, Fergu­
sson then proceeded carefully to induce the municipality to 
contribute at least Rs.15*000 towards Lock Hospital where 
patients under the C,I), Act were treated. He hoped that if 
the municipality refused to contribute directly it might agree 
to contribute in an indirect fashion, Fergusson informed
p
Hartington about his ,lmanoeuvre,y  With the municipality.
The attempt, however, failed as the Corporation rejected 
such a move in August, 1880,
The defiance enraged Fergusson and his Government deli­
vered a threatening note to the municipality stating that 
if they refrained themselves from contributing Rs.15*000 
towards the expenses of the C.D.Act, the Sovernment would 
deduct that amount from their regular contribution to the
(1) Desp.Govt*of I. to S, of S. Home, No.2, 20th Feb.1883. 
KuiuProc.Govt.of I.Feb. 1883.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 30th July, 1880. F.C.
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police charges ofthe municipality* The Corporation paid no 
heed to this threat and the Government of Bombay withheld 
Rs.15,000 from their police grant for the year 1881 and
A
handed over Rs.75,000 to the municipality. This method of 
disciplining the defiant municipality was pre-planned. As 
early as in June, 1880 Fergusson informed Hartington that 
the government would face stiff opposition from the Bombay 
Municipality who would certainly refuse to pay for the work­
ing of the C.D.Act. tfIn that case”, he wrote, "the Government 
shall have to deduct Rs.15*000 from the subsidy of Rs.90,000
p
to the municipality.11 Fergusson*s measure excited wide­
spread indignation among the people of Bombay. Native 
Opinion denounced this act of the government as na senseless 
p r o c e e d i n g . T h e  Indian Spectator considered this measure
as fla piece of financial vandalism” and commented that it
foe
was better to repeal the Muhicipal Act and make, municipality
A
a mere department of the State than to trifle with the 
feelings of intelligentoCiti^en©.^ The Bombay City Municipa­
lity spiritedly decided to fight this unjust decision and 
they drew the attention of the Supreme Government to the 
fact that "by withholding a portion of the police contribution
towards defraying a part of the cost of the working of the
(1) Desp.Govt.of B.to S. of S. General No.16, 7th June,1881.
P.P.1883,Vol.50, p.535.
(2} Fergusson to Hartington ,9t3mJni£te^  1880. F.C.
(3) Native Opinion, Anglo-Marathi Newspaper, 12th Dec.1880, 
Bomb.Native Newspaper Report, 1880.
(4) The Indian Spectator, English newspaper, 12th Dec.1880. 
Bomb.Native Newspaper Report, 1880.
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C. D. Act, the Government of Bombay are acting both arbitra­
rily and unjustly. " 1 In justification of their act Fergu- 
sson*s Government took refuge in the plea that in 1875 when 
the question of government contribution regarding the police 
charge was determined, the contribution was made discretionary 
to the Government of Bombay. Thus they insisted that they 
were quite justified in exercising their discretion in the
present case when the Corporation turned a deaf ear to all
pthe conciliatory proposals of the government. The Munici­
pality was in no mood to surrender and appealed to the Secre­
tary of State by pointing out that the action of the govern­
ment should be judged as laying hands on the municipal trea­
sury without any authority from the municipality. This, the 
Municipality argued, was illegal and "in violation of the 
rights rested in the Corporation in respect of the custody 
and disposal ofa&ll municipal funds!r Ripon was very dis­
satisfied with this maltreatment of a local body. "The way 
in which the Bombay Government treated the municipality of 
that city," he observed, "appears to me to be quite unjusti- 
fiable." Ripon*s Government naturally pronounced an opinion
in favour of Bombay City Municipality. They were of the
Petition of the Corporation ofBombay to Viceroy, IgthTbec.
1880. Mun.Proc.Govt.ofI.March,1881.
(2) Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.Govt.of I.Municipal,No.172,14th 
Jan.1881.Mun.Proc.Govt.of I.March,1881.
(5) Memorial of Bombay City Municipality to S. of S.8th June,
1 8 8 1 . P.P. 1883 Vol.50,p.549.
(4) Ripon to James Stanfeld, M.PjSMi&giS6,1883. Printed R.P.
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opinion that the re-introduction of the C.D.Act afforded no
sufficient justification for compelling tjie Municipality to
contribute by withholding a corresponding sum "which.••under
other circumstances the Government of Bombay would pay them
1on a totally different account.” As to the claim of the
}
Bombay Government that the police grant was discretionary on 
their part* the Government of India concluded that the corres­
pondence on the subject from 1874- to 1877 showed clearly the 
willingness of the Supreme Government to regard the claim of
Bombay City Municipality to the entire grant of Rs.90,000 as
2"just and equitable.” The verdict of the Secretary of State 
in October, 1883 went in favour of the Municipality and he 
described the action of Fergusson1s Government as "impolitic 
and not fair to the Corporation”. The Government of Bombay 
was directed to refund to Bombay City Municipality the entire 
amount withheld. This was a crushing defeat for Fergusson 
and his Government begged the Secretary of State to reconsider 
his order in view of their public humiliation if they were 
forced to refund the money withheld for two years.^ Kimberley 
withdrew the injunction and thus saved Fergusson from "a 
severe slap in the face.”^
(1) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S.Home,No.I,16th June,1882.P.P. 
1883,Vol.50,p.596.
(2) Desp.Govt.of I.to S.of S .Home,No.2i$20th Feb.1883.Mun.Proc. 
Govt.of I.Feb.1883.
(3) Desp.S.of S.to Govt.of B.Statistics & Commerce,No.28,26th 
Oct•1882•Mun.Proc•Govt.of I.Feb•1883•
(4-) Desp.Govt.of B.to S.of S.General,No.1-16,19th Jan.1883.
Mun.Proc.Govt.of I.Feb.1883.
(5) Fergusson to KimberleyJlsl?3©e£, 1882. F.C.
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The Bombay City Municipality next decided to dispense 
with the burden of the police charges altogether and to 
demand an extension of their field of activities and respon­
sibilities. In both these objects they had the advantage of 
referring to the liberal policy of Ripon towards local self- 
government. Ripon1s Government on 30th September* 1881 sugg­
ested that the local governments should transfer some items
1of the Provincial revenue to the local bodies for management. 
On 20th October, 1881 the Government of India further desired 
that the municipalities should be entirely relieved of police 
charges and that an equal amount of expenditure on education, 
medical charity and public works should be transferred to 
them*2 In spite of these expressed desires of the Supreme 
Government the Government of Bombay hesitated to effect any 
change in Bombay City administration. At last in October, 
1884 the municipality submitted an elaborate scheme referring 
to those institutions and works which it sought to control 
and requested the Government of Bombay to relieve it from 
the police charge. The Municipality pointed out that flthe 
duty of maintaining order is the first function of the §ovem- 
ment and the sum required for the police should, like the
cost of the army, be provided by the government out of the
(1) Res. Govt.of I.Dept, of Finance and Commerce, No.3353, 
Sept.30, 1881, P.P.1883, Vol.51, p.8
(2) Under Secy.Dept.of Finance & Commerce to Secy.Finance 
Dept.Govt.of B.No.3516,10th Oct.1881. Public and General 
Letters from India and Bengal.
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general funds.”  ^ The Government of Fergusson were not
prepared to make any concession to the Bombay Municipality
and expressed their unwillingness to discuss those subjects
on which the municipality was eager to lay its control* The
Government of Bombay further stated that they might have
agreed to meet the cost of police in Bombay city if they
could transfer to the municipality an item of provincial
expenditure equal in amount to the police charge* But the
government declared that they were unable to find out such
an item and concluded that the municipality could not entirely
2
be relieved of all payment for the police charges*
Fergusson*s clash with Bombay City Municipality clearly 
demonstrated the temper and aspirations of the educated 
Indians who were generally interested in the municipal activi­
ties of the time* To them the municipalities afforded oppor­
tunities of constitutional liberty. They prized their muni­
cipal independence and resented governmental interference*
They felt that "freedom of action must be given to ensure 
success of local self-government." They denounced the atti­
tude of Fergusson*s Government, which in their opinion was 
11 calculated to destroy the sense of trust and responsibility 
on which the successful working of a local body depended.”
If such an official attitude was maintained, they commented,
(4) Chairman, Bombay Municipality to Secy.Govt. of B7tJo.lt)12, 
10th Oct.1884* Mun.Proc.Govt.of B.Jan.1885*
(2) Res. Govt.of B.General Dept.No.74, 13th Jan. 1885.Mun.Proc. 
Govt.of B. Jan.1885.
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the1 rate payers of^he city would find "their free municipal 
institutions are self—governing only in name and that all 
the diligence and intelligence at their commandi/wrlll not 
save their decisions from being set at nought whenever they
A
conflict with the widhes of the executive government."
The educated Indians had learnt that the representation
of the people was the basis ofconstitutional liberty. This
was partly conceded in Bombay City Municipality, which was
struggling for further municipal freedom. Such was, however,
not the case in mofussil municipalities where enlightened
public opinion was ceaselessly seeking municipal franchise.
The system of government nomination in the mofussil munici-
2palities was vehemently denounced. Any municipal reform 
was considered impossible to achieve "unless the nomination 
of non-official members is placed in the hands of the people1.^ 
The Anglo-Marathi newspaper, Byan Prakash, pleaded for muni­
cipal franchise and thought it "^ust and reasonable that as 
the municipal funds are derived from the taxpayers, the 
management of these funds ought to be entrusted to men in 
whom they have perfect confidence." Gujrati protested
against the autocracy of district officers in the local bodies
(/I) Memorial from bombay City Municipality to S. of £>• 8th 
June,1881. P.P.1883, Vol.50, p.549.
(2) Shiva.ji, Marathi Newspaper, 18th June, 1880. Bomb.Native 
Newspaper Report, 1880.
(3) Poona Vaibhaw. Marathi newspaper, 6th July,1880.Bomb. 
Native Newspaper Report, 1880.
(4) Byan Prakash. Anglo-Marathi newspaper, 15th July,1880. 
bomb.Native Newspaper Report,1880.
2.3 8
In its opinion the Coliector-Magistrate "should not be allowed 
to remain as at present the President of the municipalities 
of his district."^ The Poona newspaper Maratha accused the 
Government of Bombay of depriving the people of municipal 
franchise.^ Maratha also resented the fact that the munici­
palities and legislative councils were full of puppets or 
"Jo hukum wallahs”* The organ voiced the aspirations of the 
educated Indians : "What the people want is a regular repre­
sentative system which permits them to choose their own men 
in Legislative Council and municipalities.
Such was the aspiration of the enlightened Indians 
claiming a share in the administration and protesting against 
the great weight of over-centralisation of the government*
They were doubtlessly inspired by western ideas and education, 
and if antagonised they could become bitter opponents of 
British rule. The British authorities had two alternatives 
in dealing with these people, the conservative approach of
suspecting them of disloyalty and suppressing their enthusiasm 
andtthe liberal approach of utilising them by giving conce­
ssions. Fergusson had in mind the first alternative while 
Hipon zealously advocated the second. Fergusson always
suspected the loyalty of the educated Indians* The spread
(1J Gujrathi, Gu.irati newspaper* 6th No v *i881- Bnmh.NativA ~
Newspaper Report, 1881
(2) Maratha, English newspaper, 14th Aug.1881. Bomb.Native 
Newspaper Report. 1881.
(3) Maratha, 6th Nov. 1881. Bomb.Native Newspaper Report*1881
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of higher education, in his opinion, resulted in the growth
of a very numerous educated class "who look only to the
public service and whether in or out of it are not at all
too loyal.!,/* He believed that "the disloyal feelings of
the educated Indians were held in check but barely concealed
2beneath spficious professions of patriotism.11 He considered 
Poona Sarvojanik Sabha, an organisation of the enlightened 
opinion at Poona, as "an arrogant body assumed to be repre­
sentative of the people."^ In the educated community of 
Poona Fergusson witnessed nothing but "a spirit of opposi-
tL
tion to the Government." Throughout his governorship in 
Bombay he was very apprehensive about the designs of the 
Deccan Brahmins "who furnished the majority class of educa- 
ted Indians."^
Ripon, on the other hand, strongly felt the necessity 
of turning the educated Indians into "the friends instead 
of the enemies" of British rule. He was convinced that a 
gradual admission ofitbe Indians to a larger influence in 
administration and a training to exercise that influence 
would secure the continuance of British mile in India. Ripon 
considered the educated Indians as the product of the British
rule in India and his policy was "to use them for their good
tl) Fergusson to Granbrook, 31st March, 1882. C.C.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 3rd Jan. 1883. R.P.
C3) Fergusson to Hartington, 24th March, 1882. F.C.
(4) Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.Home Dept.Gov1;.of I.No.3510,
Oct.20,1881. P.P.1883, Vol.51, p.145.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley, 11th Oct.1883. F.C.
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and our o w n . I n  his eagerness to pursue this Bolicy Ripon
even suggested to the home authorities that the municipali­
ties, some of whose members were elected, should in turn 
elect members to the Provincial Legislative Councils* This,
he thought, would be appreciated by the Indians and useful
2
to the government. The Secretary of State, Hartington, was 
not in favour of such a large concession and ignored the 
suggestion by describing it as premature. Thisiinitial 
setback could not restrain Ripon1s urge for utilising the 
educated Indians and a cause was found lying at hand when 
theissue of revision of the Provincial Contracts came up 
for consideration. A growing expenditure and increasing 
demand from the provinces forced Lord Mayo in 1870 to think 
about decentralising the finances of India. The Supreme 
Government in that year effected contracts with the provin­
cial governments by transferring certain departments of 
administration with fixed assignment of revenue to meet those 
charges. In 1877 the Government of India renewed and extended 
these contracts. In 1881 Ripon1s Government thought of 
further extending the contracts by transferring to the local 
governments a proportion of Imperial revenue collected in 
the provinces iinstead of giving them a fixed stun. The 
original scheme of Mayo made an allusion to local self­
(1) Ripon to Kimberley, 10th July,1883. Cited in Gopal,
Ripon, 1956, p.84.
(2) Ripon to Hartington, 31st Dec.1881. Cited in Gopal,
Ripon, 1956, p.84.
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government• The Resolution of his Government in 1870 stated 
that the scheme of financial decentralisation "in its full 
meaning and integrity will afford opportunities for the 
development of self-government, for strengthening municipal 
institutions."^ Thus in 1881 when the Provincial Contracts 
came^iup for consideration, Ripon*s Government were necessa­
rily led to enquire whether fuller effect should not be given 
to the extension of local self-government.
Regarding the extension of local self-government in India 
Ripon was not only contemplating the introduction of the 
elective system and the employment of the energies of the 
educated Indians but also the withdrawal of governmental 
interference in the local bodies. It seemed to Ripon from 
the beginning that local self-government should not become 
a mere department of the state. Por the real development of 
self-government, Ripon even preferred an initial mismanage­
ment of the people of their own affairs to the efficient and 
paternal guidance of the government officials. He always 
considered it very desirable to encourage municipal action 
and life in India and thought that in order to foster self- 
government "it was better to suffer some folly rather than to 
interfere with the independence of the local bodies."^ This 
attitude later on matured into the basic tenet of his local 
self-government policy, that the extension of self-government
(1) Res.Govt.of I.Dept.of Finance af and Commerce, No.5353, 
Sept.30, 1881. P.P.1883,*Vol.51, p.8.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 8th July, 1880. F.C.
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was chiefly desirable "as an instrument of political and
A
popular education,1
As opposed to these ideas Fergusson believed that the 
necessity of local self-government in India existed only as 
a means of administrative convenience. He regarded munici­
pal institutions as “a valuable field for enlisting the 
public in the work of the Government and as affording relief 
from the inevitable despotism of British rule.** Thus some 
independence, if found prudent, might be given to the local
bodies and even they might be allowed 11 to prize and display1
2this independence. But this fax Fergusson could concede 
and no further. He was always impressed with the necessity 
of caution and the inexpediency of hurrying any novel change? 
He was convinced that the people were not Mripefl for the
h
extensive concession of the elective principle. Further
he was afraid that popular elections could not be tried
without some risks in view of the ambitions and discontent
of the educated class. To Kimberley he wrote that it was
very necessary to see that "what is called by local self-
government does not mean a Deccan Brahmin oligarchy.”^ The
cry for local self-government as revealed by the native
press came, in the opinion of Fergusson, not from the mass 
11) Ses.Govt.of I.No.17_ 18th May,1882.P.P.1883,Vol.51,
P.25.
(2) Pergusson to Ripon, 12th July,1880. R.P.
(3) Pergusson to Ripon, 31st May,1882. R.P.
(4) Govt.of B.to Govt.of I.General,No.414-1, 27th Oct.1882.
P.P.1883, Vol.51, p.163.
(5) Pergusson to Kimberley, 11th Oct.1883. P.O.
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of the people but from the educated class agitating with a
/!
political motive. The divergence of opinion between Ripon 
and Fergusson on the issue of local self-government was funda­
mental and irreconcilable unless one of them faltered, hesi­
tated and gave way. Fergusson in one respect was handicapped 
as a Presidency Governor. He remarked to Kimberley about the 
difficulty of those "whose future depended on the Viceroy" 
to become candid critics. But Fergusson like Ripon was 
devoted to his own cause and was ready to fight to the last.
"I would have rather leave India," he declared, "as unpopular
a man as ever left those shores than sacrifice one point or
pprinciple which I believe to be essential."
The clouds of an impending storm soon gathered. In
September, 1881 Ripon1s Government invited the attention of
the local governments to the view enunciated by Lord Mayo
that the development of local self-government was among the
greatest objects connected with the decentralisation of the
finances. The Government of India had already transferred
certain heads of expenditure to the provinces since 1870.
The provincial governments in their turn, the Government of
Ripon desired, should hand over some items of expenditure
kept in their hands to the local bodies.^ In the following
month the Government of India further elaborated their plan
and pointed out that the police charges, imposed as a rule 
Fergusson to Ripon, ^nst May, 1882. R.P. 1
(2) Chairman's speech, 25th Aug. 1885* Bomb.Legis.Cotin.Proc.
(3) Hes.Govt.of I. Dept.of Finance and Commerce,No.3353» Sept. 
3 0 ,1 8 8 1. P.P.1883, Vol.519 p.8 .
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on the municipalities, should be discontinued and the receipt 
and control of several items of provincial finance should be 
made over to the local bodies. They, however, thought that 
such transfer of items of expenditure to the local bodies 
could not profitably be considered apart from the question 
of introducing changes in the powers and composition of the 
local bodies. Ripon1s Government felt that the powers of the 
municipal bodies should be advantageously extended and the 
rural boards should be consolidated, with subordinate commi­
ttee for each sub-division. The local bodies, in their 
opinion, should comprise persons not in the service of the 
government and elected or nominated to the extent of not less 
than one-half or two-third of the total number of members.
A certain measure of control and inspection of the work of 
these bodies should be left to the government though the 
principle must be one of non-interference. "Within limits... 
the fullest possible liberty of aotion should be given to 
the local bodies." Ripon*s Government specially directed 
the Government of Bombay to take effective measures for the 
extension of local self-government. They even suggested the 
exact items of expenditure which could be conveniently passed 
over to the local bodies, namely, a part oftthe educational
expenses, medical expenditure under the heads» vaccination.
(1) Govt.of I.to Govt.of Madras, No.3515* Oct.10,1881.P.P.
1883fVol.51* p.2 0 .
(2)
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sanitation, hospitals and dispensaries and the local public
A
works expenditure*
Fergusson*s first reaction to these declared intentions 
of the Supreme Government was to show that his government 
should not be supposed ,!to be disinclined to extend local
p
self-government.11 At the same time he was reluctant to 
effect any substantial change in the administration of local 
government in his Presidency. On the plea that the existing 
state of local self-government in Bombay Presidency was 
advanced and the municipal law sound, Pergusson*s Government 
wanted to postpone giving effect to the proposals of the 
Supreme Government. In their opinion the District and Taluk 
Fund Committees could not advantageously be charged with any 
further heads of expenditure and similar conclusions were 
arrived at in respect of the municipal committees. The only 
concession that Fergusson*s Government could offer was a very 
partial handing over of the charge of primary education to 
few of the prominent local bodies.^ The Government of Bombay, 
however, decided to introduce what they called a very subs­
tantial change in the organisation of the local bodies by 
permitting the elective principle to be adopted in the City 
municipalities. They declared that the election of one-half 
of the total number of Commissioners would take place in all
the City municipalities.^ Apparently this looked like a
Under Secy.Govt.of I.Dept#of Fin.£ Comm.to Secy.Fin.Dept. 
Govt.of B.No.3516,10th Oct.1881.Public and General Letters 
from India and Bengal.
C2) Fergusson to Ripon,3%d?J/SpraJ^  1882* R.P.
(5) Res.Govt.of B.Fin.Dept.No.1093*25th March,1882.P.P.1883.
, N Vol.51,p.34.
(4) Ibid.
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great stride towards the extension of local self-government 
in Bombay Presidency where only Bombay City Municipality 
enjoyed partial franchise and the other ten city municipal!—
■'I
ties were not blessed with this concession* Fergusson 
proudly informed Ripon that his government was"the first 
in India that had proposed to introduce election in large 
municipalities"2 In reality, however, the elective principle 
was conceded by the Government of Bombay only in order to 
counterbalance their refusal to transfer any new head of 
expenditure to the local bodies* The fact was that in Bombay 
Presidency the concession of the elective principle was over­
due* Under the Bombay Municipal Act VI of 1873 the govern­
ment was empowered to direct that in any city municipality the 
whole or any portion of non-official commissioners should be 
appointed by election* Since 1873 the Government of Bombay 
had not taken any advantage of this permissive legislation 
and disregarded the public opinion. The native press in fact 
was relentlessly advocating the extension of the franchise 
to all the city municipalities. It is interesting to note 
that the Government of Fergusson conceded franchise to the 
city municipalities .which in March, 1882 had considered any 
such step "injudicious" several months earlier in October,1881
in response to the petition of some city municipalities 
(i; Ten City Municipalities were : Poona, Sholapur, Broach,
Ahmednagar, Ahmedabad, Surat, Karachi, Hyderabad,Shikarpur, 
Sukkur.
(2} Fergusson to Ripon, 25th Oct.1882. R.P.
(3) Shivaji, 11th June,1880.Dyan Prakash. 15th July,1880 and 
Hitechhu, Anglo-Gujrati newspaper,1st Sept.1881.Bomb*Native 
Newspaper Report,1880 and 1881.
(4) Secy.General Dept.Govt.of B.to Secy.Home Dept.Govt.of I.No. 
3510,Oct.20,1881.P.P.1883,Vol.5>p*145
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Meanwhile Ripon's Government regretted the decision of the 
Government of Bombay as regards the transfer of expenditure 
and could not see "any insuperable11 difficulty preventing
A
Bombay from giving effect to their wishes. The public opi­
nion in Bombay Presidency also reacted unfavourably to the 
decision of the Government of Bombay. The Indian Spectator
commented that the concession of franchise paraded by the
2government was by no means a substantial concession. The 
Marathi newspaper Arunodaya thought that the attitude of 
Pergusson's Government was "calculated to prevent people desir­
ing to manage their own a f f a i r s . Dyan Prakash alleged that 
the secret of the opposition of the Bombay Government to Ripon' 
liberal measure was due to the reluctance of the government
lL
officials to loosen their hold on the public purse.
Pergusson1s unwillingness to move in the matter of local 
self-government was thus clear from the initial stage of Ripon1s 
endeavours. Such an attitude sooner or later was certain to 
develop into active opposition if Ripon's Government insisted 
on further advance. This was exactly the case when on 18th May, 
1882 the Government of India published their famous Resolution 
on local self-government and invited the local governments
to extend self-government by adopting certain
(1) Secy.Home Dept.Govt.of I.to Secy.Govt.of B.Public No.631, 
31st Mayr1882. P.P.Vol.51, 1883.
(2) The Indian Spectator. 23rd April, 1882. Bomb.Native News­
paper Report, 1882.
(5) Arunoday, 23rd April,1882. Bomb.Native Newspaper Report,
1882.
(4-) Dyan Prakash. 3rd March, 1882. Bomb.Native Newspaper Report, 
1882.
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principles. The object of local self-government was declared 
to be political education rather than administrative effi­
ciency. The political education was to be afforded to the 
rapidly growing educated class of public spirited men ,!whom 
it is not only bad policy but sheer waste of power to fail 
to utilise.*1"1 In urban areas Ripon wanted to utilise the 
energies of the educated Indians and in rural areas he desired 
to revive the village system of India and **to let the super­
structure of self-government rise upon that ancient traditionf 
The principles that the Government of India advocated for 
adoption were chiefly relating to the mode in which local 
boards should generally be constituted and to the degree of 
control which the government should retain over these bodies* 
The rural boards were to be set up similar to municipal 
boards and the unit of administration should be the sub­
division or Taluk sending delegates to the District Committee. 
All boards, rural or municipal, should contain a two-third 
majority of non-officials, who should be elected wherever 
possible. The elective principle should generally be intro­
duced in towns and might be extended gradually to backward 
rural boards. Different methods of election should be expe­
rimented for this purpose. The government control over local 
boards should be exercised from f,without rather than from
(1) Res.Govt.of I.Ho. 17 18th May,1882.P.P.1883,Vol.51,
P. 25.
(2) Ripon to Tom Hughes,12!tto$uiSg, 1882. Cited in Wolf, Ripon 
19^1, Vol.2, p.100 —
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within", meaning that the government should revise and check 
the works of the local bodies but not dictate them# For the 
exercise of this external control the executive officers of 
the government should not take part in the proceedings of the 
boards. It was further declared the Presidents of the local
A
bodies should in general be non-officials.
Ripon in a personal letter to Fergusson requested him to 
take into account the two most vital principles, namely, the 
introduction of the elective principle and the withdrawal of 
government interference. He declared that he was in favour 
of a low suffrage and assured Fergusson that his object was 
not to secure a representation of the people of an European 
democratic type. He, however, insisted that the elective 
principle should be immediately implemented in all parts of 
the country. As regards the government control, Ripon 
observed that if the object of political training of the 
Indians was to be realised, the officials should not dictate 
the board's proceedings. "If the boards are to be of any use," 
he remarked, "for the purpose of training the natives to 
manage their own local affairs they must not be overshadowed 
by the constant presence of the Burra Saheb."^ To Fergusson 
the ideas of a general introduction of the elective principle 
and the withdrawal of official control^wae unacceptable. It
(1) Hes.Govt.of I.Ho. 17 18th May,1882. P.P.1883,Vol.51,WPT&
P.25.
(2) Ripon to Pergusson, 26th May,1882. P.O.
was difficult for him to agree to any change ”so utterly 
novel” and he frankly conveyed to Ripon that he could not
1guarantee ”the early and complete realisation” of such change*
The fact was that Fergusson's views were exactly opposite
to the very objectives Ripon set before himself. While Ripon
gave utmost emphasis to the political education of the Indians,
Fergusson was convinced that ‘’political education was a tender
plant of very slow growth” and that ”it cannot wisely be
2forced into a premature development.” Ripon believed that 
the extension of self-government would be an “instrument” 
of political education. Fergusson on the contrary preferred 
to create and educate a public spirit first before entrusting 
more extended powers to the local bodies* The Government of 
India was eager to utilise educated Indians by affording them 
opportunities for devoting their energies in a non-official
h.
capacity* To this Fergusson's Government refused to attach 
any importance at all immediately. In their opinion ”the 
educated section is so small a part of the whole community 
that the enthusiasm which animates it is not a certain test of 
its independent energy.”^ On the one hand Ripon believed 
that the officials presiding over the local bodies would serve 
rather ”to hamper the development of public spirit than to
(1) Fergusson to Ripon,31st May,1882. R.P.
(2) Res.Fin.Dept.Govt.of B.No.3583*Sept.19,1882.p.p.1883,Vol.
, x 5^,P.39.
(3) Ibid.
(4-) Secy.Govt.of I.to Secy.Govt.of B.Public No.1521 .Oct.4, 
1882.P.P.1883*Vol.51* p.70.
(5) Desp.Govt.of B.to S. of S.Legis.No.I,9th May,1883.Legis. 
Dept.Proc.Govt.of B.May,1883.
create it1.1"1 On the other hand Fergussotu was convinced that 
it was impossible for Indians, however carefully selected,
"to interest themselves in local affairs from which they 
derive no personal benefit." He recalled the beneficial 
measures taken by the official chairmen of the municipalities 
entirely against popular feeling. If the people were allowed 
fair representation, Fergusson thought, "many such reforms
p
would be reversed." Regarding the rural boards he had no 
doubt that they could ill spare the guiding influence of the 
collectors "which hitherto enabled the committees to overcome 
caste enmities and conflicting influence of local factions."^ 
To Fergusson the usefulness of the local bodies almost inva­
riably depended "on the character of the government officer
/L
presiding." Such was also the opinion of the officialdom 
in Bombay who very strongly dissented from the idea of entru­
sting local administration entirely to the management of the 
people. They were afraid of retrogression in matters of 
municipal taxation, sanitation and public works. In their 
opinion "if the sheep of India are to be turned adrift in 
the field of experimental administration without their 
shepherds the works of the last twenty years will be undone."
Thus, when Ripon was in favour of withdrawing officials as a
(1^ Ripon to Fergusson, 20th May, 1882. F.C. 
f2) Fergusson to K i m b e r l e y 1882. F.C.
(3) Res.Govt.of B.Finance Dept.No.3585,19th Sept.1882,P.P.
1883,Vol.51.p.39.
(4} Fergusson to Ripon,31st May,1882. R.P.
(5) Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.Govt.of I.No.4141,0ct.27,1882.
P.P.1883,Vol.51,p.163.
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rule from the position of the Presidents of the local bodies, 
Pergusson would not consider it "prudent to eliminate the 
official chairman at the outset.” Ripon always felt that 
if the collector was not himself a member of the local board 
his control over it might be more judiciously exercised. lfI 
can not but think”, he wrote, ”that privately the position 
of the executive officer outside the board urging it forward 
if it is supine, checking it if it has gone wrong and gene­
rally supervising its proceedings from the independent posi­
tion of one who has had no personal part in them will be more 
dignified and more important than it would be as chairman
either dictating those proceedings or taking an active share
2in the controversies connected with them.” Fergusson and 
his Government could not agree to this view. In their opinion 
a local body should not be permitted to dissociate itself 
from the policy of the executive authority or fall back from 
the level of civilisation which that authority endeavoured 
to attain. So the executive authority should keep up perpe­
tual communication with the local boards, giving advice and 
enforcing obedience. Thi^ould only be done through the
District officer for ”habitual official leading is indispen­
sable to the local bodies.”^ f
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 17th Sept.1882. R.P.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 26th May, 1882. F.C.
of J*B*Peile» 25th Aug. 1885# Bomb.Iegis.CcauProc.1885.
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Silent tension prevailed in governmental circles in 
Bombay for a considerable period after the issue of the 
Government of India's Resolution of 18th May, 1882. Appa­
rently Fergusson's Government were engaged in deliberations 
for nearly four months without any expression of opinion. 
Ripon was very anxious to hear what was being done in Bombay 
on the subject.1 Finally, on September 19*1882 Fergusson's 
Government expressed!, their opinion as to Ripon's scheme of 
local self-government. The Resolution of the Government of 
Bombay of September 19,1882 was in fact a conservative 
challenge of Fergusson to Ripon's liberalism. Such a cha­
llenge was inevitable when Fergusson considered the Resolu­
tion of 18th May, 1882 as "calculated to raise expectations 
that go beyond what is prudent and that under cover of the
liberal principles that prompt the scheme a great deal of
2hostile sentiment will be encouraged." He evidently was 
eager not to waste any opportunity to denounce a scheme 
which created among Indians "a wide and deep impression 
that something like complete emancipation was intended."^ 
Fergusson's Government claimed that the population of Bombay 
Presidency, urban and rural, had enjoyed for many years a 
large share of local self-government. The Bombay system of
(1} Ripon to Fergusson, 14-th Sept.1882. F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley,l£VdSef!ti9 1883, F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley,1®tcQeiq, 1882, F.C.
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local self-government functioned admirably under the existing 
circumstances and achieved remarkable progress* The Govern­
ment of Bombay found in Ripon*s scheme an attempt to "subvert" 
the Bombay system by substituting for committees working 
under the guiding influence of the collectors "newly consti­
tuted and less experienced boards" and proposing to bestow
A
on them "unlimited powers". Fergusson's Government believed 
that the retention of the collectors in the local bodies with 
a voice in their administration and guiding their delibera­
tions was essential. They deprecated in strong terms the 
idea of entrusting full administrative functions to untried 
men. They accused the Government of India of insisting on 
the introduction of "very radical measures pf self-govern- 
ment/'which, in the opinion of the Government of Bombay, was 
"somewhat premature" and "not compatible with safety?^ The 
Government of Bombay unscrupulously sent their Resolution 
for publication and it was actually in print in the local 
newspapers before it reached the Government of India.^ 
Fergusson later on pleaded his lack of knowledge of the prac­
tice that no official paper addressed to the Secretary of
State or to the Government of India should be made public by
4.
a local government. Fergusson's ignorance of ordinary
"('I; ites.Govt.of B.finance Bept.No.5583,Sept. 19,'1B82.S'.¥.'1885, 
Vol.5 1 ,p.3 9 . J>
(2) Ibid.
(3) Ripon to W. E. Baxter ,6£hcD6q,1882. Printed R.P.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 7th Nov.1882. R.P.
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official procedure was extraordinary and it produced unhappy
consequences. Ripon felt that a reply of the Government of
India to this criticism of the Bombay Government was necessary
1
and "a public reply was therefore i n e v i t a b l e T h u s  all the 
differences of views between the local government and the 
Supreme Government on the whole issue subsequently became 
public - a fact almost unparalleled in the history of British 
administration in India*
On 4th October, 1882 the Government of India criticised 
the claim of the Government of Bombay that their existing 
system of local self-government was too good to make any 
change desirable* They pointed out the fact that in general 
the local bodies in Bombay Presidency lacked representation 
of the people like the local bodies in other parts of India. 
The local bodies of the Presidency were also subjected to 
extreme official control and by the Bombay Municipal Act of 
1873 the official Presidents ofc1,these bodies possessed even 
the right to suspend entire municipal proceedings. The func­
tions of the local bodies in Bombay Presidency were also 
limited and the Government of Bombay had not so far transfe­
rred to them any new head of expenditure. The Government of 
India were clearly not prepared to regard such a state of 
affairs with complacency. They asserted that they had no 
intention either of subverting the existing system of Bombay
(1) Ripon to W. E. Baxter$bitecB,1882. Printed R.P.
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or of conferring unlimited powers upon the local bodies. The 
Government of India then accused Fergusson*s Government of 
seriously misapprehending the object of Ripon1s local self- 
government scheme. They thought that much of the anxiety of 
the Government of Bombay as to the safety of the proposed 
measure was due to their misconception. What the Government 
of Ripon wanted was simply an extension of the existing 
arrangement by allowing the local bodies a greater degree of 
independence, initiative and responsibility. This,in their 
opinion, could only be achieved by the introduction of muni­
cipal franchise, by restraining government interference and
A
by removing the collector from the local bodies.
Fergusson sharply reacted to these views of the Govern­
ment of India and decided to give another rejoinder in a
2
"studiously civil manner." To Ripon he reiterated his stand 
that he would not approve a scheme which seemed to him to be 
"a too rapid development."-^ The letter of the Government of 
Bombay dated October 27, 1882 pointed out that Riponfs Govern­
ment in their Resolution of May 18th declared that members 
of the boards should be chosen by election "as widely as 
possible." It further declared that the Government of India 
wished to see non-official persons acting wherever practicable
as chairmen ofthe local boards and that every local board
(1) Secy.Govt.of I. to Secy.Govt.of B.Public,No.1521,Oct.4, 
1 8 8 2. P.P.1885,Vol.51, p.70.
(2*) Fergusson to H a r t i n g t o n , 1 © t d t 1882. F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 25th Oct.1882. R.P.
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should have the entire control of the proceeds of all local 
rates and cesses within its jurisdiction as well as the charge 
of some provincial items of expenditure. To Fergusson's 
Government these proposals taken together meant fla sweeping
if
and momentous alteration of the existing system. In the con­
text of the ignorance and inexperience of the public, they 
Os
argued, such^sudden grant of independent powers to the local 
committees was "impolitic.” They stated that they had no 
objection to the training of the Indians in the management of 
their own local affairs. But Fergusson's Government were 
decidedly of the opinion that the increased power by which 
such training was to be effected "should be conferred some­
what more gradually than the scheme of the Government of India 
seemed to contemplate." They further believed that before 
this programme of political education had made some progress 
it was expedient to retain the collector's position inside
A
the board.
Ripon found the declarations of Fergusson's Government as 
"written very much in the tone of a Tory pamphlet" for the 
special consumption of Fergusson's conservative friendds at 
home. He considered it most probable that the conservative 
opposition in the English Parliament "would take up the cudgels
p
for Fergusson." Ripon even implored John Bright, the liberal 
M.P., to speak in defence of his local self-government scheme 
in case Fergusson inspired his political friends in Parliament
(1) Secy.Govt.of B.to Secy.Govt.of I.Public,No.4141,Oct.27, 
1 8 8 2. P.P.1883,Vol.51> p.163.
(2) Ripon to W.E.Baxter,6tbcD€q,1882.Printed R.P.
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to attack the policy of the Government of India. The appre­
hension was proved to be justified and Fergusson was in touch 
with the leading Tory, Lord Cranbrook, conveying to him an 
impression that Ripon in India wanted even to go "beyond what 
has been tried in England." On 9th April, 1883 Lord Lytton 
and Lord Salisbury joined Cranbrook in the House of Lords to 
launch an attack on the local self-government policy of the 
Government of India* All of them, while criticising Ripon*s 
radicalism, emphasised the necessity of retaining government 
control over the local boards through official presidents* 
Lytton deprecated the misuse of the power of the Viceroy in 
compelling obedience of the local governments by disregarding 
their experience.^ Cranbrook even cited Fergusson's Govern­
ment, who, in his opinion, were determined not to sacrifice
h
the official chairmen of the boards* Even Kimberley, the
Secretary of State, could not approve all Ripon*s ideas though
he defended the Government of India in the House of Lords.
His hesitation was apparent when he thought that Fergusson's
opposition to Ripon*s policy merely "somewhat ruffled the
waters" and that Fergusson had a right to express his "free
and independent opinion."^ Fergusson meanwhile was eager to
show the support of the officialdom of Bombay behind his stand* 
M )  Ripon to J.Bright 1882. Printed R.P. '
(2^ Fergusson to Cranbrook, 26th June, 1882. C.C.
(3) Hansard, H. of Lords, 9th April,1883, Col.1797*
Hansard, H.of Lords, 9th April,1883, Cols. 1740-4-1.
(5) Kimberley to Fergus son ,11£hi JTSsfo* 1883. F.C.
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The criticism of Lord Ripon*s scheme, he informed Kimberley* 
f!was rather founded upon the general opinion of the service 
than upon my conservative prepossessions*n To Ripon he 
pointed out his duty to voice the strong feelings of his
2colleagues and the general opinion of the whole service*
Fergusson, however, was aware of the fact that his chances 
of success in opposing his official superior, a liberal 
Viceroy under a liberal regime at home, were extremely 
limited* Under such circumstances the best course open to 
him was to concede the elective principle and to defend the 
vital point of official chairmanship* With suitable provi­
sion for government control through the officials he was 
willing to agree to the general concession of the election of 
the local bodies. In fact his government decided to increase 
the number of city municipalities from 10 to 24 with the 
object of experimenting with the elective principle*^ This 
was abundantly clear when the Government of Bombay first 
drafted their own scheme for the extension of local self-
government in September, 1882* In their draft scheme the
Government of Fergusson proposed to concede the election of
one-half of the total number of members of the City and Town
11) Fergusson to Kimberley/istclje.q* 1882. F.C*
(2j Fergusson to Ripon, 7th Nov. 1882. R.P*
(3) Secy.Govt.of B. to Secy.Govt.of I.Public, No.4141,Oct.27, 
1882. P.P.1883, Vol.51, p.163.
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municipalities. They decided that the elective principle
‘ ‘ /
would be applicable only in those taluks which contained a /  
population over 5000. The scheme proposed that the District 
Local Fund Committee would include one elected representative 
from each taluk, elected members from City and Town munici­
palities and official and nominated members. As regards the 
powers to be conferred on the local committees the Government 
practically proposed no change. The Government, however, 
reserved the right to set aside the proceedings of the boards 
and the power to supersede a board for gross neglect of duty. 
It decided to retain the collector as the President of the 
local committee but favoured a curtailment of his extensive 
powers. They felt that f,he should still enjoy a voice in 
the administration of local affairs and the power of direct­
ing the deliberations in the local committees should be vested 
in him.11 Finally, the scheme of the Government of Bombay 
provided for certain restrictive clauses. The boards were 
forbidden to raise any loan, to impose new taxes, to inter­
fere in public peace, public food, public health and public 
water supply without previous sanction of the government.^
The cautious measure thus contemplated by Fergusson's 
Government conceded the elective principle but deprived the 
elected non-officials of a majority in the committees. The
(1) Res.Govt.of B.Finance Dept.No.3583, Sept.19, 1882.P.P.
1883, Vol.51, p.39.
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collectors were retained as chairmen of all the local bodies 
with a predominating voice in the deliberations and there was 
no room for the appointment of non-official chairmen in the 
future. The scheme also proposed no extension of the respon­
sibilities of the local bodies in spite of the repeated 
suggestions of the Government of India. Even the independence 
of the local bodies was carefully guarded by "bludgeon clauses*1 
which Ripon found to be "most unnecessarily restrictive." The 
requirement of previous sanction by the government of the 
resolutions of the local bodies in matters such as the budget, 
public food, water supply and public health was condemned by 
Ripon. "I can not see", he wrote to Fergusson, "what sphere 
of independent action will be left to the local bodies or 
what opportunity they will afford for training their members 
in the management of their own local affairs." In the opinion 
of Ripon the main defect of the scheme of the Government of 
Bombay was its draft "so drawn as absolutely to prevent the 
policy of the Government of India in its full meaning and 
integrity from being carried out...I* He disliked the rigidity 
of the proposals and insisted on the recasting of the scheme 
before it was introduced in the shape of a Bill in the Legis- 
lative Council. The Government of India officially required 
the Government of Bombay to effect modifications of the scheme
(1) Ripon to Fergusson, 30th Dec.1882. F.C.
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with regard to election and powers ofthe local bodies*
Fergusson had no objection to making the scheme a little 
more elastic. He informed Ripon that he was willing to eli­
minate passages of "too great finality and restriction*" But 
the point which Fergusson was determined not to give up was 
the position of the collectors in the local bodies. He was 
not in favour of suddenly withdrawing the guiding hands from 
the local bodies and allowing people to mismanage their affairs
p
to the extreme* He had no doubt that the withdrawal of the 
official guidance would be ffto throw municipal governments 
in confusion*”^ His terms of a compromise were frank and 
clear. "We'mean to carry out your wishes,” Fergusson wrote to 
Ripon, "but not be compelled to go far, further than what we
A
believe to be in any sense prudent." Ripon, 0El his part,too,
was showing reluctantly a tendency to compromise even at the 
cost of the principle of non-interference of the government 
in matters of the local bodies. But this he was willing to 
do only if the Government of Bombay agreed to recast their 
scheme in an elastic manner. He implored Fergusson : "what 
I am asking you is not to oblige yourself to do what I should 
wish, but simply not to prohibit yourself by law from doing
it."^ Ripon was convinced that nothing more could be done in
(1) Desp.Govt.of B.to S.of S.No.I,9th May,1883.Legis.Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of B.May,1883.
(2) Fergusson to -Ripon, 3rd Jan,1883. R.P.
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley,1§te1J&!l*t1883. F.C.
(4-) Fergusson to Ripon, 3rd Jan.1883. R.P.
(5) Ripon to Fergusson, 30th Dec.1882. F.C.
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Bombay Presidency as long as Fergusson remained Governor 
there. But he had a faint hope that in future, after Fergu­
sson rfasi replaced by a successor, "a considerable further
1advance may most advantageously be made.1*
The fact is that Ripon at this point was pressed by those 
to whom he looked for support to make an unfortunate conce­
ssion. The publication of Ripon1s Resolution of 18th May 
without previous reference to the home authorities wounded 
the pride of the India Council. The disaffected Council 
disagreed with the principles involved in the Resolution and 
spared no opportunity to criticise Ripon*s local self-govern­
ment policy, especially with regard to the non-official chair-
p
manship of the local boards. However, Gladstone, Hartington 
and Kimberley all wanted to support Ripon and he had the 
impression that the India Council could do no more than to 
seek to defeat his policy only in detail.^ Soon it was found 
to Ripon's utter surprise that the home authorities were 
challenging the very basis of the policy of the Government of
India. In connection with the new local self-government Act
>
of the Central Provinces the Secretary of State in April,1883 
strongly emphasised the preference of the home authorities
for official chairmen in the local b o a r d s ^
Ci; Ripon to Dufferin,3Ehv&§y*1884. Printed R.P.
(2) Hartington to Ripon, 23rd June,1882.Cited in Gopal,Ripon, 
1953, p.97- “
(3) Rjpon to Northbrook, 31st March,1883. Cited in Gopal.Ripon.
1 >
(4) Desp.S.of S.to Govt.of I.Legislative,No.15,19th April,1883. 
Legis.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.Nov.1883•
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When Ripon was showing signs of vulnerability Fergusson
had no hesitation to recast the scheme for Bombay local self-
government, He and his colleagues promptly decided to draft
their local self-government Bills in a manner which would
1leave provisions for future concessions# Thus the bargain
was made and the compromise was complete, Ripon expressed 
his relief when he wrote Kimberley that Fergusson had "yielded
p
with a very fair grace.n Fergusson on his part was satis­
fied with the outcome and felt that Ripon had had enough of 
"candid criticism."^ On 25th August, 1885 the Government of 
Bombay moved two Bills in the Legislative Council, the Local 
Boards Bill and the Bill to amend Bombay District Municipal 
Act. In due course both these Bills were passed into Acts and 
together they embodied the compromise effected#
In nature the Bills were elastic as Ripon desired, while 
they retained official control over the local bodies as Fer­
gusson wanted. The Bombay Local Boards Bill created two sets 
of rural boards, Taluk and District. It introduced the elec­
tive principle in Taluk boards providing that not less than 
one-half of the total number of members should be elected.
The other half should consist of the nominated and official 
members. The District Board should consist of the elected
representatives of the Taluk boards and municipalities o-f the
M )  Fergusson to Ripon, 15th Jan. 1883. R*P. ' ’ “
(2) Ripon to Kimberley,2*Thtr 1885. Cited in Wolf, Ripon,
* ✓ - m  p«105*
(5) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 9th March,1885. C.C.
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of the District as well as nominated and official members of 
equal proportion. The Bill was so drawn as to provide for an 
increase of elected members and a proportionate decrease of 
nominated members in future. The presidentship of the boards 
was opened equally to officials and non—officials. However, 
the "Statement of Objects and Seasons" of the Bill and the 
Report of the Select Committee for the Bill strongly urged 
the appointment of official presidents. In cases of official 
presidents the Bill provided for non-official Vice-Presidents. 
The function of the President was to preside over the delibe­
rations and to supervise the general administration of the 
bodies. The government reserved certain restrictive clauses 
to control the local bodies, the most important of which was 
the power given to the collector of the district. The collec­
tor was given the right to suspend the execution of the order 
of the board on specific grounds. He could also check the 
proceedings, documents and assets of the local bodies. Finally, 
the government, according to the Bill, could force a local 
body to undertake work in default of performance and could
p
suspend a board in case of perpetual mal-administration.
The Bill to amend Bombay District Municipal Act abolished
the nomenclature of City and Town municipalities. According
(1) Statement of Objects and Reasons of Bill No.5, 1883 and ~ 
the Report of the Select Committee. Legis.Dept.Proc.Govt. 
of I. April, 1884.
(2) Draft Bill, No.3 (Bombay Local Boards Bill), Legis.Dept. 
Proc.Govt.of I.April, 1884.
to the Bill the municipal committees should consist partly 
of elective and partly of nominee councillors, the proportion 
of the former should not be less than one-half of the total 
number. Of the nominated members one-half would be salaried 
servants of the government. The Bill allowed large discre­
tion to the government as to framing rules for election and 
determining qualifications of voters and candidates. This 
was done with a view to making the provisions flexible. With 
the growth of enlightenment extension of franchise was 
expected to be necessary, and qualifications suitable for the 
people of one place might not be suitable for another. The 
remedy was to empower an independent authority like the 
government to determine the particulars from time to time.
This principle was also adopted in the Bombay Local Boards 
Bill. As regards the President and the Vice-President, in 
case the President was an official, the Bill contained similar 
provisionsjto those of the Bombay Local Boards Bill. The sys­
tem of government control and the predominance of the collec­
tor were also similar in every way to those proposed in the 
Bombay Local Boards Bill. Police charges on the municipali­
ties were abolished but in none of the Bills was any further
A
transfer of expenditure indicated.
The compromise over the local self-government enactments
in Bombay betrayed the avowed object of Ripon, namely, a real 
tT)" Draft Bill, No.3*(Bombay'"District Municipal Act Amendment”"
Bill). Legis.Dept.Proc.Govt.of I.April,1884.
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extension of powers vested in the people in the management 
of their own affairs. The proportion of the government nomi­
nees was one half and as Badruddin Tayebji in the Legislative
Council commented, "unless a decisive majority is given to
1
the elected members the Bill will be useless.11 In fact the 
apprehension that the elected members would be swamped by the 
"creatures of the government" was considerable. The reten­
tion of the official Presidents of the boards, even if for 
an initial stage, was bound to affect the independence of the 
members very adversely. The introduction of the elective 
principle was largely neutralised by the "bludgeon clauses" 
giving an extensive power of thwarting self-government to the 
collectors and still more extensive powers into the hands of 
the government. V. N. Mandlik in the Legislative Council 
described this by saying that the government was setting up
a bulwark of popular liberties in front and letting in the
p
foe of liberty from the back. Fergusson’s Government 
refused as before to extend the responsibilities of the local 
bodies.
The measure as a whole failed to satisfy popular aspira­
tions. The Indian Spectator wrote in August, 1883 : "we
are to be accorded the image and superscription of local self-
(T) Speech of Badruddin Tayebji,25th Aug.1883.Bomb.Legis. 
0<jram«.Proc.
(2) Speech of V. N.Mandlik, 25th Aug.1883«Bomb.Legis.Coun.Proc
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government without that sacred power which waring that image.”
Ripon had no doubt that Fergusson's Government applied the
local self-government policy of the Government of India "in
a very narrow spirit, although many parts of their Presidency
2are really fitter than any other district in India." Ripon
in fact made a last bid to impress upon Fergusson that the
Bombay Bills were open to most effective criticism on the point
of the power taken by the government of nominating one-half of
the local committees. He wrote to Fergusson : 11... if you
would see your way to make a concession on this point and
limit the number of nominated members to one-third, it would
*
I think be a wise and graceful act."^ Fergusson, however, was 
adamant in not making any further concession. The opinion of 
his (government on the point was categorical: "We have only 
demurred to legislating in such a way as to make a marked 
elective majority immediately absolute before anything is known
IL
of its quality." Fergusson could net see the reason why the 
number of nominated members should be circumscribed simply to 
increase the powers of the elected members. He asked Kimberley 
"why such absolute confidence on one side and not on the other
- our own ?"^ He remonstrated to Ripon on this point and even
g
threatened him with outright resignation. The matter was 
(1J Indian Spectator,5th Aug.i883.Bomb.Native Newsnaner Report.
T555I
(2^ Ripon to Dufferin£tffr>1!k>3r,.1884. Printed R.P.
(3) Ripon to Fergusson,1st Oct.1885* F.C.
(4) Speech of J.B.Peile,9th Jan.1884.Bomb.Legis.Coun.Proc.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley,11th Oct.1883.F.C.
(6) Fergusson to Ripon, 7th Oct.1883. R.P.
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eventually dropped and the Bills were passed in^Bombay Legis­
lative Council with minor modifications on 6th February,1884. 
The passing of the Bills was a victory for Fergusson, however 
partial, over Ripon. This was the best that a Tory local 
governor could achieve under a liberal regime in India. Fergu- 
sson*s speech in^Bombay Legislative Council was characterised 
by this note of triumphant Toryism : "...because it is always
so easy and so pleasant to be in the first rank, it is so popu­
lar to be in advance that men in their ardour forget how great 
a responsibility rests with those who frame a measure and who
have to take particular care that they do not go beyond the
1limits of due caution."
Fergusson*s success in forcing a compromise was by no
means a total defeat of Ripon*s liberalism with regard to
local self-government. His policy, though hesitatingly applied 
effected substantial extension of local self-government in 
India by emphasising the fundamental principles of self-govern­
ment. The Indian people remembered Ripon as the father of 
local self-government in India. Above all, Ripon*s scheme for 
local self-government left behind a liberal British tradition 
of understanding the Indian aspirations. But the tragedy was 
that in the India of 1880-85 the Viceroy alone was liberal and 
the vast majority of British Indian administrators were, like 
Fergusson, firm believers of paternal administration. The
(1) Speech of His Exc.the President, 9th January,1884. Bomb. 
Legis.Coun.Proc•1884.
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result was opposition and conflict inside the governmental 
system and under such circumstances no liberal project could 
attain complete success*
Z71
CHAPTER V 
Land,Public Y/orks and Famine
In an agricultural country like India good or bad 
government meant, as observed by Sir Charles Metcalfe, 
good or bad settlements of land revenue. This cardinal 
question demanded Fergusson* s attention from the time of 
his arrival in Bombay. The question had a special significanee 
owing to the ravages of a destructive famine in the Presidency 
in the years 1876-77. Following the famine in Western India 
there arose a strong suspicion that all was not well with 
tne Bombay land revenue system and that famine stricken 
cultivators of the Presidency were subjected to a rigid and 
excessive demand by the State. Prom the beginning Pergusson 
had to do battle to dispel doubts about the recovery of the 
cultivators from the effects of the famine and the soundness 
of tne rand revenue system. In December i860 he wrote:MWe 
are carrying on a double controversy with the Secretary of 
State and the Government of India about our re-survey and 
settlement."^ The famines of 1876-77 also left behind a 
fear of the appearance of further famines. Expert opinion in 
India held that great famines might be anticipated at intervals
(1) Northbrook to Ripon, 7th Sept. 1881 . Printed R.P.
(2) Pergusson to Baring, 26th Dec. 1880 . P. CL
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of approximately 12 years.^ This meant that the authorities
in India should always he prepared to face recurring
calamities. The caprieious climatic conditions of the
country could produce at any time serious droughts if not
a great famine. Pergusson experienced such a contingency as
early as August 1880 when he informed the Viceroy that if
rains did not arrive in the Hthirsty parts” of the Presidency
2
he would be forced ”to resort to relief works” . Thus in 
1880 when Pergusson took charge in Bombay he was confronted 
with two compex problems. The first was an accusation against 
V^eBombay land system of over assessment and rigidity of collection. 
The second was the grave responsibility of insuring the 
country against famines.
The question of over assessment, with which Pergusson had 
to deal first, was a legacy of the preceding administration.
The Bombay system of land tenure was based on the method of 
observation of the real agricultural conditions employed by 
two Bombay revenue officials, H.E. Goldsmid and G. Wingate.
Their method of settlement consisted of three distinct phases 
of operations. In the first phase accurate survey was under­
taken by expert surveyors. Their crucial work was the 
delimitation of fields into "numbers”. The "number” was 
roughly an area which a rayat or a cultivator could cultivate 
with a pair of bullocks. In the second phase a classing 
party arrived at the fields, classified the soil in each 
"number” and determined the value of irrigation on it. The 
works of the measuring party and the classing party were
(1) Famine Commission Report, 7th July 1880, Part I, para 72, 
f.f. 1880, vol 52.
(2). Pergusson to Ripon, 14th August, 1880 R.P.
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recorded separately. In the third phase the Survey Officer 
examined both the reports, considered various other points 
such as climate, facilities for marketing, cojpmunications, 
average prices etc. and proposed the assessment to the 
government. The settlement thus effected with the ray at was 
to continue for 30 years.1 During these years the right of 
occupancy of the rayat was subject only to the payment of
fixed revenue. The rayat could sell, bequeath and mortgage
2
his property.
The outbreak of the American Civil War in 1860 suddenly 
favoured the fortunes of the rayat in Bombay Presidency. The 
flow of American cotton to England stopped and the demand in 
England for Bombay cotton increased. The steady rise in the 
prices of Bombay cotton resulted in a corresponding rise in 
the prices of the agricultural products and a great amount of 
land was brought under cultivation . However, this mid- 
Victorian boom of Bombay was short-lived. As soon as the 
American war ended, American cotton recaptured the market in 
England and the profit of the Bombay rayat quickly disappeared 
Meanwhile, the rayat had cultivated an expensive standard of 
living and started borrowing from the village money lender in 
addition to his ancestral debts. The situation for the 
rayat worsened when the Presidency faced a drought in 1867- 
He began to feel the burden of his debt and the village money­
lender often brought the debtor before the court for failing 
to pay.interest on his debt. The number of suits for debt in 
the court of Poona district doubled between 1867 and 1873*^
(1) B.H. Baden-Powell, A manual of land revenue, systems 
and land tenures in British India, 1882,pp. 551-72.
(2) Bomb, Admn. Report, 1882-83, p*31 .
(3) R.D. Choksey, Economic Life in Bombay Deccan, 1955, p.21.
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The more the rayat became involved in debt the more the 
village money lender pressed him. In consequence, the rayat 
either became a quasi-slave by surrendering all his produce 
to the money lender or Soo4ar, receiving only a dole of 
economic necessities, or he was forced to sell his land to the 
Sohu&ar. 3y 1875 the growth of landless peasantry was 
formidable and the discontent of the rayats ripened into 
hatred against the Sasiifars.
In 1867 the original settlement of land revenue in Bombay 
Presidency came to an end and the revisions resulted in a 
considerable enhancement of the assessments. The new 
assessments were fixed on the basis of prices during the boom 
period, when Bombay revenue officials thought that the rent 
of land in real economic terms had become excessively low.
The officials misunderstood Agrarian indebtedness as a 
product of the cultivator's luxuries and thought that any 
reduction of the Government assessment would quickly pass over 
to the creditor's purse. The result was the levy of almost 
double assessments. The new assessments introduced in Poona 
district effected an enhancement of 54 percent.*1-
Such a frustrating state of things induced the Government 
of Sir Philip Y/odehouse (1870-75) to limit the rate of increase 
of assessment in 1874- They declared that the increase of 
assessment in the case of a taluk or group of villages should 
not exceed 30 percent and in the case of a village 66 percent. 
They further declared that the unassessed waste in the original 
settlement (called Pot Kharab)should so remain and not be
2liable to be classed in the revision although found cultivable.
(1) R.D. Choksey, Economic life in Bombay Deccan, 1955, p*21.
(2) Res. Hev. Dept. Govt . of B. No. 5739* 29th Oct. 1874* 
Papers connected with Bombay Revenue and Settlement System 
Rev. & Agr, Dept. Govt, of I. Calcutta. 1883*
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The home authorities and the Government of India, however, 
refused to accept Wodehouse's proposal with regard to the 
Pot Kharab^ Unfortunately Wodehouse's policy of moderation 
was put into practice on a moderate scale only in the 
districts of Poona and Sholapur. Meanwhile, agrarian 
conditions had so worsened that the ray ats threatened their 
immediate oppressors and the Deccan riots broke out in 1875*
The Deccan riots consisted of a series of preconcerted attacks 
on Saukars in the districts of Poona, Satara, Sholapur and 
Ahmednagar. The government promptly appointed a Commission 
to enquire into the causes of the outbreak.
The Report of the Deccan Riots Commission of 1875 showed
that one-third of the occupants of land in the Deccan were
embarrassed with debts and two-thirds of their debts were
2
secured by mortgage of land. The Commission attributed the 
riots to the fraudulent practices of the Saukars. The 
ignorant rayats, who signed the bond of debt without a 
true knowledge of its contents, found the action of the Court 
to their disadvantage. So the Commission proposed primarily 
legal remedies, which were later embodied in the Deccan 
Agriculturists Relief Act of 1879* The Act provided for 
strict inspection of the accounts of the debt to prevent 
forgery and for conciliation between the debtor and lender 
to avoid litigation. In the case of legal procedure, additional 
subordinate judges were to be appointed to enquire fully into 
the history of the debt, to disallow unreasonable interest
(1) Desp. Govt. of I. to Govt, of B. No. 1094» 24th Dec.
1874* Papers Connected with Bombay Revenue and Settlement 
System Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I. Cal. 1883^
(2) R. D. Choksey, Economic Life in Bombay Deccan, 1955* p*92.
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and to fix instalments for payment of the sum decreed. In 
case the agriculturist was found to be insolvent the Court 
was to direct the collector to let the property of the 
Agriculturist for a period or to supervise it in order to meet
i
the creditor's demand. Such was the measure taken by the 
government in 1879 to rescue the rayats of Poona, Satara, 
Ahmednagar and Sholapur from the clutches of the Saukar.
But the Deccan Riots Commission in their report went further 
and indicated another vital factor behind the rural indebted­
ness in Bombay, namely, a fixed and excessive demand of the 
State. They strongly advocated an elastic system of collection 
and deprecated the injurious effects of sudden enhancement of
p
assessment on revisions. Sir Richard Temple (1875-80), the
successor of Wodehouse, rejected this criticism of the
Commission on the ground that^Bombay revenue system took all
precautions while revising the assessment by enquiring into
agricultural conditions and allowing room for every concession.
A revenue fixation after such elaborate enquiries, he asserted,
would only be a just amount "easy for the people to pay."^
Temple therefore zealously promoted the legal remedy of the
rayat1s indebtedness or the Relief Act of 1879* Simultaneously,
he was in favour of continuing enhanced revisions of revenue.
The crushing famine of 1876-77 struck down in Bombay
Presidency a struggling peasantry. The famine resulted in a
heavy mortality and in the destruction of agricultural wealth
and cattle. Temple was forced to suspend and remit revenue
during the famine years as it became "impracticable to realise
revenue."^* But immediately after the famine he enhanced
Tl) 'H.fr.'CJqoks'ey, Economic in Sombav I)eccan,l95$ p p -92-94-
(2; Report of Deccan Riot's Commission, 1875»paras 125-126.Papers 
connected with Bombay Revenue and settlement system,Rev.& 
Agr.Dept. Govt, of I.Cal. 1883.
(3) Govt, of B. to Govt, of I .Rev. No .2202,6th April, 1887-Papers 
connected with Bombay Revenue and Settlement System.Rev.& 
Agr. Dept. Govt, of I. Cal. 1883*
(4) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. no.34»4th Dec.l879*Rev 
Proc.Govt, of I. Jan. 1880.
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assessment on every revision in Dharwar, North Kanara, Nasik,
Konkain, Gujajnt and the Deccan.1 Everywhere Temple aimed at
40 percent increase in The Taluks, lord Cranbrook, the then
Secretary of State, considered this impolitic and inexpedient.
’’This is an increase to the burdens of the agricultural
classes,” he concluded, ”heavier than has been found practicable
' 2in other provinces of the empire#” Even Lord Lyttonfs
Government, including members like Sir John Strachey, who
•5
allegedly stood for "screwing up the land revenue”, were
seriously concerned. They opposed the enhancements in the
Deccan, if not in other parts of the Bombay Presidency. They
resolved not to "ignore the present state of affairs in the
Deccan districts where agrarian indebtedness and disquiet have
been deepened by prolonged scarcity and famine.”^
In the face of these criticisms Temple’s Government remained
unwavering. They firmly asserted that their recent assessments
were moderate, and equitable, that the whole country had
recovered from the famine losses and the rayats could well
afford to pay a moderately increased revenue and that the
prices of the produce ranged higher than they did when the
original settlement of the 1840’s was made. The indebtedness
of the rayats according to them was caused by the thriftlessness
5
of the rayats and not by the pressure of the government demand. 
Thus a controversy was developing as Temple left Bombay in 
1880. Fergusson, as the successor of Temple, had to take up
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S of S . Rev. no.4, 17th March 1880. 
Rev.Proc. Govt, of I. March 1880.
(2) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. no.34,4th Dec.1879* 
Rev.Proc. Govt, of I. Jan 1880.
(3) Northbrook to Ripon, 7th Sept. 1S81 Printed R.P.
(4) Desp* Govt, of I. to S.of S. Rev.No.4 17th March 1880. Rev. 
Proc. Govt..of I. March, 1880.
(5) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Home, Rev. & Agr.Dept.Govt, of I 
Rev. No.634, 5th Feb,1880. Rev. Dept. Proc.Govt, of I. 
March,1880.
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the vexed question of over assessment and to carry it forward 
to a decision. Had Fergusson assumed a different attitude on 
the issue from that of his predecessor interesting developments 
might have followed in the Bombay land revenue system. But 
Fergusson was quite content, like Temple, with the Bombay 
system and decided to defend it against all onslaughts.
In 1880 Lytton left India strongly criticising the Bombay
Government’s revision of assessments, especially in the famine
stricken districts of the Deccan and the Bouth Maratha country.
His Government had demanded a postponement of revision operations
for 5 years in the districts of Poona, Satara, AhmedaHbad and
Sholapur. In the opinion of the Supreme Government Such a
measure was necessary to ensure the success of the Relief Act
of 1879* passed to ameliorate the indebtedness of the rayats
of these districts. !,The condition of the rayats would be
jeopardised, "they observed,1 if, side by side, settlements
continued to go on and land revenue assessments are imposed
and collected.1'1 Fergusson on his arrival in Bombay decided
to disprove that the re-classifications ani enhancements of
2
the Bombay Government were hexcessive" • His Government 
pointed to the fact that the enhancements objected to were 
small in proportion to the rise of the prices of the produce, 
improvement in communications and material progress of the 
country. They contended that the country was fast recovering 
from the famine devastations. Enhancements were 32 percent 
to 55 percent higher than the original Settlements, which 
they claimed, was only one-eleventh of the value of the 
produce of the assessed lands. In terms of real rent, they 
believed, the new assessments were even lower than what the 
original settlement imposed in the 1840's. This was, in the
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Rev. No.4, 17th March, 1880.
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. March, 1880.
(2) Fergusson to Baring, 26th Dec. 1880. F.C.
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Si opinion of Fergusson*s Government, because of the
fact that the average prices for the 9 years preceding the
famine of 187&-77 were double the prices of 30 years earlier,
and the prices of 1879-80 were nearly double the prices of
the 9 years average. As to Lyttonfs proposition of
postponing revisions in the Deccan districts for 5 years,
Fergusson*s Government had serious objections. They pointed
out the administrative inconvenience that would be caused
by such temporary suspensions and the hazards of further
recalculations. Besides, they argued that such a measure
would involve difficulty for the government in enhancing
assessment at all in future. After a postponement of 5
years a good season might be followed by drought, creating
a perpetual demand for the postponement of revisions. As
regards agricultural indebtedness in the Deccan Fergusson*s
Government maintained that the Deccan rayat was n6t
bothered about the assessment if it left him only a bare
subsistence, for the usurer would appropriate anything beyond
1a bare subsistence.
While defending their revisions the Government of 
Bombay failed to observe that an enhancement in proportion 
to a rise in the prices of the produce was not necessarily 
a just one. They were unable to take account of the 
rise in cost between the original settlement and its 
revisions. Annual demand based on long term average of 
prices would be excessive and burdensome in lean years.
They also failed to appreciate the significance of the 
Deccan Agriculturists Relief Act of 1879* passed in
(1) Desp. Govt, of B. to £. of S. Rev. No.10, 22nd May,
1880, Cited in Desp# S# of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. No. 36 
lbth Sept. 1880. Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Nov. 1880.
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order to restrict the extorting power of the hearer and thus
to allow the rayat to enjoy a little more than a hare
minimum. The home authorities at first overlooked these
fallacies of reasoning while examining Iytton's proposal
concerning revisions in the Deccan. In September, 1830
Hartington, the Secretary of State, rejected Lytton!s plea for
the postponement of revisions on the ground of his reluctance
to interfere in the sphere of a local government• ^
The issue, however, remained alive and in August 1880
Ripon's Government expressed their concern in connection with
the reassessment of the 143 famine-affected villages of
Parasgad taluk of Belgaum district and Nargund taluk of
Dharwar district. The Government of India entertained doubts
"whether there is not a risk of crippling the resources of
agriculturists... by subjecting them to a largely enhanced
assessment when they have had only two years to recover from
2
the effects of the famine." This probably led Hartington 
to re-examine the question. Soon he discovered a tendency on 
the part of the Bombay Government towards undue enhancement.
In November, 1880 he came to the conclusion that in the 
circumstances of the calamitous famine of 1876-77# revised 
assessments of the Bombay Government in some parts of the 
Deccan and the South Maratha country were excessive. Hartington 
pointed out the difficulties of fixing assessment simply on the 
basis of a rise in the prices of the agricultural products.
(1) Desp. 8. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. No.36, 16th Sept.1880 
Rev. Proc. Govt of I. Nov. 1880.
(2) Secy. Home, Rev & Agr.Dept. Govt, of I# to Secy. Govt.of B. 
Rev. No. 409# 28th Aug.1880. Rev.Proc.Govt. of I.Sept.1880.
(3) Desp. S # of to Govt, of B. Rev. No.36,lbth Sept.1880. 
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Nov. 1880.
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"The rise in the prices may he of no advantage to the 
cultivator", he commentated, “if accompanied by a decrease
i
of production." He feit that the famine resulted in a
decrease of population, occupied area and agricultural stock,
indicatfobi a disruption of agriculture. In his opinion the
Deccan and the South Maratha country were "in a sadly
depressed condition." In view of these facts the Secretary
of State laid down that enhancement on revision above 22
per cent should not be carried out in the distressed districts
of the Deccan and the South Maratha country for a period
2
of 5 years in order to allow them time to recover. This
order of remission was clearly a proof that the home
authorities considered assessments in Bombay oppressive*
Fergusson, however, had no doubt that the order of the
Secretary of State was "based upon a misapprehension" of
the relative extent of and burden imposed by the revised
assessment. He accordingly decided to offer Hartington
"very sufficient" justification of the enhancement before
4the proposed remission was actually carried out*
The Government of Bombay while justifying the revisions 
recalled the fact that the enhanced assessments bore a 
smaller proportion to produce at its increased price than 
did the old assessment to prices prevailing during the 
original settlement, fergusson*s Government were not prepared to 
admit that such a small increase of government demand could
(1) Desp. S. of to Govt, of B. Rev* Ho. 45, 11th Nov.1880* 
Rev. Proc* Govt, of I. Dec. 1880.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 1st Dec. 1880. F.C.
(4 ) Fergusson to Hartington, 4th Dec. 1880. F.C.
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absorb so large a share of the produce that its collection 
would lead the rayat to pecuniary difficulties* They 
asserted that a part of the produce or its equivalent was 
the property of the State and that the government had a 
right to collect a moderate rent charge in any year in which 
the profits of agriculture were of normal a m o u n t T h u s  
was reached the crux of the whole question,whether the 
agrarian condition of the area was so sadly depressed in 
i860 following the previous famine as to justify a remission 
of revenue.
In the opinion of the Government of Bombay the country
was gradually restored to prosperity in 18bO. They admitted
that there was some decrease of population due to disease and
emigration during the famine. But they believed that the
famine sufferers were mostly landless peasants and the poorest
class of cultivators and not the more substantial cultivators.
They also accepted the fact that there was a decrease of
occupied area following the famine, but insisted that “the
number of food producing cultivators has not decreased.1 In
their opinion the poorest class of cultivators succumbed
to the famine and joined the rank of field labourers by
resigning their holdings, which were consequently taken up by
richer peasants. Thus on the whole agriculture had not suffered
They further argued that the diminution of agricultural stock
2
in the Presidency was uneven and negligible. Under these 
circumstances Fergusson1s Government felt that the remission
(1) Desp. Govt, of B . to S. of S. Hev. No.27* 24th Dec.1880.
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Feb. 1881.
(2) Ibid -
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directed by the Secretary of State was unnecessary. In their 
opinion:1 1 ♦ the agricultural population is not retrogading 
but advancing, ... the losses they sustained in the famine 
were not so irretrievable as to disable them or to make them 
fit objects for a donation from public revenue and..* the 
distress caused by famine fell chiefly on the non-agricultural 
classes to whom a remission of land revenue will not convey 
any r e l i e f . F e r g u s s o n  personally was convinced that the 
reduction desired by the home authorities would give at best 
an inconsiderable relief to the peasants while it would 
sacrifice in the aggregate a considerable amount of government 
revenue. He suggested that the increased amount of the 
revisions could profitably be used in famine insurance works.
He implored Hartington to consider this aspect of the 
question. uWere we at liberty to expend a capital sum secured 
upon an infinitesimal portion of the cultivation profit which 
you propose to return to them ^b.e cultivators^ , we could 
execute 7/orks which would sensibly improve their condition and
contribute a material protection against the vicissitudes of
2their industry.1 Fergusson’e attempt to justify the means 
by an end reflects the paternalist desire to absorb increments 
of agriculture to finance general improvements.
Hartington, however, stuck to his decision with little 
modification. He modified his previous instruction by reducing 
the term of remission from 5 to 3 years. He again cautioned 
Fergusson*s Government that high prices reflected low production
3
and he emphasised the need to consider output and price together,
(1) Desp. Govt, of B# to S. of S . Rev. Ho. 27* 24th Dec. 1880.
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Feb. 1881.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 4th Dec. 1880. P.O.
(3) Des. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. No.13, 31st March, 1881.
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. May. 1881.
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Clearly Hart i ngto n..was not convinced with the claim of the 
Government of Bombay that the Deccan and' the South Maratha 
country had recovered from the famine. He called for a 
departmental enquiry on the agrarian condition of the area 
in question and Fergusson1s Government appointed H.T. Sondar 
to undertake such an enquiry. A report was soon prepared by 
experimental enquiries in some of the ffnluks of the Diecan, 
and the South Marathan country. The report revealed’that in 
Dharwar the decrease of cultivated area between 1877 and 1880 
was percent, in Kaladgi 20 percent and in Sholapur 
44 percent.^ The Government of Bombay*s own statistics 
supplied by their Revenue Department Report of October 1881 
showed that the land revenue demand fell by Rs. 2J- lakhs 
from Hs. 2,687,20jO in 1878-79 to Hs. 2,663,3000 in 1879-80.2 
There was hardly any doubt that the decrease would have been 
more considerable had it not been for revision and enhancement 
of assessment up|fco 1880. Further, the reports gave no 
evidence that the lands resigned by poor peasants had passed 
into the hands of the rich cultivators.. Fortunately for the 
Government of Bombay the home authorities in February,1882 
did not proceed any further than to direct them to watch 
carefully the condition of the cultivating classes.^ Fergusson 
resentfully accepted this verdict with a determination to show 
in future how easily the cultivators could pay assessments and 
thus to dispel the notion that his Government overassessed.
(1) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. No. 46* 22nd Dec.1881. 
Rev. Letters to I.
(2) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Rev. No. 6 23rd Feb. 1882. 
Rev . Letters to I.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Fergusson to Hartington, 31st Jan. 1882. F.C.
■ 28 S'
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The matter in early 1882 was by no means closed and the
Vernacular press in Bombay was complaining against the over
assessment of the government. In March, 1861, Indu Prakash
compared the conditions of Irish peasants with those of the
rayats in Bombay, the grievances in both cases being sudden
enhancement. In September, 1881 the same paper elaborated
the plight of the cultivators by stating that when the land
revenue instalments were not paid on the dates fixed the
2government charged an exorbitant rate of interest. To 
the prevailing public opinion the ray at was suffering not due 
to the greed of the Saukar but to debts incurred to meet 
the high demand of the government. Maratha commented: 
"Agricultural classes need protection from the greediest of 
Saukars - the Government. A statement of the great 
BeccamwAssociation, Poona Sar^ojanik Sabha, issued in July,1882, 
created further alaim as to the deplorable condition of 
agriculture. Their statement, based on an experimental 
survey of Kopargum taluk of Poona district, revealed that in 
case of any apprehended drought, half the population and 
three-quarters of the cattle should have no stock of food to 
fall back upon, that half the inhabitants of the tract should 
desert their villages and that two-thirds of the cattle must 
be driven away to the territory of the Nizam.^ The report of 
D y. A.D. Pollen, Special Judge under the Deccan Agriculturists 
Relief Act of 1879, painted a further dismal picture .
(1) Indu Prakash, 7th March, 1881. Bomb. Native Newspaper 
Report 1(381*
(2) Indu Prakash, 5th Sept. 1881. Bomb. Native Newspaper 
Repoht, 1881.
(3) Maratha. 1st Oct. 1882. Bomb. Native Newspaper Report.1882
(4) The statement was referred to in the speech of Dr. W.W. 
Hunter in Ind.Legis. Coun. on 2nd Nov. 1882. Ind.Legis. 
Coun. Proc. 1882.
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On the basis of statistics in the four districts of the 
Deccan where the Act was employed, he concluded that the 
rayats were overburdened with "an intolerable load of 
paper debt." In his opinion the Deccan ray at in average 
years could"not gain enough from the produce to pay the 
government assessment and to support himself and his 
family, so that really no margin was left for the ,payment 
of his debts.'1'
These findings soon led to an uproar in the Viceroy* s 
legislative Council in November 1882. The incident occurred 
in connection with certain minor modifications of the Deccan 
Agriculturists Relief Act of 1879 • The opportunity was taken 
up by some members of the Council like Dr. W.W. Hunter,
C.H.T. Crossthwaite and Maharaja Jatindra Mohan Tagore to 
accuse Fergusson*s Government of over assessment and rigid 
collection. In the official circles in Bombay it was rumoured 
that Sir. W.Wedderburn, then a judge in Poona, who was 
well known for his sympathy for the poor Deccan rayats was 
the inspiration behind the attack. T.C. Hope, a member of 
the Supreme Government and a close friend of Fergusson 
since their school days, informed Fergusson that 
Wedderburn intended to obstruct any amendment of the Relief 
Act in order to extort the reform of the Bombay land revenue 
system. "All this is chiefly an outcome", wrote Hope to 
Fergusson, "of Sir W. Wedderburn* s visit here ^Calcutta^.
The critics"of the Bombay land revenue system contended 
that the Relief Act was inadequate to relieve the agrarian 
indebtedness in the Deccan and that the Deccan rayats 
would remain in the depth of distress unless the
(1) Dr. A.D. Pollen, Sp. Judge to Secy. Jud. Dept. Govt, of B. 
no. 60, 4th Feb. lo82. Papers connected with Bombay Rev. 
and Settlement System, Rev. of Agr. Dept. Govt, of I.
Gal. 1883.
(2) Hope to Fergusson, 5th Nov. 1881 F.C.
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assessments were modified* Dr* Hunter felt that the high
assessment of the government "does not leave enough food to
the cultivator to support himself and his family."
Maharaja Jatirtdramohan demanded a full enquiry into the
situation by the Supreme Government for "the evil lies not
so much in the extortion of the Manajans „ the money lender.
2as in the pressure of over assessment." Crossthwaite
remarked that when indebtedness was widespread among the
agricultural classes in Bombay "a prudent Government would
look to its revenue system to see if it was well suited to
3the conditions of the country." Fergusson was infuriated by 
these attacks and wrote to Ripon, "it is disheartening and 
alarming that those who have no practical knowledge of this 
Presidency are disposed to dogmatise upon its peculiar system 
and interfere with its management in detail."^ The controversy 
thus started in the Legislative Council soon provoked long 
notes and memoranda from the critics and adherents of the 
Bombay system.
The criticisms of the Bombay system were mainly on two 
points, the rigidity of collection and the high mte and 
suddenness of enhancement. The Bombay assessment, it was 
argued, was based on an average of good years* This method 
was unsuited to the Deccan and &outh Maratha country where 
rains could not be predicted.^ The Bombay revenue collection.
(1) Speech of Dr. Hunter, 2nd Nov. 1882. Ind. Legis. Coun. 
Proc. 1882*
(2) Speech of Maharaja Jatindra Mohan Tagore, 2nd Hov. 1882. 
Ind. Legis. Coun. Proc. 1882.
(3) Speech of C.H.T. Crossthwaite, 2nd Hov. 1882* Ind.Legis.
CountProc. 1882.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon* 30th Dec* 1882. R.P.
(5) Rote by C.H.T. Crossthwaite,10th Feb.1883.Memo* on Mr. 
Buck*s note on the Bombay System of Settlement & Revenue 
Collection. W.Lee-Warner. 27th Jan*1883.
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was rigid and the revenue literature of Bombay contained no 
adequate rule for suspensions and remissions of revenue in 
the bad y e a r s T h e  high rate of assessment and the 
rigidity of collection did not allow the rayat a sufficient 
margin after meeting the government demand*
The adherents of the Bombay system claimed that the 
assessment of revenue in the Presidency was preceded by a 
minute classification, measurement and valuation of land. At 
every stage all variations were discounted and thus detailed 
rules for suspension and remission of revenue were super- 
fluous. It was claimed that the assessments in Bombay were 
reasonable, the rate being less than one-half of the net 
produce Such a moderate assessment in Bombay always 
allowed a fair margin in the hands of the rayat♦ This in 
fact was thought to be the reason behind the prompt recovery 
of the country from famine disasters. The continued mnney 
lending business of the SotK&ar. the sale of metal utensils, 
cotton cloth and piece goods, the receipt from the tolls and 
the high sale value of land bore testimony that the rayat * s
5
lot in reality was not as bad as was feared. Fergusson 
considered these facts to be sufficient to show that the 
attack made on the Bombay system in the Indian Legislative 
Council was unfounded. He declared that his Government had
i
(1) Note by E. C. Buck, Secy. Rev# & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I.
2lst Lee. 1882. Memo, on Mr. Buck's note etc. W.Lee-Warner
(2) Speech by C.H.T. Crossthwaite, 2nd Nov.1882.Ind.Legis.Coun. 
Proc. 1882.
(3) Note by J. Gibbs, Member, Viceroy’s Council, 7th Feb.1883* 
Memo, on Mr. Buck’s note etc. W.Lee-Warner
(4) Note on Bombay land revenue system, W.Lee-Warner. 16th 
Lee. 1882* Papers relating Leccan Agr.Relief Act,
Appendix-LL Legis.Proc.Govt• of I. Jan.1883*
(5) Memo, on Mr. Buck’s note on the Bombay bystem of Settlement 
and Revenue collection. W.Lee-Warner.
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"no motive to oppress the cultivators of the soil" and that 
the condition of the Deccan rayat,though precarious because 
of the vagaries of the climate, was "never better than it is 
at present."1
The defence of the Bombay system rested entirely on the 
assertion of solvency and financial well-being of the rayat. 
Unfortunately, none could offer any conclusive proof in support 
of this belief and in 1881 Fergusson*s Government failed to 
convince the home authorities on the point. The truth was, 
as it appeared from the various reports, that agriculture was 
still in a depressed condition in the Deccan and South 
Maratha country. The revenue return of the Government of 
Bombay for 1879-80 showed that 677,000 acres of land had been
transferred to the head of government waste owing to non-
2payment of revenue. Even in 1883 the Secretary of state 
was found to be grumbling about a further decrease in the 
occupied area, forfeiture of land for arrears and a fall in 
the demand for land.^ The Government of Bombay admitted 
that the diminution in population due to emigration and 
famine was considerable in some districts and affected 
a g r i c u l t u r e T h e r e  was hardly any fact to dispute Dr.Pollen*s 
claim that four-fifths of the rayats were deeply embarrassed 
by debt.^ The decision of the Government of Bombay to assess
(1) Fergusson to Kimberley, 1st Feb. 1883# F.c.
(2) Returns for Bombay land settlement and revenue,1879-80. 
Encl. to Des. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Rev. Ro.b, 23rd Feb. 
1882. Rev. Letters to I. 1882.
(3) Desp. 8. of S. tcGovt. of B. Rev. No.2, 8th Feb. 1883*
Rey. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1883•
(4) Desp. Govt, of B. to 8. of S. Rev. ffo.16. 24th July,1883. 
Rev. Proc* Govt, of I. Aug. 1883*
(5) Dr. A.d . Pollen to becy. Jua.Dept.Govt, of B. No.60,4th 
Feb.1883. Papers connected with Bombay Revenue and 
Settlement System, Rev. & Agr.Dept. Govt, of I.Cal.1883.
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Pot Kharab was largely responsible for over assessment. In 
the original settlement the survey "number1 or unit of 
assessment was usually large, containing^portion of waste or 
Kharab land, and these wastes were not assessed. As prices 
rose the rayat brought much of this land into cultivation, 
making such improvements as his small means could afford .
The government, without caring whether such lands yielded 
sufficient production as to pay rent, assessed them on the 
ground that they were cultivated . In consequence thq rayat 
all of a sudden found an revision that he had incurred an 
unusually increased liability.
r .
The claim of the adherents of the Bombay system that a 
fair margin was allowed to the rayat in consequence of a 
moderate government demand was doubtful. Even if it was 
accepted tnat the Bombay assessment was less than half the 
net produce the situation remained ominous. In connection with 
the introduction of the Belief Act, T.C. Hope on 17th July,1879 
stated in the Legislative Council that the average Bombay 
assessment on poor land was 7 annas per acre while on good 
land it was 12 annas.^ On the basis of these facts it might 
be calculated that the average net produce on poor land was 
Bs. v and on good land Bs.^# As the average holding of a 
rayat was about 20 acres and the government assessment was 
half the net produce,^it seemed probable that the whole surplus 
left to the cultivator in an ordinary year would not be more 
than Bs.15/ - Bs. 20/. This margin left to meet variations
(1) Speech of C. H. E. Crossthwaite, 2nd Nov.1882. Ind.
Legis.Coun.Proc . 1882.
(2) Note on Bombay land revenue system, W.Lee-Warner,
16th Dec. 1882. Papers relating Deccan Agr. Belief Act, 
Appendix- D D . Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. Jan. 1883.
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of price and production was only very small .
In view of the criticisms of the Bombay system the 
Supreme Government should have instituted an enquiry into the 
conditions of the rayats in Bombay Presidency and formulated 
remedial measures. However, the whole controversy merely 
produced much heat but no light. Bipon1s Government not 
only failed to intervene but also refrained from pronouncing 
any observation on the issue . Bipon personally was conscious 
of the importance of the land question in India and 
considered the revenue assessment "far more vital to the 
interests of the great mass of the people than the question of 
the local self-government."^ Yet in practice his Government 
were content to declare only the outlines of their policy 
without taking any step to put matters right. With regard 
to the revisions of land settlement the Government of India 
vaguely referred to the necessity of introducing flexibility of 
collection and of restraining overassessment. The Government 
of India supported the recommendation of the Famine Commission 
that suspension and remission of revenue should be resorted 
to in bad years. They proposed to simplify assessment 
procedure by doing away with the re-measurement and re­
classification at the end of every settlement. This would be 
done by fixing an "initial" government demand based on existing 
assessment, area of cultivation and prices of the produce.
Once the initial demand was thus fixed the increase should only 
be made on one of the three grounds: an extension of 
cultivation, a rise in the prices and an increase in produce
(1) Wolf, Bipon,vol 2, p* 8,
due to improvements effected by the government."*" The 
enhanced assessment, however, should gradually be introduced, 
as Ripon remarked,1 1 • so as not suddenly to raise very
largely the payments which the rayats have previously been
2
accustomed to make." As regards agricultural indebtedness 
the Supreme Government resolved to back up Wedderburn1 s plan 
of agricultural banks with government aid to provide 
capital for the cultivators on moderate terms.^ They 
further sought to extend government loans to the rayats for 
land improvement (called Takkavl advances) at low interest 
and with an assurance that any permanent improvement of land 
with these loans should be discounted when revising assessment.^ 
With these general principles Fergusson and his Government 
had no intention to differ. In the years of drought the 
Government of Bombay were willing to suspend and remit the 
collection of revenue. They agreed to the principle that 
the enhancement of revenue should take place only on 
substantial increase of agricultural profit. In their opinion 
the settlement operations in Bombay Presidency would in effect 
determine the ,"initial" assessment.^ The Government of 
Bombay enthusiastically supported Ripon1s endeavours to extend
*7
lakkari advances to the cultivators as early as November,1881.
(1) Secy.Govt, of I. to Secy.Govt, of N.W.P. & Dudh no.525 R- 
9th May,l883« Rev.Proc. Govt, of I. May,1883.
(2) Speech of the President, 2nd Nov.1882. Ind.Levis.Coun. 
Proc.1882.
(3) Secy.Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I . to Secy.Govt, of B.
Rev. no.658, 5th Dec. 1882. Rev. Proc.Govt, of I.Jan 1883*
(4) Gopal, Rippn p.187.
(5) Speech of Sir. S. Bayley, 2nd Nov.1882. Ind.legis.Coun. 
Proc.1882.
(6) Under-Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy.Rev. & Agr.Dept.Govt, of 
I. no .Rev. 6 340,27th Aug,l883« Rev.Proc .Gov.of I.Nov.1883.
(7) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Govt, of I. Rev. no.6683,
10th Nov.1881. Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Oct.1882 .
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As regards the establishment of agricultural banks,Fergusson1s 
Government attempted to give the proposal a fair trial on a 
small scale in Purandharpur Tftluk of Poona district. ^ v*
When such apparent accord was found to be existing between 
the local and the Supreme Governments, Kipon w$s reluctant 
to interfere or to enquire into the realities of the 
situation in the Deccan and south Maratha country. The 
attitude of his Government was to watch the action of the
2Government of Bombay “with interest and not without concern.1 
Ihe home authorities went further and when Kimberley succeeded 
Hartington as the Secretary of State, he believed that the 
evil of high assessment in Bombay had already been remedied.^
In 1883 the previous instruction of the Secretary of State to 
remit assessment in some parts of the Presidency for 3 years 
came to an end and Fergusson had no difficulty in collecting 
the enhancements on the grounds of "unmistakeable signs of the
A
recovery of the agricultural population." Thus enhancement 
of assessment continued unabated in the Bombay Presidency and 
little was heard against it.^ until the late 1890*s when 
famine, plague and starvation wreafced havoc in India.
Though obsessed with the idea that the Deccan and the South 
Maratha Country had recovered from the famine losses,Fergusson
I D  Desp.Govt. of I . to S. of S. Rev.no.7» 31st Ivlay, 1854. Rev. 
Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1884.
(2) Speech of Sir S Bayley, 2nd Nov,1882. Ind.Legis.Coun.
Proc.1882.
(3) Kimberley to Fergusson,22nd Feb.1882. F.C.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. &ev. No.16, 24th July,1883* 
Rev. Proc. Govt, of I. Aug. 1883*
(5) It is interesting to note that Dr. W.W. Hunter, a 
conspicuous critic of the Bombay system in 1882, diamet­
rically changed his opinion. In his book: Bombay, 1885-90» 
1892, p.243 he observed:,f.. .in no country of the world has 
greater care been taken than in Bombay that the cultivator 
of the soil should pay no more rent than he is fairly
able to pay.1
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was always concerned with the possibility of another famine 
in Western India. His concern was reflected in his attitude 
with regard to public works. Public works policy in India was 
inseparable from the famine insurance measures. During the 
years 1875 to 1879 India had been continually visited by 
famines and lytton in 1879 appointed a Commission to enquire 
into the causes and remedies of the famines in India. The 
Commissioners submitted their report to Ripon in 1880 in 
which they recommended a further extension of railway and 
irrigation works for protecting the country against the 
consequences of droughts."^ The Commission ignored the 
need for ’a policy of price stabilisation through the 
storage of grain and the regulation of the grain trade by 
the State. They believed that a famine in India did not 
involve an overall food problem and that any deficit in a 
famine area could be met by imports from surplus areas of 
the country.2 Ripon's Government accented this conclusion
I
and thought that "there will always be available in India
a sufficient food supply in unaffected parts to feed the
inhabitants of any area visited by famine provided the state
■5
of communications admits of such food being transferred."^
Thus the extension of railways was naturally considered to 
be the best remedy against crop failure in future.
When the first railways were constructed in India it was 
found that the joint stock companies could not raise capital 
without the assistance of the state. The then Governor General
(1) Famine Commission Report, Part II, Para I, P.P. 1880.vol.52*
(2) Ibid, Part I, para 156.
(3) Res. Govt, of I. Famine, No.44, 9th June,1883.Cited in 
B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India. 1963* p.183.
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Dalhousie proposed a system under which railways would
be constructed by the private companies with a guarantee
from the Government of India of 5 percent interest on the
capital raised, their operations within certain limits
being under the control of the government. This was
finally adopted, and from 1846 to 1867 all railways in
India with minor exceptions were made through the agencies of
the guaranteed companies. The policy, although it led to
rapid and continuous application of capital to railway
extension in India, was not considered conducive to economy
either in the execution of the work or in the working of
the lines . The Government of India, finding it difficult
to obtain the consent of the companies to the alterations
in the contracts necessary in their opinion to insure
proper control and economy, decided to discard indirect
agency and undertake the works and the working of the
future lines themselves.1 Thus state agency in railways
began in 1869 on loans raised by the Government of India
for the construction of railways. On 24th July, 1879 the
Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Public
Works recommended restrictions on the railway expenditure
of the Government of India on the ground that the railways
2
in India, though beneficial, were not remunerative.
The restrictions allowed the Government of India to borrow £2.5m. 
(Rs. 250 lakhs) annually for the construction of public works.
(1) Report of the Select Committee on Indian Public Works, 
24th July, 1879. P.P. 1878-79. vol. 9*
(2) Ibid,
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Of this sum £700,000 was to be spent on irrigation and the 
remainder on the construction of railways with prospects of 
earning 4 percent annual interest on the capital outlay 
within 5 years of completion. Works which were exclusively 
protective against famines could be constructed by utilising 
half the Famine-Insurance Fund (£1,500,000 or Rs. 150 lakhs 
a year) which had been created in 1878. Of this £250,000 
(Rs . 25 lakhs) were allotted to irrigation and £500,000 
(Rs. 50 lakhs) to railways.^*
From the point of view of famine relief the restrictions 
imposed on railway construction constituted an obstacle.
The Famine Commission estimated that at least another 5,000
miles of railway would be required to supply food to all parts
2of India in times of crisis. With Rs . 50 lakhs available 
for protective railway construction only 400 miles of 
metergauge were possible in the course of every 5 years and 
the process might take 30 years for the construction of 
essential lines.^ The Government of India dared not increase 
taxation for this purpose for fear of discontent among the 
people, and the policy of the home government precluded them 
from raising the sum required by way of loans. The only way 
out of the situation was either a lifting of the restrictions 
imposed on the Government of India1s borrowing capacity or 
entrusting railway works to private enterprise under reasonable 
guarantee. Ripon first attempted the latter method in 1881
-  - - - — T  T '   . '------  - I----- - -- - --- -     - ■ —  - -  - ■ ■- -
(1) Desp. Govt, of I to S. of S. Hailway, No.92, 22nd July,
1881. P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1881.
(2) Famine Commission Report, Part II, Chapt V,See.-4,
Para -10, P.P. I880.,wi.52.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Railway, no .92, 22nd July,
1881. P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1881.
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and took up the former in 1883* In July, 1881 the Government
of India proposed to the Secretary of State that "the private
capitalists should be invited to undertake the construction
of these famine insurance lines upon a guarantee of
interests both in amount and in duration, "payable either
out of the famine insurance fund or the railway receipts
of the government. The Secretary of State, Hartington,
was clearly reluctant to revert to the guarantee system.
He reaffirmed the general principle that the main attraction
of private enterpise shjuld be the prospect of commercial
success and not a government guarantee. In his opinion the
famine lines, if unremunerative, should only be constructed
2by the government itself. The home authorities thus were 
less impressed than the Viceroy with the responsibility for the 
speedy construction of the famine lines and more impressed 
with the disadvantage of imposing guaranteed interest on the 
Indian revenues.
Fergusson, in his turn, felt the immediate necessity 
of improved communications and had no hesitation in supporting 
the Supreme Government in their stand. As early as June, 1880 
he thought that the means of inter-changing the products of 
every part of India were essential as a famine insurance 
measure. "With proper means of communications," he wrote 
to Hartington, "India can save every district from distress."^ 
He was thinking in the same direction as did Hipon for the 
speedy construction of the famine lines. It seemed most 
desirable to him "to enlist private agency for this purpose."
XT) Besp. Govt, of 1. to S. of 5. Hailway, no.92, 22nd 'July 
1881, P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1881.
(2) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Financial no . 365, 8th Dec. 
1881, P.P. 1884. vol. 11. p. 507. •
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June, 1880. F.C.
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In Fergusson1s opinion the construction of the railways 
urgently required for India by State Agency would simply 
involve the raising of India1s state-debt to an extent 
which the home authorities were not prepared to admit. But 
the lines were so essential that any delay should be ruled 
out and the private agency must be attracted to undertake 
them. Fergusson believed that the private agency could not 
be induced to make railways in India on mere speculation, 
especially when the famine lines were unremunerative projects.
It was necessary therefore, that "$here must be something 
in the shape of a guarantee."'*' Ripon resented the attitude 
of the home authorities with regard to the construction 
of the famine lines. He considered it thoroughly unsatisfactory 
on the part of the India council "to delay making protective 
railways and to allow three or four famines to pass by."^
Almost similar was the reaction of Fergusson when he wrote 
to Kimberley: "I know enough of the India Office to under­
stand the course of timid counsels that prevail.... I fear 
that either their prepossessions or the removal from the 
scene of anxiety blunts their sense of the paramount need 
of improved communications to enable this country to be 
secured against calamities."-'
Y/hen Hartington was succeeded by Kimberley as the Secretary 
of State, the Government of India renewed their search for 
funds. They were ready to accept the principle that the 
famine lines should be constructed by the state agency only on 
the understanding that the home authorities would raise the
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 23rd Feb. 1882. F.C.
(2) Ripon to Hartington, 12th Nov. 1881. Cited in Wolf, Ripon, 
vol. 2, p. 81 .
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley, 26th Aug. 1883. F.C.
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limit on the Government of India's borrowing. They calculated 
an annual borrowing of approximately £605,000 more than the 
£2.5 m. already sanctioned.1 Before Kimberley could 
consider the proposal the Toiy party in the House of Commons 
launched a severe attack on the Government of India for - 
being extravagant in public works and E. Stanhope on 8th 
May, 1883 spearheaded the attack by moving a resolution. 
Kimberley claimed that it was politically inexpedient to
sanction any additional expenditure in face of such an
2offensive. ‘ T. C. Hope, the member in charge of the Public 
Y/orks Department of the Government of India, implored 
Fergusson to usd his influence in the Tory circles to 
restrain further criticism.^ But before any such effort 
could be made by Fergusson, Kimberley proposed to appoint 
a Select Committee of the House of Commons to consider the 
question of railway extension with special reference to 
the protective line s.^ In spite of the disapproval of the 
Tories at home Pergusson remained a firm believer in the 
extension of railways in India. He disliked the criticism 
of his "political friends" in the House of Commons and 
thought'it a misfortune if their agitation would lead to 
reduction of public works in India". He denounced 
the continued existence of a restriction on the 
Government' of India's borrowing ability, especially when
(1) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Financial, no.29, 
23rd Jan. 1883. P.P. 1884, vol. 11, p. 509.
(2) Kimberley to Ripon, 20th July, 1883- Cited in Wolf 
Ripon, vol 2, p.82 .
(3) Hope to Pergusson, 6th June, 1883* F.C.
(4) Kimberley to Pergusson, 3rd Aug. 1883* F.C.
(5) Pergusson to Kimberley, 18th June, 1883* F.C.
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so many famine insurance projects were of "crying urgency
He was convinced that the railways were "the only cure of
our e v i l s a n d  that their postponement would condemn "large
districts to continued stagnation and recurring dangers."3
Whatever might be the inconvenience of Kimberly in the
face of a Tory opposition he was certainly hesitant over
accepting the proposal of the Government of India or the
views of Fergusson. Like Hartington he was on principle
4
reluctant "to revert to a guarantee practice." Simultaneously,
he was against overstraining the finances of India by "too
5
heavy borrowing." It was only when the Select Committee 
of the House of Commons on Indian Railways recommended it in
July, 1884, that Kimberley permitted the Government of India£
to borrow annually a sum of Bs. 350 lakhs.
Whether the home authorities agreed or not the 1880's
was favourable for private investment in railways in India,*
The credit of India was good and the European capitalists
7
were eager to invest money. Thus the problem really was the 
manner in which the old guarantee system could be modified to 
remove its defects. A solution lay in what was later called 
ihe formation of the assisted companies, the principle being 
a state undertaking through the agency of a company. Under this 
method a private company would raise the capital for a projected 
line on behalf of the government and construct the line on 
lease for a texm of years under definite government control.
Fergusson to Ripon, 23rd Aug. 1883* R.P.
Fergusson to Kimberley, 22nd May, 1884* F.C.
Fergusson to Kimberley, 18th June, 1 8 8 3. F.C.
Kimberley to Fergusson, 9th Nov. 1883* F.C.
Kimberley to Fergusson, 20th June, 1884. F.C.
Lesp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Railway, no.1 4 8, 27th Nov.
1884. P.P. 1884-85, vol 58. p.291.
(7) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Railway, No .92, 22nd July,
1881. P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. Oct. 1881.
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At the end of the lease the railway would revert to the 
government. In return the government would give the 
Company a guarantee of certain percentage on the capital 
supplied by the company, a share of profit and a free grant 
of land. Such an arrangement would not affect the 
restriction on the Government of India's borrowing capacity 
and would make any guarantee less disadvantageous to the 
state as the undertaking could be regarded as a state 
operation under sole state proprietorship. An assisted 
company of this type was formed with regard to the construction 
of railway lines in the depressed areas of the Deccan and 
the South Maratha country. By Article VI of the Anglo- 
Portuguese Commercial Treaty of 1878 the two authorities 
agreed to further their mutual trade interests by constructing 
a line between Marmagao - a port in Portuguese India - 
and Bellary in British Western India. It was decided that 
the construction of this line should be entrusted to a 
private company. Meanwhile the Government of Bombay, since 
the famine of 1877, had been contemplating the construction 
of a line in Eastern Deccan between Godak and Sholapur via
1 mBijapur. fhe construction of this line was considered in
official circles as "a preventive of the awful scourge of a
2
famine." Both the authorities in Bombay and in Calcutta
decided that these two lines could conveniently be constructed 
by one company.^ At this point a South Maratha Railway 
Company was fomed in England by Sir Douglas Porsyth, who
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 12th Sept. 1881. P.O.
(2) Commissioner, Southern Division to Under-Secy. P.W. Dept. 
Govt, of B. No. 1534, 17th July, 1880. P.W. Proc.Govt. 
of I. Jan. 1881.
(3) Pergusson to Porsyth,, 6th Sept. 1881. P.O.
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started negotiations with the India Office on the basis 
of "assistance,f. The plan impressed Hartington who felt 
that it would avoid "some of the inconveniences of the 
guarantee system."^ The negotiations of Forsyth finally 
resulted in the conclusion of a contract between the Secretaiy 
of State and the South Maratha Railway Company on 1st June,1882. 
By this contract the Company undertook the construction of 
the Southern Deccan line (from Portuguese territory to 
Bellary via Godak) and the Eastern Deccan line (from Godak 
to Sholapur via Bijapur) with a branch to Belgaum. The 
Company agreed to raise £3 for the construction of these 
450 miles of railway . It was to act as the agent of the 
government, the railway being the property of the state. The
contract would last for 50 years and the Company would 
receive one-fourth of the net receipt of the railways, the 
government taking the remaining three-fourths. The company 
was finally subjected to a strict government control in 
carrying out its business. The contract of June,1882 
embodying the assisted system was well-received by the
government and the investors. In quick succession I'Arakeswar
Railway Company in 1883» Indian Midland Railway in I8b5 and 
Bengal-Nagpur Railway Company in 1887 were formed on the 
basis of similar ideas.
Pergusson was happy with the project and thought that the 
lines would relieve the districts "where scanty rains most 
frequently occur. '*3 But he wanted'to go further and urged the
(1) Hartington to Pergusson, 17th March 1882. P.O.
(2) Copy of the Contract with S.M.R.Co. Encl. to Desp. S.of S.
to Govt, of I. Railway, no.86, 22nd June,1882. P.W.Proc.
Govt, of I. Aug. 1882.
(3) Pergusson to Hartington, 12th Sept. 1881. P.O.
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addition in the contract with the South Maratha Railway 
Company of another line from Poona to Belgaum, connecting 
Satara and Kolhapur. This addition, he claimed, was expedient 
not only from the consideration of famine insurance but also 
from political and financial considerations. Politically, 
the line was desirable as it would pass through a number of 
native states, and financially the line would be remunerative.1 
As a preventive measure, Pergusson believed, the line would
p
cover a countiy "very much liable to the droughts.'1 Pergusson
implored Hartington to ask the Company to take up this
Western Deccan line and reminded him that it would be "a sad
mistake" to leave it out.^ The Government of India supported
Pergusson and recommended the inclusion of this section in
the contract with the South Maratha Railway Company.^ The
home authorities were reluctant to concede the point on the
ground of the inconvenience of raising further capital for
5the extension. Both the Government of India and the 
Government of Bombay opposed this plea and pointed to the 
favourable money market and to the urgency of constructing 
the line. Pergusson personally was unwilling to share 
"the evil of postponement of the works of development." To 
Kimberley he declared that he should like "to leave no ground
7
for self reproachment in future." The efforts of Pergusson
(1) Minute by Sir. J. Pergusson, 29th Nov. 1881. Encl. to
Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Railway, no.32, 18th March,
1882. P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1882.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 23rd Peb. 1882. P.C.
(3) Pergusson to Hartington, 10th July, 1882. P.C.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Railway, no. 114. 6th Sept.
1882. P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept, 1884*
(5) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. Railway, no.25» 8th Peb.1883* 
P.W. Proc. Govt, of I. March, 1883.
(6) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Railway, no.70.26th May,
1883 & Desp.Govt, of B. to S . of S. no.HR, 26th June,1883*
P.W.Proc.Govt, of I. June 1883*
(7) Pergusson to Kimberley,20th Aug.1883. P.C.
wgained a further support from Ripon's Government,which
volunteered to contribute Rs 20 lakhs to the stipulated
capital in order to enable the Company to undertake the
Western Deccan line.*1* The determination of Pergusson and
the assistance of Ripon finally prevailed over the Secretary
of State and the construction of the Y/estern Deccan line
was incorporated into the contract with the South Maratha
Railway Company. It was a well-earned victory and the Bombay
2authorities were as glad as if they had had "a bumper crop."
Among the famine insurance measures the Famine Commission 
laid greater emphasis onworks of irrigation.*^ Regarding 
Western India the Commission suggested three important 
protective irrigation works in the famine rayaged South 
Maratha country and the Deccan. These were Nira canal,
Mhasvad: Tank and Godak canal.^ Pergusson was convinced
5
that these works "will be of incalculable advantage. The 
Nira canal project was originally planned to provide water in 
thirsty central Deccan. The work was undertaken in the 
preceding period but was discontinued when the home authorities 
refused to sanction it as a protective work. Pergusson took 
up the cause of its construction on the ground that it would 
give the area "security from periodical distress." Ripon's 
Government supported Pergusson in the belief that the project
(1) Teleg. Viceroy to S. of S. 24th Oct. 1883* P.W. Proc.
Govt, of I. Nov. 1883.
(2) Pergusson to Kimberley, 17th Sept. 1883- P.C.
(3; Famine Commission Report, Part II, p. 150 P.P. l880.vol52.
(4) Desp. ^ovt. of I. to S. of S. P.W. & Pakine, no.2,
12th Feb. 1884. P.W. Proc. (Irr.) Govt, of I. March 1884 •
(5) Minute by Sir J. Pergusson, 29th Nov.1881. P.W. Proc.
Govt, of I. April 1882.
(6) Pergusson to Hartington, 11th Sept. 1880. P.C.
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“should fulfil its main object in affording protection 
against famine. The Secretary of State accordingly 
sanctioned this urgent work. The Mhasvad tank in Satdra 
district was also originally planned by Temples Government 
as protective work but its construction was not started.
In view of the recommendation of the Famine Commission 
Fergusson's Government pressed for its sanction in December, 
1880. The Supreme Government in their turn had no hesitation 
in supporting its construction and in June, 1881 the
project was sanctioned as protective work in the hope that
2
it would afford "protection against famines." The Godak 
canal project was in Belganm district where rainfall was 
always precarious. In November, 1881 Fergusson1s Government 
urged its immediate construction and obtained the necessary 
sanction in February, 1882.^ Fergusson was satisfied to work 
on these projects and expressed a hope that on their completion 
"the Government of Bombay will breathe more freely".^ All 
the projects made considerable progress by 1884» The Nira 
canal, which was to provide for irrigation of 100,000 acres 
of land, was almost complete. The Godak canal providing for 
irrigation of 8000 acres of land and Mhasvad tank providing
5
for irrigation of 26,000 acres were half completed. Later, 
in 1897, Fergusson proudly recalled these irrigation works in 
the House of Commons. "In those parts of the country where in 
1877 no green blade was seen," he remarked,"now enormous tracts 
of crops were to be found independent of rainfall.
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. P.W. no.18,27th May,1881. 
P.W. Proc. (Irr.) Govt, of I. June, 1881.
(2) Desp S. of S. to Govt, of I. P.W. no.29,30th June.l88l. 
P.W. Proc.(Irr.) Govt, of I. Aug.1881.
(3) Govt. of I.P.W.D to Govt, of B. P.W.D. no. 651, 22nd Feb
1882. P.W.Proc .(Irr.) Govt, of I, May,1882.
(4) Fergusson to Hartington>L2thOti.tM88l F.C.
(5) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. P.W. of Famine.no.2 12th
Feb.1884* P.W. Proc (Irr.) Govt, of I. March, I8 8 4.
(6) Speech of Sir J Fergusson, M.P. Manchester,26th Jan.1897.
Hansard. H. of Commons. 4th series, f.525.
1
With regard to the broader aspects of public works policy
and famine insurance measures Ripon and Pergusson held
similar views. However, in matters of detail they differed
on occasions. One such case of difference was relative to
the framing of the Famine Codes in 1883 by which the system
and machinery of famine relief were put on a stable footing.
The Famine Commission of 1880 suggested that all the local
governments should issue a set of rules that would govern the
1administration of famine relief. Ripon1s Government in 
1883 prepared a model famine code on the basis of this
recommendation of the Commission and directed the local
2
governments to prepare their own on similar lines. In 
Bombay Fergusson appointed a Special Committee to draft a code 
and in January, 1884 a draft code was submitted to the 
Supreme Government for sanction. The code contained detailed 
rules for the guidance of the local administration in the 
matters dealing with a famine. These included the establish­
ment of a system of information from local areas to the 
Presidency Government concerning onset of scarcity, the type 
and nature of relief works to be constructed, the classific­
ation of relief labour and the scale of wages to be paid, the 
organisation of gratuitous relief and the establishment of a 
system of village inspection, suspension of revenue and loans 
to landholders.  ^ Ripon1s Government approved this draft 
except the vital point relating to gratuitous relief. The 
point at issue was whether the poor residents of a village,
(1) Famine Commission Report, Part I, para-113 *P*P .1880. vol. 52 .
(2) Circular, Govt, of I. No.44F, 9th June, 1883. Famine 
Proc. Govt, of I. June, 1883.
(3) Draft Famine Code, Bombay. Encl. to Under-Secy. Govt, of 
B. to Secy. Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I. no.39i 4th Jan. 
1884* Rev. Letters from I. 1884»
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who were unable to perform labour by reason of infirmities, 
should be relieved in the time of famine in their own 
villages or should be compelled to enter and receive relief 
in a poor house of the government. Pergusson* s Government 
contended that as a rule the incapable poor should not be 
relieved in the village and that every person eligible for 
gratuitous relief should be transferred to a, poor house.
The village relief, they felt, could be abused but only the 
truly needy would leave their villages for the poor houses.
The poor house relief, according to the Government of Bombay,
succeeded in their Presidency in the past while village
2relief proved to be financially damaging. Fergusson*s 
Government further believed that to ensure the success of 
gratuitous relief an Act should be passed empowering 
government officials to send incapable persons to the poor 
houses and to retain them there until the distress was at 
an end.^ Ripon*s Government on the other hand were of the 
opinion that gratuitous relief should be given to the 
incapable persons intheir villages and the poor houses should 
be exclusively reserved for the wanderers and beggars. They 
were aware, they stated, af the possibility that thevillage 
relief system might involve **the risk of a too free grant of 
rexief.1* Still the Government of India preferred village 
relief system for general adoption for **the poor house system**
4
involves the more serious risk of veiy insufficient relief."
(1) Draft Famine Code, Bombay. Encl. to Under-Secy Govt. of B. 
to Secy. Rev. & Agr. Dept. Gove, of I. no.39* 4th Jan.
1884* Rev. Letters from I. 1884.
(2) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Rev . & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I.
No.7715, 27th Sept. 1884. Bev. Letters from I. 1884.
(3) Under-Secy. Govt, of B.to Secy. Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt,
of I. no. 39* 4th Jan. 1884* Rev. Letters from I.
(4) Secy. Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I. to Secy. Govt, of B.
no. 64B* 12th June, 1884* Rev. Letters from I 1884,
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Ripon1 s Government were also opposed to the proposal of 
compulsory legislation to force poor infiim people to go 
to the poor houses. Such a law, in their opinion, "would 
be unpopular, liable to cause panic and thus might defeat its 
own o b j e c t . T h e  difference between the supreme Government 
and the Presidency Government became so sharp that the matter 
was referred to the Secretary of State who upheld the views 
of the Government of India. The ruling forced Pergusson1s
Government to modify their draft as regards the use of poor
2
houses.
Pergusson*s authoritarian attitude created a further 
difference in 1883* During 1882, some parts of the Presidency 
had been visited by a new calamity - locusts - and at the 
beginning of 1883 it assumed serious proportions. The 
locusts caused injuiy to crops in the Deccan and the South 
Maratha country and proceeded towards Bombay Konkan. In 
Ahmednagar and Khandesh the entire crop was destroyed. In 
Nasik half the area was ravaged by locusts and the fate of 
Satara, Ratnagiri and Belgaum was no better.^ The Government 
of Bombay had to arrange for immediate relief works in 
Ahmednagar and Nasik as well as for remissions of revenue in 
all the affected areas.^ Pergusson estimated the direct 
loss of his Government from the visitation of locusts as
5
approximately Rs. 17 lakhs. Soon the Government of Bombay 
decided to make an all-out effort to destroy locusts and
XT) Desp V Govt, of "TV to S. of £>. Pamine, no. 3, 9th Dec.1884. 
Rev. Letters from I. 1884*
(2) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Govt, of I. no.5746.16th July, 
1885* Rev. Letters from I. 1885*
(3) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Rev. & Agr. Dept. Govt. Of I. 
no. 3882, 21st May, 1883• Rev. Letters from I.l883»
(4) Pergusson to Ripon, 13th Jan, 1883* R*P*
(5) Pergusson to Kimberley, 19th Jan.l883« P-C.
303
locust eggs.*^ Such an effort could only succeed if the 
agricultural population was employed en masse in locust 
killing. However, it was difficult to induce cultivators 
as a body to destroy locusts. Their superstition led them 
to regard the locust visitation as God-sent and not to be
opposed by mortal means. Besides, religion instructed
2
them not to commit violence of any kind. Under this
circumstance Pergusson*s Government decided in July, 1883
to resort to legislation to force the cultivators to join
in locust killing. They promptly drafted a Bill, which
Pergusson thought was necessary in view of ”either apathy or
superstition of the cultivators.1’*' By the draft Bill it
was proposed to give power to the government officials to
force the cultivators to join the campaign against the
locusts without any payment and any refusal to do this was
declared punishable.^ Ripon personally thought compulsory
legislation obnoxious and desired that the Government of
Bombay should pay for any forced labour. ’’Payment appears to me,1
he informed Pergusson, Mto be an essential condition of any
resort to compulsion.”  ^ The Supreme. Government thus was
prepared to sanction the Bill only on condition of its
limitation to the present season and of the guarantee that
£
payment should be at full current rates. Pergusson on the 
other hand had objections to payment. He feared that if it
( 1 ) i . Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Rev.& Agr.Dept. Govt, of I.
No.3882, 21st May.1883* Rev. Letters from 1.1883*
(2) Secy.Govt, of B* to Secy. Rev. & ^gr. Dept.Govt, of I.
No. 5168,11th July,1883. Rev. Letters from I. 1883*
(3) Pergusson to Ripon, 11th July,1883* B.P.
(4) Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Rev. & Agr.Dept.Govt, of I.
No.5205, 12th July,1883. Rev.betters from I. 1883.
(5) Ripon to Pergusson, 13th Aug. 1883* P.C.
(6) Teleg. Govt, of I. to Govt, of B. No.145,25th July,1883# . 
Rev. Letters from I. 1883.
was once known that the people were entitled to be paid when 
called upon to protect crops, they would hardly move without 
payment and "the expense would be very great.1 ^ Besides, 
he considered it /'utterly wrong to pay people to protect 
crops which were either their own or of their community#u 
Ripon in his turn remained adamant not to make any concession 
on the whole issue, fergusson in utter irritation referred 
to Ripon and his advisers as men 11 who have set the country 
in a flame by legislating on matters like local seif-^ovt. 
and Ilbert Bill which might have slumbered for a generation, 
but who are fearful of the consequences of compelling villagers
•z
to protect their own c r o p s . T h e  Government of Bombay 
calculated the vast financial burden of paying cultivators 
full current wages as beyond the means of their provincial 
fund.^ Pergusson1s authoritarianism was thus brought face 
to face with Riponfs liberalism and the issue was referred 
to the home authorities. The Secretary of State joined 
Ripon in objecting to the proposed Bill and the measure was 
eventually dropped. Kimberley reminded Pergusson that the 
crying grievance of the Prench peasantry before the 
Revolution was that they were pressed just in the manner in
which Pergusson proposed and that "no such system /forced
"7 5labour/ ought to prevail under a civilised government."
(1) Pergusson to Ripon, 11th Aug# 1883. P.O.
(2) Ibid
(3) Pergusson to Kimberley, 30th Aug. 1883. P.O.
(4; Secy. Govt, of B# to Secy. Rev# & Agr. Dept. Govt, of I# 
no# 49R# 30th July, 1883. Rev. Letters from I.
(5) Kimberley to Pergusson, 11th Oct. 1883. P.O.
The difference of views between Pergusson and Ripon as 
regards the proper role of government was not reflected in 
the public works policy. Theiar apparent agreement was due 
to their common anxiety for insuring the country against 
the succession of droughts and famine. The uncertainty of 
monsoon in India demanded the speedy construction of the 
famine lines and the rapid extension of irrigation works.
Any delay in lengthy discussion as to the principles of public 
works policy was not only irrelevent but haimful. But 
Pergusson stoutly defended the over assessment of land when 
Ripon advocated strict moderation of the government demand.
The contrast of Ripon1s liberal concern for individual 
liberty with Pergusson1s authoritarian paternal outlook, 
stressing the positive functions of the government, was 
further revealed with the locust Bill and the Bombay famine 
code.
• CHAPITER VI
Administrative Reforms.
A most distinctive feature of Ripon1s Viceroyalty in 
India was the large number of administrative reforms 
attempted. E. . Baring, the finance member of the Government 
of India,observed a year after Ripon1s arrival that Malmost 
every big Indian question" had already cropped up in some 
foim or another."^ Lord Northbrook and Lord Halifax were
even anxious at the pace at which reforms were introduced
2
in India. Pergusson1 s tenure of office coincided with a 
period of large scale changes in the Indian administration. 
Administrative changes in India were often controversial and 
those proposed by Ripon were no exception. Pergusson 
participated in some of these controversies and pressed his 
own view with considerable effect. In addition to his concern 
for local self-government, public works and land 
administration, Pergusson took particular interest in factory 
legislation and in the question of the criminal jurisdiction 
of Indian judges over Europeans. He also forcefully expressed 
his opinions on taxation policy and on the admission of 
Indians to the Civil Service. All these issues touched the 
well-being of the Indian people in general and the interests
(1) ^Baring, to Ripon, 10th Peb. 1881. Cited in Gopal,
Ripon, p. 83-
(2) Northbrook to Ripon, 2nd Peb 1883, and Halifax to Ripon 
2nd March, 1883* Cited in Wolf, Ripon, vol. 2, p. 120.
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of the educated section and the industrial working class in 
particular. Together they formed a vital part of Eipon1s 
liberal policy in India. Pergusson1s attitude towards each 
of these issues was characteristic of his Tory disposition.
India was essentially an agricultural country in the 
1680*s but industrialism was not unknown, especially in 
Bengal and in Bombay. Out of a total of 20 jute mills in 
India, Bengal possessed 18* Of a total of 62 cotton mills 
in India, 46 were in Bombay. Besides, in the Bombay 
Presidency there were other, non-textile, factories using 
machines for production. Tne grand total of all factories, 
workshops and cotton mills was about 200 and more than
p
8,000 people were engaged in them. At this dawn of 
industrialism in India the working class was numerically 
small but not without its problems. Working conditions in 
the factories were deplorable and sanitation and ventilation 
unknown. The hours of work were unlimited, machines were 
unguarded and women and children were employed as freely as 
men. These abuses attracted the attention of the government 
as early as 1873 and the Report of the Bombay Cotton Department 
of 1872-73 described the long working day of the factory workers, 
the absence of any rest day, the indiscriminate employment of 
children and the irreparable undermining of their health. The 
Department recommended the fixation through legislation of the 
minimum age of employment and the maximum hours of work, at 
least for children and women.^ In 1875 the home authorities
(1) Moral and Material progress and condition , of India,
1882-83. p.p. 1884-85, vol 60, p.218.
(2) Minute by Sir R.Temple, Governor of Bombay,22nd Dec.1878. 
Legis Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(3) Extract from the Report of the Bombay Cotton Department 
for 1872-73* Legis.Proc .Govt .of I. April,1881.
first took notice of the abases existing in Indian factories. 
(They learnt from unofficial sources that children of 6 years 
and women worked in the factories from sunrise to sunset with­
out a day's rest for weeks or months. They were informed 
that "children not uncommonly dropped down from exhaustion 
between the alleys and passages of the machines." In view 
of these reports the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury* 
invited the opinion of the local authorities of Bombay and
Bengal as to the necessity of introducing immediate factory
1legislation in India. The Government of Bombay in reply 
admitted that conditions were unsatisfactory. But they were 
reluctant to impose restrictions which might give rise to a 
serious reduction of the wages of factory hands. In their
opinion, factory legislation should be confined to sanitation
2
and ventilation. The Government of Bengal, in their turn, 
found no cause of complaint in Bengal.^
In the history of factory legislation in England the 
Disraelian tradition was important. While rehabilitating 
Tory ideas in the face of new industrial conditions of England, 
Disraeli desired in 1840 "to elevate the physical as well as 
moral condition of the people by establishing that labour 
required regulation." This attitude matured into a Tory 
labour policy between Disraeli's suppoft of the Ten Hours Bill 
in 1844 and his famous labour legislation of 1875* ^
(1) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of B. Legis. No.4* 4th March,1875. 
Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(2) Secy. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B. to Secy. Agr. & Comm. Dept. 
Govt, of I. No. 393* 1st Peb. 1876. Legis.Proc. Govt, of 
I. April, 1881.
(3) Secy. Gen. Dept. Govt, of Beng. to Secy. Agr. & Comm.Dept. 
Govt, of I. No. 2941* 27th Sept.1875.Legis.Proc.Govt. of 
I. April, 1881.
(4) G. E . Buckle, The life of M s F a e U f 1910, vol.I,bp. 570 & 
633, vol. 2, p. 692.
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It was therefore natural that a -Disraelian Viceroy first took 
an initiative in labour legislation in India. The credit 
for pioneering a Factory Act in India should be shared, 
ironically, by men belonging to opposite political camps,
Lytton and Ripon.^ In April, 1877 Lytton1s Government 
decided in favour of factory legislation to limit the age 
and hours of labour of children and prescribe the fencing of
p
machines. A Bill was drafted providing for the fixation 
of the minimum age of children in the factories at 9 years.
The Bill fixed 8 hours daily work for young persons between 
9 and 14 years and prohibited the employment of children in 
dangerous works. The Bill further insisted on the fencing 
of dangerous machines and provided for government inspection 
to enforce compliance with the rules.^ The reactions of the 
local governments to the Bill were of a mixed nature and while 
Bombay, Assam and Central Provinces supported legislation 
Madras, British Burma, North West Provinces and Oudh and 
Bengal disapproved of it. In the opinion of the Bengal 
Government under Sir. A. Eden, the proposed Factory Act would 
irritate the industrialists and discourage the growth of 
industries. They felt that if a law was to be passed at all
(1) S. Gopal in his book Viceroyalty-of Lord Ripon, 1953, 
treated Lytton1 s initial proposals""f or a Factory Act 
lightly by commenting that these could hardly be deemdd 
"drastic or far reaching." (p.58) Historically, however, 
some credit should be given to Lytton who first proposed 
a Factory Bill, the clauses of which remained almost 
unchanged when Ripon later enacted it.
(2) leleg.Viceroy to S. of S. 18th April, 1877* Legis. Proc. 
Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(3) Draft Bill (Factories Act), 13th Oct. 1879* Legis Proc. 
Govt. of I . April, 1881.
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"it should not be general in its effects, but applicable to
each province as the local government may require.^ The
Government of Bombay, on the other hand, not only approved of
the Bill but wanted to go further by fixing the hours of work
for adult workers, by providing one day's rest in a week for.
all in the factories and by emphasising the need for sanitation
2
and ventilation provisions for factory premises. lytton's 
Government wavered over these contrary opinions and finally 
conceded to the views of the Bengal Government. They decided 
"not to make the measure of general application, but 
permissive so that each local government will be empowered... 
to extend the Act in whole or in part to any tract or part of 
its territories."^ However, a Select Committee of the 
Legislative Council, while examining the draft Bill in February, 
1880 disapproved the permissive nature of the Bill on the ground 
that "to subject one locality to legislation and not to 
subject another is anomalous." As regards the provisions of 
the Bill they suggested an increase of the hours of work of
the children and a decrease of their minimum age from 9 to
o 4.8 years. It is difficult to say what would have been the 
result of a discussion in the legislative Council on the 
Report of the Select Committee. But a few hours before such 
a discussion was due to take place in the Council, Sir A. Eden
(1) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. legis. No .29, 20th Nov.1879* 
Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(2) Minute by Sir R. Temple, Governor of Bombay, 28th Feb.1880. 
Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Legis*No.29,20th Nov.1879* 
Legis.Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(4) Report of the Select Committee on the Bill,28th Feb.1880. 
Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881.
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persuaded Lytton to postpone enactment on the ground that
sufficient time had not been granted to the local governments to
consider the Report.1 The matter was thus left in abeyance
until it was revived by Ripon.
Ripon had no faith in the doctrinaire liberal attitude of
John Bright on factory legislation. In England in 1844 John
Bright objected to the interference of the State between the
2
contracting parties of labour and employer. He even 
- predicted that if labour hours were restricted the wages of the 
workers would inevitably fall. This prophecy, based on 
laissez-faire economic theory proved to be false . In fact a 
very rapid rise in wages in England from 1850 made smooth any 
difficulties that might have resulted from the Act of 
Parliament restricting labour to 10 hours.1 Ripon was 
acquainted with the working of the English Factory Acts and 
their great benefits to the working class. He had seen the 
prophecy made by the opponents of legislation in England 
proved false. He was conscious of the workman's plight that 
might ensue from unrestrained industrial relations. He 
announced in January, 1881, that he would greatly regret the 
abandonment of the Factory Bill of his predecessor in India, 
expressed his preference for an Indian rather than a local
A
Act and directed papers to be•recirculated.
Fergusson in Bombay accepted the Disraelian tradition of 
labour regulation by the state. He had considerable experience 
about the working of the Factory Acts in England where he 
served as the Chairman of the Factories and Workshops Act 
Commission of 1875-76. Fergusson*s knowledge about factory 
legislation was known to Ripon who considered him “highly
(1) Note by Fitspatrick, Secy. Letis .Lept. G-ovt. of I . bth 
January,1881. Legis.Proc.Govt. of I. April, 1881.
(2) G.M. Trevelyan, Life of John Bright, 1913* p* 59*
(3) Ibid.
(4) Note of Ripon, 31st Jan. 1881. Cited in Gopal, Ripon, 
p. 59.
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experienced"^ Fergusson had no doubt as to the necessity 
of a general Factory Act in India. He believed that the
Factory Bill as modified by the Select Committee(February,1880)
2
was the minimum that could be done in India. The 
restrictions of English factory laws as regards women workers and 
working hours of men were not included in the proposed Bill.
Even the restrictions proposed on the age and working hours 
of children were too moderate in comparison with those 
imposed by Factory Acts in England.^ Fergusson's watchful 
eyes,however, noticed some serious defects in the draft of 
the Bill.
The term ‘'factory" was defined in the Bill as a premise 
wherein not less than 100 persons were employed and where 
w,ork was carried on by utilising mechanical devices. Such a 
definition would mean the exemption of factories working 
with less than 100 hands but employing children. Fergusson 
felt that if the protection of children was the main objective 
of legislation, then, the restriction of 100 persons was 
"unjust and irrational". He was further of opinion that no 
child should be employed for more than 2 hours at a 
stretch or more than 8 hours daily. He considered the 
fixation of the minimum age of a child at 8 or 9 years as 
exceedingly low. Again, the Bill provided for a penal provision 
of Rs . 2000/ on the occupier of the factory premise for any
(1) Ripon to Fergusson, 17th March,1881 F.C.
(2) Minute by Sir J. Fergusson, 15th Sept.1880. Legis.
Proc. G-ovt. of I. April, 1881 .
(3) Age Hrs. of work in England
(a) Adult Male & Female xOhrs daily
lb) Young persons bet. 12 &14 yrs* 5 M "
(c) Children bet. 10 & 12 yrs. 5 " "
(d) Children bet. 8 & 10 yrs. Not employed 
Desp. S. Of S. to Govt, of I. Statistics, No.4, 15th 
May, 1890. P.P. 1890-91, Vol. 59, p. 193.
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infringement of law. To Fergusson this seemed quite 
inadequate. He was convinced of the necessity of providing 
for a clause by which the occupier should maintain the 
victims of preventible accidents and defray medical charges 
A penal compensation or fine, Fergusson commented, was ^but 
a poor remedy for an injured child.1 Finally, Fergusson 
thought that the Act should provide for flawless provision 
with regard to the employers liability for any breach of the
Factory Act. His experience in England taught him to be
careful on this point as the employers there often evaded
their primary responsibility for any breach of law by
shifting their guilt to the employees. ^
The suggestions of Fergusson would have ensured what was 
essential for the reasonable protection of children in the 
factories. But it was difficult for Bipon to admit any 
further ■improvements in the draft Bill. It was even doubtful 
if any general factory legislation could be effected in face 
of opposition from important quarters. There was no doubt 
that the general applicability of the Factory Act was the most 
important principle and its acceptance most vital. A 
peimissive legislation would simply mean an unequal treatment 
of the industries. If the Government of Bombay alone decided 
to apply such legislation, the industries of Bombay would be 
placed under restriction while factories in other provinces 
would enjoy protective exemption. Bipon found the Secretary 
of State, Hartington, “cold1 about the Factory Act and preferring 
permissive legislation. Besides, there was "much lukewarmness" 
among the members of his Council. It was with great difficulty
(l) Minute by Sir J * Fergusson, lbth Sept. i860* Legis.
Proc. Govt, of I. April, 1881,
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that Bipon succeeded in convincing the majority of his Council
as to the main principle that the Act should be general,
applying to all parts of India.^ Once the Council resolved in
favour of a general Act Hartington had to allow the Viceroy
his discretion.^ Then Ripon came face to face with the main
opposition, namely the Government of Bengal under Sir A. Eden.
The communications of Ripon convinced Eden that the Viceroy was
determined to pass an Act applicable to all parts of the
countiy and that Bengal would not be exempted at any rate. The
best that Eden could do in this situation was an attempt to
strike a bargain. He agreed to a general Factory Act only if
the minimum age of children proposed in the Bill (9 years)
was reduced to 7 years and the upper age limit of the young
persons (14 years)Was reduced to 12 years.^ Ripon, much
against his will, decided to give his consent to such
curtailment of the Bill. It seemed to him "important to avoid
a warm discussion which might have had a great effect on the
India Office... and to give all the. weight of his /the
Secretary of State'sjauthority to the opposition."*^ Ripon
particularly regretted the reduction of the minimum age to 7
years. He apologetically explained to Pergusson that "lacking
support both here and at home as I did, it seemed to me that
it was on the whole better to agree and to pass the Bill now
than to postpone it for another year with all the risks of its
" 5being further whittled down in the interval.
(1) Ripon to Pergusson, 17th March, 1881. P.C.
(2) Teleg. S. of S. to Viceroy, 20th Dec. i860. Legis.Proc*
Govt, of I. April, 1881.
(3) Eden to Ripon, 5th March, 1881, Cited in Gopal,Ripon.p.60.
(4) Ripon to Pergusson, 17th March, 1881, P.C.
(5) Ibid.
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The Indian factories Act (^V) of 1881 was passed on 
13th March, 1881 and it was applicable to the whole of British 
India. A factory was defined as any premise wherein was 
carried on for not less than 4 months in the year any process 
utilising mechanical power and employing not less than 100 
persons. However, indigo, tea and coffee plantations were 
exempted. No one under 7 years was to be employed in a 
factory, the burden of proof of the age lying on the employer. 
Young men under 12 years were not to be employed more than 9 
hours a day. The children and young persons should be granted 
an hours interval during the day and four days holiday per 
month. Dangerous machinery was to be fenced. Provisions 
were to be made by the local governments for inspection of 
factories and fines up to Rs. 2000/ could be imposed by Courts 
for infringement of law.^ Clearly the Act was inadequate*
The arbitrary working hours of women and adult males were 
left untouched and the injustice of considering a boy of 13 
years to be able to work from dawn to dusk was not remedied.
The need for compulsory rest days for all workers and for a 
minimum provision for sanitation and ventilation was overlooked. 
Bven as regards the very limited object of the Act - the 
protection of children - the measure was insufficient. The 
Act should have included those factories where a total of 100 
persons were not employed but children were employed freely.
The Government of -^ ipon was conscious of these limitations and 
commented that "it would have been scarcely possible to frame 
a more moderate measure". However, the Pactory ^ct of 1881 
supplied for the first time a factory law in India. It also 
achieved three important objects, namely, the government 
inspection of the factories, the limitation of the age and hours 
of work for the children and the fencing of the machines .
(1) Indian Pactories , 188.1. Legis. Proc. Govt, of I. 
y April, 188^.
(2) Circular, G0vt. of I. to local govts. No.12-710-719>
27th May, 1881. Jud. Proc. Govt, of I. May, 1881.
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The reactions of Pergusson were naturally very bitter.
His urge to keep his comparatively industrialised Presidency 
in good order was not satisfied. To this was added the contempt 
of a Governor of Bombay for the Government of Bengal. The 
fact that Eden opposed the measure made him repugnant to 
Pergusson. "Sir A. Eden*s vigorous opposition", Pergusson 
commented to Cranbrook, "procured its j/the Act* sj being 
whittled down to n o t h i n g . H e  wrote to Hartington of the 
measure as "a wretched Pactoiy Act.11 ^ To Bipon he 
expressed his disappointment at "the weakness of the measure". 
But he felt that even the experience of a weak measure would 
be valuable for future amendments.*^ In fact throughout his 
stay in Bombay, Pergusson neither failed in scrutinising the 
working of the Act nor missed any opportunity to insist on its 
further amendment.
Pergusson1s Government in April 1881 asked the home 
authorities to permit them to appoint an Inspector of the 
factories from England. He would superintend the working of 
the Pactoiy Act in Bombay and would advise the government as 
to the measure to be adopted to ensure the success of the Act. 
The officer selected for duty from among the Inspectors of 
factories in England was W.O. Meade-King. But before Meade-King 
could complete his work Pergusson felt the necessity to raise 
the issue of an amendment. A boy of 15 working in a small 
bone-crushing factory (employing less than 100 persons) was 
caught by the machine and was crushed to death. It was believed
(1) Pergusson to Granbrook, 12th April, 1881. C.C.
(2) Pergusson to Hartington, 24th March, 1881. P.O.
(3) Pergusson to Ripon, 29th March, 1881. R.P.
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Shat the accident occurred due to the exhaustion of the hoy
wbo had worked for long hours. The Government of Bombay
immediately advocated an amendment of the definition of the
factories in the Act by substituting for ”100 persons” a
smaller number. They felt that the Act should be rendered
applicable to ”the numerous small, ill-built, carelessly
2
managed and insufficiently equipped factories. Ripon
was sympathetic to the cause but thought that it would 
not be judicious in the interest of factory legislation in 
India ”to attempt to amend the Act of last year before it 
has been in operation for 12 months.”
But further proofs of the inadequacy of the Act soon 
followed when Meade-King submitted his reports in July,1882. 
In Meade-King*s opinion the glaring abuse in the factories 
was their absolute lack of ventilation and sanitary arrange­
ments. ^ But the greatest defect of the Act according to 
Meade-King was its inability to protect women and young 
persons above 12 years who worked the whole day without rest 
like the adult males.5 He most emphatically stressed the 
urgency of extending the Act to factories where power 
of any kind was used regardless of the number of persons 
employed. Machines in small factories were usually unfenced 
and workers overworked. These conditions invariably led to
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 15th April, 1882 R.P.
(2) Secy. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B, to Secy* Home Dept. Govt,
of I. No. 1510, 11th April, 1882. Jud. Proc. Govt, of I. 
May 1882.
(5) Ripon to fergusson, 16th May, 1882. P.C.
(4) Inspector of Factories, Bombay to Secy. Gen. Dept. Gov.
of B. 24th June, 1882. Report on the Indian Factories 
Act, W.O. Meade-King, 1882 .
(5) Ibid.
accidents and Meade-King commented: "... the marvel is that the
accidents are not of a more frequent occurrence than they are.M ^
He advocated the extension of the Act to factories employing
less than 100 persons. He proposed to give women and young
persons holidays like the children and recommended that the
minimum age of a full-time worker should he raised from 12
to 13 years and the minimum age of the children from 7 to
8 years. In Meade-King!s opinion the children should work ,
2
for 6 hours a day instead of 9 hours.
While pressing the Government of India to amend the Act in 
the light of Meade-King’s findings, Fergusson and his 
Government judiciously restricted themselves to the limited 
scope of the Act, namely, the protection of the children. They 
did not touch on issues like the protection of women, working 
hours of all and sanitation and ventilation. The opponents 
of the Act, who were even reluctant to offer full protection 
to the children, would certainly have lent a deaf ear to 
these issues. Fergusson1s Government thus proposed 
modifications of the Act merely ,fto prevent enslaving over­
work of children and young persons." The provisions of the 
Act of 1881, in the opinion of the Government of Bombay, were 
clearly insufficient "to furnish adequate and satisfying 
remedy of the evils against which the measure was directed." 
Hipon was eager to consider the case for amendment and invited 
the opinions of other local governments. The reactions of the 
local governments to the proposal for amendment were as usual
(1) Report of the Inspector of Factories on The application of 
The Factories Act to small mills and factories,7th July, 
1882. Report on the Indian Factories Act, W.O. Meade-King, 
1882.
(2) Inspector of Factories, Bombay to Secy. Gen.Dept .Govt. of 
Bombay 24th June,1882. Report on the Indian Factories Act 
W.O. Meade-King, 1882.
(3) Act. Secy* Govt, of B. to ^ecy. Govt, of I. No.2705,19th 
July, 1882. Report on The Indian Factories Act, W #0. 
Meade-King, 1882 .
discouraging. Most of tbem found no necessity of amendment
and the Government of Bengal was frankly opposed to any
amendment at all. In face of such opposition Ripon decided
to move no further. Fergusson,, in disgust, commented that
the Governor-General1s Council/"yielded and fallen with the
Calcutta influence." ^
The lack of support for Fergusson*s urge for amendment
was largely circumstantial. The Presidency of Bombay in
respect of steampower manufacture was far in advance to
all other parts of India. This was mainly owing to the
concentration of the textile factories. But numerous other
factories and workshops were growing up in the Presidency
very rapidly. These were mills for flour grinding and for
wool and cotton cleaning, manufacturing workshops of iron,
brass, leather, acid etc. There were 19 large non-textile
factories in the Presidency and 18 more belonging to the
3
government, the railway companies and the Port Trust. Even
the aggrieved voices of the workers as to the working 
conditions and working hours were heard in the Presidency.
The workers of the spinning and weaving mills of Bombay city 
held public meetings in September 1884 to give expression to 
their grievances. ^ This local importance ofthe factories 
necessitated the rapid and repeated requests of the Government 
of Bombay for an adequate Factory Act. like Bombay, the 
province of Bengal was comparatively industrialised but t&e
(1) Secy. Govt, of Beng. to Secy. Home Dept. Govt, of I.
No. 275 T-G, 19th May, 1883. Jud. Proc.Govt. of I.
Sept. 1883*
(2) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 9th Sept. 1882. C.C.
(3) Res. &ovt. of B # Gen. F>ept. ^°- 375, 4th Feb. 1885* P.P# 
188, vol. 77, p.399-421 .
(4) Petition of workers of spinning and weaving mills of 
Bombay city to Lord Lansdowne, 24th Oct. 1889* P*P* 
1890-91, vol. 59, p. 176.
Z2-&
but the authorities there considered factory legislation as 
an interference with industrial development. In other parts 
of India factories were so small in number that the local 
authorities could afford to remain indifferent. In 1881 the 
general applicability of factory law in all parts of the 
country was accepted as a sound principle and.any departure 
from this principle or any special legislation in a particular 
locality like Bombay was out of the question* Thus, in this 
situation of uneven industrialism in India, Fergusson hardly 
had any chance of immediate success unless he was able to 
change the prevailing indifference through constant advocacy 
of his cause. The task was almost impossible to perform but 
Fergusson patiently stuck to it.
In February and March, 1883 Fergusson^ Government insisted 
on the necessity of bringing smaller factories under the 
supervision of the government.1 In May, 1884 Fergusson took 
a measure of greater dimension in his persistent advocacy for 
the amendment of the Act of 1881. His Government appointed 
a Factory Commission to report on the advisability of 
accepting Meade-King1s suggestions, after enquiring into the 
details of the matter. The Commission consisted of official 
and non-official members presided over by W.B. Mullock, a 
Bombay civilian. The Chairman of/Bombay Chamber of Commerce
Z'-
and the Chaiiman of^Bombay Millowners Association took 
prominent part in the proceedings of the Commission. The 
Commission examined both factoiy workers and owners and 
submitted their report in January, 1885* The chief conclusions 
of the Commission ran on the lines of Meade-King*s suggestions. 
They recommended legislation with regard to the maintenance and 
sanitary condition of the factories. They advised that
(1) Secy. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B. to Secy. Home Dept. Govt, of I.
No. 711, 28th Feb. 1883 and No . 942, 16th March, 1883.
Froc.Govt, of I. Sept. 1883*
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factories employing 10 women and children should be brought 
under legislation. They were in favour of protecting women by 
fixing their daily working hours to 11 and providing for 4 
days1 rest in a month. As regards children the Commission 
proposed that the minimum age should be raised to 9 years while 
the maximum must be 14 years.^
These findings gave Fergusson another opportunity to 
raise the whole question in an effective manner. His Government 
pointed out the fact that the recommendations of the Commission, 
composed of ’independent and experienced gentlemen, fully 
justified the repeated previous contention of the Governor in
Council that an amendment of the existing law was urgently
2
called for.” The amendment was indispensable, in the 
opinion of Fergusson, in the direction of the small factories 
’’owned by petty capitalists and worked so as to secure profit 
without any consideration for the life and health of the 
miserably paid employees.” Fergusson and his colleagues 
pointed out that the Presidency of Bombay contained more 
factories than all other parts of India. It was unwise, 
in their opinion, to disregard the views of the authorities 
of such an area in favour of an amendment only because ”a 
demand for it has not been made in other parts of India.
In spite of this forceful appeal lord Dufferin, the 
successor of Ripon, categorically refused to reconsider the
A
subject. Thus Fergusson left Bombay without being able to
(1) Report ah’d Proceedings of the Commission, 6th Jan.1885. P.P. 
1888. Vol. 77, p.p. 402-416.
(2) Res. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B. No- 375, 4th Feb.1885. P.P.
1888, vol. 77, p. 417.
(3) Res. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B. No. 375, 4th Feb. 1885.P.P*
1888,vol 77, p.417.
(4) Secy. Home Dept. Govt, of I. to Secy. Gen. Dept. Govt, of B. 
No. 765, 3rd June, 1885* Jud. Proc. Govt, of I. June 1885-
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achieve any further success. His exertions during his stay 
in Bombay could not create sufficient response to remedy a 
growing socio-economic abuse . Each succeeding year was 
certain to add to the necessity for extending the meagre factory 
legislation* Fergusson*s paternal administrative attitude was 
at its best in connection with the factory legislation in 
India. His endeavours also were not altogether futile and 
5 years later in 1890 the Government of India had to appoint 
a Factoly Commission and undertake legislation for the 
amendment of fee Act of 1881.^
If the factory Act was a measure relating to the welfare
%
of a particular community, the taxation policy of the 
Government of India was a matter of concern for all sections 
of the people. The subject received the serious attention 
of Ripon1s Government in 1881. Ripon and Baring, the 
finance member, carefully examined the income of the government 
and the mode of taxation in order to introduce important 
changes. Fergusson, as a Presidential governor, had only a 
limited scope for playing a significant role in deciding 
questions relating to the Indian Exchequer. However, he 
carefully watched the fiscal developments and from tim6 to time 
xoressed his own views on the government of India.
In i860 Ripon1s Government inherited an uncertain state of 
Indian Public finance. Indian finance on the expenditure side 
had been dislocated by a period of war, famine and increasing 
home charges, the liabilities of the Government of India to be 
met in England. The depreciation of silver in 1873 resulted in 
a fall in the exchange value of the Indian silver rupee and 
further aggravated a situation over which the Government of
(1) Res. Govt, of I. Home Dept. Judicial, No.10, 25th 
Sept. 1890. P.P. 1890-91, vol. 59, p.72.
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India had no control. Uncertainty of expenditure would not
have been alarming if the public Income was certain. The
land revenue, which formed one-third of thk total revenue of
India, was largely dependent on rainfall.^ Another important
item, the opium revenue, depended on the demand for and price
of the drug in China, and the Chinese authorities were reported
to be treating opium with dislike.^ In England,too, a
campaign against opium revenue of the Government of India
was organised by the Society for the Suppression of Opium Trade
and the subject was discussed from time to time by a virtuous
2
House of Commons. The revenue from taxation was also 
inadequate. People in India were poor and the pressure on 
land was increasing . In view of this the prevailing informed 
British opinion agreed with Lord Lawrence that "light 
taxation is the panacea of foreign rule in India."^ The 
result was that India, excluding land tax, was the most 
lightly taxed country in the world and the only existing 
direct tax was the Licenbe tax, introduced in 1878. It was not 
a fee paid for licences as in England but a tax assessed on 
persons engaged in trade according to their presumed income 
and thus resembled the Income tax. However, the tax was 
grossly defective. The highly paid government officials and 
the professional men were exempted, although they otherwise 
contributed as negligibly as the trading classes did to the 
public revenue. The incidence of the tax was not uniform 
all over India and the method 0.f its calculation and collection 
was unpopular* The tax also fell with particular severity on 
small traders and artisans.^- Among the indirect taxes the
IT) Sir I .Wade, Br. Consul' Peking, to Ripon, 28th April, 1862.
Cited in Gopal, Ripon, p.197.
(2) Hartington to Fergusson, 11th June,1880. F.C.
(3; Minute by E. Baring, 11th Aug. 1883. P.P. 1884-85 
vol. 58, p.517.
(4) J.P. Neogi, Evolution of the Income Tax in India,1929,p.101,
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salt duty, varying from province to province and pressing
mainly the poor, was most important* Customs duties - once,
a growing head of revenue - were in a diminishing condition.
Free trade had triumphed in England and taxes on trade in
general collided with the accepted English economic principle*
Side by side with this theoretical consideration, political
pressure was brought on the government by the cotton
manufacturers of Lancashire in order to capture the market
in India by outmanoeuvring the Indian cotton mills. In 1877
the House of Commons invited the Government of India to
abolish the cotton import duties. Lytton1s Government
in 1879 responded by remitting import duties on certain
coarse cotton goods which formed the main product of Indian
mills*, Ihus in spite of a heavy budget deficit (£1,182,949
in 1879-80) and the rapid decline in exchange a revenue of
1
about £200,000 was sacrificed.
The Viceroyalty of Ripon began with a deficit budget of 
£4,044,139 in 1880-31. Soon the end of Afghan campaigns, 
absence of famines, bounteous harvests and the practice of 
strict economy relieved Ripon*s Government from financial
2
hardship. Even small but healthy surpluses were visible, 
affording a good opportunity to the Government of IGdia to 
plan elaborately to meet future exigencies. Baring, a firm 
believer in free trade principle?,attempted such a preparation 
for the future in his budget proposals of 1882-83. Io him
(1) P.N. Banerji, A history of Indian Taxation,1930, p*199.
(2) Year Revenue Expenditure Surplus
18BT=82 -  £7375957806 -  271,113,079 -  £2,582,727
1882-83 - £67,913,900 - £67,854,100 - £ 59,800
1883-84 - £67,274,000 - £66,817,000 - £ 457,000
Minute by E. Baring, 11th Aug. 1883* P.P* 1884-85 
Vol. 58, p.517,
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the progress of the public treasury lay in giving India the
full benefits of free trade, in remitting indirect taxes
and levying direct taxes. He proposed in September 1881 the
repeal of all customs import duties, including cotton and
the reduction of the Salt tax* To cover the consequent loss
he proposed that the Licence t ax should continue on annual
incomes below Rs. 2000/ and that a 3s percent Income tax
should be imposed on all annual incomes above Rs. 2000/.^
Baring*s proposals, though influenced by the doctfine of.the
age, had their own merits. The abolition of import duties
would not serve the interest of India but the reduction of the
Salt tax would benefit ordinary people. The imposition of an
Income tax would certainly strengthen the Indian Exchequer and
would remove the great flaw of comparative tax exemption of
the upper income group. Ripon, however, could not admire the
proposal for direct taxes and thought it would be unpopular
and would mischievously unsettle the minds of the most
2
influential classes in India. With the principles of 
Baring*s proposals he had no quarrel and he believed in the 
free trade ideas of his time . But he doubted the practicability 
of introducing direct taxes in the circumstances of India and 
thought that the government should have Ha careful regard to 
the feelings and even the prejudices of those over whom they 
rule.1*^  Ripon clearly emphasised the golden rule of light 
taxation and in October, 1680 even proposed the abolition of
(1) Baring to Ripon, 26th Sept. 1881. Cited in G-opal, Ripon
p. 201.
(2) Ripon to Northbrook, 1st Oct. 1881. Cited in Copal, Ripon
p. 201.
(3) Ripon to Northbrook, 23rd Sept. 1881. Cited in Wolf, Ripon 
vol. 2, p. 199.
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the Licence tax?" Unfortunately, Ripon could not understand 
that whatever might be thought in favour of light taxation, 
it definitely weakened the fiscal position of the government. 
Baring at least was right in this consideration and clung 
to his own proposals. ilhe difference between Baring and 
Ripon over the Income fex proposal developed into a 
governmental crisis and a compromise was effected only after 
the intervention of the home authorities. The result of the 
compromise was the withdrawal of the proposal for an Income 
tax and the abolition of all import duties except those on 
spirits, liqueurs, wines, beers, arms, ammunitions, opium and 
salt . The salt duty was reduced to Rs. 2/ per maund throughout 
India except in those places where duties were already nominal. 
It; was further announced that Mno change should for the present 
be made in connection with the existing system of direct 
taxation.”  ^ Thus the budget of 1882-83 curtailed revenue 
from salt duty and the import duty without arranging for any 
compensatory direct tax. Instead of safeguarding the Treasury 
the compromise added to its future uncertainties.
Fergusson on his part could not welcome such an outcome.
He was a realist who believed that the Indian financial 
situation should be judged always from a practical point of 
view. He admitted that indirect taxation in India was "far 
less unpopular than the direct."3 Bue he did not agree to the 
contention that direct taxes in India should not be imposed 
simply because they could be unpopular among the upper strata 
of Indian society. Apart from the question of the financial 
reasons for a direct and progressive tax, Fergusson always had
(1) Circular to local governments, 1st Oct.1880. cited in 
Gopal, Ripon, p. 199*
(2) Lesp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Financial, Ho.313* 19th 
Dec. 1881. Financial Letters from Igdia. 1881.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June, 1880. F.C.
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in mind the defect of the Indian taxation system, "While 
the humblest cultivator pays his land tax,1 he wrote to 
Baring, "... it can not he right that the wealthy trader 
or the holder of property should contribute little or 
nothing."'*' This attitude led him to oppose Ripon*s proposal 
for the abolition of the Licence fex. Fergusson declared that 
he could agree to an abandonment of the Licence fex only if it
was replaced by an Income tax" which would reach all the
2
wealthy classes." Fergusson personally had a preference 
for the Income tax. But he had no objection to the retention 
of the Licence tax thoroughly reformed if the Income tax was 
considered too unpopular to impose. To him the defects of 
the existing Licence tax were glaring and the gravest was its 
lack of uniformity. In Northern India the assessees under 
the Licence Tax were divided into 2 classes subdivided into 8, 
in Bengal 6 classes, in Madras 8 classes and in Bombay 11. In 
Central Provinces, British Burma and Assam the tax was not 
levied at all.^ Only traders and artisans were subjected to 
the tax which did not touch professional men and men in fixed 
employment. Everywhere the maximum leviable fee was Rs.500/ 
per annum, whereas in Bombay it was Rs. 200/. The distinction 
was invidious and there was no reason why a rich trader in 
Bombay should not pay as much as another of similar means 
paid in Agra'or Delhi. Fergusson also felt that the disprop­
ortionate gradation of the Licence J£ax rendered it "a very 
heavy tax" upon low income but "very light" upon high income.^"
(1) Fergusson to Baring, 26th Bee. 1880. F.C.
(2) Ibid
(3) Besp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Financial, No.313, 19th 
Bee. 1881. Financial Letters from I.
(4) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June, 1880. F.C.
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Under the Licence fax regulations, a joint stock company or 
a firm clearing lakhs of rupees profit yearly paid precisely 
the same amount as an individual who earned but Rs. 10,000/ 
per annum. It was plain to Fergusson that the Licence fax 
mignt be continued by amending it "so as to make it less 
obnoxious and more productive"."^ The Government of India 
also agreed to the fact that the Licence fax could not be 
allowed to remain "permanently on its present footing." But 
they delayed reform on the ground of gaining more experience as
to the exact reform necessary and to avoid frequent changes in
2
direct taxation. Unfortunately, the question was never 
taken up again by Ripon1 s Government and Baring in his 
insistence for an Income fax neglected all the possibilities 
of reforming the Licence -tax. Fergusson, however, continued 
his advocacy of tne amendment of the Licence fax. In March, 
1862, he invited Ripon*s attention to the subject.^ In 
March, 1884 he repeated his pleas as to the necessity of
adjusting the tax.^ In August, 1884 he implored Ivimberley
to amend "the wretched tax."^
Whatever might be Baring* s credit for visualising the 
justice of an Income fax, it was overshadowed by his readiness 
to dispense with the import duties on the plea of free trade.
It was Baring who first suggested the repeal of the remaining 
cotton duties in February, 1881.° The plan was probably
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June, 1880. F.C.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Financial, No.313, 19th Dec. 
1881 Financial Letters from I.
(3) Fertusson to Ripon, 20th March, 1882. R.P.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 8th March, 1884- R.P-
\o) Fergusson to Kimberley, 11th Aug. 1884- F.C.
(b; Gopal, Ripon, p. 199.
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preconceived, as Ripon hinted, Baring . coming to India with 
"a cut and dried policy" arranged between him and the India 
office.^- The commercial interests of Lancashire played an
important role in the total abolition of the cotton duties
2as uhey had played in their earlier reduction. And if the 
cotton duties were abolished, the Government of India found 
it meaningless,;to ^ retain the general import duties.^ So 
the import duties as a whole were sacrificed as the offering 
to the idol of free trade . Ripon was personally reluctant 
to go so far. When Baring first proposed the repeal of the 
remaining cotton duties Ripon thought that such repeal would
A
be unpopular. He informed Hartington that he was much
struck by the intensity of feeling among the Indians over the
5
manner in wnicn nis predecessor dealt with the question.
Fven in his speech on the budget of 1832-83 Ripon, while 
upholding the act of his Government admitted that "when 
Manchester manufacturers ask for the repeal of cotton duties 
they ask for something which will confer benefit upon them­
selves^
Fergusson in his turn was conspicuous in official circles 
for his utter dislike of the measure . As early as August 1881 
he informed Ripon that in his opinion "nothing will be more
7unfair or more unpopular" than the repeal of the cotton duties.
(1) Ripon to Northbrook, Nov. 14, 1881, Cited in Y/olf, Ripon,
vol. 2, p* 75 • ""
(2) P. Harnetty, "The Imperialism of Freetrade: Lancashire and 
the Indian Cotton Duties, 1859-62", The Economic History 
Review, Vol. XVIII, p. 333, 1965*
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Financial, No.313, 19th 
Dec. 1881. Financial Letters from I.
(4) Ripon to Baring, 9th Feb.1881. Cited in Gopal,Ripon,p.199
(5) Hartington to Fergusson, 6th May,1881. F.C.
(6) Ripon*s Speech, 10th March, 1882* Speeches of Lord Ripon in 
India. 1883, vol. I, p.246.
(7) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st Aug.1881. R.P*
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Fergusson in fact always regarded the reduction of the cotton 
duties by Lytton1s^Government as a result of "selfish 
pressures" which were "never based on honest grounds."'*"
In May, 1881 he had reported to Hartington the criticism of
2Lytton*s measure by the Indians and considered it justified.
The reasons that Fergusson offered against the reduction
or abolition of import duties were conventional but weighty.
He believed that indirect taxes like the cotton duties and other
import duties were unobjectionable to Indians. These duties,
in the opinion of Fergusson, were not only the least
oppressive but "the most just". The articles of luxury were
fit objects of taxation and cotton goods from Manchester in
the circumstances of India should be considered luxury goods.
Fergusson spoke with the voice of the protectionist when he
stated that a free trade competition between India and England
-was an unequal competition. India was only at the threshold
of the industrial arena, depending solely on the purchase of
British machines, and thus she had "too many weights to carry 
4
on the race." Finally, Fergusson considered the abolition
of import duties in India as unfair when such Indian products 
as tea, rice, manufactures of gold and silver ware were taxed 
in England. He asserted that till all Indian products were 
free from duty at home "India should not be debarred from 
placing a moderate duty on English goods." . There was no doubt 
that in the whole issue a strong provincialist like Fergusson
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June, 1880. F. CL
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 30th May,1881. F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 10th June,l880. F.C.
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st Aug, 1881. H.P.
(b): Fergusson to Cranbrook, 31st March, 1882 6*6#
(6) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st Aug.1881.R.P.
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had Bombay cotuon mills and millowners in mind . He emphatically 
reminded Ripon that speaking for Bombay, the claims advanced 
in England for the abolition of cotton duties were purely 
selfish and that he would "deprecate any further reduction or 
a b o l i t i o n . T n e  fact was that further reduction or 
abolition of the import duties was not really necessary even 
for safeguarding the interests of Lancashire. The Government 
of India themselves admitted that after the reduction of the 
cotton duties in 1879 "direct protection to Indiaycotton 
industries no longer existed."^ To Fergusson*s sympathy 
for infant Indian industrialism and to his feelings for the 
local cotton mills of Bombay was probably added his 
characteristic paternal attitude. This attitude worked behind 
his eagerness to protect the interests of the mill hands in 
factory legislation. Simultaneously, the same might have 
prompted him to complain to Ripon about the distress of 
Bombay manufacturers and traders due to the total abolition of 
the import duties. Throughout his stay in India Fergusson 
maintained his categorical disapproval of the measure and 
commented that no one could ever believe that the import duties 
were "taken off in the interests of India.
Though very critical of the Government of India on the points 
of the Licence Tax and the import duties, Fergusson heartily 
approved of the reduction of the salt duty. In his opinion the 
reduction of the salt duty, which pressed hard on the ordinary
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 31st Aug. 1881. R.P.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Financial, No. 313, 19thL>ec. 
1881. Financial Letters from !.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 20th march, 188. R.P.
(4) Fergusson to Kimberley, 11th Aug. 1884* F.C.
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people, would afford Ma sensible relief*1'1 He, in fact, was
in favour of going ahead in this direction and in March, 1884
wrote to Ripon : HI do wish that you were able further to
2
reduce the salt duty." But this was not possible for the 
Government of India looked upon salt duty as essentially a 
fiscal reserve for any emergency. Baring in August,'1883 
was contemplating no further reduction but the enhancement 
of the salt duty in the event of any future financial 
requirement.1
With regard to the taxation policy in India during the 
years 1880-85 no responsible authority seemed to be thinking 
wholly in the right direction. Both Baring and Ripon failed 
to plan for the future and accepted good years as the normal. 
Ripon was dominated by expediency in order to keep the country 
in a stupor of contentment. Baring was clearly the victim 
of doctrines and pressures and the home authorities hardly 
had any opinion to offer. They all sadly lacked what 
Fergusson seemed to jjossess to a certain extent - a strong 
practical approach towards Indian Taxation.
The controversial taxation policy of Ripon, however,created 
little uproar in comparison with the tension occasioned by his 
other administrative reforms. The tension was specially high 
when some of Ripon*s administrative measures clearly showed 
sympathy for the aspirations of the educated Indians, the 
creative minority of Indian society. As to the broad British
a) Fergusson to Ripon, 2pth March, 1882. R.P.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 8th March, 1884- R.P.
(3) Minute by H. Baring, 11th Aug. 1883* P.P. 1884-851 vol.5 8,
P-517,
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attitude towards this community Ripon and Fergusson entertained
widely different views. Fergusson looked upon the aspirations
of the educated Indians as a disruptive force to the British
rule in India and felt the lyttonite urge to keep a suspicious
watch on them. On the contrary, Ripon wanted to utilise the
enlightened Indians for the benefit of both the rulers and
the ruled and realised the need for fostering their aspirations.
Such divergence of views resulted in 1882 in an open clash
between Fergusson and Ripon over local self-government policy.1
But even prior to 1882 Fergusson disapproved some of Ripon* s
earlier measures in India. Ripon* s initial task in India
was to reassure the Indians as to their just and fair treatment
under the British authority. His preliminary works therefore
comprised of the annulment and reform of some of the Lyttonite
repressive measures. As early as July 1880 he laid his hand on
the infamous Vernacular Press Act of 1878 that muzzled the
Indian Press and he effected its repeal in January, 1882.
Similarly, Ripon attempted to amend the Arms Act of 1878 which
was popularly believed to aim at the total disarming of the
Indian people. In this, however, he could not finally succeed.^
Fergusson frankly disliked both these proceedings of the
Viceroy. In his opinion the Anas Act was at that moment "very
2necessary in India." He reminded Hartington that political 
opposition in India never took the form of a struggle for 
office but "a subversion of the reigning power.**1 As regards 
the Press Act he strongly felt that the repeal of the Act would 
be "a signal for seditious articles." He recalled "the 
intolerable insults" showered by the Indian Press on the British 
that induced Lytton to legislate . "No great power can dispense
(1) See above, Chapter IV.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 23rd July, 1880. F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 18th June, i860. F.C.
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with the Press laws except England and America,” he declared, 
•'and here in India we have an excitable population, capable 
of believing the most preposterous assertions."^" Pergusson's 
distrust of Ripon1s liberalism remained unchanged throughout 
his stay in India. But he became more tactful and less hostile 
after the controversy over the local self-government policy. 
This was clearly revealed in connection with the issue of the 
recruitment of Indians for Civil Service.
There were two modes by which Indians were admitted to the 
Covenanted Civil Service in India, by competition and by 
nomination. Indians were given the right to take part in the 
competitive examination for the Indian Civil Service in 
London by the Act of 1853 of Parliament.(16 & 17 Vic. c.14)
This was confirmed by the Statute which transferred the 
Government of India from the Company to the Crown in 1858 
(21 & 22 Vic. C.106) The second mode was the establishment 
of The Statutory Civil Service, which had been foreshadowed in 
an Act of Parliament in 1870. This Act provided for additional
facilities for employment of the natives of India of proved
2
merit and ability who were unable to compete in England.
Both these modes, however, underwent considerable changes by 
1880, much to the dissatisfaction of the educated Indians.
In the field of competitive examination the Indian candidates 
faced the problem of the reduction of the age limits, which put 
them at a great disadvantage in examinations held in England in 
the English language and in competition with British students. 
The maximum age limit for the examination was reduced from 23 
years to 22 years in 1859 and it was further reduced to 21 years
(1) Pergusson to Hartington, 18th June, 1880. P.O.
(2) Report of the Public Service Commission, 1886-87* p-24* 
para 39. Calcutta, 1888.
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in 1864* In 1876 the Secretary of State for India, lord 
Salisbury, decided to lower the age from 21 to 19 years in 
opposition to the advice of lord Northbrook's Government, of 
a majority of civil servants consulted in India and of the 
Civil Service Commissioners in England . The decision had the 
effect prophesied by the British Indian Association at Calcutta 
in December, 1876 - "the closing of the competitive door" to 
the people of India, lytton's Grovernment in May, 1878 admitted 
that such reduction would "practically render the competition 
of natives, educated in their own country»a matter of except­
ional difficulty." lytton's Government proposed that the 
Indian Civil Service should no longer be open to Indians and 
that a close native service should be established. In November 
1878, however, lord Cranbrook, the successor to Salisbury, 
decided not to exclude the Indians from the competitive Civil 
Service in contravention of the decision of Parliament.'1’ While 
the right of the admission of Indians to^Civil Service by 
competition was secured through Parliamentaiy legislation and 
by the acknowledgement of Cranbrook, it was practically 
jBullified by an Indian Office regulation. In fact between 1876 
and 1883 only one Indian candidate was successful in competition 
in England. This obviously agitated the aspirant educated 
Indians who thought their right was rudely flouted and they 
strongly advocated a return to the ag^Limit of 21 years.
If the Educated Indian youth found the door of competition 
practically closed, he did not find the door of Statutory 
Civil Service fully opened either. The Act of 1870 stated that 
appointments to the Statutory Service should be subject to such 
rules as might be prepared by the Government of India. 
Northbrook's Government in 1874 drafted a set of provisional
(1) Minute by Lord Ripon, 10th Sept.1884* Pub.Proc.Govt. of I. 
Sept. 1884-
rules for the recruitment to the Statutory Service* These 
provisional rules were further modified in 1875 but remained 
virtually inoperative.^" In 1879 Lytton1 s Government finally 
prepared a new set of rules by setting aside the rules of 1875*
By these rules of 1879 a proportion not exceeding one-sixth of 
all recruits to the Covenanted Civil Service in any year was to 
be selected from among Indians in India. The appointments were
to be made on the basis of family or attainments or efficiency
2
in the service of the government. Although Lyttonfs Government 
mentioned efficiency and attainments they in fact preferred 
candidates from the upper strata of society. This object was 
clear wnen in their Resolution of 24th December, 1879 they 
confined the selection of candidates to young men of high 
family.^ Each local government according to the rules of 1879, 
was instructed to nominate in every year 3 Indians of high 
family of whom the Government of India would select one.^ The 
emphasis an aristocratic background of the candidates 
consequently prevented the appointment of educated Indians who 
came mainly from the middle income group. The decision also 
affected a large number of educated Indians who were in^actual 
service of the government in Uncovented posts and who might 
expect promotion to Covenanted posts as a reward of their 
service and experience.
In 1882 Ripon1s Government for the first time considered the 
modes of recruitment to the Civil Service while deciding the
(1) H.L. Suigh, Problems and Policies ‘of the British in India
1963, p.25. : :
(2) Desp.Govt. of I. to S. of S. Pub. No.31, 1st May,1879,
p.p. 1878-79, vol 55, {>.322.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Pub No.51, 12th Sept.1 8 8 4 .
Pub.Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. I8 8 4 .
(4) Secy. Home Dept. Govt, of I. to local govts. Pub.no.19-720A, 
30th April, I0 8 4. Rev.Letters from B.
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distribution of civilians in different parts of the country.^"
In July, 1883 Ripon was eager to recast the system of 
selection for the Statutory Service on the basis of educational 
and intellectual attainments of the candidates. He even 
expressed himself in favour of simultaneous examinations for it
o
covenanted Civil Service in England and in India, and thus to 
afford to Indians an opportunity to overcome the obstacle of 
undertaking costly foreign travel. The Indian educated class 
had in fact been agitating for such simultaneous examinations 
for a considerable time. The Hast India Association, the Bombay 
Association and the British Indian Association had already moved 
in this direction. In 1883 three organisations in Bengal, namelj 
Indian Association, Burdwan Association and Sadharawl 
Hitasadhini Sabha of Pubna raised the question of recruitment 
of Indians to the Civil Service. In their petitions to the 
Viceroy they strongly pleaded for raising the age limit of 
competition to 22 years and for holding the examinations in 
India as well.^ The Poona Sarvojanik Sabha also added their 
voice to the claim for examinations in India. Without this, the 
Subha concluded, Mthe mere restoration of the old limit of age 
will not be sufficient to satisfy... the just and legitimate 
aspirations of the countrymen."^ The Government of India could 
not disregard these voices but thought that in the excitement 
following the criminal jurisdiction of Indian civilians over 
Europeans Bill (popularly called the Ilbert Bill) in 1883 the
5
time was inopportune for discussing the question .
(1) Desp. Govt. of I. to S# of S . Pub. No. 57, 7th Nov. 1882. 
Pub.Proc. Govt, of I. June. 1883.
(2) Viceroy’s Note, 26th July,1883* Cited in Gppal,Ripon 
1953. p.168,
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S# of S# Pub. No.69, 1st Oct.1883 
P.P. 1884-85, vol. 58, p.118.
(4) Secy. Poona Sarvojanik Sabha to the Editor, Bombay Gazette, 
27th June, 1884. Pub. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1884,
(5) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S# Pub. No. 69, 1st Oct. 1883. 
P.P. 1884-85, vol. 58, p.118.
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However, Ripon had not missed the opportunity of expressing 
his opinion that the reduction of age was a mistake and that 
"it would be desirable at the first convenient opportunity 
to return to the arrangement formerly in force.
In 1884 Ripon took up the matter with all seriousness and 
clarified his views. He objected to the reduction of age on 
two grounds. The first was the ground of Parliamentaiy oblig­
ation. Ripon thought that the executive government should not 
create any hindrance to the enjoyment of a privilege which 
Parliament conferred on the Indians. In the second place, he 
questioned the wisdom of any measure which kept up "a kind of 
political discontentment”. He had no doubt that the educated 
Indians should be encouraged to take part in the competitive 
examinations. The educated Indians who would compete in 
England were "the cream" of Indian society and those who would
be successful would certainly be "the veiy best recruits" for
2
the service. Thus Ripon and his colleagues strongly advocated 
raising the age of competition to 21 years.^ As regards the
r
Statutory Civil Service the Government of Ripon felt that the 
emphasis on the family background of the nominees failed to 
produce good results as "there was no antecedent guarantee of 
the fitness" of the persons so selected.^ Por this reason the 
Government of India had no doubt that the selection of young men 
of high family had "practically failed". They recommended that
future selections should be made on the grounds of educational
5
attainments and proofs of merit and ability. Kimberley, the
£15 Viceroy’s minute, 26th Sept.1883. P.P. 1884-85, Vol.5 8,p.126,
(2) Viceroy*s minute, 10th Sept. 1884« Pub.Proc.Govt.of I.
Sept.I8 8 4 .
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Pub. No.51» 12th Sept.1884*
Pub.Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1884*
(4) Secy. Home Dept. Govt, of I. to local govts. Pub.No.19- 
720 A, 30th April, 1884* Rev. Letters from B.
(5) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Pub. No. 51, 12th Sept.l884« 
Pub. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1884*
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Secretary of State, however, did not share Ripon1s sympathy for*
the aspirations of educated Indians, especially, with regard 
to the age of competition. He thought that the legitimate 
aspirations of the Indians had been provided for by the 
creation of the Statutory Civil Service and, therefore, that 
the exclusion of the Indian candidates in competition was of
little importance.'1' This Ripon thought "a serious mistake"
2
on the part of the home authorities.
Fergusson had neither any sympathy for the aspirations of 
the educated Indians nor any confidence that the educated 
Indians would be good administrators. Even in Uncovenanted 
posts he was not always in favour of recruiting Indians in 
accordance with the definite policy of the British Government. 
Cranbrook*s Despatch, Public, No.7 of 10th July,1779 laid down 
the rule that no person other than the natives of India should 
be appointed to an office carrying a salary of more than Rs.200 
per month without the previous sanction of the Secretary of 
State. Fergusson had no objection to the principle of this 
rule but he was opposed to its literal application and thought 
that in some Uncovenanted posts the Indians were unfit.^ He 
also entertained a poor opinion about the Indian civilians 
posted in Bombay Presidency. To Hartington he candidly 
remarked: "I am sorry to say that our native civilians have
5
not given much hope of their future." In his opinion they 
always failed "when they have responsibility thrown upon them."*
0 7  Kimberley to Ripon, 15th Feb. l884« Cited "in-"Gopal,Ripon 
p.169.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 8th April, 1884* F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 29th May 1880. F.C.
(4) Fergusson to Hartington, 26th June, 1880. F.C.
(5) Fergusson to Hartington, 22nd Aug. 1881. F.C.
(6) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 19th Oct. 1881 . C.F.
Even with this strong view Fergusson approached the problem of 
Indian recruitment to the Civil Service with his characteristic 
practical sense. Fergusson disliked the Lytton rules from the 
beginning. In November, 1880 he informed Hartington that the 
rules of 1879 by which only one native in each province was 
admitted eveiy year would neither satisfy the Indians nor help 
the government. In his opinion the government, while recruiting 
Statutory civilians, should consider the reward of proved merit 
To Ripon he pleaded that the men of proven ability in Uncoven­
anted service should be promoted to the Covenanted Service.^
He was convinced that the system of nomination was thoroughly 
unsatisfactory. Apart from the fact that such nominations were ' 
not satisfying the educated Indians,1 Fergusson felt it 
"invidious to select in each Presidency one or two rather on 
account of birth than of qualifications." It was difficult 
according to him to find men of high birth with the desirable 
qualifications of a good civilian .’ To find candidates of such 
rarity every year seemeclto Fergusson "like ordering the' Colonel 
of a regiment annually to find a recipient for the Victoria 
C r o s s . T h u s  Fergusson, who shared Lytton's distrust of the 
educated Indians, did not share the Lyttonite preference for
Indian aristocracy. He had no doubt that the present system of
.4Statutory appointments was "utterly unsatisfactoiy."
Fergusson admitted that the age reduction was practically
5"prohibitory to the natives" in the competitions in Hngland*
(1) Fergusson to Hartington, 19th Nov. 1880. F.C.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 7th June, 1884* R.P*
(3; Fergusson to Ripon, 20th June, 1883* R.P*
(4) Fergusson to Ripon, 7th June, 1884- R.P.
(5) Ibid.
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He was conscious of the Parliamentary obligation and thought that
the rules for competition should be such as to enable Indians
to compete.'1’ But Fergusson was in favour of returning to the
former age/Limit not only out of consideration for Indians but
also in favour of maturer mind and body of the candidates,
Europeans and Indians alike. He was shocked at the ”pale faced
out turn of the competitive examinations1’ and found junior
2English civilians lacking in energy and stamina. The remedy
according to him was "a return to the more advanced age for
entrance” and a general test of physical fitness.^ The increase
of age would result in a competition of men ’’whose education
4is complete and whose fitness can accurately be judged.”
Ripon similarly felt that the age reduction resulted in a fall
of general examination standard and substituted a competition
of school leaving boys for a competition of University
graduates. Thus Fergusson apparently had little difference
with Bipon as regards the existing facts, faults and anomalies.
When the Grovernment of India asked for the opinion of the
Government of Bombay on the Civil Service, Fergusson and his
colleagues had no hesitation in disapproving the rules of 1879
6and in recommending a return to the higher age limit. But 
Fergusson differed widely from Bipon with regard to the motive 
and manner in which changes should be introduced. This was clear
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 20th June, 1883. R.P.
(2) Fergusson to Hartington, 4th July 1881. F. C.
(3) Fergusson to Hartington, 18th Jan.1882. F.C.
(4) Fergusson to Hartington, 20th April,1882.F.C.
(5) Viceroy*s Minute, 10th Sept. 1884. Pub.Proc.Govt. of I.
Spt. 1884-
(6) Res. Govt, of B. No. Confi* J ^Ufle>l884.
Rev. Letters from B.
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when he proposed a.scheme of his own for the recruitment of 
the Statutory Civil Service.
If the aspirations of the educated Indians were given 
pre-eminence, Fergusson argued, then such aspirations would 
not be fulfilled through any system of nomination to the 
Statutory Service. The Indian educated men would never be 
contented with the simple reduction of age and would only be 
satisfied with a competition for the Civil Service arranged in 
India. In view of this circumstance Fergusson suggested that 
all posts in the Statutoiy Civil Service should be filled 
up by a competition neld in India and not by nomination. The
successful candidates might be sent for 2 years* training in
an English University. The remainder of the candidates,
according to their merit in the competition, should have
priority in Uncovenanted service. This would mean simultaneous 
competitions in India and in England. Fergusson believed that 
his scheme, if accepted, would prove to be “popular and 
satisfactoryH. It would be popular for the concession of 
simultaneous examinations and satisfactory for emphasising 
the attainments of the candidates. In addition to these 
advantages the proposal would overcome what Fergusson thought 
the practical exclusion of the Indians in competitions in 
England , He believed that in the event of two competitions 
being held - (l) the Indians competing in England and (2) the 
Indians competing in India, *'... the natives would give up 
class (1) if they got the opportunity of having class (2),v It 
should be noted here that by the rules of 1879 the most 
important posts in the Civil Service, like that of Secretary 
of the government, the Chief Magistrate of a district and the
(l) Minute by Sir J . Fergusson, 17th May, 1884* Rev.Letters 
from H.
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Commissioner of a division &>uld not be filled by the 
Statutory civilians. Thus Fergusson’s scheme proposed to 
close such key posts to the Indians. This in Fergusson's 
opinion would not involve any injustice. If Uncovenanted posts 
were almost entirely reserved for the Indians, he argued, 
the key posts in the Covenanted Service might also be reserved 
for the members of the ruling class.^ This exclusion of the 
Indians from competitions in England was what lytton once 
proposed and what Ripon disliked and objected to. Thus when 
Bipon was eager to place Indians on terms of equality with 
European candidates in open competitions in England, Fergusson 
was trying to find a means which would practically exclude the . 
Indians from the competitions in England without affecting 
the commitment of Parliament.
Bipon’s Grovernment naturally/ disregarded the scheme of
Fergusson and made no reference toJ it when they finally forwarddd
their recommendations to the Secretary of State. As regards
recruitment in the Statutory Service they merely stated that
their decided opinion was to give up the selection of
candidates of high birth and to admit the principle of selection
on the grounds of intellectual attainments, proved merit and
ability. As regards competitive examinations Ripon's government
recommended an increase of the age limit and the elevation of
Eastern classical languages like Sanskrit and Arabic to parity
2with Latin and Greek in the examinations. The Secretary of 
State, unfortunately, was not willing to concede any of these 
proposals. In his opinion the recommendations, if accepted,
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 20th June, 1883* R.P.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Pub. No.51, 12th Sept.l884« 
Pub. Proc. Govt, of I. Sept. 1884.
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Would turn an open competition into Ma substantially Oriental 
examination.” He, however, hinted that the Statutory Service 
rules of 1879 might be amended to a certain extent.**" In 
1885 the matter was thus left to a succeeding government.
The most controversial administrative refoim during the 
years 1880-85 was not the recruitment of Indians to the 
Civil Service, but the criminal jurisdiction of the few 
Indians already in the service, over British European subjects 
in India, ^he system of criminal justice in India in the 
pre-mutiny days lacked unity and cohesion. There were two 
systems operating simultaneously, the Muhammadan law administ­
ered by the Company’s courts in the mofussil (country) 
districts and the English law administered by the Supreme Court 
in the Presidency towns, Phe Company’s courts theoretically 
derived their powers from the Mughal& while the Supreme Court 
derived its from the British Crown. This dual system of 
Criminal justice in British India was simplified in the post­
mutiny days when the Indian Penal G ode of 1861 supplied the 
country with a uniform criminal law and in-the same year the 
High Courts replaced the Supreme Courts with an authority over 
all subordinate courts in the Presidency towns and in mofussil 
alike. So far European British subjects were amendfl&ble only 
to the Supreme Courts and it was considered unfair to apply 
the Muhammadan law to Englishmens. With the introduction of 
the changes in 1861 such distinction of European subjects in 
India became unnecessary. Yet under the arrangements of 1861 
only a Justice of the Peace in the mofussil had the limited
(l) Desp. S. of S # to ^ovt. of I. Pub. No.l, 8th Jan, 1885 
P.P. 1884-85, vol 58. p.154.
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power of enquiring into the charges against Europeans and 
committing them to the High Court for trial. The government 
could anoint any member of the Covenanted Civil Service,
including the Indians, as a Justice of the Peace hy the
Acts of 1793 ana of lb69* But a Justice of the Peace in 
mofussil had no jurisdiction to try an European and such 
jurisdiction was reserved to the High Courts. The Government 
of India meanwhile became anxious to render the Europeans 
amenable to the courts in mofussil . From the point of view 
of administrative convenience the matter was urgent as the 
Europeans gradually settled in the distant parts of the countiy
and the prosecution of the Europeans exclusively in the High
Courts meant expense, delay and hazard. But there was consid­
erable difficulty in the way of systematising the whole 
arrangement. Tne intense racial animosity following the 
mutiny led Europeans to dislike the idea of criminal juris­
diction of the district courts over them. They entertained 
objections to tne possibility of being tried by Indian civilians, 
appointed as Justice of the Peace by the government. In 1872 
a compromise between the government and the English non­
officials was effected as regards the amenability of Europeans 
before the district courts. At the time of revising the Code 
of Criminal Procedure, the law member of the Government of 
India, Sir Fitzjames Stephen, came to an understanding with the 
representatives of tne European community in the Select Committee 
of the Legislative Council. It was decided that the Europeans 
would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the district courts only 
on condition that the Magistrate, the Sessions Judge or the 
Justice or the Peace must be a British European subject. The 
Magistrate who was also a Justice of the Peace,was given the 
power to sentence an European up|fco 3 months imprisonment and 
the Sessions Judge was given the power of imprisoning upvto one
3 5*Z
year.1 The compromise of 1872 achieved in this manner 
administrative convenience at the cost of the principle of 
racial equality so solemnly declared in the Queen’s Proclamation 
of 1858. While such deprivation was thus affected, an Act was 
passed in 1877 (Act IV) giving the Magistrates of whatever race 
jurisdiction over all within the limits of the Presidency 
irowns# This Act made the compromise of 1872 especially 
anomalous and an Indian Magistrate in a Presidency town could 
try an European which he could not do in the position of a 
District Magistrate in Mofussil. Besides, a European Joint- 
Magistrate, who was subordinate to an Indian District Magistrate, 
would try cases which his immediate superior could not. More­
over, the Criminal Code provided the Courts of Sessions and the 
District Magistrate with certain powers of revision of the 
proceedings of the inferior courts. An Indian civilian could 
exercise such powers in regard to cases in which a European 
British subject was tried by an English civilian while he 
himself was deprived of such direct jurisdiction."^ Thus the 
criminal jurisdiction of an Indian civilian with reference to 
a European British subject was not only based on insidious 
racial discrimination but created a highly anomalous adminis­
trative situation. The anomalies would assume serious probation 
in future when the rules for Statutory Civil Service decided that 
one-sixth of the offices for the whole Covenanted Civil Service 
should be filled by the natives of India.
(1) Gopal, Ripon, p. 126.
(2) Ibid, p.127.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S.of S. Legis. No.35* 10th Aug.1883* 
P.P. 1884, vol 60, p.687.
3 53
The necessity of a remedy was first raised in connection 
with the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1882. 
B.L. Gupta of Bengal Civil Service wrote a note pointing out 
the anomalies and suggested an amendment to the arrangements 
of 1872. He advocated an extension of the criminal jurisdiction 
of the Indian civilians holding the office of a District
1
Magistrate or Sessions Judge in order to try the Europeans.
Soon after this the Government of Bengal under Eden supported
the note of Gupta. They contended that when Indian Magistrates
in Presidency towns could exercise criminal jurisdiction over
Europeans, there was no reason why Covenanted Indian civilians
in the posts of District Magistrate and Sessions Judge in
2
mofussil should not exercise the same. Ripon’s Government 
had to take up the matter in earnest and in April 1882 they 
sought the opinions of the local governments on the subject, 
without, however, stating any specific measure.^ Apparently 
all the local governments supported the Government of India 
on the issue. The Government of India at once proposed that all 
District Magistrates and Sessions Judges should be empowered 
to exercise jurisdiction over European British subjects and that 
the local governments should be authorised to confer this 
jurisdiction on those civilians who were exercising first class 
magisterial powers. The proposals were intended to remove 
Mall distinctions based on the race of the judge.”^  ®.C. Hope, 
the member in charge of the Public Y/orks Department of the
(1) Note by B.L. Gupta, 30th Jan. 1882. P.P. 1883, vol 51,p653.
(2) Secy. Jud. Dept. Govt, of Beng. to Secy. Home Dept. Govt, 
of I. No.1411 J, 20th March, 1882. P.P. 1883,vol.a,p.653 .
(3) Circular, Govt, of I. to local govts. Jud.No.7-587, 28th 
April, 188 2. Jud .Pro c. Govt, of I. Sept. 1882.
(4) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S. Jud* No.33, 9th Sept.1882. 
P.P. 1883, vol. 51, p.649.
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Government of India supported the proposals only in part. He 
was in favour of extending the jurisdiction only to the 
District Magistrates and Sessions Judges and was hesitant to 
grant the jurisdiction to other civilians unless indispensable. 
But his reservation was not due to any apprehension of European 
agitation but merely because he considered native civilians 
racially inferior and unable to attain the requisite 
impartiality and judgement The home authorities found no
objection to the proposals and promptly sanctioned them without
2
reservation. Only one member of the India Council, Sir
H. Maine, sounded a note of warning as to the reactions of 
Europeans in India. Unfortunately his letter containing the 
warning was lost and the Viceroy had no knowledge of it.^ 
Strangely, however, none of the advisors of the Viceroy cared 
to know the views of non-official Europeans - who only a decade 
ago had forced a compromise on the issue. This was extraordinary 
when Eipon1s Government intended ±6 undo that very compromise. 
Presumably everyone minimised the significance of the measure 
and considered it a mere administrative adjustment.
The proposals of the Government of India were given the 
shape of a Bill which was introduced by the law member, C.Ilbert, 
on 2nd February,1883* ^he Bill in the first place provided that 
all District Magistrates and Sessions Judges should be vested 
with the criminal jurisdiction over Europeans by virtue of their 
offices. In the second place the Bill permitted the local 
governments to conf er these powers upon (a) members of the
(1) Note by T.C. Hope, 8th Sept. 1882. Jud.Proc.Govt. of I.
Sept. 1882.
(2) Desp. S. of S. to Govt, of I. 7th Dec. 1882. P.P. 1884*
Vol. 51» p. 668.
(3) Wolf, Hipon, vol 2, p. 139.
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Covenanted Civil Service, (b) members of the Statutory Civil
Service and (c) Assistant Commissioners of Non-Regulation
districts and Cantonment Magistrate^, who were exercising
firstclass magisterial powers and found fit to be appointed
Justices of the Peace.^ The introduction of the Bill,
popularly named after Ilbert, produced an immediate explosion.
The non-official European community found in the measure a
clear attempt of Riponfs Government to exalt the Indians and
dethrone the Englishmen in India. There was widespread alaim
that^Englishman*s liberty would be jeopardised in the hands
of native civilians. Agitation started in Calcutta, led by the
members of tne Bar, fanned by the English-owned press and
participated in by all those who had a stake in tea gardens,
indigo plantations and silk factories. The question of the
security of European womanhood in India was promptly raised to
give a passionate fervour to the movement. A tornado of
violent denunciation of the Bill and its authors was set in
motion. Representations were made to the government for the
outright withdrawal of the Bill and an indignant meeting of the
Europeans was held in the i°wn hall, Calcutta on 28th February,
1883. This was followed by the formation of the Anglo-Indian
Defence Association to fight the issue out with the government.
The resignation en masse of the European military officials and
civilians was strongly rumoured and an emissary was sent to
England to court the sympathy of the British working class. The
non-official European community boycotted the Viceregal levee
and on return to Calcutta from a tour in KashmocLr the Viceroy
2
was insulted in the streets.
(1) Draft Bill to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882. 
P.P. 1883, vol 51, p.673.
(2) The account of the European agitation was elaborately 
treated by S. Gopal in his book, Viceroyalty of Dord Ripon, 
lhb3, chapter IX and by Christine~"Dobbin in her article, 
"Ilbert Bill : A study of Anglo-Indian opinion in India, 
1883," historical Studies Australia and New Eealan(^
vol. 12,p.87,ih6p ,
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A great majority of European officials were in sympathy with 
the agitators and advocated the abandonment of the Bill* A 
large number of the judges of the High Courts and other Chief 
Courts were opposed to the abolition of racial distinction* ^ 
Even the Lieutenant Governor of Bengal, Rivers Thompson, was
p
suspected of "inciting the Anglo-Indian agitation." What 
was more, the agitation questioned some of the principles of 
British rule in India as declared by the Crown and confirmed by 
Parliament . The agitators were so convinced of the inferiority 
of native character arising out of racial difference that 
they doubted the ability of an Indian civilian to judge the 
civilised motives of the Europeans. Besides, they thought 
that the legal consideration in India should always be guided 
by political expediency , that the English people should enjoy 
exclusive rights and privileges in India and that the 
British rule should continue mainly to the advantage of the 
Englishmen. ^
The storm was unexpected and Ripon was startled . His 
determination in fact showed a tendency to fail at the first 
shock and he regretted the whole undertaking. To Gladstone 
he wrote; " I frankly confess that if I had reason to suppose 
that such an outbreak of violent feeling and race hatred would
(1) Lesp. Govt, of I. to S. of S* Legis. No.35, 10th Aug. 1883. 
P.P. 1884, vol. 60, p. 687.
(2) Ripon to Baring, loth July, 1883* Cited in Gopal, Ripon 
p. 147.
(3) Speeches made at the Calcutta Town Hall meeting, 28th 
Feb. 1883, p. 699, memorial of the Eurasian and Anglo- 
Indian Association, 8th March, 1883, p* 562, Memorial of 
Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 19th April, 1883, p.583, 
Memorial of Ladies residing in Bihar, p. 591 and Memorial 
of 11, 783 British European subjects of India, 9th June 
1883, p. 633. P.P. 1884, vol. 60.
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have been excited by the Bill, I would have hesitated to
propose i t T h e r e  was no doubt that tactical blunders
were made. Neither the (Government of India nor the Viceroy
personally made clear the extent to which they wished to go
inthe matter. vVhen the ^Government of India originally asked
the opinions of the local governments, they vaguely referred
to the necessity of conferring jurisdiction on the native
members of the Covenanted Civil Service, especially, on those
who attained the ranks of District Magistrates and Sessions 
2Judges. Ripon at the beginning drew Fergusson*s attention 
to the subject by expressing merely his opinion that members
of the Covenanted Civil Service - Europeans and natives -
ought to be placed on the same footing. The Government of 
Fergusson when first consulted found much diversity of opinion 
on the subject in Bombay and they advised that only those 
civilians who rose to the ranks of District Magistrates and 
Sessions Judges should be given the jurisdiction to try 
Europeans.^ They believed that such was also the intention 
of the Government of India.^ Everything ir^ fcact was done in
such a manner that the local governments might argue that their
knowledge of the full implications of the Government of India’s 
desires was incomplete. This was exactly what Fergusson 
pleaded after the introduction of the Bill that its provisions 
went "very much further" than what the Government of India 
fir£t referred to.^
(1) "fcipon to Gladstone.24th March, 1883VSited in V/oif.Ripon 
vol 2, p.136.
(2) Circular of Govt of I. to local govts. Jud.No.7-587,
28th April,1882. Jud.Proc. Govt of I. Sept. 1882 .
(3) Ripon to Fergusson, 21st April, 1882. F.C.
(4; Act. Under-Secy. Jud.Dept. Govt, of B. to Secy.Home Dept. 
Govt, of I. No.4622, 28th July,1882.Jud.Proc.Govt, of I. 
Sept. 1882.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley, 9th March,1883# F.C.
(6) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883. R.P.
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He distinctly objected to the second part of the Bill which 
proposed the extension of criminal jurisdiction to Indian 
civilians on a large scale at the discretion of the local 
government. ^ To concede criminal jurisdiction over 
Europeans to the senior native officials like the Sessions 
Judge or the District Magistrate was quite different from 
conferring the right on ordinary native civilians with mere 
first class magisterial powers. "It is certainly a 
difj-erent matter," Fergusson commented to Kimberley, "to 
give an Assistant Collector, a Covenanted Magistrate or 
Uncovenanted Magistrate in non-regulation district a 
criminal jurisdiction over Europeans." It was a change, in
p
the opinion of Fergusson, "too far reaching and significant." 
Fergusson even claimed that his Coverament foresaw that
Europeans were not prepared to accept anything beyond the
grant of jurisdiction to District Magistrates and Sessions 
Judges. He wrote to Ripon, "You will recognise that we were not
consulted with reference to a measure such as has been
introduced or we should honestly have stated our opinion 
then.
Whatever might be the justifications for Fergusson1s claim 
to foresight, the fact was that the Government of India never 
specifically stated that they were considering to extend the 
jurisdiction to all civilians exercising first class magisterial 
powers. Besides, the proposals contained in the second part 
of the Bill were especially distasteful to the opponents of 
the measure. Again, the draft of this part of the Bill was 
unsatisfactory. The grant of jurisdiction to officers exercising 
first class magisterial powers should not have been left to 
the local executive instead of settling it by statute. Further
1*1) Fergusson to Ripon, 14th April,' 1883* R*P*
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, 9th March, 1863* F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883* R.P*
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the Commissioners of Non-Regulation districts and Cantonment
Magistrates did not belong to the category of Covenanted
Civilians, created and defined by law. Though the draft of
this part was defective the motive behind it was justifiable.
When Hope at the outset proposed to restrict the measure by
confining the jurisdiction to native District Magistrates and
Sessions Judges Eipon objected to what he considered Hope’s
"crotchet"• He had in his mind the aspirations of the educated
Indians and thought that such limited concession would be a
practical sham, especially, when District Magistrates in India
were too overburdened with administration and appellate work
to try original cases.^ Besides, the number of native
civilians in the ranks of District Magistrate and Sessions
2
Judge were too small in India, at most 5 in the 1880’s.
A substantial grant of jurisdiction should obviously go to 
all officials with first class magisterial powers. Ripon 
commented to Hartingtons ”It is better to do nothing than to 
expose the govt, to a charge of having pretended to do an 
act of justice to the native members of the Civil Service, 
while in reality leaving them very much in the same position 
which they occupy at present.'1 Taking all these factors 
into account one feels that the defective drafting of the 
Bill, the inability of the Supreme G-overnment to express their 
intentions to the local Governments in full and their 
indifference to non-official European opinion were unfortunate 
tactical blunders. But there was no doubt that Ripon was
(1) Ripon to Hartington, 8th Sept. 1882. Cited in Wolf, Ripon. 
Vol. 2, p* 123.
(2) Desp. G-ovt. of I# to S, of‘ S. Legis No. 35$ 10th Aug. 1883* 
P.P. 1884, Vol. 60, p. 687.
(3) Ripon to Hartington, 8th Sept. 1882. Cited in Wolf, Ripon, 
Vol. 2, p. 123. -----
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proceeding on a sound principle. To disregard this is to 
minimise the character of the European agitation against 
the Ilbert Bill. There is nothing in fact to show that if the 
Bill's scope had been narrower the principle of the Bill would 
have been accepted without violent criticism. The European 
agitation of 1883 was for maintaining racial inequality, in 
opposition to Indian aspirations and against Ripon's policy
-  to
of enabling Indians^a substantial share in the administration.
Fergusson personally had sympathy for the opponents of
the Ilbert Bill. He conceded that the administrative
disqualifications Of the native civilians should be removed
to a certain extent in order to remedy the existing anomalies.
But he was emphatically opposed to the abolition of all
disqualifications based on race.^ The abolition of race
distinctions, Fergusson thought, was neither possible nor
desirable. It was not possible, for the European community
in India was in favour of its retention and he considered it
2
wrong to ignore it outright. It was undesirable, for 
Fergusson believed that the European alarm against trial by 
native civilians was not groundless.^ In his opinion the 
difference of language, feelings and social customs would 
create difficulties for an Indian trying an European. Fergusson 
and his colleagues admitted that such difficulty arising out 
of the difference of race was common both to Europeans and 
natives. But Europeans were unwilling to be tried by Indians 
whereas Indians preferred trial by Europeans. This was probably
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883* R.P«
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, 16th March, 1883* F. G.
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley, 26th Aug. 1883* F.C.
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"because the Europeans in India were above caste considerations 
and free from social connections through which the influence 
of interested parties might reach the adjudicator’s mind.^ 
Fergusson was personally convinced that caste and community
prejudices might influence an Indian judge and lead to
2 ■ unsatisfactory proceedings. Besides, he had suspicions
about the ability of an Indian civilian to perform judicial
duties arising from the example of the solitary Indian
Sessions Judge in Bombay Presidency, Satyendranath Tagore
3of the famous Tagore family of Calcutta* Ripon and his 
Government, on the other hand, were convinced that the Indian 
civilians possessed "excellent qualities for judicial work.”^ 
But the strongest objection that Fergusson entertained 
against the B i n  was its liberal flavour. He disliked Ripon1 s 
flirting with the educated Indians and the policy of taking 
them into his confidence. In his opinion the Ilbert Bill was
5
a proof of Ripon’s "popularity hunting tendency." He found 
the European agitation against the Bill as a natural reaction 
to the recent policy of the Government of India that excited 
European uneasiness and incited the aspirant educated Indians. 
To Ripon he frankly stated:" I do not believe that there is a 
considerably predominating dislike to the measure filbert BillJ 
on its own account so much as because it is recognised as a 
part of a policy which is regarded as experimental and far 
reaching if not dangerous.” Fergusson believed that the
(1) Ch. Secy. Govt, of B, to Secy. Legis.Bept. Govt, of I.
Ho.32p2, 14th May,1883• P.P. 1884, Vol. 60, p.170 ,
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, March, 1883# F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883* R.P.
(4) Besp. Govt, of I. to S# of S. legis. No.35, 10th Aug.
1883. P.P. 1884, vol. 60, p. 687,
(5) Fergusson to Cranbrook, §th March, 1883. C.C.
(6) Fergusson to Kimberley,9th March, 1883. F.C.
(7) ’ Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883. R.P.
Ilbert Bill was part of the same dangerous policy that
conceded Indians prematurely the scheme of local self-
government. He warned Ripon that too many changes closely
following each other was bound "to create disquietude11.*1*
Like the agitators against the Bill Fergusson, in the
interests of the British empire in India, was apprehensive of
the final outcome of such a policy. The concessions to the
educated Indians, in his opinion, would encourage and not 
2
satisfy them.
Though he sympathised with the agitation Fergusson could
not approve the tone and temper of the agitators. He
regretted that race animosities were running so high. He had
no doubt that the leaders of the opposition in Calcutta
injured their cause by using "grossly intemperate language.11^
His authoritarian bent of mind could not accept the excesses
of the agitation and he was detennined to keep European agit-
5
ation in his Presidency "within decent limits." He kept a 
scrutinising eye on the Europeans in Bombay and strongly felt 
the necessity of maintaining authority irrespective of the 
dimensions of the difficulties. Fortunately, Bombay Presidency 
had not many non-official Europeans in the interior like the 
Bengal planters. Most Europeans concentrated in Bombay City 
and Europeans outside the Presidency town were either belonging 
to the army or serving the government offices. However, the
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883. R.P.
(2) Fergusson to Kimberley, 3rd May, 1883. F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley, l?th May, 1883. F.C*
(4) Fergusson to Kimberley, 9th March, 1883. F.C.
(5) Fergusson to Kimberley, 16th March, 1883. F.C,
(6) Fergusson to Ripon, 6th Pec. 1883. R.P*
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opinion of the government officials was overwhelmingly against 
the Bill.'1 The opposition in Bombay city was formidable and 
the English press critical. Still, the press in Bombay was
p
never grossly unfair” like its counterpart in Calcutta.
Tuere was hardly any noisy public meeting and Fergusson 
personally requested the leaders of the European community 
in Bombay to remain moderate in their behaviour.^ The result 
was a general avoidance among Europeans in Bombay of anything 
like “the Bengal l a n g u a g e R i p o n  was happy to witness that
people in Bombay had ”not lost their heads as they have in
5Bengal."^ Kimberley expressed his satisfaction, too, at "so 
much less excitement" in Bombay.
In spite of all his objections to the Bill, Fergusson saw 
the impossibility of withdrawing the measure after introducing 
it. He was convinced tnat it would not be possible to pass 
the Bill as it stood. At the samej^ime he felt that it would
be unfortunate if the government "were to give way to the late
7
clamour." The solution that Fergusson had in mind was
(1) Official opinion on Ilbert Bill:-
Total In favour Suggesting withdrawal Suggesting 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _   modifications
46 4 27 15
( 2
(3
(4
(5
(6
(7
Ch. Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Legis. Dept. Govt, of I. 
Ho. 4026 15th June, 1883* P.P. 1884, Vol. 60, p.32,
Fergusson to Kimberley, 27th Sept. 1883. F.C.
Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883* R.P.
Fergusson to Kimberley, No date, Dec. 1883* P* CL
Ripon to Fergusson, 27th March, 1883* F.C.
Kimberley to Fergusson, 29th March, 1883- F.C.
Fergusson to Kimberley, 3rd May, 1883• F.C.
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obviously a compromise and a modification of the measure.
Unlike men like Rivers Thomson in Bengal, Fergusson felt a
genuine desire to assist the Government of India in their
. . 1crisis.
Ripon in his turjp., thoughihe regretted having introduced
the Bill, also saw the impossibility of giving it up. The
European agitation was against tne principle of racial
equality and equal opportunities declared and confirmed by
the successive acts of tne British in India. His, Government
therefore, were “bound not to abandon the principles."^
Hipon and his adherents attempted to reason with tne opponents.
They pointed out that the racial distinction between the
civilians was detrimental to the esp^rit de corps of tne
Civil Service. They argued that in civil cases Indians were
already exercising jurisdiction over Europeans and that the
Chinese in HongKong and the Sinhalese in Ceylon had criminal
jurisdiction over Europeans. They showed that the measure
was not taking away all the privileges of Europeans in India -
regarding appeals, penalties and Habeas Corpus applications.^
The opponents, however, were in no mood to listen to reason and
their attitude was one of ferocious hostility.
Ripon could hardly survive the initial shock that he
received from the violence of the European agitation. To
Northbrook he confessed, "I nave never had in my life to
4
deal with so difficult a state of things." As early as April, 
ioo3 ais vulnerability was revealed when Fergusson accused him
(1) Fergusson to Rimberleyj 3rd may, 1883* F.C.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I. to S. of S . Legis No.35, 10th Aug, 1883*
P.P. lfi§4, vol. 60, p. 687.
(3) Gopal, Ripon, pp. 139-142 .
(4) Ripon to Northbrook, 25th Dec. 1883* Printed R.P.
US'
01 going “much in advance” of what was originally proposed
i
and supported oy the Bombay Goverjament. Ripon hurriedly
tried to convince Fergusson that the Ilbert Bill was not as 
“wide reaching” as it was believed. He pointed out that the 
first part of the Bill was in accordance with the recommend­
ation of the Bombay Government while the second part was 
unimportant . He conaeded at once what he opposed with vigour 
when Hope proposed his “crotchet”. To Fergusson he wrote 
that the second part of the Bill was “in no degree its essence 
and might be modified or withdrawn without touching the 
principle of the measure which consists in giving the proposed
2
jurisdiction to Sessions Judges and xhe District Magistrates.“ 
Fergusson was satisfied and thought that “it ought not to be 
difficult to render it (the Bill) innocuous.“J
Fergusson lost no time in pressing for a compromise and 
devising his own formula. He proposed that the Bill should be 
recast by limiting its scope. In his opinion the importance, 
power and experience of che native District Magistrates 
demanded that they should have criminal jurisdiction over 
Europeans. Such was not the position of other native civilians 
with mere firstclass magisterial powers and in their case 
any grant of jurisdiction over Europeans would be inexpedient. 
However;, the Europeans were alarmed that even a native District 
Magistrate might misuse his jurisdiction. In Fergusson*s 
opinion such abuse of jurisdiction could only be averted by the 
adoption of the method of the Mixed Bench. Thus in his opinion 
the native District Magistrate should sit with one of his 
European colleagues when trying an issue between a European and
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883* R«P*
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 6th April, 1883* F. Cl
(3) Fergusson to Ripon, 14th April, 1883* R*P*
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a native. He felt that the power of the District 
Magistrate to sentence an European only upto 3 montns 
imprisonment was insufficient and so he recommended an 
increase of such power. As regards the native Sessions 
Judge, Fergusson believed that he should, as the highest 
judicial authority in a district, exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over Europeans. But to allay any fear of 
injustice Fergusson proposed a further check, namely, the
right, of every European to claim a jury at least half of whom
1 2 snouid oe Europeans. The proposals came to liipon as
signs of great relief and he was particularly favourable to 
the suggestion of giving Europeans the right to claim a jury. 
This, he thought, "may afford a means of satisfying all that 
is substantial and reasonable, in the objections urged against 
the Bill in its present shape." His susceptibility to 
yielding was clear when he wrote to Fergusson: "I am ready ' 
to make any reasonable modifications in the Bill which would 
be calculated to remove ... bonafide alarms."^ Meanwhile in 
April, 1883 the Bill after some discussion in the Legislative 
Council was sent for the opinion of the local governments.
On 14th May, 1883 the Government of Bombay officially commun­
icated their suggestions of the Mixed ftench and trial by juiy
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 2nd April, 1883. R.P*
(z) S. Gopal in his book Viceroyalty of Lord Ripon, 1953,
p* 158, erroneously ascribed the proposals of the Mixed
Bench and the trial by jury to Sir. A. Colvin who 
advocated them in December, 1883* Colvin might have 
shared i&e views of Fergusson on a compromise but the 
proposals in fact came from Fergusson who devised them 
in April, 1883*
(3) Ripon to Fergusson, 10th April, 1883.. F.C.
(4) Ripon to Fergusson, 19th April, 1883* F.C.
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to the Government of India*"*- Fergusson was convinced that
his proposal of practical modifications to the Bill would
satisfy the agitators and would "go some way to maintain"
2
the object of Ripon. To Kimberley he expressed his belief
that the suggestions would provide a solution "acceptable to
3
reasonable people". Kimberley in his turn warmly appreciated 
"the cordial and judicious spirit" in which Fergusson 
approached the subject. ^ Ripon's reaction was similar and 
he wrote to Fergusson: "I am sure the government at home will 
appreciate it as nu-ch as I do."
Fergusson1s proposals, though appreciated at a time of 
high tension, had tneir inherent limitations. The scheme of 
the Mixed Bench, if applied in case of the native District 
Ivi agist rates, the racial distinction among the civilians would 
be confirmed and not remedied. Ripon came to appreciate the 
point and decided to reject the proposal.b Similarly, the 
jury offer to Euopeans was open to objection. The system 
of trial by jury in India in 1883 was operating only on a
7
limited scale and without any uniformity at all. To give the
(1) Ch. Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Legis. Dept. Govt, of
I. No. 3232, 14th May, 1883. P.P. 1884, vol. 60,
p. 170.
(2) Fergusson to Ripon, 14th April, 1883* R.P.
(3) Fergusson to Kimberley, 3rd May, 1883. F.C.
(4) Kimberley to Fergusson, 25th May, 1883* F.C.
(5) Ripon to Fergusson, 31st May, 1883- F.C.
(6) Ripon to Northbrook, 25th Dec. 1883- Printed R.P.
(7) The jury system existed throughout Assam, in some districts
of Bengal, in .most districts of Madras and in one 
district of Bombay, namely, Poona. The system was not 
introduced in the North West Provinces, Central Provinces 
and the Punjab.
3iB
Europeans the right to claim a jury even in those places 
where the jury system was not introduced would thus be 
exceptional and prejudicial to Indians. However, the chief 
value of the proposals of Fergusson lay not so much in safe­
guarding the principle of the Ilbert Hill as in creating an 
agreeable atmosphere of compromise. The proposed modif­
ications even received the support of some of the leading
exponents of native opinion, like Jumsetji Jejeebhoy and
1Badruddin Tayebji.
When tne Viceroy's Council discussed the proposed
modifications they agreed that the constitution of the
mixed Bench would lead to administrative difficulties. As
regards the juiy offer, to which Ripon himself was inclined,
a difference of opinion resulted. Ripon, backed up by the
Commander in Chief supported the proposal. But the majority
was disinclined i;o any extension of^juiy system in India.
The Council, however, unanimously accepted the proposal of
the Government of Bombay that the Bill should be modified so
as to give the proposed jurisdiction only to the District
2
Magistrates and Sessions Judges.
Unfortunately, the modification had no effect and 
the European agitation against the Ilbert Bill continued 
unabated. The opponents.,of the Bill obstinately clung to 
their demand for the total withdrawal of the Bill and maintained 
that a European subject had a right only to be tried by 
magistrates and judges of his own race. The tension was 
mounting in the months of September and October, 1883 and the 
opponents were demanding a Parliamentary intervention from 
England to safeguard their privileges. Ripon was also thinking 
in the same direction in order to avoid"the risk of a street
TI7 Note 'by Jamsetji Jejeebhoy, 7th May, 1883 and note by ~
Badruddin Tayebji, 4th May, 1883* P.P. 1883, vol. 60.p
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 20th Aug. 1883* R.P.
(3) Desp. Govt, of I. to S . of S . Legis. No .11.20th Jan. 1**4- 
p.p. 1884,vol.oO,p.851 .
row in Calcutta.Pergusson did not like such a procedure
and thought that a Parliamentary discussion on the Ilbert Bill
would render it a party question and would increase excitement 
2
in India. To Kimberley he pleaded that the support of the
Government of India by the House of Commons would not lessen
the crisis in India and might have evil reaction among
European settlers. Portunately no further fuel was added
to the fire and Gladstone decided against any Parliamentary
intervention on the ground^ that a Parliamentary decision
would be “handing over our responsibility as an executive
to a branch of the Legislature.
The situation took a dramatic turn when the Government
met: at Calcutta in December, 1883 and when the opposition
snowed a tendency for conciliation. G.II.P. Evans, a member
of the Legislative Council and the mouthpiece of the
opponents of tne Bill, offered a proposal for further
modification. In the opinion of Evans, if the Bill could
by no means be withdrawn* the high native civilians might
be granted a jurisdiction over the Europeans. But at the
same time every European British subject brought before a
native judge should be given the right to claim a transfer
5
of the case to a European judge. The proposal of Evans was 
thus to barter away the principle of the Bill anu to take 
away with one hand what it gave with the other. Ripon could
not 'accept it for the simple reason that it would admit
(1) Ripon to Kimberley, 20th Oct. l883> Cited in Wolf, Hi 
vol. 2, p. 143.
(2) Pergusson to Kipon, 6th Dec, 1883* P.O.
(3) Pergusson to Kimberley, No Date, Dec. 1883 • P* CL
(4) Gladstone to Kipon, 11th Oct, 1883 • Cited in Wolf,Ripon
vol* 2. p. 143.
(5) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. Legis. No.11,20th Jan.1884 
P.P. 18c 4> vol. 60.p.851.
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“the claim put forward by Europeans to decline at their Own
discretion the jurisdiction of native magistrates."^
Though the Government of India rejected the proposal of Evans,
they were glad thatnan opening was made in the deadlock by
Evans. They were eager to continue negotiations and thought
that in their turn they should offer terms to the opponents
of the Bill. The proposals of Pergusson again came into
discussion and they were referred to Kimberley. Kimberley
by telegraph rejected the proposal of the Afixed Bench but
Kipon insisted that the jury offer was must suitable to 
2
concede.
Hope was the only opponent of the jury offer in the 
Council. He considered trial by jury “a retrogade measure'* 
which would not prosper either in England or in India. But 
his main objection was that an exceptional jury concession to 
the Europeans in general and not to Indians would be "very 
e m b a r r a s s i n g . K i p o n  waived the objection on the ground that 
Englishmen were accustomed to enjoy trial by jury at home and
f f c t '  A
were brought up to set^highest value on it. Such an 
opinion resembled the views of Pergusson and his colleagues 
that Europeans by virtue of tneir national distinction could 
claim most reasonably the trial by jury in India. Thus in 
the prospect of a compromise Ripon's Government nad ultimately 
to admit the Englishman's national distinction in India. They 
finally had no hesitation in supporting one of the proposals of 
Pergusson*s Government which they had rejected three months
(1) Ripon to Northbrook, 25th Dec. 1883. Printed R.P.
(2) Ibid.
(3) minute by T.C. Hope, 24th Jan* 1884* P.P. 18845 vol. 60. 
p. 855.
(4) Minute by the Viceroy, 26th Jan, 1884* P*P* 18841 vol.60, 
P.S58.
(5) Ch. Secy. Govt, of B. to Secy. Legis.Dept. Govt .of I.
No. 3232, 1 4th May 1883* P*P* 1 8 8 4, vol. 60, p. 170.
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earlier, The opposition also accepted gracefully the offer 
of trial by jury and conceded the government in their turn 
an increase in the power of the District Magistrate to 
sentence an European from 3 months imprisonment to 6 months. 
Pergusson himself proposed such an increase and he even felt 
that similar extension of the power of the Sessions Judge 
beyond one years imprisonment on an European accused should 
be granted. A judge who could sentence a native to death, 
Pergusson thought, should not have so limited power over 
Europeans. ^
The Concordat ultimately reached between the Government
of India and the Anglo-Indian Defence Association decided
that the District Magistrates and the Sessions Judges should
be ex-Officio Justices of the Peace with powers to try
European-British subjects. Any European-British subject charged
before them, however, could claim a mixed jury. The Concordat
extended the penal power of the District Magistrates from 3
months imprisonment to 6 months . It directed further that the
District Magistrate, in case of difficulty in arranging a
trial by jury, could transfer the case of an European for trial
2
to such other courts as the High Court might decide.
The reaction of Pergusson to the Concordat was one of 
unmixed satisfaction. He was delighted to observe that “the 
expedient at last adopted by the two parties1 was based on the
7
proposals of his Government. But he felt that the proposal 
of the mixed Bench in case of trial by the District Magistrate 
was more convenient an arrangement than trial by the District
(1) Pergusson to Kimberley, 28th Dec. 1883* P.O.
(2) Desp. Govt, of I . to S. of S. legis. Ho.11,20th Jan.1884* 
P.P. 1884. vol. 60, p.851.
(3) Pergusson to Kimberley, 28th Dec. 1883* F.C.
Magistrate ''saddled with a jury.1 ^ Ripon, in his turn, was 
greatly relieved at the conclusion of the controversy. He 
feebly attempted to prove that ttefc the compromise ’’yielded
it 2
nothing for which the government was contending, and
that it had abolished all distinctions between Indians and
Europeans of the grade of District Magistrate and Sessions
Judge . But in his own conscience the Viceroy was
uncertain.. "I know I have risked the loss of the confidence
of the natives,” he confessed to Northbrook, ”... and that
I may be charged with having betrayed those who trusted me
and with having yielded weakly to mere clamour. I feel all
this'deeply and at times it almost crushes me.”^
ike
The Concordat over^Ilbert Bill achieved the legal equality 
of European and Indian judges of certain categories only at 
the expense of the disparity between the European and Indian 
offenders. This was merely because the former might demand a 
jury which the latter might not. The remedy lay in an 
uniform extension of trial by jury in all parts of the country. 
The Maharaja of Darbhanga suggested this in the concluding 
debate on the Ilbert Bill in the Legislative Council.** The 
Bombay branch of East India Association hinted at this by 
pointing out the anomaly. The matter was pressed strongly 
in May,1884 by^East Indian Association, Calcutta. .They indicated 
that the jury system, so meagrely employed in India, could be 
extended by executive action. ' By the l3ode of Criminal
(1) Fergusson to Ripon, 10th Jan, 1884. R.P.
(2) Ripon to Fergusson, 26th Dec. 1883. F.C.
(3) Speech of Viceroy, 7th Jan, 1884. India Legis Council.Proc.
(4) Ripon to Northbrook, 25th Dec. 1883. Printed R.P.
(5) Speech of Maharaja of Darbhanga, 25th Jan,1884. India 
Legis. Council Proc.
(6) Memorial, Bombay branch of East India Association,12th 
Jan. 1884. P.P. 1884, vol. 60, p. 786 .
(7) Memorial, Eagt Indian Association, Calcutta, 27th May,1884,
. Proc. Govt, of I. July, 1884.
373
Procedure the local governments were empowered to extend the 
jury system to any district they might think fit for its 
reception.
Hipon, who was conscious of the disparity of the Ilbert 
Bill, felt that trial by jury should be extended as widely 
as possible. His intention was to proceed in the matter 
through the local governments and by instalments so as not 
to raise any public discussion. In the light of the Ilbert 
i»ill controversy he was cautious but eager to soothe the 
injured Indian sentiment, lo fergusson he wrote that even a 
limited extension "would be a valuable indication of the
i
willingness of the government to apply the jury system*"
He invited fertusson to take the initiative and hoped that 
"the other governments will doubtlessly follow suit.*1 ^
Pergusson, however, was quite reluctant to revive "the 
smouldering embers of the Ilbert Hill controversy." His 
main objection was based on his conviction in "the shortcomings 
of native character." He doubted the suitability of trial 
by juiy in a. country" where caste, creed and prejudice enter 
so largely into considerations of justice."^ Though 
reluctant Fergusson found it difficult to disregard the wishes 
of the Viceroy. Besides, he was at least content that the 
Viceroy gave the initiative on the subject to the local 
government and had not taken it centrally.^ In April, I884  
Fergusson confidentially asked for the opinion of men in the 
judicial ‘service in the Presidency. The majority of the 
judicial officers favoured only a very limited extension of the
(1) Hipon to Fergusson,8th April, 1864. F.C.
(2) Hipon to Fergusson, 19th June, 1884* F.C.
(3) Fergusson to Hipon, 27th April, 1864« H.P.
(4) Fergusson to Hipon, 27th April, 1884 • H.P.
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jury system in some enlightened parts of the Presidency.1 
In September, 1884 tne government of Bombay announced that
trial by jury would be■introduced in Karachi, Belgaam,
0Ahmedabad and Surat in addition to Poona.
The administrative reforms during 18&3-85 distinctly 
show two different British attitudes towards the government 
of India. Hipon represented the liberal outlook with his 
sympathy for the Indian opinion, respect for the rights and 
interests of Indians and eagerness to concede to them a vital 
share in the administration of the country. Sometimes, however, 
Hipon appeared vacillating in spite of his benevolence, high 
principle and anxiety to promote the aspirations of the 
Indians. Unsupported in India and at home, he swayed before 
opposition on issues like the factory Act, Ilbert Bill and 
the import duties. Pergusson represented the civilising 
paternal attitude towards the administration of India. He was 
concerned about efficient management of the public affairs 
under Britain's lofty imperialism. He was reluctant to rely on 
tne members of the subject race and was committed to the 
belief of superiority of the race character of Indian 
administration. With these views he approached.the questions 
of factory legislation, taxation, civil service, Ilbert Bill 
and the trial by jury displaying his practicability, 
constructiveness and public spirit.
a) Confidential correspondence regarding an extension
of the system of trial by jury in Bombay Presidency/H.P.
(2) Res. Govt, of B. ind. Dept. No. 6636-38, 16th Sept. 1854*
lad. Proc. Govt, of B. Sept. 1884.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout the nineteenth century the administration 
of India, the centre of the British empire, was considerably 
influenced by contemporary English thought on government 
and empire* Eergusson - a Tory by political upbringing, 
authoritarian by military training and paternalist by the 
tradition of the laird - closely resembles the intellectual 
liberals in outlook* The intellectual liberals of mid- 
Victorian England like Sir E. Stephen and Sir H. Maine broke 
away from the mainstream of Gladstonian or democratic 
liberalism and helped to give a philosophical force to 
Tory i m p e r i a l i s m T h e  Stephen*approach to administering 
India was based on the assumed superiority of European 
civilisation and race in India* Britain’s imperial mission in 
India, according to Stephen, was the introduction of the 
essential parts of European civilisation in a country ”densely 
populated, grossly ignorant, steeped in idolatrous superstition* 
In Stephen’s opinion British rule in India was ’essentially 
an absolute government.* • founded not on consent but on
p
conquest*” Britain’s object in India was not the
(1) Sir Jf‘* Stephen, the political philospher and historian, and ' 
Sir H Maine, the legal expert, advocated the ideas of 
intellectual liberalism after they returned from service in 
India as law members of the Viceroy’s Council*
(2) Stephen’s letter to The Times, 1st March, 1883; in 
C*H* Ihilips, ed. The !Evolution of India and Pakistan* 
1838-1947: Select Documents* 19b2, p* 5& . ,
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transplantation of democratic institutions but the welfare 
of the backward peoples of India through efficient and 
paternal government. The Stephen method ruled out any 
concession of the right of self determination to the Indians 
and presupposed that Britain could not abandon her civilising 
task in India without disaster ensuing, and that her connection 
with India would grow stronger rather than the reverse. Many 
of Stephen’s views were shared by his friend Lord lytton and 
later on,by his intellectual disciple Lord Curzon, who 
elevated ”£he Englishman’s justification in India” to the 
height of an imperialist philosophy. As opposed to the 
Stephen outlook the democratic liberals assumed a different 
attitude towards the government of India, Liberals like 
Gladstone stood for racial equality and for an appreciation 
of the desires and aspirations of the Indians, They refused 
to ignore the opinion of the western educated Indians - a 
product of British rule. They pleaded for the retrenchment 
of the Indian aimies and the replacement, as far as possible,
/£e
of^ expensive European element in the civil services by Indian 
officials.^ Gladstonian liberal policy in India aimed at 
sound finance, moderate establishments and the liberal 
extension of the privileges of the subject race. As early as 
1858 Gladstone himself summed up the rightful object of
(1) R,J. Moore, Liberalism and Indian politics, 1966, p.27t
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Britain’s Indian policy : "India is to be governed for 
India and as far as may be proved practicable, by Indians.”'*’ 
The relationship of a Tory Presidency Governor like 
Fergusson and a Gladstonian liberal Viceroy like Ripon during 
1880-85 can be understood in terms of a conflict between 
the two approaches to Indian administration. The conflict 
was reflected on most of the important issued raised during 
Ripon’s Viceroyalty. The focal point of the contrast was 
the attitude to be assumed by the British towards the 
educated middleclass Indians, the future leaders of Indian 
Society. While Ripon, as the representative of democratic 
liberalism, wanted to prepare the educated classes for the 
government of the countly, Fergusson was disdainful of their 
ability, distrusted their aspirations and insisted on their 
racial inferiority. Fergusson resisted Ripon’s scheme for 
the extension of local self-government and disapproved of 
Ripon’s repeal of the Vernacular Press Act and the attempted 
amendment of the Arms Act. He entertained a poor opinion 
of the Indian civilians and favoured the virtual exclusion 
of Indians from the open Civil Service competition in 
England. He was sympathetic towards the European agitation 
against the Ilbert Bill and was opposed to the total abolition
(1) J. L, Hammond and M.R.D. Foot, Gladstone and liberalism, 
1 9 5 2, p.77,
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of racial disqualification of native judges in trying 
Europeans in criminal proceedings. He was in favour of 
increasing taxation and enhancing assessments on land. On 
the questionSof land revenue, factory legislation, famine 
relief and the official chairmanship of the local boards he 
emphasized the benevolent paternalism of the British Government 
Ripon, on the other hand, was in favour of minimum government 
interference, moderation in government assessment on land, 
light taxation and cautious factory legislation. His 
advocacy for the increase of age in civil service competition, 
his belief in the justice of racial equality in the Ilbert 
Bill and his attempt to afford political education to the 
Indians through local self-government are proofs of his 
devotion to the objects of democratic liberalism. While 
Fergusson was without regard for the importance of popular 
feeling Ripon was always sensitive to the reactions of the 
people. He could not allow Fergusson*s proposed Bill to 
extort forced labour from the agriculturists for locust killing 
On two other occasions he had to disallow Fergusson*s attempts 
towards legislation that would interfere with the free action 
of individuals. First in August, 1880 the Government of Bombay 
introduced a Bill in the Legislative Council for the 
preservation of all kinds of game in the Presidency. Indian
opinion objected on the ground that the measure would promote 
the increase of animals injurious to agriculture, especially
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in a country like India where agriculture was the chief
employment of the people. Ripon, unwilling to disregard the
feelings of the people for such an insignificant cause,
decided to withhold his assent to the Bill, Similarly, in
June, 1882 Fergusson*s Government moved a Bill to amend the
excise law in the Presidency in order to regulate consumption
2
of and trade in Mhowra flowers. The government believed
x
that these flowers were widely used for illicit distillation. 
The critics of the Bill in the Bombay Legislative Council 
firmly established that the Mhowra flowers were used widely 
in Gujarat and some other parts as vegetables by poorer people.
lL
The flowers were also used as fodder for cattle. Ripon 
suspected that the provisions of the Bill would result in 
"undesirable interference on the part of the excise officers 
with an article of food consumed by many poor people in the 
country11. ^  The Viceroy accordingly refused to give his assent 
to the Bill. Excluding the issue of the essential works of 
irrigation and railways in a famine-threatened country, the 
outlook and emphasis of Ripon and Fergusson were entirely 
different.
(1 ) Ripon to Fergusson, 22nd April, 1881. F.C.
(2) Flowers or berries from the Mhowra or Mahuda tree were 
widely prevalent in Gujarat and Konkan. The fleshy 
corolla of these flowers was consumed as food by the poor 
and the hill tribes like the Kolis and the Bhils. Country 
liquor was also distilled from these flowers.
(3) Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill to amend 
Bombay Akbari Act, 1882. Legis Proc.Govt.of I.Nov.1882.
(4-) Speech of V. N. Mandalik,21st June,1882.Bomb.Legis.Coun. 
Proc.
(5) Ripon to Fergusson, 16th Aug.1882. F.C.
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The difference existed also in their attitudes towards 
the British imperial policy with regard to Afghanistan and 
the coastal areas of the Red Sea. The expansionist foreign 
policy of Disraeli in England and the aggressive forward 
movement of Lytton in India influenced Fergusson to advocate 
a policy of interference and strategic advancement. Ripon, 
in contrast, preferred a policy of restraint and non­
involvement - though his concern for imperial security was 
not really less than that of Fergusson. Fergusson's forward 
leanings explain much of his constant and assiduous interference 
in the jurisdiction of the native chiefs on comx>aratively small 
issues. He, however, preferred in the larger issues like 
the massacre of the Maiyas or the rising of the Bhils to 
support princely authority in the name' of law and order. Ripon, 
on the other hand, generally maintained his position of 
liberal abstention and desired to show respect for the 
privileges and sentiments of the native princes. But in cases 
of grave misrule he was not reluctant to intervene. As 
regards the defence of India Ripon was in favour of retrenchment 
of the Indian army in order to facilitate public works and 
preparations for famine relief. Bergusson - a Russophobe — 
wished to increase the defence expenditure on the plea of an 
insurance against future emergency* Ripon, who disliked 
centralisation as a principledemanded centralisation of
(1) Ripon to Sir E Perry, 27th June, 1881* Printed R.P*
3$l
command of the Indian army on the ground of efficiency. 
Fergusson vigorously defended the Presidential commands on 
considerations of imperial security and local sentiment.
Ripon frankly disliked this"intensely local feeling"of 
Fergusson.^
Ripon1s overall estimation of Fergusson was also poor.
"I am much disappointed with Fergusson," he wrote Northbrook,
;/ p
"he is - I fear - very narrowminded and injudicious. To 
Viscount Halifax he ridiculed Fergusson*s unusual concern 
for British security in India : "I ought to tell you that 
Sir J. Fergusson - the Governor of Bombay Presidency - has 
made a great discovery, he has found out that Macaulay*s 
essays on Clive and Warren Hastings are very dangerous to 
British rule in India and has ordered them to be removed 
from the reading books in the schools of his Presidency:
India is now safe."^"Fergusson? Ripon commented to Hartington,
ZL
"was a silly fellow.” Fergusson on his part did not
entertain any high opinion about Ripon. He disapproved
"the popularity hunting tendency" of Ripon and was amazed at
5
his success in this direction. He had no doubt that Ripon*s
(1) Ripon to Northbrook, 1st July,1881. Printed R.P.
Ibid.
(3) Ripon to Halifax, 28th May, 1881. Printed R.P.
(4) Ripon to Hartington, 25th May,1881. Cited in Gopal 
Ripon, p.219
(5) Fergusson to Cranbrook, 9th March,1 8 8 3. C.C.
3S2-
appeals to popular applause had weakened British authority in 
India, exalted the natives and incited a partisan spirit in 
the country. Ripon*s claim to have promoted the good govern—
A
ment of the country seemed to him to be “incomprehensible11.
The difference of views between Fergusson and Ripon and their 
intolerance of each other was also reflected in the relation­
ship between the Presidency Government and the Supreme Govern­
ment. The British disaster at Maiwand, the question of the 
abolition of the Presidential command of the Indian army and 
the controversy over the extension of local self-government 
rudely disturbed the governmental relations u^bo 1882. In 
official circles this estrangement of relations between the 
Government of India and the Government of Bombay were not
p
“anything that could be wished.** Sir E. Perry found the 
Government of Bombay “recalcitrant*1 following the reverses at 
Maiwand. Hartington was embarrassed to observe “the frequent 
causes of friction** between the two governments.^ In connec­
tion with the local self-government scheme the estrangement 
of the governments in India became bitter and public and the 
dismayed Indian press readily recorded it. The relations, 
however, improved following Fergusson*s
(1) Fergusson to Kimberley, 19th Dec. 1884. F.C.
(2) Baring to Fergusson, 9th Jan. 1881. F.C.
(j) Perry to Ripon, 14th July, 1881. Printed R.P.
(4) Hartington to Fergusson, 24th Dec. 1880. F.C.
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exertions to reach a compromise on the Ilbert Bill controversy, 
but they remained far from satisfactory.
Fergusson1s colleague in government, General A. Hardinge, 
the Commander in Chief of Bombay, was of the opinion that 
Fergusson1s chief credit lay in maintaining his position 
"as much by opportune resistance at one time as by conciliation 
at another. " 1 Fergusson1s opposition to the liberal policies, 
his shrewd manoeuvres and the extortion of timely compromises 
and concessions brought him real successes. The arguments 
that he presented to Hartington for the retention of Pishin 
must have added weight to Ripon's case. His strenuous efforts 
resulted in the establishment of a British protectorate on^the 
Hadramaut. He also took an active part in increasing Britain's 
imperial liabilities on the Somali coast, despite the 
disinclinations of the liberal cabinet at home. Fergusson 
attained similar success in connection with local self- 
government in Bombay when he forced Ripon to accept the 
official guidance of the local boards and a meagre extension of 
municipal franin^iise. He had little difficulty in getting 
his own way with regard to the enhancement of land revenue 
assessments at revisions. On the Ilbert Bill controversy 
Fergusson's success was no less significant. His plea that 
the Europeans in criminal cases should have the right to claim
(1) Hardinge to Fergusson, No date. F.C
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a mixed jury before a native judge finally resulted in the Ilberl
Bill compromise. It compelled Ripon to acknowledge the
exceptional judicial privileges of Europeans in India,
Fergusson's successes were Ripon*s failures and the
number of such failures during his Viceroyalty was quite
large. Ripon was liberal but vulnerable to opposition. He
was rich in sound ideas but lacked the driving force to
implement them. He was sincere to the cause of extending
the rights and privileges of tne Indians but was weak in
determination. Often he was vacillating and compromising.
His compromises over the Factory Act, the import duties and
the Ilbert Bill were glaring examples of his weaknesses.
Ripon*s Viceroyalty in India, in fact, is important for its
intentions rather than for its achievements.
In comparison with Ripon Fergusson was 3 mediocre but
firm and practical. In his limited sphere he was efficient,
believing that the Anglo-Indian administration should be
*
a despotism of a paternal and beneficient type, working 
ceaselessly for the good of the people. A contemporary 
English political observer like W.F. Blunt found him a 
typical good old Tory'who "does his best as a kindly despot 
and a liberal landlord,ll^  Indian opinion admitted that
"■s
Fergusson was conscientious, hardworking and even possibly
(l) W. S. Blunt, India under Ripon, 1909, p.225 .
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“well meaning". Dufferin entertained a better opinion about 
Fergusson*s efficiency than did his predecessor. On the eve 
of Fergusson* s return from Bombay Dufferin wrote about him to 
Kimberley : ,fHe has been a very respectable Governor, not
very clever, but painstaking and sufficiently sensible. He
2
leaves his Presidency in a fair order.*' But historically in 
India Fergusson went against the forces of the time, which 
Ripon wanted to sustain and direct. Sentimental or 
democratic liberalism sought to promote the interest of 
the educated Indians and to foster representative government in 
India. Stephen's view of racial superiority, the Lyttonite 
jealousy of the educated Indians and the Curzonian imperial 
mission were opposed to Indian aspirations and obstructive to 
the growth of free institutions in India. To the people of 
Bombay Fergusson at the most was "entitled to individual 
admiration but certainly not to national gratitude." ^
(1) Indian Spectator. 15th Feb. 1885. Bomb. Native
Newspaper Report.
(2) Dufferin to Kimberley, 2nd March, 1885* Dufferin Papers.
. Dr. R.J. Moore kindly passed this information to me.
(3) Sind Times, 21st Feb. 1885* Bomb. Native Newspaper Report.
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